Bidayah al-Hikmah [The Elements of Islamic Metaphysics] by Allama Muhammad Husayn Tabatabai

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ﻣﻘﺪﻣﺔ ﻓﻲ ﺗﻌﺮﻳﻒ ﻫﺬا اﻟﻔﻦ ﻪ وﻣﻮﺿﻮﻋﻪ وﻏﺎﻳﺘ واﻟﺼﻼة واﻟﺴﻼم ﻋﻠﻰ رﺳﻮﻟﻪ ﳏﻤﺪ ﺧﲑ ﺧﻠﻴﻘﺘﻪ وآﻟﻪ ، وﻟﻪ اﻟﺜﻨﺎء ﲝﻘﻴﻘﺘﻪ ، اﳊﻤﺪ ﷲ اﻟﻄﺎﻫﺮﻳﻦ ﻣﻦ أﻫﻞ ﺑﻴﺘﻪ وﻋﱰﺗﻪ . – وﻣﻮﺿﻮﻋﻬﺎ ، اﳊﻜﻤﺔ اﻹﳍﻴﺔ ﻋﻠﻢ ﻳﺒﺤﺚ ﻓﻴﻪ ﻋﻦ أﺣﻮال اﳌﻮﺟﻮد ﲟﺎ ﻫﻮ ﻣﻮﺟﻮد اﻟﺬي – ﻳﺒﺤﺚ ﻓﻴﻪ ﻋﻦ أﻋﺮاﺿﻪ اﻟﺬاﺗﻴﺔ ، ﻫﻮ اﳌﻮﺟﻮد ﲟﺎ ﻫﻮ ﻣﻮﺟﻮد وﻏﺎﻳﺘﻬﺎ ﻣﻌﺮﻓﺔ اﳌﻮﺟﻮدات ﻋﻠﻰ ﻛﻠﻲ وﲤﻴﻴﺰﻫﺎ ﳑﺎ ﻟﻴﺲ ﲟﻮﺟﻮد ﺣﻘﻴﻘﻲ وﺟﻪ . ﺗﻮﺿﻴﺢ ذﻟﻚ : أن اﻻﻧﺴﺎن ﳚﺪ ﻣﻦ ﻧﻔﺴﻪ أن ﻓﻼ ﻳﻄﻠﺐ ، وأن ﻟﻪ أن ﻳﺼﻴﺒﻬﺎ ، وأن ﻫﻨﺎك ﺣﻘﻴﻘﺔ وواﻗﻌﻴﺔ وراء ﻧﻔﺴﻪ ، ﻟﻨﻔﺴﻪ ﺣﻘﻴﻘﺔ وواﻗﻌﻴﺔ ، ﺷﻴﺌﺎ ﻣﻦ اﻷﺷﻴﺎء وﻻ ﻳﻘﺼﺪﻩ إﻻ ﻣﻦ ﺟﻬﺔ أﻧﻪ ﻫﻮ ذﻟﻚ اﻟﺸﺊ ﰲ اﻟﻮاﻗﻊ وﻻ ﻳﻬﺮب ﻣﻦ ﺷﺊ ، وﻻ ﻳﻨﺪﻓﻊ ﻋﻨﻪ إﻻ ﻟﻜﻮﻧﻪ ﻫﻮ ذﻟﻚ اﻟﺸﺊ ﰲ اﳊﻘﻴﻘﺔ – ﻓﺎﻟﻄﻔﻞ اﻟﺬي ﻳﻄﻠﺐ اﻟﻀﺮع – ﻣﺜﻼ واﻹﻧﺴﺎن ، ﻛﺬﻟﻚ ﻻ ﻣﺎ ﻫﻮ ﲝﺴﺐ اﻟﺘﻮﻫﻢ واﳊﺴﺒﺎن ، إﳕﺎ ﻳﻄﻠﺐ ﻣﺎ ﻫﻮ ﲝﺴﺐ اﻟﻮاﻗﻊ ﻟﱭ ، ﻻ ﲝﺴﺐ اﻟﺘﻮﻫﻢ واﳋﺮاﻓﺔ ، إﳕﺎ ﻳﻬﺮب ﳑﺎ ﻫﻮ ﲝﺴﺐ اﳊﻘﻴﻘﺔ ﺳﺒﻊ ، اﻟﺬي ﻳﻬﺮب ﻣﻦ ﺳﺒﻊ أو ، ﻛﺎﻟﺒﺨﺖ واﻟﻐﻮل ، ج ﻓﺮأى ﻣﺎ ﻟﻴﺲ ﲝﻖ ﺣﻘﺎ واﻗﻌﺎ ﰲ اﳋﺎر ، ﻟﻜﻨﻪ رﲟﺎ أﺧﻄﺄ ﰲ ﻧﻈﺮﻩ ﻓﻤﺴﺖ ، ﺮدR ﺮدة واﻟﻌﻘﻞ ا R ﻛﺎﻟﻨﻔﺲ ا ، ج ﺑﺎﻃﻼ ﺧﺮاﻓﻴﺎ اﻋﺘﻘﺪ ﻣﺎ ﻫﻮ ﺣﻖ واﻗﻊ ﰲ اﳋﺎر ﻟﻴﻤﻴﺰ -ﺎ ﻣﺎ ﻫﻮ ، اﳋﺎﺻﺔ ﺑﻪ ، اﳊﺎﺟﺔ ﺑﺎدئ ﺑﺪء إﱃ ﻣﻌﺮﻓﺔ أﺣﻮال اﳌﻮﺟﻮد ﲟﺎ ﻫﻮ ﻣﻮﺟﻮد ﻣﻮﺟﻮد ﰲ ﺔ واﻟﻌﻠﻢ اﻟﺒﺎﺣﺚ ﻋﻨﻬﺎ ﻫﻮ اﳊﻜﻤﺔ اﻹﳍﻴ ، ﻛﺬﻟﻚ اﻟﻮاﻗﻊ ﳑﺎ ﻟﻴﺲ . : وﻳﺴﻤﻰ أﻳﻀﺎ ، ﻓﺎﳊﻜﻤﺔ اﻹﳍﻴﺔ ﻫﻲ اﻟﻌﻠﻢ اﻟﺒﺎﺣﺚ ﻋﻦ أﺣﻮال اﳌﻮﺟﻮد ﲟﺎ ﻫﻮ ﻣﻮﺟﻮد “ “ اﻟﻔﻠﺴﻔﺔ اﻷوﱃ “ و، . “ اﻟﻌﻠﻢ اﻷﻋﻠﻰ “ : وﻣﻮﺿﻮﻋﻪ . “ اﳌﻮﺟﻮد ﲟﺎ ﻫﻮ ﻣﻮﺟﻮد “ : وﻏﺎﻳﺘﻪ ﲤﻴﻴﺰ اﳌﻮﺟﻮدات اﳊﻘﻴﻘﻴﺔ ﻣﻦ – وﻣﻌﺮﻓﺔ اﻟﻌﻠﻞ اﻟﻌﺎﻟﻴﺔ ﻟﻠﻮﺟﻮد ، ﻏﲑﻫﺎ وﺑﺎﻷﺧﺺ وﻫﻮ اﷲ ، ﺎ اﻟﻌﻠﻴﺎ T وﺻﻔﺎ ، وأﲰﺎﺋﻬﺎ اﳊﺴﲎ ، اﻟﻌﻠﺔ اﻷوﱃ اﻟﱵ إﻟﻴﻬﺎ ﺗﻨﺘﻬﻲ ﺳﻠﺴﻠﺔ اﳌﻮﺟﻮدات ﻋﺰ اﲰﻪ – ” .
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INTRODUCTION In the Name of God, the All-beneficent, the All-merciful. All praise belongs to God and to Him refers all eulogy in its reality. May benedictions and peace be upon Muhammad, His Apostle and the best of His creation, and upon the Pure Ones of his family and progeny. THE DEFINITION, SUBJECT AND END OF HIKMAH Metaphysics (al-hikmat al-ilahiyyah, literally, ‘divine wisdom’) is a discipline that discusses being (mawjud) qua being. Its subject deals with the essential properties of being qua being. Its end is to achieve a general knowledge of existents and to distinguish them from that which is not really existent. To explain, when man considers himself, he finds his own self as possessing a reality. Ke also finds that there is a reality lying beyond liis self that is within the reach of his knowledge. Accordingly, when he seeks something, that is because it is what it is, and when he avoids something or runs away from something, that is because it is what it is. For instance, an infant groping for its mother’s breast seeks real not imaginary milk. Similarly, a man running away from a lion, runs away from what he considers to be a real wild beast, not something imaginary. However, at times he may mistakenly regard something unreal as existing in external reality; for instance, luck and giants. Or, at times, he may consider something existing in external reality as unreal; for instance, the immaterial soul (al-nafs al-mujarradah) and the immaterial Intellect (al‘aql al-mujarrad). Hence it is necessary, first of all, to recognize the characteristics of being qua being in order to distinguish it from that which is not such. The science that discusses these matters is metaphysics. Metaphysics is also called the First Philosophy and the Higher Science (al-‘ilm al-a’la). Its subject is being qua being and its end is to distinguish real existents from that which is not real, and to recognize the higher causes (al-‘ilal al-‘aliyah) of existence, especially the First Cause (al-‘illat al-ula), in which terminates the entire chain of existents, and Its most beautiful Names and sublime Attributes; chat is, Allah, exalted is His Name.
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ﻛﻠﻴﺎت ﻣﺒﺎﺣﺚ اﻟﻮﺟﻮد اﻟﻤﺮﺣﻠﺔ اﻷوﻟﻰ ﻓﻲ و ﻓﻴﻬﺎ اﺛﻨﺎ ﻋﺸﺮ ﻓﺼﻼ CHAPTER ONE: THE GENERAL PRINCIPLES OF EXISTENCE 12 Units
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اﻟﻔﺼﻞ اﻷول ﻓﻲ ﺑﺪاﻫﺔ ﻣﻔﻬﻮم اﻟﻮﺟﻮد ﻣﻔﻬﻮم اﻟﻮﺟﻮد ﺑﺪﻳﻬﻲ ﻣﻌﻘﻮل ﺑﻨﻔﺲ ذاﺗﻪ ﻻ ﳛﺘﺎج ﻓﻴﻪ إﱃ ﺗﻮﺳﻴﻂ ﺷﻲ ء آﺧﺮ ﻓﻼ ﻣﻌﺮف ﻟﻪ ﻣﻦ ﻛﻮن اﳌﻌﺮف أﺟﻠﻰ و أﻇﻬﺮ ﻣﻦ اﳌﻌﺮف ﻓﻤﺎ أورد ﰲ ﺗﻌﺮﻳﻔﻪ ﻣﻦ أن ﺣﺪ أو رﺳﻢ ﻟﻮﺟﻮب اﻟﻮﺟﻮد أو اﳌﻮﺟﻮد ﲟﺎ ﻫﻮ ﻣﻮﺟﻮد ﻫﻮ اﻟﺜﺎﺑﺖ اﻟﻌﲔ أو اﻟﺬي ﳝﻜﻦ أن ﳜﱪ ﻋﻨﻪ ﻣﻦ ﻗﺒﻴﻞ ﺷﺮح اﻻﺳﻢ دون اﳌﻌﺮف اﳊﻘﻴﻘﻲ ﻋﻠﻰ أﻧﻪ ﺳﻴﺠﻲ ء أن اﻟﻮﺟﻮد ﻻ ﺟﻨﺲ ﻟﻪ و ﻻ ﻓﺼﻞ ﻟﻪ و ﻻ ﺧﺎﺻﺔ ﻟﻪ ﲟﻌﲎ إﺣﺪى اﻟ د ﻜﻠﻴﺎت اﳋﻤﺲ و اﳌﻌﺮف ﻳﱰﻛﺐ ﻣﻨﻬﺎ ﻓﻼ ﻣﻌﺮف ﻟﻠﻮﺟﻮ

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1.1. THE SELF-EVIDENT CHARACTER OF THE MEANING OF EXISTENCE The concept of ‘existence’ is a self-evident one and needs no mediating terms. Hence it has no explanatory terms (mu’arrif) in the form of a definition (hadd) or description (rasm), because its meaning is more obvious than that of any explanatory term. Such definitions as “Existence is what subsists in reality,” or “Existence is that which allows of predication” are explications of the word, not true definitions. Moreover, as will be explained later, existence has neither any genus (jins), nor differentia (fasl), nor any proprium (khassah) in the sense of one of the five universals (al-kulliyyat al-khams). As all explanatory terms are based on these, existence can have no definition or description.
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اﻟﻔﺼﻞ اﻟﺜﺎﻧﻲ ﻓﻲ أن ﻣﻔﻬﻮم اﻟﻮﺟﻮد ﻣﺸﺘﺮك ﻣﻌﻨﻮي ﳛﻤﻞ اﻟﻮﺟﻮد ﻋﻠﻰ ﻣﻮﺿﻮﻋﺎﺗﻪ ﲟﻌﲎ واﺣﺪ اﺷﱰاﻛﺎ ﻣﻌﻨﻮﻳﺎ. ﻛﺘﻘﺴﻴﻤﻪ إﱃ وﺟﻮد اﻟﻮاﺟﺐ و و ﻣﻦ اﻟﺪﻟﻴﻞ ﻋﻠﻴﻪ أﻧﺎ ﻧﻘﺴﻢ اﻟﻮﺟﻮد إﱃ أﻗﺴﺎﻣﻪ اﳌﺨﺘﻠﻔﺔ وﺟﻮد اﳌﻤﻜﻦ و ﺗﻘﺴﻴﻢ وﺟﻮد اﳌﻤ ﻜﻦ إﱃ وﺟﻮد اﳉﻮﻫﺮ و وﺟﻮد اﻟﻌﺮض ﰒ وﺟﻮد اﳉﻮﻫﺮ إﱃ أﻗﺴﺎﻣﻪ و وﺟﻮد اﻟﻌﺮض إﱃ أﻗﺴﺎﻣﻪ و ﻣﻦ اﳌﻌﻠﻮم أن اﻟﺘﻘﺴﻴﻢ ﻳﺘﻮﻗﻒ ﰲ ﺻﺤﺘﻪ ﻋﻠﻰ وﺣﺪة اﳌﻘﺴﻢ و وﺟﻮدﻩ ﰲ اﻷﻗﺴﺎم. و ﻣﻦ اﻟﺪﻟﻴﻞ ﻋﻠﻴﻪ أﻧﺎ رﲟﺎ أﺛﺒﺘﻨﺎ وﺟﻮد ﺷﻲ ﻛﻤﺎ ﻟﻮ أﺛﺒﺘﻨﺎ ء ﰒ ﺗﺮددﻧﺎ ﰲ ﺧﺼﻮﺻﻴﺔ ذاﺗﻪ
ﻟﻠﻌﺎﱂ ﺻﺎﻧﻌﺎ ﰒ ﺗﺮ ﻛﻤﺎ ﻛﻮﻧﻪ ذا ﻣﺎﻫﻴﺔ أو ﻏﲑ ذي ﻣﺎﻫﻴﺔ و ﻛﻮﻧﻪ واﺟﺒﺎ أو ﳑﻜﻨﺎ و ﰲ ددﻧﺎ ﰲ ﺎ ﳎﺮدة أو ﻣﺎدﻳﺔ و ﺟﻮﻫﺮا أو ﻋﺮﺿﺎ ﻣﻊ ﺑﻘﺎء اﻟﻌﻠﻢ 5ﻛﻮ ﻟﻮ أﺛﺒﺘﻨﺎ ﻟﻺﻧﺴﺎن ﻧﻔﺴﺎ ﰒ ﺷﻜﻜﻨﺎ ﰲ ﻛﺎن ﻣﺸﱰﻛﺎ ﻟﻔﻈﻴﺎ ﻣﺘﻌﺪدا ﻣﻌﻨﺎﻩ ﻛﺎن ﻓﻠﻮ ﱂ ﻳﻜﻦ ﻟﻠﻮﺟﻮد ﻣﻌﲎ واﺣﺪ ﺑﻞ ﺑﻮﺟﻮدﻩ ﻋﻠﻰ ﻣﺎ ﺑﺘﻌﺪد ﻣﻮﺿﻮﻋﺎﺗﻪ ﻟﺘﻐﲑ ﻣ ة ﻌﻨﺎﻩ ﺑﺘﻐﲑ ﻣﻮﺿﻮﻋﺎﺗﻪ ﲝﺴﺐ اﻻﻋﺘﻘﺎد ﺑﺎﻟﻀﺮور. و ﻣﻦ اﻟﺪﻟﻴﻞ ﻋﻠﻴﻪ أن اﻟﻌﺪم ﻳﻨﺎﻗﺾ اﻟﻮﺟﻮد و ﻟﻪ ﻣﻌﲎ واﺣﺪ إذ ﻻ ﲤﺎﻳﺰ ﰲ اﻟﻌﺪم ﻓﻠﻠﻮﺟﻮد اﻟﺬي ﻫﻮ ﻧﻘﻴﻀﻪ ﻣﻌﲎ واﺣﺪ و إﻻ ارﺗﻔﻊ اﻟﻨﻘﻴﻀﺎن و ﻫﻮ ﳏﺎل. و اﻟﻘﺎﺋﻠﻮن ﺑﺎﺷﱰاﻛﻪ اﻟﻠﻔﻈﻲ ﺑﲔ اﻷﺷﻴﺎء أو ﺑﲔ اﻟﻮاﺟﺐ و اﳌﻤﻜﻦ إﳕﺎ ذﻫﺒﻮا إﻟﻴﻪ ﺣﺬرا ﻣﻦ ﻟﺰوم اﻟﺴﻨﺨﻴﺔ ﺑﲔ اﻟﻌﻠﺔ و اﳌﻌﻠﻮل ﻣﻄﻠﻘﺎ أو ﺑﲔ اﻟﻮاﺟﺐ و اﳌﻤﻜﻦ و رد ﺑﺄﻧﻪ ﻳﺴﺘﻠﺰم ﻛﺎن اﳌﻔﻬﻮم ﻣﻨﻪ اﳌﻌﲎ اﻟﺬي ﻳﻔﻬﻢ ﺗﻌﻄﻴﻞ اﻟﻌﻘﻮل ﻋﻦ اﳌﻌﺮﻓﺔ ﻓﺈﻧﺎ إذا ﻗﻠﻨﺎ اﻟﻮاﺟﺐ ﻣﻮﺟﻮد ﻓﺈن ﻛﺎن اﳌﻔﻬﻮم ﻣﻨﻪ ﻣﺎ ﻳﻘﺎﺑﻠﻪ و ﻫﻮ ﻣﺼﺪا ﻣﻦ وﺟﻮد اﳌﻤﻜﻦ ﻟﺰم اﻻﺷﱰاك اﳌﻌﻨﻮي و إن ﻪ ق ﻧﻘﻴ ﻀ ﻛﺎن ﻧﻔﻴﺎ ﻟﻮﺟﻮدﻩ ﺗﻌﺎﱃ ﻋﻦ ذﻟﻚ و إن ﱂ ﻳﻔﻬﻢ ﻣﻨﻪ ﺷﻲ ﻛﺎن ﺗﻌﻄﻴﻼ ﻟﻠﻌﻘﻞ ﻋﻦ اﳌﻌﺮﻓﺔ و ء ﻫﻮ ﺧﻼف ﻣﺎ ﳒﺪﻩ ﻣﻦ أﻧﻔﺴﻨﺎ ﺑﺎﻟﻀﺮورة

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1.2. THE CONCEPT OF EXISTENCE IS UNIVOCAL Existence is predicated of different existents in a single sense, i.e., univocally (ishtirak ma’nawi). A proof of it is that we divide existence into its different categories, such as the existence of the Necessary Being (wujud al-wajib) and the existence of the contingent being (wujud al-mumkin). The existence of the contingent is divided into that of substance (wujud al-jawhar) and that of accident (wujud al-mumkin). The existence of substance and the existence of accident are again divided into their various kinds. It is evident that the validity of a division depends on the unity of what is being divided and on its presence in all its divisions. Another proof of it is that after positing the existence of something, at times we have doubts about its essential characteristics. For instance, after affirming the existence of a creator for the world, we may have doubts as to whether the creator is a necessary (wajib) or a contingent (mumkin) being, or as to whether or not he is characterized with quiddity (mahiyyah). Or, for instance, after affirming that man has a soul (nafs), we may have doubts as to whether it is material (maddi) or immaterial (mujarrad), a substance (jawhar) or an accident (‘arad). Hence, if ‘existence’ were not univocal in the different instances and were it an equivocal or homonymous term with disparate meanings (mushtarak lafzi), its meaning would necessarily vary from one subject of which it is predicated to another. Another proof is that non-existence (‘adam) is the contradictory of existence (wujud): non-existence is univocal, because there, are no distinctions (tamayuz) in non-existence. Hence, existence, which is the contradictory of non-existence, is also univocal, for otherwise it would imply a violation of the law of contradiction, which is impossible. Those who have held that ‘existence’ is equivocal in relation to different existents, i.e. in relation to the Necessary Being and contingent beings, have done so in order to avoid the conclusion that there is a similarity (sinkhiyyah) between cause and effect, or between the Necessary Being and contingent existents. However, such a position stands refuted, because it amounts to suspending the intellect’s cognitive faculties. To elaborate, if in the statement, ‘The Necessary Being exists,’ we understand ‘existence’ to mean the same as what it means in a statement asserting the existence of a contingent being, it implies that ‘existence’ is univocal (mushtarak ma’nawi). If what is understood in the former statement [by ‘existence’] were the opposite of that which is understood in the latter, being the contradictory of the latter, the statement ‘The Necessary Being exists,’ would amount to the negation of Its existence. Finally, if nothing were understandable from it, that would amount to a suspension of the intellect’s cognitive faculties, which is not however the state in which we find ourselves.
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اﻟﻔﺼﻞ اﻟﺜﺎﻟﺚ ﻓﻲ أن اﻟﻮﺟﻮد زاﺋﺪ ﻋﻠﻰ اﻟﻤﺎﻫﻴﺔ ﻋﺎرض ﻟﻬﺎ ﲟﻌﲎ أن اﳌﻔﻬﻮم ﻣﻦ أﺣﺪﳘﺎ ﻏﲑ اﳌﻔﻬﻮم ﻣﻦ اﻵﺧﺮ ﻓﻠﻠﻌﻘﻞ أن ﳚﺮد اﳌﺎﻫﻴﺔ و ﻫﻲ ﻣﺎ ﻳﻘﺎل ﰲ ﺟﻮاب ﻣﺎ ﻫﻮ ﻋﻦ اﻟﻮﺟﻮد ﻓﻴﻌﺘﱪﻫﺎ وﺣﺪﻫﺎ ﻓﻴﻌﻘﻠﻬﺎ ﰒ ﻳﺼﻔﻬﺎ ﺑﺎﻟﻮﺟﻮد و ﻫﻮ ﻣﻌﲎ اﻟﻌﺮوض ﻓﻠﻴﺲ اﻟﻮﺟﻮد ﻋﻴ ﳍﺎ ﻨﺎ ﻟﻠﻤﺎﻫﻴﺔ و ﻻ ﺟﺰءا . ﻛﺎن ﻋﻴﻨﺎ أو ﺟﺰءا ﳍﺎ ﱂ ﻳﺼﺢ ذﻟﻚ و اﻟﺪﻟﻴﻞ ﻋﻠﻴﻪ أن اﻟﻮﺟﻮد ﻳﺼﺢ ﺳﻠﺒﻪ ﻋﻦ اﳌﺎﻫﻴﺔ و ﻟﻮ ﻻﺳﺘﺤﺎﻟﺔ ﺳﻠﺐ ﻋﲔ اﻟﺸﻲ ﻪ ء و ﺟﺰﺋﻪ ﻋﻨ. و أﻳﻀﺎ ﲪﻞ اﻟﻮﺟﻮد ﻋﻠﻰ اﳌﺎﻫﻴﺔ ﳛﺘﺎج إﱃ دﻟﻴﻞ ﻓﻠﻴﺲ ﻋﻴﻨﺎ و ﻻ ﺟﺰءا ﳍﺎ ﻷن ذات اﻟﺸﻲ ﲢ ء و ذاﺗﻴﺎﺗﻪ ﺑﻴﻨﺔ اﻟﺜﺒﻮت ﻟﻪ ﻻ ﻞ ﺘﺎج ﻓﻴﻪ إﱃ دﻟﻴ ﻛﺎن اﻟﻮﺟﻮد ﻋﻴﻨﺎ أو و أﻳﻀﺎ اﳌﺎﻫﻴﺔ ﻣﺘﺴﺎوﻳﺔ اﻟﻨﺴﺒﺔ ﰲ ﻧﻔﺴﻬﺎ إﱃ اﻟﻮﺟﻮد و اﻟﻌﺪم و ﻟﻮ ﺟﺰءا ﳍﺎ اﺳﺘﺤﺎﻟﺖ ﻧﺴﺒﺘﻬﺎ إﱃ اﻟﻌﺪم اﻟﺬي ﻫﻮ ﻧﻘﻴﻀﻪ

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1.3. EXISTENCE IS ADDITIONAL TO QUIDDITY A thing’s existence is additional to its quiddity, in the sense, that each of them [i.e. ‘existence’ and ‘quiddity’] signifies something not understandable from the other. From existence, the intellect first abstracts [or divests] quiddity, which is represented by the answer to the question, ‘What is it?’ Then the intellect considers it in isolation and attributes existence to it. This is what is meant by predication [‘urud, i.e. ascription of existence to quiddity]. Hence existence is neither identical with quiddity nor a part of it. A proof of it is that one may properly negate existence in relation to quiddity. Had it been identical with quiddity, or a part of it, such a negation would have been invalid, for it is impossible to negate something in regard to a thing which is identical with it or a part of it. Also, a proof is required if existence is to be predicated of a quiddity; therefore, it is neither identical with quiddity nor a part of it, because a thing’s essence (dhat) and its essential characteristics [i.e. genus and differentia] are self-evident and do not stand in need of a proof. Moreover, quiddity is in itself indifferent (mutasawiyat al-nisbah, lit. ‘equally related’) to existence and non-existence. Were existence identical with quiddity or a part of it, it would be impossible to attribute to it nonexistence, which is its contradictory.
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اﻟﻔﺼﻞ اﻟﺮاﺑﻊ ﻓﻲ أﺻﺎﻟﺔ اﻟﻮﺟﻮد و اﻋﺘﺒﺎرﻳﺔ اﻟﻤﺎﻫﻴﺔ إﻧﺎ ﻻ ﻧﺮﺗﺎب ﰲ أن ﻫﻨﺎك أﻣﻮرا واﻗﻌﻴﺔ ذات آﺛﺎر واﻗﻌﻴﺔ ﻟﻴﺴﺖ ﺑﻮﻫﻢ اﻟﻮاﻫﻢ ﰒ ﻧﻨﺘﺰع ﻣﻦ ﻛﻞ ﻣﻨﻬﻤﺎ ﻏﲑ ج ﻣﻔﻬﻮﻣﲔ اﺛﻨﲔ ﻛﻞ ﻣﻦ ﻫﺬﻩ اﻷﻣﻮر اﳌﺸﻬﻮدة ﻟﻨﺎ ﰲ ﻋﲔ أﻧﻪ واﺣﺪ ﰲ اﳋﺎر اﻵﺧﺮ ﻣ ج اﳌﻨﺘﺰع ﻛﺎﻹﻧﺴﺎن اﻟﺬي ﰲ اﳋﺎر ﻔﻬﻮﻣﺎ و إن اﲢﺪا ﻣﺼﺪاﻗﺎ و ﳘﺎ اﻟﻮﺟﻮد و اﳌﺎﻫﻴﺔ ﻋﻨﻪ أﻧﻪ إﻧﺴﺎن و أﻧﻪ ﻣﻮﺟﻮد. و ﻗﺪ اﺧﺘﻠﻒ اﳊﻜﻤﺎء ﰲ اﻷﺻﻴﻞ ﻣﻨﻬﻤﺎ ﻓﺬﻫﺐ اﳌﺸﺎءون إﱃ أﺻﺎﻟﺔ اﻟﻮﺟﻮد و ﻧﺴﺐ إﱃ اﻹﺷﺮاﻗﻴﲔ اﻟﻘﻮل ﺑﺄﺻﺎﻟﺔ اﳌﺎﻫﻴﺔ و أﻣﺎ اﻟﻘﻮل ﺑﺄﺻﺎﻟﺘﻬﻤﺎ ﻣﻌﺎ ﻓﻠﻢ ﻳﺬﻫﺐ إﻟﻴﻪ أﺣ ﺪ ﻣﻨﻬﻢ ﻛﻞ ﺷﻲ ﻛﻮن ﻻﺳﺘﻠﺰام ذﻟﻚ ة ء ﺷﻴﺌﲔ اﺛﻨﲔ و ﻫﻮ ﺧﻼف اﻟﻀﺮور. و اﳊﻖ ﻣﺎ ذﻫﺐ إﻟﻴﻪ اﳌﺸﺎءون ﻣﻦ أﺻﺎﻟﺔ اﻟﻮﺟﻮد. و اﻟﱪﻫﺎن ﻋﻠﻴﻪ أن اﳌﺎﻫﻴﺔ ﻣﻦ ﺣﻴﺚ ﻫﻲ ﻟﻴﺴﺖ إﻻ ﻫﻲ ﻣﺘﺴﺎوﻳﺔ اﻟﻨﺴﺒﺔ إﱃ اﻟﻮﺟﻮد و اﻟﻌﺪم ﻓﻠﻮ ﱂ ﻳﻜﻦ ﺧﺮوﺟﻬﺎ ﻣﻦ ﺣﺪ اﻻﺳﺘﻮاء إﱃ ﻣﺴﺘﻮى اﻟﻮﺟﻮد ﲝﻴﺚ ﺗﱰﺗﺐ ﻋﻠﻴﻬﺎ اﻵﺛﺎر ج ﳍﺎ ﻋﻦ ﺣﺪ ﻛﺎن ذﻟﻚ ﻣﻨﻬﺎ اﻧﻘﻼﺑﺎ و ﻫﻮ ﳏﺎل ﺑﺎﻟﻀﺮورة ﻓﺎﻟﻮﺟﻮد ﻫﻮ اﳌﺨﺮ ﺑﻮاﺳﻄﺔ اﻟﻮﺟﻮد اﻻﺳﺘﻮاء ﻓﻬﻮ اﻷﺻﻴﻞ. و ﻣﺎ ﻗﻴﻞ إن اﳌﺎﻫﻴﺔ ﺑﻨﺴﺒﺔ ﻣﻜﺘﺴﺒﺔ ﻣﻦ اﳉﺎﻋﻞ ﲣﺮج ﻣﻦ ﺣﺪ اﻻﺳﺘﻮاء إﱃ ﻣﺮﺣﻠﺔ اﻷﺻﺎﻟﺔ ﻓﺘﱰﺗﺐ ﻋﻠﻴﻬﺎ اﻵﺛﺎر ﻣﻨﺪﻓﻊ ﺑﺄ5ﺎ إن ﺗﻔﺎوﺗﺖ ﺣﺎﳍﺎ ﺑﻌﺪ اﻻﻧﺘﺴﺎب ﻓﻤﺎ ﺑﻪ اﻟﺘﻔﺎوت ﻫﻮ اﻟﻮﺟﻮد ﺎ ﻣﻮﺟﻮدة و 5 اﻷﺻﻴﻞ و إن ﲰﻲ ﻧﺴﺒﺔ إﱃ اﳉﺎﻋﻞ و إن ﱂ ﺗﺘﻔﺎوت و ﻣﻊ ذﻟﻚ ﲪﻞ ﻋﻠﻴﻬﺎ أ ﻛﻤﺎ ﺗﻘﺪم ﻛﺎن ﻣﻦ اﻻﻧﻘﻼب ﺗﺮﺗﺒﺖ ﻋﻠﻴﻬﺎ اﻵﺛﺎر ﺑﺮﻫﺎن آﺧﺮ اﳌﺎﻫﻴﺎت ﻣﺜﺎر اﻟﻜﺜﺮة و اﻻﺧﺘﻼف ﺑﺎﻟﺬات ﻓﻠﻮ ﱂ ﻳﻜﻦ اﻟﻮﺟﻮد أﺻﻴﻼ ﱂ ﺗﺘﺤﻘﻖ وﺣﺪة ﺣﻘﻴﻘﻴﺔ و ﻻ اﲢﺎد ﺑﲔ ﻣ ﺎﻫﻴﺘﲔ ﻓﻠﻢ ﻳﺘﺤﻘﻖ اﳊﻤﻞ اﻟﺬي ﻫﻮ اﻻﲢﺎد ﰲ اﻟﻮﺟﻮد و اﻟﻀﺮورة ﺗﻘﻀﻲ ﲞﻼﻓﻪ ﻓﺎﻟﻮﺟﻮد ﻫﻮ اﻷﺻﻴﻞ اﳌﻮﺟﻮد ﺑﺎﻟﺬات و اﳌﺎﻫﻴﺔ ﻣﻮﺟﻮدة ﺑﻪ. ﺑﺮﻫﺎن آﺧﺮ اﳌﺎﻫﻴﺔ ﺗﻮﺟﺪ ﺑﻮﺟﻮد ﺧﺎرﺟﻲ ﻓﺘﱰﺗﺐ ﻋﻠﻴﻬﺎ آﺛﺎرﻫﺎ و ﺗﻮﺟﺪ ﺑﻌﻴﻨﻬﺎ ﺑﻮﺟﻮد ذﻫﲏ ﻛﻤﺎ ﺳﻴﺄﰐ ﻓﻼ ﻳﱰﺗﺐ ﻋﻠﻴﻬﺎ ﺷﻲ ﱂ ء ﻣﻦ ﺗﻠﻚ اﻵﺛﺎر ﻓﻠﻮ ﻛﺎﻧﺖ ﻳﻜﻦ اﻟﻮﺟﻮد ﻫﻮ اﻷﺻﻴﻞ و اﻷﺻﺎﻟﺔ ﻟﻠﻤﺎﻫﻴﺔ و ﻫﻲ ﳏﻔﻮﻇﺔ ﰲ اﻟﻮﺟﻮدﻳﻦ ﱂ ﻳﻜﻦ ﻓﺮق ﺑﻴﻨﻬﻤﺎ و اﻟﺘﺎﱄ ﺑﺎﻃﻞ ﻓﺎﳌﻘﺪم ﻣﺜﻠﻪ. ﺑﺮﻫﺎن آﺧﺮ اﳌﺎﻫﻴﺔ ﻣﻦ ﺣﻴﺚ ﻫﻲ ﺗﺴﺘﻮي ﻧﺴﺒﺘﻬﺎ إﱃ اﻟﺘﻘﺪم و اﻟﺘﺄﺧﺮ و اﻟﺸﺪة و اﻟﻀﻌﻒ
ج ﳐﺘﻠﻔﺔ ﰲ ﻫﺬﻩ اﻷو و اﻟﻘﻮة و اﻟﻔﻌﻞ ﻟﻜﻦ اﻷﻣﻮر اﳌﻮﺟﻮدة ﰲ اﳋﺎر ﺻﺎف ﻓﺒﻌﻀﻬﺎ ﻣﺘﻘﺪم أو ﻛﺎﳌﻌﻠﻮل و ﺑﻌﻀﻬﺎ ﺑﺎﻟﻘﻮة و ﺑﻌﻀﻬﺎ ﺑﺎﻟﻔﻌﻞ ﻓﻠﻮ ﱂ ﻳﻜﻦ ﻛﺎﻟﻌﻠﺔ و ﺑﻌﻀﻬﺎ ﲞﻼف ذﻟﻚ ﻗﻮي ﻛﺎن اﺧﺘﻼف ﻫﺬﻩ اﻟﺼﻔﺎت ﻣﺴﺘﻨﺪة إﻟﻴﻬﺎ و ﻫﻲ ﻣﺘﺴﺎوﻳﺔ اﻟﻨﺴﺒﺔ إﱃ اﻟﻮﺟﻮد ﻫﻮ اﻷﺻﻴﻞ اﳉﻤﻴﻊ ﻫﺬا ﺧﻠﻒ و ﻫﻨﺎك ﺣﺠﺞ أﺧﺮى ﻣﺬﻛﻮرة ﰲ اﳌﻄﻮﻻت.
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و ﻟﻠﻘﺎﺋﻠﲔ ﺑﺄﺻﺎﻟﺔ اﳌﺎﻫﻴﺔ و اﻋ ﻛﺎن اﻟﻮﺟﻮد أﺻﻴﻼ ﻛﻘﻮﳍﻢ ﻟﻮ ﺘﺒﺎرﻳﺔ اﻟﻮﺟﻮد ﺣﺠﺞ ﻣﺪﺧﻮﻟﺔ ج ﻓﻠﻪ وﺟﻮد و ﻟﻮﺟﻮدﻩ وﺟﻮد ﻓﻴﺘﺴﻠﺴﻞ و ﻫﻮ ﳏﺎل ﻛﺎن ﻣﻮﺟﻮدا ﰲ اﳋﺎر. و أﺟﻴﺐ ﻋﻨﻪ ﺑﺄن اﻟﻮﺟﻮد ﻣﻮﺟﻮد ﻟﻜﻦ ﺑﻨﻔﺲ ذاﺗﻪ ﻻ ﺑﻮﺟﻮد آﺧﺮ ﻓﻼ ﻳﺬﻫﺐ اﻷﻣﺮ إﱃ ﻏﲑ اﻟﻨﻬﺎﻳﺔ و ﻳﻈﻬﺮ ﳑﺎ ﺗﻘﺪم ﺿﻌﻒ ﻗﻮل آﺧﺮ ﰲ اﳌﺴﺄﻟﺔ ﻣﻨﺴﻮب إﱃ اﶈﻘﻖ اﻟﺪواﱐ و ﻫﻮ أﺻﺎﻟﺔ اﻟﻮﺟﻮد ﰲ اﻟﻮاﺟﺐ ﺗﻌﺎﱃ و أﺻﺎﻟﺔ اﳌﺎﻫﻴﺔ ﰲ اﳌﻤﻜﻨﺎت و ﻋﻠﻴﻪ ﻓﺈﻃﻼق اﳌﻮﺟﻮد ﻋﻠﻰ اﻟﻮاﺟﺐ ﻛﺎﻟﻼﺑﻦ و اﻟﺘﺎﻣﺮ ﲟﻌﲎ ﺎ ﻣﻨﺘﺴﺒﺔ إﱃ اﻟﻮﺟﻮد 5 ﲟﻌﲎ أﻧﻪ ﻧﻔﺲ اﻟﻮﺟﻮد و ﻋﻠﻰ اﳌﺎﻫﻴﺎت ﲟﻌﲎ أ اﳌﻨﺘﺴﺐ إﱃ اﻟﻠﱭ و اﻟﺘﻤﺮ ﻫﺬا و أﻣﺎ ﻋﻠﻰ اﳌﺬﻫﺐ اﳌﺨﺘﺎر ﻓﺎﻟﻮﺟﻮد ﻣ ﻮﺟﻮد ﺑﺬاﺗﻪ و اﳌﺎﻫﻴﺔ ﻣﻮﺟﻮدة ﺑﺎﻟﻌﺮض.
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1.4. THE FUNDAMENTAL REALITY OF EXISTENCE We have no doubt that there are real things out there in external reality possessing certain real properties (athar), and that they are not illusory. In regard to each of the things that we observe – which is a single reality in the external world – we form two concepts different from one another, though they pertain to a single thing. These two concepts are ‘existence’ and ‘quiddity.’ For instance, in regard to a person existing in external reality, we posit his/her quiddity as a ‘human being’ and that he/she exists. The philosophers (hukama) have differed as to which of the two concepts is fundamental (asil). The Peripatetics (al-Mashsha’un) hold existence to be fundamentally real (asalat al-wujud). The belief in the fundamentality of quiddity (asalat al-mahiyyah) has been ascribed to the Emanationists (alIshraqiyyun). The view that both of them may be regarded as fundamentally real is one which no one has held, for that would imply that every thing is two things, which is logically inadmissible. The Peripatetics are right in holding existence to be fundamentally real. A proof of it is that quiddity as such is indifferent to [or stands in equal relation to] existence and non-existence, and were it capable by itself of emerging from this state of indifference [or neutrality] and assuming existence along with its properties (athar), that would amount to a violation of the law of identity (inqilab; lit. ‘mutation’), which is impossible. Hence it is existence that brings quiddity out of its state of indifference and is fundamentally real. As to that which some have said, that quiddity emerges from its state of indifference to assume reality through the relation that it acquires with the Maker, such an argument stands refuted. Because the difference in the state of quiddity after its relation with the Maker amounts to existence, though it should be called ‘a relation with the Maker.’ And should there occur no difference in its state, and should existence nevertheless be predicated of it, that would amount to a violation of the law of identity, as mentioned. Another proof is that quiddities are the source of multiplicity and diversity. Had existence not been fundamentally real, there would have been no real unity, nor any union between two quiddities [in one thing]. As a consequence, there would be no predication, which signifies unity in existence [as in a proposition of the type, ‘A is B’], and logical necessity requires the contrary of it. Hence existence is fundamentally real, existing by itself, and quiddity exists through it. Another proof is that when quiddity exists externally, it possesses the properties (athar) expected of it. But when quiddity exists through mental existence (wujud dhihni) (which will be dealt with later on), it does not possess any of these properties. So if existence were not real, and were quiddity – which is there in both modes of being – real, there would be no difference between these two modes. Since this consequent premise is invalid, the antecedent must also be such. Another proof is that quiddity as such is indifferent in its relation to priority (taqaddum) and posteriority (ta’khkhur), strength (shiddah) and weakness (da’f), actuality (fi’l) and potentiality (quwwah). However, things existing in external reality differ in regard to these characteristics. Some of
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them are prior and strong, such as the cause (‘illah), and some are the opposite of that, such as the effect (ma’lul). Some of them have actuality and some of them possess potentiality. Were existence not fundamentally real, the difference in respect to these characteristics would be attributable to quiddity, which is indifferent in relation to all of them. This involves a contradiction. There are other proofs besides the ones given here and they are mentioned in detailed works. Those who believe in the fundamental reality of quiddity arid consider existence to be derivative (i’tibari), have offered certain infirm arguments, like the one which says, ‘If existence were fundamentally real, it would exist externally; from which it follows that it has an existence, and that existence again has another existence, and so on ad infinitum. This involves an infinite regress, which is inadmissible.’ The answer to such an argument is that existence does indeed exist; but it exists by itself, not by another existence. So the matter does not lead to an infinite regress. In the light of what has been said, the infirmity of another view, ascribed to Dawwani, also becomes evident. That view ascribes fundamental reality to existence with respect to the Necessary Being, and to quiddity with respect to contingent beings. According to it, existence is attributable to the Necessary Being in the sense that It is existent by Itself and to quiddities in the sense that they have only a relation with being, such as the relation between the ‘milkman’ (labin) and ‘milk’ (laban) and the ‘date seller’ (tamir) and ‘dates’ (tamr). However, in accordance with the doctrine endorsed by us, existence exists by itself (bi dhatih) and quiddity exists accidentally (bi al-‘arad).
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اﻟﻔﺼﻞ اﻟﺨﺎﻣﺲ ﻓﻲ أن اﻟﻮﺟﻮد ﺣﻘﻴﻘﺔ واﺣﺪة ﻣﺸﻜﻜﺔ اﺧﺘﻠﻒ اﻟﻘﺎﺋﻠﻮن ﺑﺄﺻﺎﻟﺔ اﻟﻮﺟﻮد ﻓﺬﻫﺐ ﺑﻌﻀﻬﻢ إﱃ أن اﻟﻮﺟﻮد ﺣﻘﻴﻘﺔ واﺣﺪة ﻣﺸﻜﻜﺔ و ﻫﻮ اﳌﻨﺴﻮب إﱃ اﻟﻔﻬﻠﻮﻳﲔ ﻣﻦ ﺣﻜﻤﺎء اﻟﻔﺮس ﻓﺎﻟﻮﺟﻮد ﻋﻨﺪﻫﻢ ﻟﻜﻮﻧﻪ ﻇﺎﻫﺮا ﺑﺬاﺗﻪ ﻣﻈﻬﺮا ﻛﺎﻟﻨﻮر اﳊﺴﻲ اﻟﺬي ﻫﻮ ﻇﺎﻫﺮ ﺑﺬاﺗﻪ ﻣﻈﻬﺮ ﻟﻐﲑﻩ ﻣﻦ اﻷﺟﺴﺎم اﻟﻜﺜﻴﻔﺔ ﻟﻐﲑﻩ ﻣﻦ اﳌﺎﻫﻴﺎت ﻟﻸﺑﺼﺎر. ﻓﻜﻤﺎ أن اﻟﻨﻮر اﳊﺴﻲ ﻧﻮع واﺣﺪ ﺣﻘﻴﻘﺘﻪ أﻧﻪ ﻇﺎﻫﺮ ﺑﺬاﺗﻪ ﻣﻈﻬﺮ ﻟﻐﲑﻩ و ﻫﺬا اﳌﻌﲎ ﻣﺘﺤﻘﻖ ﺎ و اﺧﺘﻼ Tﻛﺜﺮ ﰲ ﲨﻴﻊ ﻣﺮاﺗﺐ اﻷﺷﻌﺔ و اﻷﻇﻠﺔ ﻋﻠﻰ ﻓﻬﺎ ﻓﺎﻟﻨﻮر اﻟﺸﺪﻳﺪ ﺷﺪﻳﺪ ﰲ ﻧﻮرﻳﺘﻪ اﻟﱵ ﻳﺸﺎرك ﻓﻴﻬﺎ اﻟﻨﻮر اﻟﻀﻌﻴﻒ و اﻟﻨﻮر اﻟﻀﻌﻴﻒ ﺿﻌﻴﻒ ﰲ ﻧﻮرﻳﺘﻪ اﻟﱵ ﻳﺸﺎرك ﻓﻴﻬﺎ اﻟﻨﻮر اﻟﺸﺪﻳﺪ ج اﻟﻀﻌﻴﻒ ﻣﻨﻪ و ﻻ ﻋﺮﺿﺎ ﺧﺎرﺟﺎ ﻋﻦ ﻓﻠﻴﺴﺖ ﺷﺪة اﻟﺸﺪﻳﺪ ﻣﻨﻪ ﺟﺰءا ﻣﻘﻮﻣﺎ ﻟﻠﻨﻮرﻳﺔ ﺣﱴ ﳜﺮ اﳊﻘﻴﻘﺔ و ﻟﻴﺲ ﺿﻌﻒ اﻟﻀﻌﻴﻒ ﻗﺎدﺣﺎ ﰲ ﻧﻮرﻳﺘﻪ و ﻻ أﻧﻪ ﻣﺮﻛﺐ ﻣ ﺎ5 ﻦ اﻟﻨﻮر و اﻟﻈﻠﻤﺔ ﻟﻜﻮ ﻛﺬا ﺿﻌﻒ اﻟﻀﻌﻴﻒ ﻓﻠﻠﻨﻮر ﻋﺮض ﻋﺮﻳﺾ أﻣﺮا ﻋﺪﻣﻴﺎ ﺑﻞ ﺷﺪة اﻟﺸﺪﻳﺪ ﰲ أﺻﻞ اﻟﻨﻮرﻳﺔ و ﺑﺎﻋﺘﺒﺎر ﻣﺮاﺗﺒﻪ اﳌﺨﺘﻠﻔﺔ ﺑﺎﻟﺸﺪة و اﻟﻀﻌﻒ و ﻟﻜﻞ ﻣﺮﺗﺒﺔ ﻋﺮض ﻋﺮﻳﺾ ﺑﺎﻋﺘﺒﺎر اﻟﻘﻮاﺑﻞ اﳌﺨﺘﻠﻔﺔ ﻣﻦ اﻷﺟﺴﺎم اﻟﻜﺜﻴﻔﺔ. ﻛﺬﻟﻚ اﻟﻮﺟﻮد ﺣﻘﻴﻘﺔ واﺣﺪة ذات ﻣﺮاﺗﺐ ﳐﺘﻠﻔﺔ ﻣﺘﻤﺎﻳﺰة ﺑﺎﻟﺸﺪ ة و اﻟﻀﻌﻒ و اﻟﺘﻘﺪم و اﻟﺘﺄﺧﺮ و ﻏﲑ ذﻟﻚ ﻓﲑﺟﻊ ﻣﺎ ﺑﻪ اﻻﻣﺘﻴﺎز ﻓﻴﻬﺎ إﱃ ﻣﺎ ﺑﻪ اﻻﺷﱰاك و ﻣﺎ ﺑﻪ اﻻﺧﺘﻼف إﱃ ﻣﺎ ﺑﻪ اﻻﲢﺎد ﻓﻠﻴﺴﺖ ﺧﺼﻮﺻﻴﺔ ﺷﻲ ﻲ ﻛﻤﺎ ﺳﻴﺠ ء ﻣﻦ اﳌﺮاﺗﺐ ﺟﺰءا ﻣﻘﻮﻣﺎ ﻟﻠﻮﺟﻮد ﻟﺒﺴﺎﻃﺘﻪ ء و ﻻ
ج ﻋﻨﻪ ﺑﻞ اﳋﺼﻮ أﻣﺮا ﺧﺎرﺟﺎ ﻋﻨﻪ ﻷن أﺻﺎﻟﺔ اﻟﻮﺟﻮد ﺗﺒﻄﻞ ﻣﺎ ﻫﻮ ﻏﲑﻩ اﳋﺎر ﻛﻞ ﻣﺮﺗﺒﺔ ﺻﻴﺔ ﰲ ﻣﻘﻮﻣﺔ ﻟﻨﻔﺲ اﳌﺮﺗﺒﺔ ﲟﻌﲎ ﻣﺎ ﻟﻴﺲ ﲞﺎرج ﻣﻨﻬﺎ. ﻛﺜﺮة ﻃﻮﻟﻴﺔ ﺑﺎﻋﺘﺒﺎر اﳌﺮاﺗﺐ اﳌﺨﺘﻠﻔﺔ اﻵﺧﺬة ﻣﻦ أﺿﻌﻒ اﳌﺮاﺗﺐ و ﻫﻲ اﻟﱵ ﻻ ﻓﻌﻠﻴﺔ و ﳍﺎ ﳍﺎ إﻻ ﻋﺪم اﻟﻔﻌﻠﻴﺔ و ﻫﻲ اﳌﺎدة اﻷوﱃ اﻟﻮاﻗﻌﺔ ﰲ أﻓﻖ اﻟﻌﺪم ﰒ ﺗﺘﺼﺎﻋﺪ اﳌﺮاﺗﺐ إﱃ أن ﺗﻨﺘﻬﻲ إﱃ اﳌﺮﺗﺒﺔ اﻟﻮاﺟﺒﺔ ﻟ ﻛﺜﺮة ﻋﺮﺿﻴﺔ ﺑﺎﻋﺘﺒﺎر ﺎ و ﻫﻲ اﻟﱵ ﻻ ﺣﺪ ﳍﺎ إﻻ ﻋﺪم اﳊﺪ و ﳍﺎ Tﺬا ﲣﺼﺼﻬﺎ ﺑﺎﳌﺎﻫﻴﺎت اﳌﺨﺘﻠﻔﺔ اﻟﱵ ﻫﻲ ﻣﺜﺎر اﻟﻜﺜﺮة. ﻛﻮﻧﻪ ﺣﻘﺎﺋﻖ ﺎ أﻣﺎ T ﻛﻮن اﻟﻮﺟﻮد ﺣﻘﺎﺋﻖ ﻣﺘﺒﺎﻳﻨﺔ ﺑﺘﻤﺎم ذوا و ذﻫﺐ ﻗﻮم ﻣﻦ اﳌﺸﺎءﻳﻦ إﱃ ﺎ ﻣﺘﺒﺎﻳﻨﺔ ﺑﺘﻤﺎم اﻟﺬوات ﻓﻠﺒﺴﺎﻃﺘﻬﺎ 5ﻛﻮ ﻣﺘﺒﺎﻳﻨﺔ ﻓﻼﺧﺘﻼف آﺛﺎرﻫﺎ و أﻣﺎ و ﻋﻠﻰ ﻫﺬا ﻳﻜﻮن ﻣﻔﻬﻮم اﻟﻮﺟﻮد اﶈﻤﻮل ﻋﻠﻴﻬﺎ ﻋﺮﺿﻴﺎ ﺧﺎرﺟﺎ ﻋﻨﻬﺎ ﻻزﻣﺎ ﳍﺎ. ﻛﺬﻟﻚ ﺎ ﺣﻘﻴﻘﺔ واﺣﺪة ﻓﻸﻧﻪ ﻟﻮ ﱂ ﺗﻜﻦ 5ﻛﻮ و اﳊﻖ أﻧﻪ ﺣﻘﻴﻘﺔ واﺣﺪة ﻣﺸﻜﻜﺔ أﻣﺎ ﻛﻮن ﻣﻔﻬﻮم اﻟﻮﺟﻮد و ﻫﻮ ﻣﻔﻬﻮم واﺣﺪ ﻟﻜﺎﻧﺖ ﺣﻘﺎﺋﻖ ﳐﺘﻠﻔﺔ ﻣﺘﺒﺎﻳﻨﺔ ﺑﺘﻤﺎم اﻟﺬوات و ﻻزﻣﻪ ﻛﻤﺎ ﺗﻘﺪم ﻣﻨﺘﺰﻋﺎ ﻣﻦ ﻣﺼﺎدﻳﻖ ﻣﺘﺒﺎﻳﻨ ﺔ ﲟﺎ ﻫﻲ ﻣﺘﺒﺎﻳﻨﺔ و ﻫﻮ ﳏﺎل ﺑﻴﺎن اﻻﺳﺘﺤﺎﻟﺔ أن اﳌﻔﻬﻮم و
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ﻛﻮن اﻟﻮﺟﻮد ذﻫﻨﻴﺎ أو ﺧﺎرﺟﻴﺎ ﻓﻠﻮ اﻧﺘﺰع اﻟﻮاﺣﺪ ﲟﺎ ﻫﻮ واﺣﺪ اﳌﺼﺪاق واﺣﺪ ذاﺗﺎ و إﳕﺎ اﻟﻔﺎرق ﻛﺜﲑ و ﻫﻮ ﳏﺎل ﻛﺜﲑا ﲟﺎ ﻫﻮ ﻛﺎن اﻟﻮاﺣﺪ ﲟﺎ ﻫﻮ واﺣﺪ ﻛﺜﲑ ﻣﻦ اﻟﻜﺜﲑ ﲟﺎ ﻫﻮ و أﻳﻀﺎ ﻟﻮ اﻧﺘﺰع اﳌﻔﻬﻮم اﻟﻮاﺣﺪ ﲟﺎ ﻫﻮ وا ﻛﺜﲑة ﻓﺈﻣﺎ أن ﺣﺪ ﻣﻦ اﳌﺼﺎدﻳﻖ اﻟﻜﺜﲑة ﲟﺎ ﻫﻲ ﺗﻌﺘﱪ ﰲ ﺻﺪﻗﻪ ﺧﺼﻮﺻﻴﺔ ﻫﺬا اﳌﺼﺪاق ﱂ ﻳﺼﺪق ﻋﻠﻰ ذﻟﻚ اﳌﺼﺪاق و إن اﻋﺘﱪ ﻓﻴﻪ ﺧﺼﻮﺻﻴﺔ ذاك ﱂ ﻳﺼﺪق ﻋﻠﻰ ﻫﺬا و إن اﻋﺘﱪ ﻓﻴﻪ اﳋﺼﻮﺻﻴﺘﺎن ﻣﻌﺎ ﱂ ﻳﺼﺪق ﻋﻠﻰ ﺷﻲ ء ﻣﻨﻬﻤﺎ و إن ﱂ ﻳﻌﺘﱪ ﺷﻲ ﺑ ء ﻣﻦ اﳋﺼﻮﺻﻴﺘﲔ ﺑﻞ اﻧﺘﺰع ﻣﻦ اﻟﻘﺪر اﳌﺸﱰك ﻴﻨﻬﻤﺎ ﱂ ﻳﻜﻦ ﻣﻨﺘﺰﻋﺎ ﻛﺎﻟﻜﻠﻲ اﳌﻨﺘﺰع ﻣﻦ اﳉﻬﺔ اﳌﺸﱰﻛﺔ ﺑﲔ اﻷﻓﺮاد اﻟﺼﺎدق ﻛﺜﲑ ﺑﻞ ﲟﺎ ﻫﻮ واﺣﺪ ﻣﻦ اﻟﻜﺜﲑ ﲟﺎ ﻫﻮ ﻋﻠﻰ اﳉﻤﻴﻊ ﻫﺬا ﺧﻠﻒ. و أﻣﺎ أن ﺣﻘﻴﻘﺘﻪ ﻣﺸﻜﻜﺔ ﻓﻠﻤﺎ ﻳﻈﻬﺮ ﻣﻦ اﻟﻜﻤﺎﻻت اﳊﻘﻴﻘﻴﺔ اﳌﺨﺘﻠﻔﺔ اﻟﱵ ﻫﻲ ﺻﻔﺎت ﻛﺎﻟﺸﺪة و اﻟﻀﻌﻒ ﻣﺘﻔﺎﺿﻠﺔ ﻏﲑ ﺧﺎرﺟﺔ ﻋﻦ اﳊﻘﻴﻘﺔ اﻟﻮاﺣﺪة و اﻟﺘﻘﺪم و اﻟﺘﺄﺧﺮ و اﻟﻘﻮة و ﻛﻞ ﻣﺎ ﺑﻪ اﻻﻣﺘﻴﺎز إﱃ ﻣﺎ ﺑﻪ ﺎ ﻳﺮﺟﻊ ﻓﻴﻬﺎ T اﻟﻔﻌﻞ و ﻏﲑ ذﻟﻚ ﻓﻬﻲ ﺣﻘﻴﻘﺔ واﺣﺪة ﻣﺘﻜﺜﺮة ﰲ ذا اﻻﺷﱰاك و ﺑﺎﻟﻌﻜﺲ و ﻫﺬا ﻫﻮ اﻟﺘﺸﻜﻴﻚ.
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1.5. EXISTENCE IS ONE GRADATIONAL REALITY The believers in the fundamental reality of existence disagree amongst themselves. Some of them regard existence as a single gradational reality (haqiqah mushakkakah wahidah). This view is ascribed to the Fahlaviyyun, philosophers of [ancient] Iran. Existence, according to them, is selfmanifesting and makes other things – i.e. quiddities – manifest. It may be likened to sensible light, which is self-manifesting and makes other things, such as opaque bodies, manifest to vision. Sensible light is a single species. Its reality is that it is self-manifesting and manifests things other than itself. This feature applies to all the different grades of light and shade with their multiplicity and diversity. Hence a strong light shares its luminous nature with a weak light, and a weak light shares its luminous nature with a strong one. The strength of a strong light is neither the constituting differentia (juz muqawwim) of its luminous nature, so as to negate the luminous character of weak light, nor is it an accident extraneous to its reality. The weakness of a weak light neither negates its luminous nature, nor is it a compound of light and darkness, for darkness is non-existence of light. The intensity of a strong light inheres in its luminous nature, and so does the weakness of a weak light. Light possesses a wide range in accordance with its various degrees of intensity and weakness, and there is a wide range associated with each of its degrees depending on the varying receptivity of opaque bodies [as in reflection and refraction]. Similarly, existence is one reality with various degrees differentiated by intensity and weakness, priority and posteriority, etc. That which differentiates these degrees of existence is exactly that which is common to them, and that which makes them different is exactly that which makes them one. Hence the particularity of any of these degrees is not a constituting differentia of existence, by virtue of the simplicity (basatah) of existence – as will be explained later on – nor is it anything extraneous to it. This is because the fundamental reality of existence precludes that there should be anything other than it or external to it. Rather, the particularity of every degree is what constitutes that degree itself and is not something other than it. The multiplicity in existence pertains to its various vertical (tuli) degrees, beginning from the weakest of degrees – represented by prime matter, which exists on the verge of non-existence – where it has no actuality except the absence of actuality. From there it rises in degrees to the level of the Necessary Being, which has no limit except the absence of limit. Also, existence has a horizontal (‘aradi) multiplicity particularized by the various quiddities, quiddity being the source of multiplicity. A group of Peripatetics have held the view that existence consists of entities essentially disparate – disparate in their entirety – from each other (haqa’iq mutabayinah bi tamami dhawatiha). They are disparate because their properties are disparate. The disparity is essential and complete, by virtue of the simplicity of their essences. On the basis of this position, the predication of existence in regard to these entities becomes, of necessity, something accidental and extrinsic to them (for, were it intrinsic to them, it would be a constituent, and this contradicts simplicity).
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The truth is that existence is one graded reality. Were it not one reality, entities would have been disparate from one another with the totality of their essences (dhawat). That would entail that the concept of existence, which is a single concept, as said, has been abstracted from disparate things qua disparate things [having no unifying aspect]. This is impossible. To explain, there is an essential unity between a concept and that to which it refers. The factor of disparity lies in existence being mental or external. Were something which is one, qua one, capable of being abstracted from that which is many, qua many, one qua one would be the same as many qua many, which is impossible. Also, suppose that a single concept were abstracted from a multiplicity of referents qua disparate things. If the concept represented a certain characteristic of one referent, it would not be predicable of a second referent. If the concept represented some characteristic of the second referent, it would not correspond to the first referent. If the characteristics of both the referents were represented in it, it would not correspond to either of the referents; and should none of these two characteristics be taken into consideration and the concept were to represent that which is common to the two referents, such an abstraction could not have been possible from different things qua different things, but from their unifying aspect, such as the abstraction of universals from the common aspect shared by all individuals covered by that universal. This, however, contradicts the assumption. As to existence being a gradational reality, since it manifests various real perfections that make up the distinctive attributes that are not extraneous” to the single reality of existence, such as intensity and weakness, priority and posteriority, potentiality and actuality, etc., existence is a single reality multiple in its essence, wherein all that makes existents differ refers to what is common to them, and vice versa. This is what is called gradation (tashkik).
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اﻟﻔﺼﻞ اﻟﺴﺎدس ﻓﻲ ﻣﺎ ﻳﺘﺨﺼﺺ ﺑﻪ اﻟﻮﺟﻮد : ﺗﺨﺼﺺ اﻟﻮﺟﻮد ﺑﻮﺟﻮﻩ ﺛﻼﺛﺔ ﺎT ﺎ اﻟﻘﺎﺋﻤﺔ ﺑﺬا T أﺣﺪﻫﺎ ﲣﺼﺺ ﺣﻘﻴﻘﺘﻪ اﻟﻮاﺣﺪة اﻷﺻﻠﻴﺔ ﺑﻨﻔﺲ ذا و ﺛﺎﻧﻴﻬﺎ ﲣﺼﺼﻬﺎ ﲞﺼﻮﺻﻴﺎت ﻣﺮاﺗﺒﻬﺎ ﻏﲑ اﳋﺎرﺟﺔ ﻋﻦ اﳌﺮاﺗﺐ و ﺛﺎﻟﺜﻬﺎ ﲣﺼﺺ اﻟﻮﺟﻮد ﺑﺈﺿﺎﻓﺘﻪ إﱃ اﳌﺎﻫﻴﺎت اﳌﺨﺘﻠﻔﺔ اﻟﺬوات و ﻋﺮوﺿﻪ ﳍﺎ ﻓﻴﺨﺘﻠﻒ ﺑﺎﺧﺘﻼﻓﻬﺎ ﺑﺎﻟﻌﺮض. و ﻋﺮوض اﻟﻮﺟﻮد ﻟﻠﻤﺎﻫﻴﺔ و ﺛﺒﻮﺗﻪ ﳍﺎ ﻟﻴﺲ ﻣﻦ ﻗﺒﻴﻞ اﻟﻌﺮوض اﳌﻘﻮﱄ اﻟﺬي ﻳﺘﻮﻗﻒ ﻓﻴﻪ ﺛﺒﻮت اﻟﻌﺎرض ﻋﻠﻰ ﺛﺒﻮت اﳌﻌﺮوض ﻗﺒﻠﻪ ﻓﺈن ﺣﻘﻴﻘﺔ ﺛﺒﻮت اﻟﻮﺟﻮد ﻟﻠﻤﺎﻫﻴﺔ ﻫﻲ ﺛﺒﻮت اﳌﺎﻫﻴﺔ ﺑﻪ ﻷن ذﻟﻚ ﻫﻮ ﻣﻘﺘﻀﻰ أﺻﺎﻟﺘﻪ و اﻋﺘﺒﺎ رﻳﺘﻬﺎ و إﳕﺎ اﻟﻌﻘﻞ ﳌﻜﺎن أﻧﺴﻪ ﺑﺎﳌﺎﻫﻴﺎت ﻳﻔﱰض اﳌﺎﻫﻴﺔ ﻣﻮﺿﻮﻋﻪ و ﳛﻤﻞ اﻟﻮﺟﻮد ﻋﻠﻴﻬﺎ و ﻫﻮ ﰲ اﳊﻘﻴﻘﺔ ﻣﻦ ﻋﻜﺲ اﳊﻤﻞ. و ﺑﺬﻟﻚ ﻳﻨﺪﻓﻊ اﻹﺷﻜﺎل اﳌﻌﺮوف ﰲ ﲪﻞ اﻟﻮﺟﻮد ﻋﻠﻰ اﳌﺎﻫﻴﺔ ﻣﻦ أن ﻗﺎﻋﺪة اﻟﻔﺮﻋﻴﺔ أﻋﲏ أن ﺛﺒﻮت ﺷﻲ ﻲ ء ﻟﺸ ﺛﺒ ء ﻓﺮع ﺛﺒﻮت اﳌﺜﺒﺖ ﻟﻪ ﺗﻮﺟﺐ ﺛﺒﻮﺗﺎ ﻟﻠﻤﺜﺒﺖ ﻟﻪ ﻗﺒﻞ ﻮت اﻟﺜﺎﺑﺖ ﻓﺜﺒﻮت ﺎ ﻋﲔ ﺛﺒﻮﺗﻪ ﳍﺎ ﻟﺰم ﺗﻘﺪم اﻟﺸﻲ T ﻛﺎن ﺛﺒﻮ اﻟﻮﺟﻮد ﻟﻠﻤﺎﻫﻴﺔ ﻳﺘﻮﻗﻒ ﻋﻠﻰ ﺛﺒﻮت اﳌﺎﻫﻴﺔ ﻗﺒﻠﻪ ﻓﺈن ء ﻛﺎن ﻏﲑﻩ ﺗﻮﻗﻒ ﺛﺒﻮﺗﻪ ﳍﺎ ﻋﻠﻰ ﺛﺒﻮت آﺧﺮ ﳍﺎ و ﻫﻠﻢ ﺟﺮا ﻓﻴﺘﺴﻠﺴﻞ ﻋﻠﻰ ﻧﻔﺴﻪ و إن . و ﻗﺪ اﺿﻄﺮ ﻫﺬا اﻹﺷﻜﺎل ﺑﻌﻀﻬﻢ إﱃ اﻟﻘﻮل ﺑﺄن اﻟﻘﺎﻋﺪة ﳐﺼﺼﺔ ﺑﺜﺒﻮت اﻟﻮﺟﻮد ﻟﻠﻤﺎﻫﻴﺔ و ﺷﻲ ﺑﻌﻀﻬﻢ إﱃ ﺗﺒﺪﻳﻞ اﻟﻔﺮﻋﻴﺔ ﺑﺎﻻﺳﺘﻠﺰام ﻓﻘﺎل اﳊﻖ أن ﺛﺒﻮت ﻲ ء ﻟﺸ ء ﻣﺴﺘﻠﺰم ﻟﺜﺒﻮت اﳌﺜﺒﺖ ﻟﻪ و ﻟﻮ -ﺬا اﻟﺜﺎﺑﺖ و ﺛﺒﻮت اﻟﻮﺟﻮد ﻟﻠﻤﺎﻫﻴﺔ ﻣﺴﺘﻠﺰم ﻟﺜﺒﻮت اﳌﺎﻫﻴﺔ ﺑﻨﻔﺲ ﻫﺬا اﻟﻮﺟﻮد ﻓﻼ إﺷﻜﺎل. و ﺑﻌﻀﻬﻢ إﱃ اﻟﻘﻮل ﺑﺄن اﻟﻮﺟﻮد ﻻ ﲢﻘﻖ ﻟﻪ و ﻻ ﺛﺒﻮت ﰲ ذﻫﻦ و ﻻ ﰲ ﺧﺎرج و ﻟﻠﻤﻮﺟﻮد ﻣ ﻌﲎ ﺑﺴﻴﻂ ﻳﻌﱪ ﻋﻨﻪ ﺑﺎﻟﻔﺎرﺳﻴﺔ ب ﻫﺴﺖ و اﻻﺷﺘﻘﺎق ﺻﻮري ﻓﻼ ﺛﺒﻮت ﻟﻪ ﺣﱴ ﻳﺘﻮﻗﻒ ﻋﻠﻰ ﺛﺒﻮت اﳌﺎﻫﻴﺔ. و ﺑﻌﻀﻬﻢ إﱃ اﻟﻘﻮل ﺑﺄن اﻟﻮﺟﻮد ﻟﻴﺲ ﻟﻪ إﻻ اﳌﻌﲎ اﳌﻄﻠﻖ و ﻫﻮ ﻣﻌﲎ اﻟﻮﺟﻮد اﻟﻌﺎم و اﳊﺼﺺ و ﻫﻮ اﳌﻌﲎ اﻟﻌﺎم ﻣﻀﺎﻓﺎ إﱃ ﻣﺎﻫﻴﺔ ﻣﺎﻫﻴﺔ ﲝﻴﺚ ﻳﻜﻮن اﻟﺘﻘﻴﻴﺪ داﺧﻼ و اﻟﻘﻴﺪ ﺧﺎرﺟﺎ و أ ت ﻣﺎ اﻟﻔﺮد و ﻫﻮ ﳎﻤﻮع اﳌﻘﻴﺪ و اﻟﺘﻘﻴﻴﺪ و اﻟﻘﻴﺪ ﻓﻠﻴﺲ ﻟﻪ ﺛﺒﻮ. و ﺷﻲ ء ﻣﻦ ﻫﺬﻩ اﻷﺟﻮﺑﺔ ﻋﻠﻰ ﻓﺴﺎدﻫﺎ ﻻ ﻳﻐﲏ ﻃﺎﺋﻼ و اﳊﻖ ﰲ اﳉﻮاب ﻣﺎ ﺗﻘﺪم ﻣﻦ أن اﻟﻘﺎﻋﺪة إﳕﺎ ﲡﺮي ﰲ ﺛﺒﻮت ﺷﻲ ﻲ ء ﻟﺸ ﻲ ء ﻻ ﰲ ﺛﺒﻮت اﻟﺸ ء و ﺑﻌﺒﺎرة أﺧﺮى ﳎﺮى اﻟﻘﺎﻋﺪة ﻫﻮ اﳍﻠﻴﺔ اﳌﺮﻛﺒﺔ دون اﳍﻠﻴﺔ اﻟﺒﺴﻴﻄﺔ ﻪ ﻛﻤﺎ ﰲ ﻣﺎ ﳓﻦ ﻓﻴ

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1.6. THAT WHICH PARTICULARIZES EXISTENCE Existence is particularized in three aspects: (1) as a single fundamental reality in itself, which is self-subsistent [unlike quiddity]; (2) in accordance with the characteristics of its degrees, which are not extraneous to it; (3) in accordance with the different quiddities to which existence pertains and which differentiate it accidentally in accordance with their difference. The manner in which existence pertains to quiddity and gives it subsistence (thubut) is not the kind peculiar to categories [like accidents in relation to substance], wherein the subsistence of a quality depends on the prior subsistence of its subject. That is because the meaning of existence of quiddity is its subsistence through existence. This follows from the fundamental reality of existence and the derivative (i’tibari) character of quiddity. It is the intellect which, by virtue of its familiarity with quiddities, supposes quiddity to be the subject to which predicates existence. However, the matter is the inverse of this predication in concrete reality. This explanation serves to answer the well-known objection concerning the predication of existence in relation to quiddity. It is said that in accordance with the Rule of Subordination (qaidat al-far’iyyah), the subsistence (thubut) of some quality (q) of a thing (A) is subordinate to that thing’s subsistence, which makes it necessary that the thing of which the property is posited subsist prior to the quality posited of it. Hence the subsistence of existence in relation to quiddity depends on the prior subsistence of quiddity. For should the subsistence of quiddity be the same as the subsistence of existence, that would imply something being prior to itself; and should it be different, the subsistence of existence in relation to quiddity would depend on another subsistence of quiddity, and so on. This results in an infinite regress. This objection has forced some philosophers to admit an exception to the rule in the case of subsistence of existence in relation to quiddity. Some of them have been forced to change posteriority into concomitance. They state: ‘The truth is that the subsistence of one thing [quality] in relation to another [subject] is concomitant with the subsistence of the subject, though it be through the subsistence of the former. The subsistence of existence in relation to quiddity is concomitant with the subsistence of quiddity through this existence itself. Hence there remains no room for an objection.” Some of them have been compelled by this objection into holding that existence has no entity or subsistence, either in the mind or in external reality. ‘Being’ has a simple meaning represented in Farsi by the word hast (‘is’). This derivation [of a substantive from a verb] is merely verbal, and existence has no subsistence at all so as to depend on the subsistence of quiddity. Some others have been led to hold that ‘existence’ has nothing but a general meaning, signifying existence in general and its parts, which is the same general meaning appended to quiddity, in the sense that the conditioning is internal while the condition is external. The individual, which is the totality of the conditioned, the conditioning, and the condition, has no subsistence.
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These attempts to solve the difficulty are invalid, like the earlier one. The correct solution is the one suggested by the foregoing discussion, that the Rule of Subordination applies to the subsistence of a thing in relation to another thing (thubutu shay’in li shay), not to a thing’s subsistence (thubutu al-shay’). In other words, the rule applies to composite propositions [e.g., ‘A has the quality q’], not to simple propositions [e.g., ‘A exists’], as is the matter in the present case.
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اﻟﻔﺼﻞ اﻟﺴﺎﺑﻊ ﻓﻲ أﺣﻜﺎم ا ﺔ ﻟﻮﺟﻮد اﻟﺴﻠﺒﻴ
ﻛﻞ ﻣﺎ ﻣﻨﻬﺎ أن اﻟﻮﺟﻮد ﻻ ﻏﲑ ﻟﻪ و ذﻟﻚ ﻷن اﳓﺼﺎر اﻷﺻﺎﻟﺔ ﰲ ﺣﻘﻴﻘﺘﻪ ﻳﺴﺘﻠﺰم ﺑﻄﻼن ﻳﻔﺮض ﻏﲑا ﻟﻪ أﺟﻨﺒﻴﺎ ﻋﻨﻪ ﺑﻄﻼﻧﺎ ذاﺗﻴﺎ. ﻛﻞ ﻣﺎ ﻳﻔﺮض ﻏﲑا ﻟﻪ ﻳﻨﻔﻰ و ﻣﻨﻬﺎ أﻧﻪ ﻻ ﺛﺎﱐ ﻟﻪ ﻷن أﺻﺎﻟﺔ ﺣﻘﻴﻘﺘﻪ اﻟﻮاﺣﺪة و ﺑﻄﻼن ﻛﻞ ﺧﻠﻴﻂ داﺧﻞ ﻓﻴﻪ أو ﻣﻨﻀﻢ إﻟﻴﻪ ﻓﻬﻮ ﺻﺮف ﰲ ﻋﻨﻪ ﻲ ﻧﻔﺴﻪ و ﺻﺮف اﻟﺸ ء ﻻ ﻳﺘﺜﲎ و ﻻ ﻳﺘﻜﺮر ﻓﻜﻞ ﻣﺎ ﻓﺮض ﻟﻪ ﺛﺎﻧﻴﺎ ﻋﺎد أوﻻ و إﻻ اﻣﺘﺎز ﻋﻨﻪ ﺑﺸﻲ ج ﻋﻨﻪ و ء ﻏﲑﻩ داﺧﻞ ﻓﻴﻪ أو ﺧﺎر اﳌﻔﺮوض اﻧﺘﻔﺎؤﻩ ﻫﺬا ﺧﻠﻒ. و ﻣﻨﻬﺎ أﻧﻪ ﻟﻴﺲ ﺟﻮﻫﺮا و ﻻ ﻋﺮﺿﺎ أﻣﺎ أﻧﻪ ﻟﻴﺲ ﺟﻮﻫﺮا ﻓﻸن اﳉﻮﻫﺮ ﻣﺎﻫﻴﺔ إذا وﺟﺪت ﰲ اﳋﺎرج وﺟﺪت ﻻ ﰲ اﳌﻮﺿﻮع و اﻟﻮﺟﻮد ﻟﻴﺲ ﻣﻦ ﺳﻨﺦ اﳌﺎﻫﻴﺔ و أﻣﺎ أﻧﻪ ﻟﻴﺲ ﺑﻌﺮض ﻓﻸن ﻛﻞ ﺷﻲ اﻟﻌﺮض ﻣﺘﻘﻮم اﻟﻮﺟﻮد ﺑﺎﳌﻮﺿﻮع و اﻟﻮﺟﻮد ﻣﺘﻘﻮم ﺑﻨﻔﺲ ذاﺗﻪ و ﺑﻪ ء ﻣﺘﻘﻮم . و ﻣﻨﻬﺎ أﻧﻪ ﻟﻴﺲ ﺟﺰءا ﻟﺸﻲ ﻟﻪ ء ﻷن اﳉﺰء اﻵﺧﺮ اﳌﻔﺮوض ﻏﲑﻩ و اﻟﻮﺟﻮد ﻻ ﻏﲑ . ﻛﻞ ﳑﻜﻦ زوج ﺗﺮﻛﻴﱯ ﻣﻦ ﻣﺎﻫﻴﺔ و وﺟﻮد ﻓﺎﻋﺘﺒﺎر ﻋﻘﻠﻲ ﻧﺎﻇﺮ و ﻣﺎ ﻗﻴﻞ إن إﱃ اﳌﻼزﻣﺔ ﺑﲔ اﻟﻮﺟﻮد اﻹﻣﻜﺎﱐ و اﳌﺎﻫﻴﺔ ﻻ أﻧﻪ ﺗﺮﻛﻴﺐ ﻣﻦ ﺟﺰءﻳﻦ أﺻﻴﻠﲔ. ﻛﺎﳉﻨﺲ و اﻟﻔﺼﻞ و إﻣﺎ ﺟﺰء ﺧﺎرﺟﻲ و ﻣﻨﻬﺎ أﻧﻪ ﻻ ﺟﺰء ﻟﻪ ﻷن اﳉﺰء إﻣﺎ ﺟﺰء ﻋﻘﻠﻲ ﻛﺄﺟﺰاء اﳋﻂ و اﻟﺴﻄﺢ و اﳉﺴﻢ اﻟﺘﻌﻠﻴﻤﻲ و ﻟﻴﺲ ﻛﺎﳌﺎدة و اﻟﺼﻮرة و إﻣﺎ ﺟﺰء ﻣﻘﺪاري ﻟﻠﻮﺟﻮد ﺷﻲ ء ء ﻣﻦ ﻫﺬﻩ اﻷﺟﺰا. أﻣﺎ ﻛﺎن ﻟﻠﻮﺟﻮد ﺟﻨﺲ و ﻓﺼﻞ ﻓﺠﻨﺴﻪ إﻣﺎ اﻟﻮﺟﻮد ﻓﻴﻜﻮن ﻓﺼﻠﻪ اﳉﺰء اﻟﻌﻘﻠﻲ ﻓﻸﻧﻪ ﻟﻮ اﳌﻘﺴﻢ ﻣﻘﻮﻣﺎ ﻷن اﻟﻔﺼﻞ ﺑﺎﻟﻨﺴﺒﺔ إﱃ اﳉﻨﺲ ﻳﻔﻴﺪ ﲢﺼﻞ ذاﺗﻪ ﻻ أﺻﻞ ذاﺗﻪ و ﲢﺼﻞ اﻟﻮﺟﻮد ﻫﻮ ذاﺗﻪ ﻫﺬا ﺧﻠﻒ و إﻣﺎ ﻏﲑ اﻟﻮﺟﻮد و ﻻ ﻏﲑ ﻟﻠﻮﺟﻮد. و أﻣﺎ اﳉﺰء اﳋﺎرﺟﻲ و ﻫﻮ اﳌﺎدة و اﻟﺼﻮرة ﻓﻸن اﳌﺎدة و اﻟﺼﻮرة ﳘﺎ اﳉﻨﺲ و اﻟﻔﺼﻞ ﻣﺄﺧﻮذﻳﻦ ﺑﺸﺮط ﻻ ﻓﺎﻧﺘﻔﺎء اﳉﻨﺲ و اﻟﻔﺼﻞ ﻳﻮﺟﺐ اﻧﺘﻔﺎءﳘﺎ. و أﻣﺎ اﳉﺰء اﳌﻘﺪاري ﻓﻸن اﳌﻘﺪار ﻣﻦ ﻋﻮارض اﳉﺴﻢ و اﳉﺴﻢ ﻣﺮﻛﺐ ﻣﻦ اﳌﺎدة و اﻟﺼﻮرة و إذ ﻻ ﻣﺎدة و ﻻ ﺻﻮرة ﻟﻠﻮﺟﻮد ﻓﻼ ﺟﺴﻢ ﻟﻪ و إذ ﻻ ﺟﺴﻢ ﻟﻪ ﻓﻼ ﻣﻘﺪار ﻟﻪ و ﳑﺎ ﺗﻘﺪم ﻳﻈﻬﺮ أﻧﻪ ﻟﻴﺲ ﻧﻮﻋﺎ ﻷن ﲢﺼﻞ اﻟﻨﻮع ﺑﺎﻟﺘﺸﺨﺺ اﻟﻔﺮدي و اﻟﻮﺟﻮد ﻣﺘﺤﺼﻞ ﺑﻨﻔﺲ ذاﺗﻪ

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1.7. NEGATIVE PROPERTIES OF EXISTENCE One of the properties of existence is that it has no ‘other.’ Since its reality exhausts all fundamental reality, this necessitates the essential vacuity of anything that may be supposed as being alienated from it or besides it. Another of these properties is that it has no second, for the oneness of its fundamental reality and the vacuity of anything else that may be supposed, precludes its possessing any ingredient within it or appended to it. It is absolute (sirf), and a thing in its absoluteness does not yield to duplication or repetition. Any second that may be assumed for it would be either identical with the first, or differ from it due to something intrinsic or extrinsic that is other than it, and the supposition (that there is nothing except existence) negates any other. Another of these properties is that existence is neither substance nor accident. It is not substance, because substance is a quiddity that does not require a subject to subsist in external reality, while existence is not of the order of quiddity. As to its not being an accident, that is because an accident subsists through its subject and existence is self-subsisting and everything else subsists through it. Another of these properties is that existence is not a part of anything, because the other supposed part will be something other than existence, while existence has no other. As to the statement that ‘every contingent existent (mumkin) is a duality composed of quiddity and existence’ [which apparently implies that existence is a part of something], that is merely one of the intellect’s constructs (i’tibar ‘aqli) representing the necessary relation between contingent existence and quiddity. It does not mean that it is a compound made up of two parts possessing fundamental reality. Another of these properties is that existence has no constituents. Constituents may be: (i) conceptual, such as genus and differentia; (ii) external, such as matter and form; or (iii) quantitative, such as length, area, and volume. Existence possesses none of these parts. As to the absence of conceptual constituents in existence, were there a genus and differentia for existence, the genus would be either existence or something else. If the genus were existence, its differentia, which divides the genus, would constitute it, for the differentia in relation to the genus actualizes the genus [through species]; it does not constitute the essence of the genus itself. Existence, however, actualizes itself. The genus cannot be something other than existence, because existence has no other. As to external constituents, i.e. matter and form, they are genus and differentia, though like genus and differentia they are not predicable of each other. The negation of genus and differentia in regard to existence necessarily implies the negation of these also. As to quantitative constituents, magnitude is a property of bodies, which are composed of matter and form. Since existence has neither matter nor form, it follows that it has neither bodiness, nor, as consequence, magnitude.
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From what has been said, it become evident that existence has no species either, for a species is actualized by individuation, and existence is actualized by itself.
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اﻟﻔﺼﻞ اﻟﺜﺎﻣﻦ ﻓﻲ ﻣﻌﻨﻰ ﻧﻔﺲ اﻷﻣﺮ ﻗﺪ ﻇﻬﺮ ﳑﺎ ﺗﻘﺪم أن ﳊﻘﻴﻘﺔ اﻟﻮﺟﻮد ﺛﺒﻮﺗﺎ و ﲢﻘﻘﺎ ﺑﻨﻔﺴﻪ ﺑﻞ اﻟﻮﺟﻮد ﻋﲔ اﻟﺜﺒﻮت و اﻟﺘﺤﻘﻖ و أن ﻟﻠﻤﺎﻫﻴﺎت و ﻫﻲ اﻟﱵ ﺗﻘﺎل ﰲ ﺟﻮاب ﻣﺎ ﻫﻮ و ﺗﻮﺟﺪ ﺗﺎرة ﺑﻮﺟﻮد ﺧﺎرﺟﻲ ﻓﺘﻈﻬﺮ آﺛﺎرﻫﺎ و ﺗﺎرة ﺑﻮﺟﻮد ذﻫﲏ ﻓﻼ ﺗﱰﺗﺐ ﻋﻠﻴﻬﺎ اﻵﺛﺎر ﺛﺒﻮﺗﺎ و ﺎT ﲢﻘﻘﺎ ﺑﺎﻟﻮﺟﻮد ﻻ ﺑﻨﻔﺲ ذا ج ﻛﺎﻧﺎ ﻣﺘﺤﺪﻳﻦ ﰲ اﳋﺎرج و أن اﳌﻔﺎﻫﻴﻢ اﻻﻋﺘﺒﺎرﻳﺔ اﻟﻌﻘﻠﻴﺔ و ﻫﻲ اﻟﱵ ﱂ ﺗﻨﺘﺰع ﻣﻦ اﳋﺎر و إن ﻛﻤﻔﺎﻫﻴﻢ اﻟﻮﺟﻮد و اﻟﻮﺣﺪة و و إﳕﺎ اﻋﺘﱪﻫﺎ اﻟﻌﻘﻞ ﺑﻨﻮع ﻣﻦ اﻟﺘﻌﻤﻞ ﻟﻀﺮورة ﺗﻀﻄﺮﻩ إﱃ ذﻟﻚ اﻟﻌﻠﻴﺔ و ﳓﻮ ذﻟﻚ أﻳﻀﺎ ﳍﺎ ﳓﻮ ﺛﺒﻮت ﺑﺜﺒﻮت ﻣﺼﺎدﻳﻘﻬﺎ اﶈﻜﻴ ﺔ -ﺎ و إن ﱂ ﺗﻜﻦ ﻫﺬﻩ اﳌﻔﺎﻫﻴﻢ ﻣﺄﺧﻮذة ﰲ ﻣﺼﺎدﻳﻘﻬﺎ أﺧﺬ اﳌﺎﻫﻴﺔ ﰲ أﻓﺮادﻫﺎ و ﰲ ﺣﺪود ﻣﺼﺎدﻳﻘﻬﺎ. و ﻫﺬا اﻟﺜﺒﻮت اﻟﻌﺎم اﻟﺸﺎﻣﻞ ﻟﺜﺒﻮت اﻟﻮﺟﻮد و اﳌﺎﻫﻴﺔ و اﳌﻔﺎﻫﻴﻢ اﻻﻋﺘﺒﺎرﻳﺔ اﻟﻌﻘﻠﻴﺔ ﻫﻮ ﻛﺬا ﰲ ﻧﻔﺲ اﻷﻣﺮ ﻛﺬا اﳌﺴﻤﻰ ﺑﻨﻔﺲ اﻷﻣﺮ اﻟﱵ ﻳﻌﺘﱪ ﺻﺪق اﻟﻘﻀﺎﻳﺎ ﲟﻄﺎﺑﻘﺘﻬﺎ ﻓﻴﻘﺎل إن . ﻛﻘﻮﻟﻨﺎ اﻟﻮاﺟﺐ ﺗﻌﺎﱃ ﺗﻮﺿﻴﺢ ذﻟﻚ أن ﻣﻦ اﻟﻘﻀﺎﻳﺎ ﻣﺎ ﻣﻮﺿﻮﻋﻬﺎ ﺧﺎرﺟﻲ ﲝﻜﻢ ﺧﺎرﺟﻲ “ ﻣﻮﺟﻮد و ﻗﻮﻟﻨﺎ ﺧﺮج ﻣﻦ ﰲ اﻟﺒﻠﺪ و ﻗﻮﻟﻨﺎ ” اﻹﻧﺴﺎن ﺿﺎﺣﻚ ﺑﺎﻟﻘﻮة ﺻﺪق اﳊﻜﻢ ﻓﻴﻬﺎ ﲟﻄﺎﺑﻘﺘﻪ ﻟﻠﻮﺟﻮد اﻟﻌﻴﲏ. ﻛﻘﻮﻟﻨﺎ اﻟﻜﻠﻲ إﻣﺎ و ﻣﻨﻬﺎ ﻣﺎ ﻣﻮﺿﻮﻋﻬﺎ ذﻫﲏ ﲝﻜﻢ ذﻫﲏ أو ﺧﺎرﺟﻲ ﻣﺄﺧﻮذ ﲝﻜﻢ ذﻫﲏ ذاﰐ أو ﺎ ﻫﻮ T ﻋﺮﺿﻲ و اﻹﻧﺴﺎن ﻧﻮع و ﺻﺪق اﳊﻜﻢ ﻓﻴﻬﺎ ﲟﻄﺎﺑﻘﺘﻪ ﻟﻠﺬﻫﻦ ﻟﻜﻮن ﻣﻮﻃﻦ ﺛﺒﻮ ﻛﻼ اﻟﻘﺴﻤﲔ ﺻﺎدﻗﺎن ﲟﻄﺎﺑﻘﺘﻬﻤﺎ ﻟﻨﻔﺲ اﻷﻣﺮ ﻓﺎﻟﺜﺒﻮت اﻟﻨﻔﺲ اﻷﻣﺮي أﻋﻢ ﻣﻄﻠﻘﺎ اﻟﺬﻫﻦ و ﻛﻞ ﻣﻦ اﻟﺜﺒﻮت اﻟﺬﻫﲏ و اﳋﺎرﺟﻲ ﻣﻦ . و ﻗﻴﻞ إن ﻧﻔﺲ اﻷﻣﺮ ﻋﻘﻞ ﳎﺮد ﻓﻴﻪ ﺻﻮر اﳌﻌﻘﻮﻻت ﻋﺎﻣﺔ و اﻟﺘﺼﺪﻳﻘﺎت اﻟﺼﺎدﻗﺔ ﰲ اﻟﻘﻀﺎﻳﺎ اﻟﺬﻫﻨﻴﺔ و اﳋﺎرﺟﻴﺔ ﺗﻄﺎﺑﻖ ﻣﺎ ﻋﻨﺪﻩ ﻣﻦ اﻟﺼﻮر اﳌﻌﻘﻮﻟﺔ. و ﻓﻴﻪ أﻧﺎ ﻧﻨﻘﻞ اﻟﻜﻼم إﱃ ﻣﺎ ﻋﻨﺪﻩ ﻣﻦ اﻟﺼﻮر اﻟﻌﻠﻤﻴﺔ ﻓﻬﻲ ﺗﺼﺪﻳﻘﺎت ﲢﺘﺎج ﰲ ﺻﺪﻗﻬﺎ ج ﻋﻨﻬﺎ ﺗﻄﺎﺑﻘﻪ إﱃ ﺛﺒﻮت ﳌﻀﺎﻣﻴﻨﻬﺎ ﺧﺎر.
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1.8. THE MEANING OF ‘THE DOMAIN OF FACTUALITY’ From what has been said above,’ it becomes clear that existence has reality and actuality by itself, or, rather, existence is reality and actuality itself. Quiddities – which are represented by the reply to the question ‘What is it?’ – either occur as external existence, in which case they possess certain properties, or as mental existence, in which case they do not possess those properties. They obtain reality and actuality through existence, not by themselves, though the two of them, existence and quiddity, are united in external reality. The derivative (i’tibarí) concepts formulated by the intellect, e.g. existence, unity, causality and the like, are those that have not been abstracted from external reality. The intellect formulates them through a kind of analysis into which it is forced by necessity. Moreover, these concepts have a kind of subsistence (thubut) by virtue of the subsistence of the instances to which they refer, although they are not abstracted from their instances in the way quiddities are abstracted from their individual instances and their limits. Subsistence in general, including the subsistence of existence, quiddity, and i’tibari concepts, is called ‘fact’ (nafs al-amr). It is that to which a proposition must correspond in order to be true, as when one says, “The case is such and such in fact.” To explain, some propositions pertain to external reality, as when we say, “The Necessary Being exists,” or when we say, “The townspeople have left the city,” or when we say, “Man is potentially risible (capable of laughing).” The truth of these propositions depends on their correspondence to external reality. There are other propositions that pertain to the mind, in that they pertain to the mind’s formulations even if they should involve concepts abstracted from external reality, such as the propositions, “A universal is either essential or accidental,” and “Man is a species.” The criterion of truth in these cases is their correspondence to the mind, wherein they find subsistence. In each of the above cases, truth depends on correspondence to ‘fact.’ Hence ‘fact’ is more general than external or mental subsistence (althubût al-dhihni wa al-khârijî). Some philosophers have said that ‘fact’ is an immaterial intellect (‘aql mujarrad), which contains the general forms of the intelligibles. True judgements relating to propositions pertaining to the mind and external reality correspond to its intelligible forms. This is not admissible, for when we shift our discussion to the immaterial Intellect and its intelligible forms, we see that they are also judgements which in order to be true stand in need of correspondence of their contents to what is external to it.
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اﻟﻔﺼﻞ اﻟﺘﺎﺳﻊ اﻟﺸﻴﺌﻴﺔ ﺗﺴﺎوق اﻟﻮﺟﻮد اﻟﺸﻴﺌﻴﺔ ﺗﺴﺎوق اﻟﻮﺟﻮد و اﻟﻌﺪم ﻻ ﺷﻴﺌﻴﺔ ﻟﻪ إذ ﻫﻮ ﺑﻄﻼن ﳏﺾ ﻻ ﺛﺒﻮت ﻟﻪ ﻓﺎﻟﺜﺒﻮت و اﻟﻨﻔﻲ ﰲ ﻣﻌﲎ اﻟﻮﺟﻮد و اﻟﻌﺪم. و ﻋﻦ اﳌﻌﺘﺰﻟﺔ أن اﻟﺜﺒﻮت أﻋﻢ ﻣﻄﻠﻘﺎ ﻣﻦ اﻟﻮﺟﻮد ﻓﺒﻌﺾ اﳌﻌﺪوم ﺛﺎﺑﺖ ﻋﻨﺪﻫﻢ و ﻫﻮ اﳌﻌﺪوم اﳌﻤﻜﻦ و ﻳﻜﻮن ﺣﻴﻨﺌﺬ اﻟﻨﻔﻲ أﺧﺺ ﻣﻦ اﻟﻌﺪم و ﻻ ﻳﺸﻤﻞ إﻻ اﳌﻌﺪوم اﳌﻤﺘﻨﻊ. و ﻋﻦ ﺑﻌﻀﻬﻢ أن ﺑﲔ اﻟﻮﺟﻮد و اﻟﻌﺪم واﺳﻄ ﺎ اﳊﺎل و ﻫﻲ ﺻﻔﺔ اﳌﻮﺟﻮد اﻟﱵ 5 ﺔ و ﻳﺴﻤﻮ ﻛﺎﻟﻌﺎﳌﻴﺔ و اﻟﻘﺎدرﻳﺔ و اﻟﻮاﻟﺪﻳﺔ ﻣﻦ اﻟﺼﻔﺎت اﻻﻧﺘﺰاﻋﻴﺔ اﻟﱵ ﻻ ﻟﻴﺴﺖ ﲟﻮﺟﻮدة و ﻻ ﻣﻌﺪوﻣﺔ ﺎ ﻣﻌﺪوﻣﺔ و 5 ﺎ ﻣﻮﺟﻮدة و اﻟﺬات اﳌﻮﺟﻮدة ﺗﺘﺼﻒ -ﺎ ﻓﻼ ﻳﻘﺎل إ 5 وﺟﻮد ﻣﻨﺤﺎزا ﳍﺎ ﻓﻼ ﻳﻘﺎل إ أﻣﺎ اﻟﺜﺒﻮت و اﻟﻨﻔﻲ ﻓﻬﻤﺎ ﻣﺘﻨﺎﻗﻀﺎن ﻻ واﺳﻄﺔ ﺑﻴ ﺎ5 ﻛﻠﻬﺎ أوﻫﺎم ﻳﻜﻔﻲ ﰲ ﺑﻄﻼ ﻨﻬﻤﺎ و ﻫﺬﻩ ﻗﻀﺎء اﻟﻔﻄﺮة ﺑﺄن اﻟﻌﺪم ﺑﻄﻼن ﻻ ﺷﻴﺌﻴﺔ ﻟﻪ.
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1.9. THINGNESS AND EXISTENCE Thingness (shay’iyyah) is identical with existence, and non-existence has no entity, being sheer vacuity with no subsistence whatsoever. Hence subsistence [thubut) means existence, and ‘negation’ (nafy) means nonexistence. According to the Mu’tazilah, ‘subsistence’ (thubut) is more general than existence. They regard some non-existents – namely, ‘non-existent contingents’ (al-ma’dum al-mumkin) – as possessing a kind of subsistence. Hence, according to them, ‘negation’ has a narrower meaning than nonexistence, not including anything except impossible non-existents (alma’dum al-mumtani’). According to some of them, there is a middle stage between existents and non-existents which they call ‘state’ {hat), which is the attribute of a being that is neither existent nor non-existent, such as ‘knowledgeability’ (‘ilmiyyah), ‘fatherhood’ and ‘strength,’ which are abstracted qualities that have no independent existence. Hence they may not be said to exist, though existents possess these [relations and qualities]. Neither may they be said to be non-existent. As to subsistence (thubut) and negation (nafy), they are contradictories, there being no intermediary between them. Such ruminations are mere fancies. The self-evident judgement, based on sound natural sense that non-existence is vacuity and has no entity, suffices to refute them.
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اﻟﻔﺼﻞ اﻟﻌﺎﺷﺮ ﻓﻲ أﻧﻪ ﻻ ﺗﻤﺎﻳﺰ و ﻻ ﻋﻠﻴﺔ ﻓﻲ اﻟﻌﺪم أﻣﺎ ﻋﺪم اﻟﺘﻤﺎﻳﺰ ﻓﻸﻧﻪ ﻓﺮع اﻟﺜﺒﻮت و اﻟﺸﻴﺌﻴﺔ و ﻻ ﺛﺒﻮت و ﻻ ﺷﻴﺌﻴﺔ ﰲ اﻟﻌﺪم ﻧﻌﻢ رﲟﺎ ﻳﺘﻤﻴﺰ ﻋﺪم ﻣﻦ ﻋﺪم ﺑﺈﺿﺎﻓﺔ اﻟﻮﻫﻢ إﻳﺎﻩ إﱃ اﳌﻠﻜﺎت و أﻗﺴﺎم اﻟﻮﺟﻮد ﻓﻴﺘﻤﻴﺰ ﺑﺬﻟﻚ ﻋﺪم ﻣﻦ ﻛﻌﺪم اﻟﺒﺼﺮ و ﻋﺪم اﻟﺴﻤﻊ و ﻋﺪم زﻳﺪ و ﻋﺪم ﻋﻤﺮو و أﻣﺎ اﻟﻌﺪم اﳌﻄﻠﻖ ﻓﻼ ﲤﻴﺰ ﻓﻴﻪ ﻋﺪم . و أﻣﺎ ﻋﺪم اﻟﻌﻠﻴﺔ ﰲ اﻟﻌﺪم ﻓﻠﺒﻄﻼﻧﻪ و اﻧﺘﻔﺎء ﺷﻴﺌﻴﺘﻪ و ﻗﻮﳍﻢ ﻋﺪم اﻟﻌﻠﺔ ﻋﻠﺔ ﻟﻌﺪم اﳌﻌﻠﻮل ﺎز ﻓﻘﻮﳍﻢ ﻣﺜﻼ ﱂ ﻳﻜﻦ ﻏﻴﻢ ﻓﻠﻢ ﻳﻜﻦ ﻣﻄﺮ ﻣﻌﻨﺎﻩ ﺑﺎﳊﻘﻴﻘﺔ أﻧﻪ R ﻗﻮل ﻋﻠﻰ ﺳﺒﻴﻞ اﻟﺘﻘﺮﻳﺐ و ا ﻛﻤﺎ ﻗﻴﻞ ﻧﻈﲑ إﺟﺮاء أﺣﻜﺎم ﱂ ﻳﺘﺤﻘﻖ اﻟﻌﻠﻴﺔ اﻟﱵ ﺑﲔ وﺟﻮد اﻟﻐﻴﻢ و وﺟﻮد اﳌﻄﺮ و ﻫﺬا اﻟﻘﻀﺎﻳﺎ اﳌﻮﺟﺒﺔ ﰲ اﻟﺴﺎﻟﺒﺔ ﻓﻴﻘﺎل ﺳﺎﻟﺒﺔ ﲪﻠﻴ ﺔ و ﺳﺎﻟﺒﺔ ﺷﺮﻃﻴﺔ و ﳓﻮ ذﻟﻚ و إﳕﺎ ﻓﻴﻬﺎ ﺳﻠﺐ اﳊﻤﻞ و ﺳﻠﺐ اﻟﺸﺮط.
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1.10. ABSENCE OF DISTINCTION AND CAUSAL RELATIONSHIP IN NON-EXISTENCE As to the absence of distinction (tamayuz), distinction is something that derives from subsistence and being, while non-existence has no existence or being. Of course, at times, [absolute] non-existence is distinguished from the non-existence related by the mind to certain faculties and kinds of existents, such as non-existence of vision or hearing, or non-existence of Zayd and ‘Amr. However, there are no distinctions in absolute nonexistence. As to the absence of causality in non-existence, that is on account of its vacuity and nonentity. As to such statements as, “The non-existence of cause is the cause of non-existence of the effeet,” they involve loose and metaphoric expression. Hence when it is said, for instance, “There were no ciouds, and therefore there was no rain,” it means that the causal relation between the existence of clouds and the existence of rain did not materialize. This case, as has been pointed out, is similar to the application of the classification of affirmative propositions to negative ones, which are classified as “negative predicative propositions” and “negative implicative propositions,” and so on, although they involve the negation of predication and implication, respectively.
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اﻟﻔﺼﻞ اﻟﺤﺎدي ﻋﺸﺮ ﻓﻲ أن اﻟﻤﻌﺪوم اﻟﻤﻄﻠﻖ ﻻ ﺧﺒﺮ ﻋﻨﻪ و ﻳﺘﺒﲔ ذﻟﻚ ﲟﺎ ﺗﻘﺪم أﻧﻪ ﺑﻄﻼن ﳏﺾ ﻻ ﺷﻴﺌﻴﺔ ﻟﻪ ﺑﻮﺟﻪ و إﳕﺎ ﳜﱪ ﻋﻦ ﺷﻲ ﻲ . ء ﺑﺸ ء و أﻣﺎ اﻟﺸﺒﻬﺔ ﺑﺄن ﻗﻮﳍﻢ اﳌﻌﺪوم اﳌﻄﻠﻖ ﻻ ﳜﱪ ﻋﻨﻪ ﻳﻨﺎﻗﺾ ﻧﻔﺴﻪ ﻓﺈﻧﻪ ﺑﻌﻴﻨﻪ إﺧﺒﺎر ﻋﻨﻪ ﺑﻌﺪم اﻹﺧﺒﺎر ﻓﻬﻲ ﻣﻨﺪﻓﻌﺔ ﲟﺎ ﺳﻴﺠﻲ ء ﰲ ﻣﺒﺎﺣﺚ اﻟﻮﺣﺪة و اﻟﻜﺜﺮة ﻣﻦ أن ﻣﻦ اﳊﻤﻞ ﻣﺎ ﻫﻮ ﻛﻘﻮﻟﻨﺎ اﻹﻧﺴﺎن إﻧﺴﺎن و ﻣﻨﻪ أوﱄ ذاﰐ ﻳﺘﺤﺪ ﻓﻴﻪ اﳌﻮﺿﻮع و اﶈﻤﻮل ﻣﻔﻬﻮﻣﺎ و ﳜﺘﻠﻔﺎن اﻋﺘﺒﺎرا ﻣﺎ ﻫﻮ ﺷﺎﺋﻊ ﺻﻨﺎﻋﻲ ﻳﺘﺤﺪان ﻓﻴﻪ وﺟﻮدا و ﳜﺘﻠﻔﺎن ﻣﻔﻬﻮﻣﺎ ﻛﻘﻮﻟﻨﺎ اﻹﻧﺴﺎن ﺿﺎﺣﻚ و اﳌﻌﺪوم اﳌﻄﻠﻖ ﻣﻌﺪوم ﻣﻄﻠﻖ ﺑﺎﳊﻤﻞ اﻷوﱄ و ﻻ ﳜﱪ ﻋﻨﻪ و ﻟﻴﺲ ﲟﻌﺪوم ﻣﻄﻠﻖ ﺑﻞ ﻣﻮﺟﻮد ﻣﻦ اﳌﻮﺟﻮدات اﻟﺬﻫﻨﻴﺔ ﺑﺎﳊﻤﻞ اﻟﺸﺎﺋﻊ و ﻟﺬا ﳜﱪ ﻋﻨﻪ ﺑﻌﺪم اﻹﺧﺒﺎر ﻋﻨﻪ ﻓﻼ ﺗﻨﺎﻗﺾ. ﻛﻘﻮﻟﻨﺎ اﳉﺰﺋﻲ ﺟﺰﺋﻲ و و -ﺬا اﻟﺘﻘﺮﻳﺐ ﻳﻨﺪﻓﻊ اﻟﺸﺒﻬﺔ ﻋﻦ ﻋﺪة ﻗﻀﺎﻳﺎ ﺗﻮﻫﻢ اﻟﺘﻨﺎﻗﺾ ﻫﻮ ﻛﺜﲑﻳﻦ و ﻗﻮﻟﻨﺎ ﺷﺮﻳﻚ اﻟﺒﺎري ﳑﺘﻨﻊ ﻣﻊ أﻧﻪ ﻣﻌﻘﻮل ﰲ اﻟﺬﻫﻦ ﻓﻴﻜﻮن ﻛﻠﻲ ﻳﺼﺪق ﻋﻠﻰ ﺑﻌﻴﻨﻪ ﻣﻮﺟﻮدا ﻓﻴﻪ ﳑﻜﻨﺎ و ﻗﻮﻟﻨﺎ اﻟﺸﻲ ء إﻣﺎ ﺛﺎﺑﺖ ﰲ اﻟﺬﻫﻦ أو ﻻ ﺛﺎﺑﺖ ﻓﻴﻪ و اﻟﻼ ﺛﺎﺑﺖ ﰲ اﻟﺬﻫﻦ ﺛﺎﺑﺖ ﻓﻴﻪ ﻷﻧﻪ ﻣﻌﻘﻮل. ﻛﻠﻲ ﺑﺎﻟﺸﺎﺋﻊ و ﺷﺮﻳﻚ اﻟﺒﺎ وﺟﻪ اﻻﻧﺪﻓﺎع أن اﳉﺰﺋﻲ ﺟﺰﺋﻲ ﺑﺎﳊﻤﻞ اﻷوﱄ ري ﺷﺮﻳﻚ اﻟﺒﺎري ﺑﺎﳊﻤﻞ اﻷوﱄ و ﳑﻜﻦ ﳐﻠﻮق ﻟﻠﺒﺎري ﺑﺎﻟﺸﺎﺋﻊ و اﻟﻼ ﺛﺎﺑﺖ ﰲ اﻟﺬﻫﻦ ﻛﺬﻟﻚ ﺑﺎﳊﻤﻞ اﻷوﱄ و ﺛﺎﺑﺖ ﻓﻴﻪ ﺑﺎﻟﺸﺎﺋﻊ.
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1.11. ABSOLUTE NON-EXISTENCE ALLOWS OF NO PREDICATION From what was said earlier’ it becomes clear that non-existence is sheer vacuity, without any kind of entity, and only an entity can be predicated of an entity. However, a doubt has been raised here by those who state that the statement, “Non-existence allows of no predication,” is self-contradictory, for non- predicability is predicated of it. This argument stands refuted on the basis of the forthcoming discussion on unity and multiplicity.” To mention it briefly here, predication is either intensional (al-haml al-awwali al-dhati, lit. ‘primary essential predication’) or extensional (al-haml al-sha’i’ alsina’i, lit. ‘common technical predication’). In intensional predication, the subject and predicate are intensionally (mafhuman) one [as is the case with all tautologies and definitions], though they are different from the viewpoint of conceptual consideration (i’tibarari), as when we say, ‘Man is man.’ In extensional predication, the two are united in concrete reality (wujudan) but differ intensionally (mafhuman), as when we say, ‘Man is a risible being.’ Absolute non-existence is absolute non-existence from the viewpoint of intensional predication and does not allow of any predication, but is not absolute non-being from the viewpoint of extensional predication, but a [conceptual] entity present in the mind of which unpredicability is predicated. Hence no contradiction is involved here. In the light of this explanation, ambiguity is removed from a number of propositions that have been imagined to be paradoxical, e.g. ‘The particular is particular,’ ‘A deity besides God is impossible,’ and ‘A thing is either subsistent in the mind or non-subsistent in it.’ One may point out that the particular is a universal in that it applies to a multiplicity of objects, that ‘a deity besides God’ is an intelligible in the mind and has an entity there, that ‘what is non-subsistent in the mind’ subsists in the mind, which apprehends it. These apparent paradoxes are resolved when we recognize that the particular is a particular from the viewpoint of intensional predication and a universal from the viewpoint of extensional predication. ‘A deity besides God’ is such from the viewpoint of intensional predication and a creature of God and a contingent being [existing in the mind] from the viewpoint of extensional predication. The ‘non-subsistent in the mind’ is such from the viewpoint of intensional predication, and subsistent in the mind from the viewpoint of extensional predication.
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اﻟﻔﺼﻞ اﻟﺜﺎﻧﻲ ﻋﺸﺮ ﻓﻲ اﻣﺘﻨﺎع إﻋﺎدة اﻟﻤﻌﺪوم ﺑﻌﻴﻨﻪ ﻗﺎﻟﺖ اﳊﻜﻤﺎء إن إﻋﺎدة اﳌﻌﺪوم ﺑﻌﻴﻨﻪ ﳑﺘﻨﻌﺔ و ﺗﺒﻌﻬﻢ ﻓﻴﻪ ﺑﻌﺾ اﳌﺘﻜﻠﻤﲔ و أﻛﺜﺮﻫﻢ ﻋﻠﻰ اﳉ ز ﻮا. و ﻗﺪ ﻋﺪ اﻟﺸﻴﺦ اﻣﺘﻨﺎع إﻋﺎدة اﳌﻌﺪوم ﺿﺮورﻳﺎ و ﻫﻮ ﻣﻦ اﻟﻔﻄﺮﻳﺎت ﻟﻘﻀﺎء اﻟﻔﻄﺮة ﺑﺒﻄﻼن ﺷﻴﺌﻴﺔ اﳌﻌﺪوم ﻓﻼ ﻳﺘﺼﻒ ﺑﺎﻹﻋﺎدة. و اﻟﻘﺎﺋﻠﻮن ﺑﻨﻈﺮﻳﺔ اﳌﺴﺄﻟﺔ اﺣﺘﺠﻮا ﻋﻠﻴﻪ ﺑﻮﺟﻮﻩ : ﻣﻨﻬﺎ أﻧﻪ ﻟﻮ ﺟﺎز ﻟﻠﻤﻌﺪوم ﰲ زﻣﺎن أن ﻳﻌﺎد ﰲ زﻣﺎن آﺧﺮ ﺑﻌﻴﻨﻪ ﻟﺰم ﲣﻠﻞ اﻟﻌﺪم ﺑﲔ اﻟﺸﻲ ء و ﻧﻔﺴﻪ و ﻠﻞ ﻫﻮ ﳏﺎل ﻷﻧﻪ ﺣﻴﻨﺌﺬ ﻳﻜﻮن ﻣﻮﺟﻮدا ﺑﻌﻴﻨﻪ ﰲ زﻣﺎﻧﲔ ﺑﻴﻨﻬﻤﺎ ﻋﺪم ﻣﺘﺨ. ﺣﺠﺔ أﺧﺮى ﻟﻮ ﺟﺎزت إﻋﺎدة اﻟﺸﻲ ء ﺑﻌﻴﻨﻪ ﺑﻌﺪ اﻧﻌﺪاﻣﻪ ﺟﺎز إﳚﺎد ﻣﺎ ﳝﺎﺛﻠﻪ ﻣﻦ ﲨﻴﻊ اﻟﻮﺟﻮﻩ اﺑﺘﺪاء و اﺳﺘﺌﻨﺎﻓﺎ و ﻫﻮ ﳏﺎل أﻣﺎ اﳌﻼزﻣﺔ ﻓﻸن ﺣﻜﻢ اﻷﻣﺜﺎل ﻓﻴﻤﺎ ﳚﻮز و ﻓﻴﻤﺎ ﻻ ﳚﻮز واﺣﺪ و ﻣﺜﻞ اﻟﺸﻲ ء ء اﺑﺘﺪا ﻲ ﻤﺎ ﻳﺴﺎوﻳﺎن اﻟﺸ 5 و ﻣﻌﺎدﻩ ﺛﺎﻧﻴﺎ ﻻ ﻓﺮق ﺑﻴﻨﻬﻤﺎ ﺑﻮﺟﻪ ﻷ ء اﳌﺒﺘﺪأ ﻣﻦ ﲨﻴﻊ اﻟﻮﺟﻮﻩ و أﻣﺎ اﺳﺘﺤﺎﻟﺔ اﻟﻼزم ﻓﻼﺳﺘﻠﺰام اﺟﺘﻤﺎع اﳌﺜﻠﲔ ﰲ اﻟﻮﺟﻮد ﻋﺪم اﻟﺘﻤﻴﺰ ﺑﻴﻨﻬﻤﺎ ﻛﺜﲑ و ﻫﻮ ﳏﺎل و ﻫﻮ وﺣﺪة اﻟﻜﺜﲑ ﻣﻦ ﺣﻴﺚ ﻫﻮ . ﻛﻮن اﳌﻌﺎد ﻫﻮ اﳌﺒﺘﺪأ و ﻫﻮ ﳏ ﺣﺠﺔ أﺧﺮى إن إﻋﺎدة اﳌﻌﺪوم ﺗﻮﺟﺐ ﺎل ﻻﺳﺘﻠﺰاﻣﻪ ﻛﻮن اﳌﻌﺎد ﻫﻮ اﳌﺒﺘﺪأ ذاﺗﺎ و اﻻﻧﻘﻼب أو اﳋﻠﻒ ﺑﻴﺎن اﳌﻼزﻣﺔ أن إﻋﺎدة اﳌﻌﺪوم ﺑﻌﻴﻨﻪ ﻳﺴﺘﻠﺰم ﰲ ﲨﻴﻊ اﳋﺼﻮﺻﻴﺎت اﳌﺸﺨﺼﺔ ﺣﱴ اﻟﺰﻣﺎن ﻓﻴﻌﻮد اﳌﻌﺎد ﻋﲔ اﳌﺒﺘﺪأ و ﻫﻮ اﻻﻧﻘﻼب أو اﳋﻠﻒ. ﺣﺠﺔ أﺧﺮى ﻟﻮ ﺟﺎزت اﻹﻋﺎدة ﱂ ﻳﻜﻦ ﻋﺪد اﻟﻌﻮد ﺑﺎﻟﻐﺎ ﻣﻌﻴﻨﺎ ﻳﻘﻒ ﻋﻠﻴﻪ إذ ﻻ ﻓﺮق ﺑﲔ ﻛﻤﺎ ﱂ ﻳﻜﻦ ﻓﺮق ﺑﲔ اﳌﻌﺎد و اﳌﺒﺘﺪإ و ﺗﻌﲔ ﺎﻳﺔ ﻟﻪ 5 اﻟﻌﻮدة اﻷوﱃ و اﻟﺜﺎﻧﻴﺔ و ﻫﻜﺬا إﱃ ﻣﺎ ﻻ اﻟﻌﺪد ﻣﻦ ﻟﻮازم وﺟﻮد اﻟﺸﻲ ﺺ ء اﳌﺘﺸﺨ. ﻮزون ﺑﺄﻧﻪ ﻟﻮ اﻣﺘﻨﻌﺖ إﻋﺎدة اﳌﻌﺪوم ﻟﻜﺎن ذﻟﻚ إﻣﺎ ﳌﺎﻫﻴﺘﻪ و إﻣﺎ ﻟﻼزم ﻣﺎﻫﻴﺘﻪ و R اﺣﺘﺞ ا ﻛﺬﻟﻚ ﱂ ﻳﻮﺟﺪ اﺑﺘﺪاء و ﻫﻮ ﻛﺎن ﻟﻮ ﻪ ﻇﺎﻫﺮ و إﻣﺎ ﻟﻌﺎرض ﻣﻔﺎرق ﻓﻴﺰول اﻻﻣﺘﻨﺎع ﺑﺰواﻟ. ﻛﻤﺎ ﻫﻮ ﻇﺎﻫﺮ ﻣﻦ اﳊﺠﺞ و رد ﺑﺄن اﻻﻣﺘﻨﺎع ﻷﻣﺮ ﻻزم ﻟﻜﻦ ﻟﻮﺟﻮدﻩ و ﻫﻮﻳﺘﻪ ﻻ ﳌﺎﻫﻴﺘﻪ اﳌﺘﻘﺪﻣﺔ. و ﻋﻤﺪة ﻣﺎ دﻋﺎﻫﻢ إﱃ اﻟﻘﻮل ﲜﻮاز اﻹﻋﺎدة زﻋﻤﻬﻢ أن اﳌﻌﺎد و ﻫﻮ ﳑﺎ ﻧﻄﻘﺖ ﺑﻪ اﻟﺸﺮاﺋﻊ اﳊﻘﺔ ﻣﻦ ﻗﺒﻴﻞ إﻋﺎدة اﳌﻌﺪوم. و ﻳﺮدﻩ أن ل اﳌﻮت ﻧﻮع اﺳﺘﻜﻤﺎل ﻻ اﻧﻌﺪام و زوا.
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1.12. WHAT HAS CEASED TO EXIST DOES NOT COME BACK ITSELF The philosophers have held that something that has ceased to exist cannot come back itself. Some theologians have followed them in this belief, but most of them consider it possible. Ibn Sina considered the impossibility of the return of what has ceased to exist to be self-evident, for the intellect regards what has ceased to exist as a nonentity and vacuity, which cannot be characterized with return. Others [who do not consider the impossibility as self-evident], considering it to be based on inference, have offered certain arguments in this regard. (i) One of their arguments is that if it were admitted that something that has ceased to exist in a certain period of time can itself return in another period of time, non-existence would intervene between the thing and itself, which is impossible, because then it would exist in two periods separated by non-existence. (ii) Another argument is that if the return of a thing after its ceasing to exist were possible, we would also have to allow the possibility of a thing having another entity identical to itself in all respects during the first and the second periods, which is impossible. To explain, there is a rule that all identical things are to be judged equally with regard to what is possible for them and what is impossible for them. There is no difference in any respect between a thing’s ‘double’ in the first period and its returning counterpart in the second period, because they are supposedly identical to the first thing in all aspects. However, the coexistence of two existents identical in all respects necessarily implies the absence of distinction between them. This amounts to oneness of many qua many, which is impossible. (iii) Another argument is that the return of a thing that has ceased to exist requires that the returning counterpart be identical with the first thing, which is impossible because it implies a violation of the law of identity and a contradiction. To explain, the return of a thing that has itself ceased to exist entails that the returning counterpart should be the same as the first thing in respect of quiddity and all its individualizing qualities, even time, so that the returning thing be identical with the first, which involves a violation of the law of identity and a contradiction. (iv) Another argument is that if the return of a thing that has ceased to exist were admissible, there would be no definite limit to the number of returns. Then there would be no difference between the first, second, and the consecutive returns ad infinitum, in the same way as there is supposedly no difference between the first thing and its returning counterpart. However, determinate number is a necessary condition for the existence of an individual thing. Those who regard such a comeback as admissible advance the argument that should the coming back of a thing after ceasing to exist be impossible, that impossibility must inhere either in its quiddity or in a proprium associated with its quiddity. Evidently, if the case were such, the thing would not come into existence in the first place. Should the impossibility be
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due to a separable accident (‘arad mufariq), the impossibility would disappear on its disappearance. This argument is refutable on the ground that the impossibility is inherent in the thing’s existence and ipseity, not in its quiddity, as is evident from the above-mentioned arguments. The main reason that has led the believers in the possibility of a thing’s return after ceasing to exist is their belief that the doctrine of resurrection preached by the true heavenly religions involves belief in the return of things after their having ceased to exist. Such a notion is refutable on the ground that death is a kind of progression (istikmal), which does not involve extinction and cessation of existence.
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اﻟﻤﺮﺣﻠﺔ اﻟﺜﺎﻧﻴﺔ ﻓﻲ اﻧﻘﺴﺎم اﻟﻮﺟﻮد إﻟﻰ ﺧﺎرﺟﻲ و ذﻫﻨﻲ ﺪ و ﻓﻴﻬﺎ ﻓﺼﻞ واﺣ CHAPTER TWO: The Division of Existence into External and Mental 1Unit
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اﻟﻔﺼﻞ اﻷول ﻓﻲ اﻟﻮﺟﻮد ﻲ اﻟﺨﺎرﺟﻲ و اﻟﻮﺟﻮد اﻟﺬﻫﻨ ء اﻟﻮﺟﻮد اﳋﺎرﺟﻲ و ﻫﻮ اﻟﻮﺟﻮد اﻟﺬي ﻳﱰﺗﺐ ﻋﻠﻴﻬﺎ اﳌﺸﻬﻮر ﺑﲔ اﳊﻜﻤﺎء أن ﻟﻠﻤﺎﻫﻴﺎت ورا ﻓﻴﻪ اﻵﺛﺎر اﳌﻄﻠﻮﺑﺔ ﻣﻨﻬﺎ وﺟﻮدا آﺧﺮ ﻻ ﻳﱰﺗﺐ ﻋﻠﻴﻬﺎ ﻓﻴﻪ اﻵﺛﺎر و ﻳﺴﻤﻰ وﺟﻮدا ذﻫﻨﻴﺎ ج ﻗﺎﺋﻢ ﻻ ﰲ ﻣﻮﺿﻮع ﲟﺎ أﻧﻪ ﺟﻮﻫﺮ و ﻳﺼﺢ أن ﻳﻔﺮض ﻓﺎﻹﻧﺴﺎن اﳌﻮﺟﻮد ﰲ اﳋﺎر ﻓﻴﻪ أﺑﻌﺎد ﺛﻼﺛﺔ ﲟﺎ أﻧﻪ ﺟﺴﻢ و ﲟﺎ أﻧﻪ ﻧﺒﺎت و ﺣﻴﻮان و إﻧﺴﺎن ذو ﻧﻔﺲ ﻧﺒﺎﺗﻴﺔ و ﺣﻴﻮاﻧﻴﺔ و ﻧﺎﻃﻘﺔ و ﻳﻈﻬﺮ ﻣﻌﻪ آﺛﺎر ﻫﺬﻩ اﻷﺟﻨﺎس و اﻟﻔﺼﻮل و ﺧﻮاﺻﻬﺎ و اﻹﻧﺴﺎن اﳌﻮﺟﻮد ﰲ اﻟﺬﻫﻦ اﳌﻌﻠﻮم ﻟﻨﺎ إﻧﺴﺎن ذاﺗﺎ واﺟﺪ ﳊﺪﻩ ﻏﲑ أﻧﻪ ﻻ ﻳﱰﺗﺐ ﻋﻠﻴﻪ ﺷﻲ ﺔ ء ﻣﻦ ﺗﻠﻚ اﻵﺛﺎر اﳋﺎرﺟﻴ. و ذﻫﺐ ﺑﻌ ﻀﻬﻢ إﱃ أن اﳌﻌﻠﻮم ﻟﻨﺎ اﳌﺴﻤﻰ ﺑﺎﳌﻮﺟﻮد اﻟﺬﻫﲏ ﺷﺒﺢ اﳌﺎﻫﻴﺔ ﻻ ﻧﻔﺴﻬﺎ و اﳌﺮاد ﻛﻴﻒ ﻗﺎﺋﻢ ﺑﺎﻟﻨﻔﺲ ﻳﺒﺎﻳﻦ اﳌﻌﻠﻮم اﳋﺎرﺟﻲ ﰲ ذاﺗﻪ و ﻳﺸﺎ-ﻪ و ﳛﻜﻴﻪ ﰲ ﺑﻌﺾ ﺑﻪ ﻋﺮض و ﻛﺼﻮرة اﻟﻔﺮس اﳌﻨﻘﻮﺷﺔ ﻋﻠﻰ اﳉﺪار اﳊﺎﻛﻴﺔ ﻟﻠﻔﺮس اﳋﺎرﺟﻲ و ﻫﺬا ﰲ اﳊﻘﻴﻘﺔ ﺧﺼﻮﺻﻴﺎﺗﻪ ﺳﻔﺴﻄﺔ ﻳﻨﺴﺪ ﻣﻌﻬﺎ ﺑﺎب ا ﻪ ﻟﻌﻠﻢ ﺑﺎﳋﺎرج ﻣﻦ أﺻﻠ. و ذﻫﺐ ﺑﻌﻀﻬﻢ إﱃ إﻧﻜﺎر اﻟﻮﺟﻮد اﻟﺬﻫﲏ ﻣﻄﻠﻘﺎ و أن ﻋﻠﻢ اﻟﻨﻔﺲ ﺑﺸﻲ ء إﺿﺎﻓﺔ ﺧﺎﺻﺔ ﻣﻨﻬﺎ إﻟﻴﻪ و ﻳﺮدﻩ اﻟﻌﻠﻢ ﺑﺎﳌﻌﺪوم إذ ﻻ ﻣﻌﲎ ﳏﺼﻼ ﻟﻺﺿﺎﻓﺔ إﱃ اﳌﻌﺪوم. و اﺣﺘﺞ اﳌﺸﻬﻮر ﻋﻠﻰ ﻣﺎ ذﻫﺒﻮا إﻟﻴﻪ ﻣﻦ اﻟﻮﺟﻮد اﻟﺬﻫﲏ ﺑﻮﺟﻮﻩ اﻷول أﻧﺎ ﳓﻜﻢ ﻋﻠﻰ اﳌﻌﺪوﻣﺎت ﺑﺄﺣﻜﺎ ﻛﺬا و ﻗﻮﻟﻨﺎ اﺟﺘﻤﺎع اﻟﻨﻘﻴﻀﲔ ﻏﲑ اﺟﺘﻤﺎع ﻛﻘﻮﻟﻨﺎ ﲝﺮ ﻣﻦ زﻳﺒﻖ م إﳚﺎﺑﻴﺔ اﻟﻀﺪﻳﻦ إﱃ ﻏﲑ ذﻟﻚ و اﻹﳚﺎب إﺛﺒﺎت و إﺛﺒﺎت ﺷﻲ ﻲ ء ﻟﺸ ء ﻓﺮع ﺛﺒﻮت اﳌﺜﺒﺖ ﻟﻪ ﻓﻠﻬﺬﻩ ج ﻓﻔﻲ ﻣﻮﻃﻦ آﺧﺮ و ﻧﺴﻤﻴﻪ اﻟﺬﻫﻦ اﳌﻮﺿﻮﻋﺎت اﳌﻌﺪوﻣﺔ وﺟﻮد و إذ ﻟﻴﺲ ﰲ اﳋﺎر. اﻟﺜﺎﱐ أﻧﺎ ﻧﺘﺼﻮر أﻣﻮرا ﺗﺘﺼﻒ ﺑﺎﻟﻜﻠﻴﺔ و ﻛﺎﻹﻧﺴﺎن اﻟﻜﻠﻲ و اﳊﻴﻮان اﻟﻜﻠﻲ و اﻟﻌﻤﻮم ﻛﻠﻲ ﰲ اﻟﺘﺼﻮر إﺷﺎرة ﻋﻘﻠﻴﺔ ﻻ ﺗﺘﺤﻘﻖ إﻻ ﲟﺸﺎر إﻟﻴﻪ ﻣﻮﺟﻮد و إذ ﻻ وﺟﻮد ﻟﻠﻜﻠﻲ ﲟﺎ ﻫﻮ ج ﻓﻬﻲ ﻣﻮﺟﻮدة ﰲ ﻣﻮﻃﻦ آﺧﺮ و ﻧﺴﻤﻴﻪ اﻟﺬﻫﻦ اﳋﺎر. ﻛﻞ ﺣﻘﻴﻘﺔ و ﻫﻮ اﳊﻘﻴﻘﺔ ﳏﺬوﻓﺎ ﻋﻨﻬﺎ ﻣﺎ ﻳﻜﺜﺮﻫﺎ ﺑﺎﳋﻠﻂ و اﻟﺜﺎﻟﺚ أﻧﺎ ﻧﺘﺼﻮر اﻟﺼﺮف ﻣﻦ ﻛ اﻻﻧﻀﻤﺎم ﻲ ﺎﻟﺒﻴﺎض اﳌﺘﺼﻮر ﲝﺬف ﲨﻴﻊ اﻟﺸﻮاﺋﺐ اﻷﺟﻨﺒﻴﺔ و ﺻﺮف اﻟﺸ ء ﻻ ﻳﺘﺜﲎ و ﻻ ﻳﺘﻜﺮر ﻓﻬﻮ واﺣﺪ وﺣﺪة ﺟﺎﻣﻌﺔ ﻟﻜﻞ ﻣﺎ ﻫﻮ ﻣﻦ ﺳﻨﺨﻪ و اﳊﻘﻴﻘﺔ -ﺬا اﻟﻮﺻﻒ ﻏﲑ ﻣﻮﺟﻮدة ﰲ اﳋﺎرج ﻓﻬﻲ ﻣﻮﺟﻮدة ﰲ ﻣﻮﻃﻦ آﺧﺮ ﻧﺴﻤﻴﻪ اﻟﺬﻫﻦ.
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2.1: The External Existence and Mental Existence The prevalent view among the metaphysicians is that quiddities, besides their external existence (al-wujûd al-khârijî), wherein they possess the properties (âthâr) expected of them, have another existence called ‘mental existence.” However, they do not possess those properties in their mental mode of existence. For instance, the human being exists in external reality and, being a substance, it exists there without the need of a subject (mawdû). As a body (jism), it is valid to ascribe to it three dimensions. Moreover, as a ‘living thing,’ ‘animal’ and ‘human being,’ it manifests the properties and characteristics of these genera and differentiae. However, the human being existing in the mind, though it fulfils the definition of ‘human being,’ does not possess any of these external properties. However, some of them hold that what we know (the so-called ‘mental existence’) is a resemblance (shabah) of the quiddity, not the quiddity itself. It is an accident (‘arad) and a quality (kayf) subsisting through the soul (nafs). In its essence (dhât) it differs from the external thing known, only resembling it and representing some of its characteristics. It is like the picture of a horse painted on a wall that represents the horse existing in external reality. Such a view in fact boils down to a denial of the possibility of knowledge, for it totally closes the door to the knowledge of external reality.” Some others have been led to deny mental existence altogether, holding that the soul’s knowledge of an external object is a special relation between it and the soul. Such a position is refuted by the knowledge of anything nonexistent; for the soul’s relation to something non-existent is meaningless. Those who believe in mental existence have advanced the following arguments in its favour. (i) We make affirmative judgements concerning non-existents, as about a “sea of mercury,” or posit such propositions as “The co-existence of two contradictories (naqîdayn) is different from the co-existence of two contraries (diddayn)” and the like. Affirmation means to posit the subsistence of something. The affirmation of one thing (B) in regard to another thing (A) is subordinate to the subsistence of A. Hence subjects that are non-existent [in external reality] have an existence. Since they have no existence in external reality, they must have an existence somewhere else, that is, the mind. (ii) We conceptualize certain notions possessing universality (kulliyyah), such as the universals ‘man’ and ‘animal.’ A concept is a rational pointer that has no significance unless it points to an existent. Since the universals qua universals do not exist in external reality, they must have existence somewhere. That somewhere is the mind. (iii) We can conceive every reality in the state of absolute simplicity wherein it is divested of everything that may be mixed with it or appended to it [in external reality]. For instance, there is the concept of ‘whiteness,’ which is divested of everything other than whiteness. Every thing in its absoluteness (sirf al-shay’) does not allow of duality and multiplicity. It is one and encompasses in its unity every thing of its kind. A reality with such
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a characteristic does not exist in the external world. Hence it must exist in an other locus, which we call ‘the mind.’
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ﺗﺘﻤﺔ ﻗﺪ ت اﺳﺘﺸﻜﻞ ﻋﻠﻰ وﺟﻮد اﳌﺎﻫﻴﺎت ﰲ اﻟﺬﻫﻦ ﲟﻌﲎ ﺣﺼﻮﳍﺎ ﺑﺄﻧﻔﺴﻬﺎ ﻓﻴﻪ إﺷﻜﺎﻻ: ﻛﻮن اﻟﺸﻲ اﻹﺷﻜﺎل اﻷول أن اﻟﻘﻮل ﲝﺼﻮل اﳌﺎﻫﻴﺎت ﺑﺄﻧﻔﺴﻬﺎ ﰲ اﻟﺬﻫﻦ ﻳﺴﺘﻠﺰم ء اﻟﻮاﺣﺪ ﺟﻮﻫﺮا و ﻋﺮﺿﺎ ﻣﻌﺎ و ﻫﻮ ﳏﺎل ﺑﻴﺎن اﳌﻼزﻣﺔ أن اﳉﻮﻫﺮ اﳌﻌﻘﻮل ﰲ اﻟﺬﻫﻦ ﺟﻮﻫﺮ ﺑﻨﺎء ﻋﻠﻰ اﳓﻔﺎظ اﻟﺬاﺗﻴﺎت و ﻫﻮ ﺑﻌﻴﻨﻪ ﻋﺮض ﻟﻘﻴﺎﻣﻪ ﺑﺎﻟﻨﻔﺲ ﻗﻴﺎم اﻟﻌﺮض ﲟﻌﺮوﺿﻪ و أﻣﺎ ﺑﻄﻼن اﻟﻼزم ﻛﻮﻧﻪ ﻗﺎﺋﻤﺎ ﺑﺎﳌﻮﺿﻮع و ﻏﲑ ﻗﺎﺋﻢ ﺑﻪ ﻓﻠﻠﺰوم . اﻹﺷﻜﺎل اﻟﺜﺎﱐ أن اﳌﺎﻫﻴﺔ اﻟﺬﻫﻨﻴﺔ ﻣﻨﺪرﺟﺔ ﲢﺖ ﻣﻘﻮﻟﺔ اﻟﻜﻴﻒ ﺑﻨﺎء ﻋﻠﻰ ﻣﺎ ذﻫﺒﻮا إﻟﻴﻪ ﻣﻦ ﻛﺎن ﻣﻨﺪرﺟﺎ ﲢﺖ ﻣﻘ ﻛﻮن اﻟﺼﻮر اﻟﻌﻠﻤﻴﺔ ﻛﻴﻔﻴﺎت ﻧﻔﺴﺎﻧﻴﺔ ﰒ إﻧﺎ إذا ﺗﺼﻮرﻧﺎ ﺟﻮﻫﺮا ﻮﻟﺔ اﳉﻮﻫﺮ ﻛﻤﺎ ﺗﻘﺪم و اﳌﻘﻮﻻت ﻣﺘﺒﺎﻳﻨﺔ ﺑﺘﻤﺎم اﻟﺬوات ﻓﻴﻠﺰم ﻻﳓﻔﺎظ اﻟﺬاﺗﻴﺎت و ﲢﺖ ﻣﻘﻮﻟﺔ اﻟﻜﻴﻒ ﻛﺎﻧﺖ اﳌﺎﻫﻴﺔ اﳌﺘﺼﻮرة ﻣﻨﺪرﺟﺔ اﻟﺘﻨﺎﻗﺾ ﰲ اﻟﺬات و ﻛﺬا إذا ﺗﺼﻮرﻧﺎ ﻣﻘﻮﻟﺔ أﺧﺮى ﻏﲑ اﳉﻮﻫﺮ ﻛﺎن ﻣﻨﺪرﺟﺎ ﲢﺖ اﻟﻜﻴﻒ اﶈﺴﻮس و اﻟﻜﻴﻒ ﻛﻴﻔﺎ ﳏﺴﻮﺳﺎ ﻛﺬا ﻟﻮ ﺗﺼﻮرﻧﺎ ﲢﺖ ﻣﻘﻮﻟﺘﲔ و ا ﺷﻲ ج ﻟﻨﻔﺴﺎﱐ و ﻫﻮ اﻧﺪرا ﺔ ء واﺣﺪ ﲢﺖ ﻧﻮﻋﲔ ﻣﺘﺒﺎﻳﻨﲔ ﻣﻦ ﻣﻘﻮﻟﺔ و اﺳﺘﺤﺎﻟﺘﻪ ﺿﺮورﻳ. ﻛﻮن ﺷﻲ ﻛﺜﲑ إﺷﻜﺎل ﰲ ﻗﺎﻟﻮا و ﻫﺬا اﻹﺷﻜﺎل أﺻﻌﺐ ﻣﻦ اﻷول إذ ﻻ ء واﺣﺪ ﺟﻮﻫﺮا و ﻋﺮﺿﺎ ﻷن اﻟﺘﺒﺎﻳﻦ اﻟﺬاﰐ اﻟﺬي ﺑﲔ اﳌﻘﻮﻻت إﳕﺎ ﻫﻮ ﺑﲔ اﳉﻮﻫﺮ و اﻟﻜﻴﻒ و اﻟﻜﻢ و ﻏﲑﻫﺎ و أﻣﺎ ﻣﻔﻬﻮم اﻟﻌﺮض ﲟﻌﲎ اﻟﻘﺎﺋﻢ ﺑﺎﳌﻮﺿﻮع ﻓﻬﻮ ﻋﺮض ﻋﺎم ﺻﺎدق ﻋﻠﻰ ﺗﺴﻊ ﻣﻦ اﳌﻘﻮﻻت و ﻣﻦ اﳉﺎﺋﺰ أن ﻳﻌﻢ اﳉﻮﻫﺮ اﻟﺬﻫﲏ أﻳﻀﺎ و ﻳﺼﺪق ﻋﻠﻴﻪ ﻷن اﳌﺄﺧﻮذ ﰲ رﺳﻢ اﳉﻮﻫﺮ أﻧﻪ ﻣﺎﻫﻴﺔ إذا وﺟﺪت ﰲ اﳋﺎرج وﺟﺪت ﻻ ﰲ ﻣﻮﺿﻮع ﻓﻤﻦ اﳉﺎﺋﺰ أن ﻳﻘﻮم ﰲ اﻟﺬﻫﻦ ﰲ ﻣﻮﺿﻮع و ﻫﻮ ﻛﺎن ﻻ ﰲ ﻣﻮﺿﻮع ج إذا وﺟﺪ ﰲ اﳋﺎر ﻫﺬا. ﻛﺎﻟﻜﻢ و اﻟﻜﻴﻒ و ﻛﺎﳉﻮﻫﺮ و اﻟﻜﻴﻒ و و أﻣﺎ دﺧﻮل اﳌﺎﻫﻴﺔ اﻟﻮاﺣﺪة ﲢﺖ ﻣﻘﻮﻟﺘﲔ اﳌﻘﻮﻻت ﻣﺘﺒﺎﻳﻨﺎت ﺑﺘﻤﺎم اﻟﺬوات ﻓﺎﺳﺘﺤﺎﻟﺘﻪ ﺿﺮورﻳﺔ ﻻ ﻣﺪﻓﻊ ﳍﺎ. و ﺑﺎﻟﺘﻮﺟﻪ إﱃ ﻣﺎ ﺗﻘﺪم ﻣﻦ اﻹﺷﻜﺎل و ﳓﻮﻩ ذﻫﺐ ﺑﻌﻀﻬﻢ إﱃ إﻧﻜﺎر اﻟﻮﺟﻮد اﻟﺬﻫﲏ ﻣﻦ أﺻﻠﻪ ﺑﺎﻟﻘﻮل ﺑﺄن اﻟﻌﻠﻢ ﺑﺈﺿﺎﻓﺔ ﻣﻦ اﻟﻨﻔﺲ إ ج ﲢﺖ ﻣﻘﻮﻟﺘﻪ اﳋﺎرﺟﻴﺔ ﱃ اﳋﺎرج ﻓﺎﳌﻌﻠﻮم ﻣﻨﺪر ﻓﻘﻂ و ﻗﺪ ﻋﺮﻓﺖ ﻣﺎ ﻓﻴﻪ. و ﺑﻌﻀﻬﻢ إﱃ أن اﳌﺎﻫﻴﺎت اﳋﺎرﺟﻴﺔ ﻣﻮﺟﻮدة ﰲ اﻟﺬﻫﻦ ﺑﺄﺷﺒﺎﺣﻬﺎ ﻻ ﺑﺄﻧﻔﺴﻬﺎ و ﺷﺒﺢ اﻟﺸﻲ ﻲ ء ﻳﻐﺎﻳﺮ اﻟﺸ ﻛﻴﻔﻴﺔ ﻧﻔﺴﺎﻧﻴﺔ و أﻣﺎ اﳌﻘﻮﻟﺔ اﳋﺎرﺟﻴﺔ ﻓﻐﲑ ﺑﺎﻗﻴﺔ ء و ﻳﺒﺎﻳﻨﻪ ﻓﺎﻟﺼﻮرة اﻟﺬﻫﻨﻴﺔ ﻓﻴﻬﺎ ﻓﻼ إﺷﻜﺎل و ﻗﺪ ﻋ ﻪ ﺮﻓﺖ ﻣﺎ ﻓﻴ. : و ﻗﺪ أﺟﻴﺐ ﻋﻦ اﻹﺷﻜﺎل ﺑﻮﺟﻮﻩ
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ﻣﻨﻬﺎ ﻣﺎ ﻋﻦ ﺑﻌﻀﻬﻢ أن اﻟﻌﻠﻢ ﻏﲑ اﳌﻌﻠﻮم ﻓﻌﻨﺪ ﺣﺼﻮل ﻣﺎﻫﻴﺔ ﻣﻦ اﳌﺎﻫﻴﺎت اﳋﺎرﺟﻴﺔ ﰲ ﻛﺎﻧﺖ ﻋﻠﻴﻪ ﰲ اﳋﺎرج و ﻫﻮ اﳌﻌﻠﻮم و ﻫﻮ اﻟﺬﻫﻦ أﻣﺮان أﺣﺪﳘﺎ اﳌﺎﻫﻴﺔ اﳊﺎﺻﻠﺔ ﻧﻔﺴﻬﺎ ﻋﻠﻰ ﻣﺎ ﻏﲑ ﻗﺎﺋﻢ ﺑﺎﻟﻨﻔﺲ ﺑﻞ ﻗﺎﺋﻢ ﺑﻨﻔﺴﻪ ﺣﺎﺻﻞ ﻓﻴﻪ ﺣﺼﻮل اﻟﺸﻲ ء ﰲ اﻟﺰﻣﺎن و اﳌﻜﺎن و اﻵﺧﺮ ج ﺻﻔﺔ ﺣﺎﺻﻠﺔ ﻟﻠﻨﻔﺲ ﻗﺎﺋﻤﺔ -ﺎ ﻳﻄﺮد -ﺎ ﻋﻨﻬﺎ اﳉﻬﻞ و ﻫﻮ اﻟﻌﻠﻢ و ﻋﻠﻰ ﻫﺬا ﻓﺎﳌﻌﻠﻮم ﻣﻨﺪر ﻛﻴﻒ ﻧﻔﺴﺎﱐ ﻓﻼ اﺟﺘﻤﺎع أﺻﻼ ﻛﻢ أو ﻏﲑ ذﻟﻚ و اﻟﻌﻠﻢ ﲢﺖ ﻣﻘﻮﻟﺘﻪ اﳋﺎرﺟﻴﺔ ﻣﻦ ﺟﻮﻫﺮ أو ﻻ ﳌﻘﻮﻟﺘﲔ و ﻻ ﻟﻨﻮﻋﲔ ﻣﻦ ﻣﻘﻮﻟﺔ. و ﻓﻴﻪ أﻧﻪ ﺧﻼف ﻣﺎ ﳒﺪﻩ ﻣﻦ أﻧﻔﺴﻨﺎ ﻋﻨﺪ اﻟﻌﻠﻢ ﻓﺈن اﻟﺼﻮرة اﳊﺎﺻﻠﺔ ﰲ ﻧﻔﻮﺳﻨﺎ ﻋﻨﺪ اﻟﻌﻠﻢ ﺑﺸﻲ ﺑﻪ ء ﻫﻲ ﺑﻌﻴﻨﻬﺎ اﻟﱵ ﺗﻄﺮد ﻋﻨﺎ اﳉﻬﻞ و ﺗﺼﲑ وﺻﻔﺎ ﻟﻨﺎ ﻧﺘﺼﻒ . و ﻣﻨﻬﺎ ﻣﺎ ﻋﻦ ﺑﻌﺾ اﻟﻘﺎﺋﻠﲔ ﺑﺄﺻﺎﻟﺔ اﳌﺎﻫﻴﺔ أن اﻟﺼﻮرة اﳊﺎﺻﻠﺔ ﰲ اﻟﺬﻫﻦ ﻣﻨﺴﻠﺨﺔ ﻋﻦ ﻣﺎﻫﻴﺘﻬﺎ اﳋﺎرﺟﻴﺔ و ﻣﻨﻘﻠﺒﺔ إﱃ اﻟﻜﻴﻒ ﺑﻴﺎن ذﻟﻚ أن ﻣﻮﺟﻮدﻳﺔ اﳌﺎﻫﻴﺔ ﻣﺘﻘﺪ ﻣﺔ ﻋﻠﻰ ﻧﻔﺴﻬﺎ ﻓﻤﻊ ﻗﻄﻊ اﻟﻨﻈﺮ ﻋﻦ اﻟﻮﺟﻮد ﻻ ﻣﺎﻫﻴﺔ أﺻﻼ و اﻟﻮﺟﻮد اﻟﺬﻫﲏ و اﳋﺎرﺟﻲ ﳐﺘﻠﻔﺎن ﺑﺎﳊﻘﻴﻘﺔ ﻓﺈذا ﺗﺒﺪل اﻟﻮﺟﻮد ﺑﺼﲑورة اﻟﻮﺟﻮد اﳋﺎرﺟﻲ ذﻫﻨﻴﺎ ﺟﺎز أن ﺗﻨﻘﻠﺐ اﳌﺎﻫﻴﺔ ﺑﺄن ﻳﺘﺒﺪل اﳉﻮﻫﺮ أو ﻛﻴﻔﺎ ﻓﻠﻴﺲ ﻟﻠﺸﻲ اﻟﻜﻢ أو ﻏﲑ ذﻟﻚ ﺬ ء ﺑﺎﻟﻨﻈﺮ إﱃ ذاﺗﻪ ﺣﻘﻴﻘﺔ ﻣﻌﻴﻨﺔ ﺑﻞ اﻟﻜﻴﻔﻴﺔ اﻟ ﻫﻨﻴﺔ إذا ﻛﻴﻔﺎ ﻛﺎن ﻛﺎﻧﺖ ﺟﻮﻫﺮا أو ﻏﲑﻩ و اﳉﻮﻫﺮ اﳋﺎرﺟﻲ إذا وﺟﺪ ﰲ اﻟﺬﻫﻦ ج وﺟﺪت ﰲ اﳋﺎر ﻧﻔﺴﺎﻧﻴﺎ و أﻣﺎ ﻣﺒﺎﻳﻨﺔ اﳌﺎﻫﻴﺔ اﻟﺬﻫﻨﻴﺔ ﻟﻠﺨﺎرﺟﻴﺔ ﻣﻊ أن اﳌﺪﻋﻰ ﺣﺼﻮل اﻷﺷﻴﺎء ﺑﺄﻧﻔﺴﻬﺎ ﰲ اﻟﺬﻫﻦ و ﻫﻮ ﻳﺴﺘﺪﻋﻲ أﺻﻼ ﻣﺸﱰﻛﺎ ﺑﻴﻨﻬﻤﺎ ﻓﻴﻜﻔﻲ ﰲ ﺗﺼﻮﻳﺮﻩ أن ﻳﺼﻮر اﻟﻌﻘﻞ أﻣﺮا ﻣﺒﻬﻤﺎ ﻣﺸﱰﻛﺎ ﺑﻴ ﻛﻤﺎ ﻳﺼﻮر اﳌﺎدة اﳌﺸﱰﻛﺔ ﺑﲔ ج ﻨﻬﻤﺎ ﻳﺼﺤﺢ ﺑﻪ أن ﻣﺎ ﰲ اﻟﺬﻫﻦ ﻫﻮ اﻟﺬي ﰲ اﳋﺎر اﻟﻜﺎﺋﻦ و اﻟﻔﺎﺳﺪ اﳌﺎدﻳﲔ. و ﻓﻴﻪ أوﻻ : أﻧﻪ ﻻ ﳏﺼﻞ ﳌﺎ ذﻛﺮﻩ ﻣﻦ ﺗﺒﺪل اﳌﺎﻫﻴﺔ و اﺧﺘﻼف اﻟﻮﺟﻮدﻳﻦ ﰲ اﳊﻘﻴﻘﺔ ﺑﻨﺎء ﻋﻠﻰ ﻣﺎ ذﻫﺐ إﻟﻴﻪ ﻣﻦ أﺻﺎﻟﺔ اﳌﺎﻫﻴﺔ و اﻋﺘﺒﺎرﻳﺔ اﻟﻮﺟﻮد. و ﺛﺎﻧﻴﺎ :ﻣﻌﲎ أﻧﻪ ﰲ اﻟﻘﻮل ﺑﺎﻟﺸﺒﺢ ﺑﻨﺎء ﻋﻠﻰ ﻣﺎ اﻟﺘﺰم ﺑﻪ ﻣﻦ اﳌﻐﺎﻳﺮة اﻟﺬاﺗﻴﺔ ﺑﲔ اﻟﺼﻮرة اﻟﺬﻫﻨﻴﺔ و اﳌﻌﻠﻮم اﳋﺎرﺟﻲ ﻓﻴﻠﺤﻘﻪ ﻣﺎ ﳊﻘﻪ ﻣﻦ ﳏﺬور اﻟﺴﻔﺴﻄﺔ و ﻣﻨﻬﺎ ﻣﺎ ﻋﻦ ﺑﻌﻀﻬﻢ أن ﻛﺎن ﻣﻦ ﻣﻘﻮﻟﺔ اﳌﻌﻠﻮم إن ﺟﻮﻫﺮا ﻓﺠﻮﻫﺮ و إن ﻛﺎن ﻣﺘﺤﺪا ﺑﺎﻟﺬات ﻣﻊ اﳌﻌﻠﻮم ﺑﺎﻟﺬات اﻟﻌﻠﻢ ﳌﺎ ﻛﻤﺎ ﻓﻜﻢ و ﻫﻜﺬا و أﻣﺎ ﺗﺴ ﻛﻞ ﻛﻤﺎ ﻳﺴﻤﻰ ﻛﻴﻔﺎ ﻓﻤﺒﲏ ﻋﻠﻰ اﳌﺴﺎﳏﺔ ﰲ اﻟﺘﻌﺒﲑ ﻤﻴﺘﻬﻢ اﻟﻌﻠﻢ ﻛﺎن ﺟﻮﻫﺮا ﻛﻴﻔﺎ ﰲ اﻟﻌﺮف اﻟﻌﺎم و إن وﺻﻒ ﻧﺎﻋﺖ ﻟﻠﻐﲑ . ج اﳌﻘﻮﻻت اﻵﺧﺮ ﲢﺖ اﻟﻜﻴﻒ و -ﺬا ﻳﻨﺪﻓﻊ إﺷﻜﺎل اﻧﺪرا. ﻛﻮن ﺷﻲ و إﻣﺎ إﺷﻜﺎل ء واﺣﺪ ﺟﻮﻫﺮا و ﻋﺮﺿﺎ ﻣﻌﺎ ﻓﺎﳉﻮاب ﻋﻨﻪ ﻣﺎ ﺗﻘﺪم أن ﻣﻔﻬﻮم اﻟﻌﺮض ﻋﺮض ﻋﺎم ﺷﺎﻣﻞ ﻟﻠﻤ ﻪ ﻘﻮﻻت اﻟﺘﺴﻊ اﻟﻌﺮﺿﻴﺔ و ﻟﻠﺠﻮﻫﺮ اﻟﺬﻫﲏ و ﻻ إﺷﻜﺎل ﻓﻴ.
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و ﻓﻴﻪ أن ﳎﺮد ﺻﺪق ﻣﻔﻬﻮم ﻣﻘﻮﻟﺔ ﻣﻦ اﳌﻘﻮﻻت ﻋﻠﻰ ﺷﻲ ﻛﻤﺎ ء ﻻ ﻳﻮﺟﺐ اﻧﺪراﺟﻪ ﲢﺘﻬﺎ ﺳﺘﺠﻲ ﻪ ء اﻹﺷﺎرة إﻟﻴ. ﻋﻠﻰ : ﻛﻴﻔﺎ ﻧﻔﺴﺎﻧﻴﺎ داﺧﻼ ﲢﺖ ﻣﻘﻮﻟﺔ اﻟﻜﻴﻒ ﻛﻮن اﻟﻌﻠﻢ اﳊﺼﻮﱄ أن ﻛﻼﻣﻬﻢ ﺻﺮﻳﺢ ﰲ ﺣﻘﻴﻘﺔ ﻣﻦ ﻏﲑ ﻣﺴﺎﳏﺔ. و ﻣﻨﻬﺎ ﻣ ج ﺑﲔ اﳊﻤﻞ ﻛﺘﺒﻪ و ﻫﻮ اﻟﻔﺮق ﰲ إﳚﺎب اﻻﻧﺪرا ﺎ ذﻛﺮﻩ ﺻﺪر اﳌﺘﺄﳍﲔ رﻩ ﰲ اﻷوﱄ و ﺑﲔ اﳊﻤﻞ اﻟﺸﺎﺋﻊ ﻓﺎﻟﺜﺎﱐ ﻳﻮﺟﺒﻪ دون اﻷول ﺑﻴﺎن ذﻟﻚ أن ﳎﺮد أﺧﺬ ﻣﻔﻬﻮم ﺟﻨﺴﻲ أو ﻧﻮﻋﻲ ﰲ ﺣﺪ ﺷﻲ ﻲ ج ذﻟﻚ اﻟﺸ ء و ﺻﺪﻗﻪ ﻋﻠﻴﻪ ﻻ ﻳﻮﺟﺐ اﻧﺪرا ء ﲢﺖ ذﻟﻚ اﳉﻨﺲ أو ج ﲢﺘﻪ اﻟﻨﻮع ﺑﻞ ﻳﺘﻮﻗﻒ اﻻﻧﺪرا ﻋﻠﻰ ﺗﺮﺗﺐ آﺛﺎر ذﻟﻚ اﳉﻨﺲ أو اﻟﻨﻮع اﳋﺎرﺟﻴﺔ ﻋﻠﻰ ذﻟﻚ اﻟﺸﻲ ء. ﻓﻤﺠﺮد أﺧﺬ اﳉﻮﻫﺮ و اﳉﺴﻢ ﻣﺜﻼ ﰲ ﺣﺪ اﻹﻧﺴﺎن ﺣﻴﺚ ﻳﻘﺎل اﻹﻧﺴﺎن ﺟﻮﻫﺮ ﺟﺴﻢ ﻧﺎم ﺣﺴﺎس ﻣﺘﺤﺮك ﺑﺎﻹرادة ﻧﺎﻃﻖ ﻻ ﻳﻮﺟﺐ اﻧﺪراﺟﻪ ﲢﺖ ﻣﻘﻮﻟﺔ اﳉﻮﻫﺮ أو ﺟﻨﺲ اﳉﺴﻢ ﺣﱴ ﻛﻮﻧﻪ ﺟﻮﻫﺮا و ﻳﻜﻮن ﻳﻜﻮن ﻣﻮﺟﻮدا ﻻ ﰲ ﻣﻮﺿﻮع ﺑﺎﻋﺘﺒﺎر ﲝﻴﺚ ﻳﺼﺢ أن ﻳﻔﺮض ﻓﻴﻪ اﻷﺑﻌﺎد ﻛﻮﻧﻪ ﺟﺴﻤﺎ و ﻫﻜﺬا اﻟﺜﻼﺛﺔ ﺑﺎﻋﺘﺒﺎر . ﻛﻢ ﻣﺘﺼﻞ ﻗﺎر ﻛﺬا ﳎﺮد أﺧﺬ اﻟﻜﻢ و اﻻﺗﺼﺎل ﰲ ﺣﺪ اﻟﺴﻄﺢ ﺣﻴﺚ ﻳﻘﺎل اﻟﺴﻄﺢ و ﻣﻨﻘﺴﻢ ﰲ ﺟﻬﺘﲔ ﻻ ﻳﻮﺟﺐ اﻧﺪراﺟﻪ ﲢﺖ اﻟﻜﻢ و اﳌﺘﺼﻞ ﻣﺜﻼ ﺣﱴ ﻳﻜﻮن ﻗﺎﺑﻼ ﻟﻼﻧﻘﺴﺎم
ﻛﻢ و ﻣﺸﺘﻤﻼ ﻋﻠﻰ اﻟﻔﺼﻞ اﳌﺸﱰ ﺑﺬاﺗﻪ ﻣﻦ ﺟﻬﺔ أﻧﻪ ا ك ﻣﻦ ﺟﻬﺔ أﻧﻪ ﻣﺘﺼﻞ و ﻫﻜﺬ. ﻛﺎن ﳎﺮد ﺻﺪق ﻣﻔﻬﻮم ﻋﻠﻰ ﺷﻲ و ﻟﻮ ﻛﻠﻲ ﻓﺮدا ﻟﻨﻔﺴﻪ ج ﻟﻜﺎن ﻛﻞ ﻣﻔﻬﻮم ء ﻣﻮﺟﺒﺎ ﻟﻼﻧﺪرا ج ﻳﺘﻮﻗﻒ ﻋﻠﻰ ﺗﺮﺗﺐ اﻵﺛﺎر و ﻣﻌﻠﻮم أن ﺗﺮﺗﺐ اﻵﺛﺎر ﻟﺼﺪﻗﻪ ﺑﺎﳊﻤﻞ اﻷوﱄ ﻋﻠﻰ ﻧﻔﺴﻪ ﻓﺎﻻﻧﺪرا إﳕﺎ ﻳﻜﻮن ﰲ اﻟﻮﺟﻮد اﳋﺎرﺟﻲ دون اﻟﺬﻫﲏ. ﻓﺘﺒﲔ :ﻏﲑ أن اﻟﺼﻮرة اﻟﺬﻫﻨﻴﺔ ﻣﻨﺪرﺟﺔ ﲢﺖ ﻣﺎ ﻳﺼﺪق ﻋﻠﻴﻬﺎ ﻣﻦ اﳌﻘﻮﻻت ﻟﻌﺪم ﺗﺮﺗﺐ آﺛﺎرﻫﺎ ﻋﻠﻴﻬﺎ ﻟﻜﻦ اﻟﺼﻮرة اﻟﺬﻫﻨﻴﺔ إﳕﺎ ﻻ ﺗﱰﺗﺐ ﻋﻠﻴﻬﺎ آﺛﺎر اﳌﻌﻠﻮم اﳋﺎرﺟﻲ ﻣﻦ ﺣﻴﺚ ﻫﻲ ﺎ ﺣﺎﺻﻠﺔ ﻟﻠﻨﻔﺲ ﺣﺎﻻ أو 5 وﺟﻮد ﻣﻘﻴﺲ إﱃ ﻣﺎ ﲝﺬاﺋﻬﺎ ﻣﻦ اﻟﻮﺟﻮد اﳋﺎرﺟﻲ و أﻣﺎ ﻣﻦ ﺣﻴﺚ إ ﻣﻠﻜﺔ ﺗﻄﺮد ﻋﻨﻬﺎ اﳉﻬﻞ ﻓﻬﻲ وﺟﻮد ﺧﺎرﺟﻲ ﻣﻮﺟﻮد ﻟﻠ ﻨﻔﺲ ﻧﺎﻋﺖ ﳍﺎ ﻳﺼﺪق ﻋﻠﻴﻪ ﺣﺪ ج ﺑﺎﻟﺬات اﻟﻜﻴﻒ ﺑﺎﳊﻤﻞ اﻟﺸﺎﺋﻊ و ﻫﻮ أﻧﻪ ﻋﺮض ﻻ ﻳﻘﺒﻞ ﻗﺴﻤﺔ و ﻻ ﻧﺴﺒﺔ ﻟﺬاﺗﻪ ﻓﻬﻮ ﻣﻨﺪر ج داﺧﻼ ﲢﺖ ﻛﻮﻧﻪ وﺟﻮدا ذﻫﻨﻴﺎ ﻣﻘﻴﺴﺎ إﱃ اﳋﺎر ﲢﺖ ﻣﻘﻮﻟﺔ اﻟﻜﻴﻒ و إن ﱂ ﻳﻜﻦ ﻣﻦ ﺟﻬﺔ ﺷﻲ ض ء ﻣﻦ اﳌﻘﻮﻻت ﻟﻌﺪم ﺗﺮﺗﺐ اﻵﺛﺎر اﻟﻠﻬﻢ إﻻ ﲢﺖ ﻣﻘﻮﻟﺔ اﻟﻜﻴﻒ ﺑﺎﻟﻌﺮ. و – ﻛﻮن ﻛﻴﻔﺎ ﺑﺎﻟﺬات و ﻛﻮن اﻟﻌﻠﻢ ﺬا اﻟﺒﻴﺎن ﻳﺘﻀﺢ اﻧﺪﻓﺎع ﻣﺎ أوردﻩ ﺑﻌﺾ اﶈﻘﻘﲔ ﻋﻠﻰ ﻛﻴﻔﺎ ﺑﺎﻟﻌﺮض ﻣﻦ أن وﺟﻮد ﺗﻠﻚ اﻟﺼﻮر ﰲ ﻧﻔﺴﻬﺎ و وﺟﻮدﻫﺎ ﻟﻠﻨﻔﺲ واﺣﺪ و اﻟﺼﻮرة اﻟﺬﻫﻨﻴﺔ
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ﻛﻴﻔﺎ ﰲ اﻟﻨﻔﺲ ﻟﻴﺲ ذﻟﻚ اﻟﻮﺟﻮد و اﻟﻈﻬﻮر ﻟﻠﻨﻔﺲ ﺿﻤﻴﻤﺔ ﺗﺰﻳﺪ ﻋﻠﻰ وﺟﻮدﻫﺎ ﺗﻜﻮن ﻫﻲ ﻷن وﺟﻮدﻫﺎ اﳋﺎرﺟﻲ ﱂ ﻳﺒﻖ ﺑ ﻛﻞ ﻣﻦ ﻣﻘﻮﻟﺔ ﺧﺎﺻﺔ و ﺑﺎﻋﺘﺒﺎر ﺎ ﰲ أﻧﻔﺴﻬﺎ T ﻜﻠﻴﺘﻪ و ﻣﺎﻫﻴﺎ وﺟﻮدﻫﺎ اﻟﺬﻫﲏ ﻻ ﺟﻮﻫﺮ و ﻻ ﻋﺮض و ﻇﻬﻮرﻫﺎ ﻟﺪى اﻟﻨﻔﺲ ﻟﻴﺲ ﺳﻮى ﺗﻠﻚ اﳌﺎﻫﻴﺔ و ذﻟﻚ اﻟﻮﺟﻮد إذ ﻇﻬﻮر اﻟﺸﻲ ء ﻟﻴﺲ أﻣﺮا ﻳﻨﻀﻢ إﻟﻴﻪ و إﻻ ﻟﻜﺎن ﻇﻬﻮر ﻧﻔﺴﻪ و ﻟﻴﺲ ﻫﻨﺎك أﻣﺮ آﺧﺮ و اﻟﻜﻴﻒ ﻣﻦ اﶈﻤﻮﻻت ﺑﺎﻟﻀﻤﻴﻤﺔ و اﻟﻈﻬﻮر و اﻟﻮﺟ ﻛﺎن ﻛﺎن ﻧﺴﺒﺔ ﻣﻘﻮﻟﻴﺔ ﻮد ﻟﻠﻨﻔﺲ ﻟﻮ ﻛﺎن وﺟﻮدا ﻓﺎﻟﻌﻠﻢ ﻧﻮر و ﻇﻬﻮر و ﳘﺎ ﻛﺎن إﺿﺎﻓﺔ إﺷﺮاﻗﻴﺔ ﻛﻴﻔﺎ و إذا ﻣﺎﻫﻴﺔ اﻟﻌﻠﻢ إﺿﺎﻓﺔ ﻻ وﺟﻮد و اﻟﻮﺟﻮد ﻟﻴﺲ ﻣﺎﻫﻴﺔ. وﺟﻪ اﻻﻧﺪﻓﺎع : أن اﻟﺼﻮرة اﻟﻌﻠﻤﻴﺔ ﻫﻲ اﳌﻮﺟﻮدة ﻟﻠﻨﻔﺲ اﻟﻈﺎﻫﺮة ﳍﺎ ﻟﻜﻦ ﻻ ﻣﻦ ﺣﻴﺚ ﺎ ﻣﻮﺟﻮدا ذﻫﻨﻴﺎ ﻣﻘﻴﺴﺎ إﱃ ﺧﺎرج ﻻ ﺗ 5ﻛﻮ ﺎ ﺣﺎﻻ أو ﻣﻠﻜﺔ 5ﻛﻮ ﱰﺗﺐ ﻋﻠﻴﻬﺎ آﺛﺎرﻩ ﺑﻞ ﻣﻦ ﺣﻴﺚ ﻛﻤﺎل ﻟﻠﻨﻔﺲ زاﺋﺪ ﻋﻠﻴﻬﺎ ﻧﺎﻋﺖ ﳍﺎ و ﻫﺬا أﺛﺮ ﺧﺎرﺟﻲ ﻣﱰﺗﺐ ﻟﻠﻨﻔﺲ ﺗﻄﺮد ﻋﻨﻬﺎ ﻋﺪﻣﺎ و ﻫﻲ ﻛﺎﻧﺖ اﻟﻨﻔﺲ ﻣﻮﺿﻮﻋﺔ ﳍﺎ ﻣﺴﺘﻐﻨﻴﺔ ﻋﻨﻬﺎ ﰲ ﻧﻔﺴﻬﺎ ﻓﻬﻲ ﻋﺮض ﳍﺎ و ﻳﺼﺪق ﻋﻠﻴﻬﺎ و إذا ﻋﻠﻴﻬﺎ ﺣﺪ اﻟﻜﻴﻒ و دﻋﻮى أن ﻟﻴﺲ ﻫﻨﺎك أﻣﺮ زاﺋﺪ ﻋﻠﻰ اﻟﻨﻔﺲ ﻣﻨﻀ ﺔ ﻢ إﻟﻴﻬﺎ ﳑﻨﻮﻋ. ﻓﻈﻬﺮ : ﻛﻴﻒ ﺣﻘﻴﻘﺔ و ﺑﺎﻟﺬات ﺎ ﺣﺎﻻ أو ﻣﻠﻜﺔ ﻟﻠﻨﻔﺲ 5ﻛﻮ أن اﻟﺼﻮرة اﻟﻌﻠﻤﻴﺔ ﻣﻦ ﺣﻴﺚ ﻛﻴﻒ ﺑﺎﻟﻌﺮض و ﻫﻮ اﳌﻄﻠﻮب ﺎ ﻣﻮﺟﻮدا ذﻫﻨﻴﺎ 5ﻛﻮ و ﻣﻦ ﺣﻴﺚ . اﻹﺷﻜﺎل اﻟﺜﺎﻟﺚ أن ﻻزم اﻟﻘﻮل ﺑﺎﻟﻮﺟﻮد اﻟﺬﻫﲏ و ﺣﺼﻮل اﻷﺷﻴﺎء ﺑﺄﻧﻔﺴﻬﺎ ﰲ اﻷذﻫﺎن ﻛﻮن اﻟﻨﻔﺲ ﺣﺎرة ﺑﺎردة ﻋﺮﻳﻀﺔ ﻃﻮﻳﻠﺔ ﻛﺎﻓﺮة و ﻫﻜﺬا ﻋﻨﺪ ﻣﺘﺤﻴﺰة ﻣﺘ ﺤ ﺮﻛﺔ ﻣﺮﺑﻌﺔ ﻣﺜﻠﺜﺔ ﻣﺆﻣﻨﺔ ﺗﺼﻮر اﳊﺮارة و اﻟﱪودة إﱃ ﻏﲑ ذﻟﻚ و ﻫﻮ ﺑﺎﻃﻞ ﺑﺎﻟﻀﺮورة ﺑﻴﺎن اﳌﻼزﻣﺔ أﻧﺎ ﻻ ﻧﻌﲏ ﺑﺎﳊﺎر و اﻟﺒﺎرد و اﻟﻌﺮﻳﺾ و اﻟﻄﻮﻳﻞ و ﳓﻮ ذﻟﻚ إﻻ ﻣﺎ ﺣﺼﻠﺖ ﻟﻪ ﻫﺬﻩ اﳌﻌﺎﱐ و ﻗﺎﻣﺖ ﺑﻪ. ﻛﺎﳊﺮارة و ا و اﳉﻮاب ﻋﻨﻪ أن اﳌﻌﺎﱐ اﳋﺎرﺟﻴﺔ ﻟﱪودة و ﳓﻮﳘﺎ إﳕﺎ ﲢﺼﻞ ﰲ اﻷذﻫﺎن ﺎ اﻟﻌﻴﻨﻴﺔ و ﺗﺼﺪق ﻋﻠﻴﻬﺎ ﺑﺎﳊﻤﻞ اﻷوﱄ دون اﻟﺸﺎﺋﻊ و اﻟﺬي ﻳﻮﺟﺐ T ﺎ ﻻ ﺑﻮﺟﻮدا T ﲟﺎﻫﻴﺎ ﺎT ﺎ دون ﺣﺼﻮل ﻣﺎﻫﻴﺎ T ﺎ اﳋﺎرﺟﻴﺔ و ﻗﻴﺎﻣﻬﺎ ﲟﻮﺿﻮﻋﺎ T اﻻﺗﺼﺎف ﺣﺼﻮل ﻫﺬﻩ اﳌﻌﺎﱐ ﺑﻮﺟﻮدا ﳍﺎ و ﻗﻴﺎم ﻣﺎ ﻫﻲ ﻫﻲ ﺑﺎﳊﻤﻞ اﻷوﱄ. اﻹﺷﻜﺎل اﻟﺮاﺑﻊ أﻧﺎ ﻧﺘ ﻛﺸﺮﻳﻚ اﻟﺒﺎري و اﺟﺘﻤﺎع اﻟﻨﻘﻴﻀﲔ و ﺼﻮر اﶈﺎﻻت اﻟﺬاﺗﻴﺔ ارﺗﻔﺎﻋﻬﻤﺎ و ﺳﻠﺐ اﻟﺸﻲ ﻛﺎﻧﺖ اﻷﺷﻴﺎء ﺣﺎﺻﻠﺔ ﺑﺄﻧﻔﺴﻬﺎ ﰲ اﻷذﻫﺎن اﺳﺘﻠﺰم ء ﻋﻦ ﻧﻔﺴﻪ ﻓﻠﻮ ذﻟﻚ ﺛﺒﻮت اﶈﺎﻻت اﻟﺬاﺗﻴﺔ. و اﳉﻮاب ﻋﻨﻪ أن اﳊﺎﺻﻞ ﻣﻦ اﶈﺎﻻت اﻟﺬاﺗﻴﺔ ﰲ اﻷذﻫﺎن ﻣﻔﺎﻫﻴﻤﻬﺎ ﺑﺎﳊﻤﻞ اﻷوﱄ دون اﳊﻤﻞ اﻟﺸﺎﺋﻊ ﻓ ﺸﺮﻳﻚ اﻟﺒﺎري ﰲ اﻟﺬﻫﻦ ﺷﺮﻳﻚ اﻟﺒﺎري ﺑﺎﳊﻤﻞ اﻷوﱄ و أﻣﺎ ﺑﺎﳊﻤﻞ اﻟﺸﺎﺋﻊ ﻛﻴﻔﻴﺔ ﻧﻔﺴﺎﻧﻴﺔ ﳑﻜﻨﺔ ﳐﻠﻮﻗﺔ ﻟﻠﺒﺎري و ﻫﻜﺬا ﰲ ﺳﺎﺋﺮ اﶈﺎﻻت ﻓﻬﻮ .
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اﻹﺷﻜﺎل اﳋﺎﻣﺲ أﻧﺎ ﻧﺘﺼﻮر اﻷرض ﲟﺎ رﺣﺒﺖ ﺑﺴﻬﻮﳍﺎ و ﺟﺒﺎﳍﺎ و ﺑﺮارﻳﻬﺎ و ﲝﺎرﻫﺎ و ﻣﺎ ﻓﻮﻗﻬﺎ ﻣﻦ اﻟﺴﻤﺎء ﺑﺄرﺟﺎﺋﻬﺎ اﻟﺒﻌﻴﺪة و اﻟﻨﺠﻮم و ا ﻟﻜﻮاﻛﺐ ﺑﺄﺑﻌﺎدﻫﺎ اﻟﺸﺎﺳﻌﺔ و ﺣﺼﻮل ﻫﺬﻩ ﻛﻤﺎ ﻗﺎﻟﻮا ﺑﻪ ﻣﻦ اﳌﻘﺎدﻳﺮ اﻟﻌﻈﻴﻤﺔ ﰲ اﻟﺬﻫﻦ ﲟﻌﲎ اﻧﻄﺒﺎﻋﻬﺎ ﰲ ﺟﺰء ﻋﺼﱯ أو ﻗﻮة دﻣﺎﻏﻴﺔ اﻧﻄﺒﺎع اﻟﻜﺒﲑ ﰲ اﻟﺼﻐﲑ و ﻫﻮ ﳏﺎل و دﻓﻊ اﻹﺷﻜﺎل ﺑﺄن اﳌﻨﻄﺒﻊ ﻓﻴﻪ ﻣﻨﻘﺴﻢ إﱃ ﻏﲑ اﻟﻨﻬﺎﻳﺔ ﻛﺎﻧﺖ ﻣﻨﻘﺴﻤﺔ ﻻ ﳚﺪي ﺷﻴﺌﺎ ﻓﺈن اﻟﻜﻒ ﻻ ﺗﺴﻊ اﳉﺒﻞ و إن ﺔ إﱃ ﻏﲑ اﻟﻨﻬﺎﻳ. ﻛﻤﺎ ﺳﻴﺄﰐ أن اﻟﺼﻮر اﻹدراﻛﻴﺔ اﳉﺰﺋﻴﺔ ﻏﲑ ﻣﺎدﻳﺔ ﺑﻞ ﳎﺮدة ﲡﺮدا و اﳉﻮاب ﻋﻨﻪ أن اﳊﻖ ﻣﺜﺎﻟﻴﺎ ﻓﻴﻬﺎ آﺛﺎر اﳌﺎدة ﻣﻦ ﻣﻘﺪار و ﺷﻜﻞ و ﻏﲑﳘﺎ دون ﻧﻔﺲ اﳌﺎدة ﻓﻬﻲ ﺣﺎﺻﻠﺔ ﻟﻠﻨﻔﺲ ﰲ ﻣﺮﺗﺒﺔ ﲡﺮدﻩ اﳌﺜﺎﱄ ﻣﻦ ﻏﲑ أن ﺗﻨﻄﺒﻊ ﰲ ﺟﺰء ﺑﺪﱐ أو ﻗﻮة ﻣﺘﻌﻠﻘﺔ ﲜﺰء ﺑﺪﱐ. و ﻲ أﻣﺎ اﻷﻓﻌﺎل و اﻻﻧﻔﻌﺎﻻت اﳊﺎﺻﻠﺔ ﰲ ﻣﺮﺣﻠﺔ اﳌﺎدة ﻋﻨﺪ اﻹﺣﺴﺎس ﺑﺸ ء أو ﻋﻨﺪ ﲣﻴﻠﻪ ﻓﺈﳕﺎ ﻫﻲ ﻣﻌﺪات ﺗﺘﻬﻴﺄ -ﺎ اﻟﻨﻔﺲ ﳊﺼﻮل اﻟﺼﻮر اﻟﻌﻠﻤﻴﺔ اﳉﺰﺋﻴﺔ اﳌﺜﺎﻟﻴﺔ ﻋﻨﺪﻫﺎ. اﻹﺷﻜﺎل اﻟﺴﺎدس أن ﻋﻠﻤﺎء اﻟﻄﺒﻴﻌﺔ ﺑﻴﻨﻮا أن اﻹﺣﺴﺎس و اﻟﺘﺨﻴﻞ ﲝﺼﻮل ﺻﻮر اﻷﺟﺴﺎم اﳌﺎدﻳﺔ ﲟﺎ ﳍﺎ ﻣﻦ اﻟﻨﺴﺐ غ و اﳋﺼﻮﺻﻴﺎت اﳋﺎرﺟﻴﺔ ﰲ اﻷﻋﻀﺎء اﳊﺎﺳﺔ و اﻧﺘﻘﺎﳍﺎ إﱃ اﻟﺪﻣﺎ ﻣﻊ ﻣﺎ ﳍﺎ ﻣﻦ اﻟﺘﺼﺮف ﻓﻴﻬﺎ ﲝﺴﺐ ﻃﺒﺎﺋﻌﻬﺎ اﳋﺎﺻﺔ و اﻹﻧﺴﺎن ﻳﻨﺘﻘﻞ إﱃ ﺧﺼﻮﺻﻴﺔ ﻣﻘﺎدﻳﺮﻫﺎ ء اﻟﺼﻮرة اﳊﺎﺻﻠﺔ ﻋﻨﺪﻩ ﻋﻠﻰ ﻣﺎ ﻓﺼﻠﻮﻩ ﰲ و أﺑﻌﺎدﻫﺎ و أﺷﻜﺎﳍﺎ ﺑﻨﻮع ﻣﻦ اﳌﻘﺎﻳﺴﺔ ﺑﲔ أﺟﺰا ﳏﻠﻪ و ﻣﻊ ذﻟﻚ ﻻ ﳎﺎل ﻟﻠﻘﻮل ﲝ ن ﻀﻮر اﳌﺎﻫﻴﺎت اﳋﺎرﺟﻴﺔ ﺑﺄﻧﻔﺴﻬﺎ ﰲ اﻷذﻫﺎ. و اﳉﻮاب ﻋﻨﻪ أن ﻣﺎ ذﻛﺮوﻩ ﻣﻦ اﻟﻔﻌﻞ و اﻻﻧﻔﻌﺎل اﳌﺎدي ﻋﻨﺪ ﺣﺼﻮل اﻟﻌﻠﻢ ﺑﺎﳉﺰﺋﻴﺎت ﰲ ﳏﻠﻪ ﻟﻜﻦ ﻫﺬﻩ اﻟﺼﻮر اﳌﻨﻄﺒﻌﺔ اﳌﻐﺎﻳﺮة ﻟﻠﻤﻌﻠﻮﻣﺎت اﳋﺎرﺟﻴﺔ ﻟﻴﺴﺖ ﻫﻲ اﳌﻌﻠﻮﻣﺔ ﺑﺎﻟﺬات ﺑﻞ ﻫﻲ ﻣﻌﺪات Tﲕ ﺎ ء اﻟﻨﻔﺲ ﳊﻀﻮر اﳌﺎﻫﻴﺎت اﳋﺎرﺟﻴﺔ ﻋﻨﺪﻫ ﺑﻮﺟﻮد ﻣﺜﺎﱄ ﻏﲑ ﻣﺎدي و إﻻ ﻟﺰﻣﺖ اﻟﺴﻔﺴﻄﺔ ﳌﻜﺎن اﳌﻐﺎﻳﺮة ﺑﲔ اﻟﺼﻮر اﳊﺎﺻﻠﺔ ﰲ أﻋﻀﺎء اﳊﺲ و اﻟﺘﺨﻴﻞ و ﺑﲔ ذوات اﻟﺼﻮر. ﺑﻞ ﻫﺬا ﻣﻦ أﻗﻮى اﳊﺠﺞ ﻋﻠﻰ ﺣﺼﻮل اﳌﺎﻫﻴﺎت ﺑﺄﻧﻔﺴﻬﺎ ﻋﻨﺪ اﻹﻧﺴﺎن ﺑﻮﺟﻮد ﻏﲑ ﻣﺎدي ﻛﻴﻔﻤﺎ ﻓﺮض ﱂ ﳜﻞ ﻋﻦ ﻣﻐﺎﻳﺮة ﻣﺎ ﺑﲔ اﻟﺼﻮر اﳊﺎﺻ ﻓﺈن اﻟﻮﺟﻮد اﳌﺎدي ﳍﺎ ﻠﺔ و ﺑﲔ اﻷﻣﻮر اﳋﺎرﺟﻴﺔ ذوات اﻟﺼﻮر و ﻻزم ذﻟﻚ اﻟﺴﻔﺴﻄﺔ ﺿﺮورة. ﻛﻮن اﻟﺸﻲ اﻹﺷﻜﺎل اﻟﺴﺎﺑﻊ أن ﻻزم اﻟﻘﻮل ﺑﺎﻟﻮﺟﻮد اﻟﺬﻫﲏ ء اﻟﻮاﺣﺪ ﻛﻠﻴﺎ و ﺟﺰﺋﻴﺎ ﻣﻌﺎ و ﺑﻄﻼﻧﻪ ﻇﺎﻫﺮ ﺑﻴﺎن اﳌﻼزﻣﺔ أن ﻣﺎﻫﻴﺔ اﻹﻧﺴﺎن اﳌﻌﻘﻮﻟﺔ ﻣﺜﻼ ﻣﻦ ﺣﻴﺚ ﲡﻮﻳﺰ اﻟﻌﻘﻞ ﺻﺪﻗﻬﺎ ﻛﻠﻴﺔ و ﻣﻦ ﺣﻴﺚ ﺣﺼﻮﳍﺎ ﻛﺜﲑﻳﻦ ﻋﻠﻰ ﻟﻨﻔﺲ ﻋﺎﻗﻠﻬﺎ اﻟﺸﺨﺼﻴﺔ و ﻗﻴﺎﻣﻬﺎ -ﺎ ﺟﺰﺋﻴﺔ ﻣﺘﺸﺨﺼﺔ ﻛﻠﻴﺔ و ﺟﺰﺋﻴﺔ ﺑﺘﺸﺨﺼﻬﺎ ﻣﺘﻤﻴﺰة ﻣﻦ ﻣﺎﻫﻴﺔ اﻹﻧﺴﺎن اﳌﻌﻘﻮﻟﺔ ﻟﻐﲑ ﺗﻠﻚ اﻟﻨﻔﺲ ﻣﻦ اﻟﻨﻔﻮس ﻓﻬﻲ ﻣﻌﺎ.
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ﻛﻠﻴﺔ ج ﺎ وﺟﻮد ذﻫﲏ ﻣﻘﻴﺲ إﱃ اﳋﺎر 5 و اﳉﻮاب ﻋﻨﻪ أن اﳉﻬﺔ ﳐﺘﻠﻔﺔ ﻓﻬﻲ ﻣﻦ ﺣﻴﺚ إ ﻛﻴﻔﻴﺔ ﻧﻔﺴ ﺎ ﺔ 5 ﺗﻘﺒﻞ اﻟﺼﺪق ﻋﻠﻰ ﻛﺜﲑﻳﻦ و ﻣﻦ ﺣﻴﺚ إ ج ﺟﺰﺋﻴ ﺎﻧﻴﺔ ﻣﻦ ﻏﲑ ﻣﻘﺎﻳﺴﺔ إﱃ اﳋﺎر.
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A SUPPLEMENTARY DISCUSSION Certain objections have been raised against the notion of existence of quiddities in the mind, in the sense that they exist there by themselves.
First Objection The view that quiddities exist in the mind by themselves implies that a single thing should be both a substance and an accident at the same time, which is impossible. To explain, the substance (jawhar) intellected by the mind is a substance in accordance with the principle of retention of the essentials (dhatiyyât). However, the same substance is also an accident (‘arad), because it subsists through the soul in much the same way as an accident subsists, through its substratum (ma‘rûd). This is selfcontradictory, because it implies that a thing be both independent of a subject (mawdû’) and depend on a subject at the same time.
Second Objection The mental quiddity belongs to the category (maqûlah) of quality (kayf),’ in accordance with the view that the intelligible forms (al-suwar al‘ilmiyyah) are qualities of the soul (kayfiyyât nafsâniyyah). When we conceive a substance, that conception would fall under the category of substance, on the basis of the principle of retention of the essentials (dhatiyyât). At the same time, as said, it falls under the category of quality, while the categories are mutually exclusive. This implies a contradiction in the essence of the mental existent. Similarly, when we conceive something belonging to a category other than that of substance, the conceived quiddity would fall under two categories. This is true also when the conception is that of a sensible quality (kayf mahsûs), for it will fall under the category of sensible quality as well as that of psychic quality (kayf nafsânî). In all these cases, a single thing falls under two mutually exclusive categories, which is logically impossible. The philosophers who believe in mental existence admit that the second objection poses a greater difficulty than the first one. The idea that a single thing may be a substance as well as an accident does not pose much of a difficulty, because the essential difference between the categories is the one between substance, quality, quantity and so on. For the notion of accident – as something that subsists through its subject – is a general one that applies to the nine categories. It may validly include mental substance as well and apply to it. Moreover, in accordance with the definition of substance as ‘a quiddity which does not require a subject to exist externally,’ it may validly subsist in the mind through a subject, for it is while existing externally that it does, not require a subject. However, the falling of a single quiddity under two categories – such as substance and quality or quantity and quality – is necessarily impossible, for the categories are mutually exclusive with respect to essence.
The Attempts to Address the Two Objections In view of the above and similar objections, some (viz. al-Râzî) have been led to an outright denial of mental existence, holding that knowledge is
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a relation between the soul and external reality. Accordingly, that which is known falls solely under the category of external entities. However, we have shown the inadmissibility of such a position. Some others have been led to hold that external quiddities existing in the mind are resemblances (asybâh), not the quiddities themselves. A thing’s resemblance is something other than and different from the thing itself. Hence the intellected forms are qualities of the soul, which do not retain the character of the external categories, and no difficulty arises on the basis of this view. However, we have shown that this position implies a denial of the possibility of knowledge. Several other attempts have been made to resolve the above-mentioned difficulties, which are as follow: ` (i) Some of them (viz. al-Qawshajî) have said that knowledge (‘ilm) is different from the known (ma’lûm). The cognition (hushûl) of an external quiddity by the mind involves two things. One is the intellected quiddity itself as it was in external reality. That is the known, and it does not subsist through the soul but is self-subsisting, being present in the mind like a thing present in space and time. The other is a quality present in the soul and subsisting through it. That is knowledge, and it is by virtue of it that ignorance is removed from the soul. Accordingly, the known – whether substance, quantity or something else – falls under an external category, whereas knowledge is a quality of the soul. Thus understood, the difficulty posed by coincidence of two categories or two kinds of one category does not arise. However, such a description is contrary to what introspection reveals to us during cognition. The form of something present in the soul during cognition is exactly what relieves the soul of ignorance and afford us the knowledge of that thing. (ii) Some others who believe in the fundamental reality of quiddity (viz. al-Sayyid al-Sanad Shadr al-Dîn al-Syirâzî) have been led to hold that the forms intellected by the mind are divested from their corresponding external quiddities and transformed into qualities. To explain, since the external existence of quiddity is prior to the [mental existence of] quiddity itself, aside from existence there will be no quiddity at all. Mental existence and external existence are different from one another with a real difference, so that when existence is transformed through an external existent becoming a mental existent, there is no reason why quiddity too should not be transformed by the transformation of substance, quantity or any other category into the category of quality. Hence a thing itself has no definite reality with regard to itself. Rather, when a mental quality occurs in the external world it is either substance or some other category, and when an external substance occurs in the mind it becomes transformed into a mental quality. Given the difference between mental and external quiddities (as a result of the above-mentioned transformation), the claim that things themselves come into the mind requires that there should be a common principle between the two. To conceive such a principle, it is sufficient for the intellect to conceptualize something indefinite and common between the two – like the conception of a matter common to a material body and its
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disintegrated form – so that what is in the mind should correspond to what is in external reality. The above theory is fruitless, first because the belief in the transformation of quiddity and of a real difference between the two modes of existence (external and mental) is inconsistent with the doctrine subscribed to by its proponent, that quiddity is fundamentally real and existence is a derivative construct. Second, since it implies an essential difference between the mental form and the external object known, it boils down to a theory of resemblances and skepticism. (iii) Some others (viz. al-Dawwânî) have stated that since knowledge is essentially identical with the object of knowledge, it belongs to the same category as the known object. Thus if the latter happens to be a substance, the former is also a substance, and if the latter is a quantity it is also a quality, and so on. As to naming knowledge a ‘quality’ by the philosophers, it is based on a somewhat loose expression, similar to the common usage wherein an attribute representing a substance is called a quality when applied to something else. With this, they claim, the second difficulty is overcome concerning the falling of other categories under the category of quality. As to the first difficulty, that a single thing should be a substance and accident simultaneously, its solution – as mentioned earlier – is that ‘accident’ in its general sense includes the nine accidental categories as well as mental substance. Hence it does not constitute any difficulty. The difficulty inherent in this view is that the mere applicability of the concept of one of the categories to a thing, as we shall explain later, does not justify its being classed under that category. Moreover, the philosophers are explicit in their statement that ‘acquired knowledge’ (al- ‘ilm al-hushûlî) is a psychic quality that really falls under the category of quality and there is no looseness of expression involved. (iv) Then there is the theory of Shadr al-Muta’allihin – may God’s mercy be upon him – which has been set forth by him in his books. The theory is based on a distinction between two forms of predication (haml): ‘primary essential predication’ and ‘common predication.’ It is the second kind of predication that implies that the intelligible form falls under an external category. To explain, the mere inclusion of a generic or specific concept in the definition of a thing and its applicability to it does not require that thing to be classed under that genus or species. Such a classification depends on the thing’s possessing the properties possessed externally by that genus or species. Hence the mere inclusion of the concepts of ‘substance’ or ‘body,’ for instance, in the definition of the human being (according to which the human being is defined as ‘a substance that is a growing, sensate body capable of voluntarily motion and possess¬ing rationality) does not entail its falling under the category of substance, or under the genus ‘body,’ unless it occurs as a concrete substance, without needing a subject, or as a body possessing three dimensions. Similarly, the inclusion of ‘quantity’ and ‘continuity’ in the definition of ‘surface’ (which is defined as ‘a static, two-dimensional continuous
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quantity’) does not necessitate its inclusion under ‘quantity’ and ‘continuous extension,’ unless as a concrete quantity it is susceptible to division and possesses the property of continuity. Were the mere correspondence of a concept to a thing to require its inclusion under the category of that thing, then every universal would itself be an individual, as it applies to itself through primary predication. Hence inclusion under a category requires the possession of external properties and it is obvious that such properties exist in external existence, not in mental existence. This shows that mentaj forms do not fall under the categories to which they correspond, for they do not possess the [external] properties expected of them. However, though the mental form does not possess the properties of the corresponding external object known, as a state (hât) or habit (malakah) present for the soul, from which it dispels ignorance, it is an ‘external’ existent existing for the soul, which possesses it as an attribute. The definition of quality is applicable to it through common predication, as quality is therefore defined as “an accident which is not subject to division or relation.” Hence the mental form as such falls under the category of quality, though from the viewpoint of its being a mental existent corresponding to external reality it does not fall-due to the absence of external properties – under any category except perhaps the category of quality-by-accident. The above explanation reveals the inadmissibility of the objection of some thinkers who have taken exception to the statement that knowledge is an essential quality (kayf bi al-dzâf) and the mental form an accidental quality (kayf bi al-‘arad). Their argument is that the very existence of those forms and their existence for the soul are one and the same. They argue that the existence and manifestation of the mental forms for the soul are nothing additional to their existence, so that they may be a quality in the soul, because their externality has ceased in its entirety; furthermore, their quiddities in themselves each belong to a particular category, while with regard to their mental existence they are neither substances nor accidents. Moreover, their manifestation for the soul is nothing but that quiddity and that existence, since the manifestation of a thing is not something additional to it, otherwise it would have a manifestation of itself, whereas there is nothing else. As to quality, it is of such a nature that it is predicated of its subject by inherence. If manifestation and existence for the soul were a categorical relation, the quiddity of knowledge would be relation not quality. But since it is an emanative relation (i.e. the creative relation between a cause and its effect) originating in the soul, it is existence. Therefore, knowledge is light and manifestation (zhuhûr), and the latter are both existence, and existence is not quiddity. This objection is not valid because though the cognitive form is existent for the soul and manifest for it, that is not on account of its being a mental existent corresponding to an external reality without possessing its properties, but due to its being a state or ‘habit’ for the soul that dispels privation (i.e. ignorance) from it, and as such it is a perfection (kamâl) for the soul, additional to it, and possessed by it as an attribute. That is an
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extraneous effect produced on the soul. Since the soul is the subject for the cognitive form and independent of it in itself, the latter is its accident and the definition of quality is applicable to it. Hence the claim that there is nothing additional to the soul, which is united with it, is inadmissible. Therefore, it is clear that the cognitive form, being a state or habit of the soul, is a quality in essence, and it is a quality by accidence due to its being a mental existent.
Third Objection: The doctrine of mental existence and presence of the very (quiddities of) things in the mind implies that the soul, while conceiving heat and cold, width and length, motion and rest, triangle and rectangle, etc., should simultaneously become hot and cold, wide and long, triangular and rectangular and so on. That is because we do not call to mind anything hot or cold, wide or long, and so on, without the soul acquiring these opposite attributes, which subsist through it. The answer is that such external notions like heat and cold and the like become present in the mind with their quiddities, not with their actual existences, and correspond to them in the sense of primary predication, not common predication. That which necessitates things becoming attributed with these qualities does so by acquiring them with their external existences and subsisting through their subjects, not by conceiving their quiddities and their subsistence in the sense of primary predication.
Fourth Objection We conceive things that are essentially impossible, such as ‘God’s partner’ (sharîk al-Bârî), the simultaneous co-existence or non-existence of two contradictories, and the negation of a thing’s identity with itself. Should things be themselves present in the mind, such essential impossibilities would obtain subsistence. The answer is that the essential impossibilities are present in the mind in the sense of primary predication, not in that of common predication. Hence ‘God’s partner’ is ‘God’s partner’ in the mind in the sense of primary predication, but from the viewpoint of common predication it is a contingent (mumkin), a quality of the soul, and a creature of God. The same applies to other impossibilities.
Fifth Objection We do conceive the earth with its great expanse, its plains, mountains, continents and oceans, as well as the great distances of space together with the planets and the stars with their huge dimensions. The impression of these huge dimensions in the mind, or in a part of the nervous system – according to physiologists – amounts to the impression of something big in something small, which is impossible. That which is said in response to this objection – that the receiving agent is infinitely divisible – is inadmissible, because a small area about that of one’s palm, though it should be infinitely divisible, cannot contain a mountain.
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The answer to this objection is that the particular perceived forms are in fact immaterial, as will be discussed later on.’ Their immateriality is imaginal (mitsâlî), wherein such material properties as dimension, geometric form, etc., are retained, but not matter itself. Hence they are present in the soul on the plane of imaginal immateriality (tajarrud mitbâli) without being imprinted on a bodily organ or a faculty related to it. As to the actions and reactions that occur on a material plane during the process of sensation or perception, they are the preparatory means for the soul for apprehending the particular imaginal cognitive forms.
Sixth Objection The physiologists state that sensation and perception involve the formation in the sense organs of impressions (shuwar) of physical bodies with all their external relations and characteristics. The sense organs modify the impressions in accordance with their particular nature and convey them to the brain. Man cognizes their sizes, dimensions, and shapes through a kind of comparison between the parts of the impressions apprehended. This description does not leave any room for the belief in presence of external quiddities themselves in the mind. The answer is that the physiologists do indeed speak of certain physical actions and reactions involved in perception. However, these physical impressions, which differ from the external things perceived, are not what constitute the perceived form itself. Rather they constitute a preparatory stage that prepares the soul for the presence before it of the external quiddities with an imaginal (mitsâlî), not a material, existence. Otherwise the disparity between the impressions in the organs of sensation and perception and the external objects represented by these impressions will amount to negation of the possibility of knowledge. In fact this is one of the strongest proofs of the immaterial presence of the quiddities themselves for the mind. That is because should we assume them to have some kind of material existence – in whatever manner – that cannot get rid of disparity between the apprehended forms and the external realities they represent, thus necessarily implying a denial of the possibility of knowledge.
Seventh Objection The doctrine of mental existence implies that a single thing should simultaneously be a particular and a universal. This is obviously inadmissible. To explain, the intellected quiddity of ‘man,’ for instance, is a universal in so far as it is applicable to a multiplicity of persons. At the same time it is a particular in so far as it is present in a particular soul through which it subsists, thus becoming particularized through its particularity, being different from the quiddity of ‘man’ intellected by other souls. Hence it is simultaneously a particular and a universal. The answer is that there are two different aspects (jihât) involved here. The intellected quiddity is a universal in so far as it is a mental existent corresponding to external reality and applicable to a multiplicity of objects.
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And in so far as it is a quality of the soul – aside from its correspondence to external reality – it is a particular.
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اﻟﻤﺮﺣﻠﺔ اﻟﺜﺎﻟﺜﺔ ﻓﻲ اﻧﻘﺴﺎم اﻟﻮﺟﻮد إﻟﻰ ﻣﺎ ﻓﻲ ﻧﻔﺴﻪ و ﻣﺎ ﻓﻲ ﻏﻴﺮﻩ و اﻧﻘﺴﺎم ﻣﺎ ﻓﻲ ﻧﻔﺴﻪ إﻟﻰ ﻣﺎ ﻟﻨﻔﺴﻪ و ﻣﺎ ﻟﻐﻴﺮﻩ و ﻓﻴﻬﺎ ﺛﻼﺛﺔ ﻓﺼﻮل CHAPTER THREE: The Division of Existence into Existence-in-itself and Existence-in-something-else, and of Existence-in-itself into Existence-for-itself and Existence-for-something-else 3 Units
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اﻟﻔﺼﻞ اﻷول اﻟﻮﺟﻮد ﻓﻲ ﻧﻔﺴﻪ و اﻟﻮﺟﻮد ﻓﻲ ﻏﻴﺮﻩ
ﻛﻘﻮﻟﻨﺎ ﻣﻦ اﻟﻮﺟﻮد ﻣﺎ ﻫﻮ ﰲ ﻏﲑﻩ و ﻣﻨﻪ ﺧﻼﻓﻪ و ذﻟﻚ أﻧﺎ إذا اﻋﺘﱪﻧﺎ اﻟﻘﻀﺎﻳﺎ اﻟﺼﺎدﻗﺔ ء اﳌﻮﺿﻮع و اﶈﻤﻮل أﻣﺮا آﺧﺮ ﺑﻪ ﻳﺮﺗﺒﻂ و ﻳﺘﺼﻞ ﺑﻌﻀﻬﻤ اﻹﻧﺴﺎن ﺿﺎﺣﻚ وﺟﺪﻧﺎ ﻓﻴﻬﺎ ورا ﺎ ﻛﻞ ﻣﻨﻬﻤﺎ إﱃ ﺑﻌﺾ ﻟﻴﺲ ﻳﻮﺟﺪ إذا اﻋﺘﱪ اﳌﻮﺿﻮع وﺣﺪﻩ و ﻻ اﶈﻤﻮل وﺣﺪﻩ و ﻻ إذا اﻋﺘﱪ ﻣﻊ ﻏﲑ اﻵﺧﺮ ﻓﻠﻪ وﺟﻮد ﰒ إن وﺟﻮدﻩ ﻟﻴﺲ ﺛﺎﻟﺜﺎ ﳍﻤﺎ واﻗﻌﺎ ﺑﻴﻨﻬﻤﺎ ﻣﺴﺘﻘﻼ ﻋﻨﻬﻤﺎ و إﻻ اﺣﺘﺎج إﱃ راﺑﻄﲔ آﺧﺮﻳﻦ ﻳﺮﺑﻄﺎﻧﻪ ﺑﺎﻟﻄﺮﻓﲔ ﻓﻜﺎن اﳌﻔﺮوض ﺛﻼﺛﺔ ﲬﺴﺔ ﰒ اﳋﻤﺴﺔ ﺗﺴﻌﺔ و ﻫﻠﻢ ﺟﺮا و ﻞ ﻫﻮ ﺑﺎﻃ. ﻓﻮﺟﻮدﻩ ﻗﺎﺋﻢ ﺑﺎﻟﻄﺮﻓﲔ ﻣﻮﺟﻮد ﻓﻴﻬﻤﺎ ﻏﲑ ﺧﺎرج ﻣﻨﻬﻤﺎ و ﻻ ﻣﺴﺘﻘﻞ ﺑﻮﺟﻪ ﻋﻨﻬﻤﺎ ﻻ ﻣﻌﲎ ﻛﻮﺟﻮد اﳌﻮﺿﻮع و اﶈﻤﻮل و ﻛﺎن ﲞﻼﻓﻪ ﻟﻪ ﻣﺴﺘﻘﻼ ﺑﺎﳌﻔﻬﻮﻣﻴﺔ و ﻧﺴﻤﻴﻪ اﻟﻮﺟﻮد اﻟﺮاﺑﻂ و ﻣﺎ ﻫﻮ اﻟﺬي ﻟﻪ ﻣﻌﲎ ﻣﺴﺘﻘﻞ ﺑﺎﳌﻔﻬﻮﻣﻴﺔ ﻧﺴﻤﻴﻪ اﻟﻮﺟﻮد اﶈﻤﻮﱄ و اﻟﻮﺟﻮد اﳌﺴﺘﻘﻞ ﻓﺈذن اﻟﻮﺟﻮد ﻣﻨﻘﺴﻢ إﱃ ﻣﺴﺘﻘﻞ و راﺑﻂ و ﻫﻮ اﳌﻄﻠﻮب. و ﻳﻈﻬﺮ ﳑﺎ ﺗﻘﺪم أوﻻ أن اﻟﻮﺟﻮدات اﻟﺮاﺑﻄﺔ ﻻ ﻣﺎﻫﻴﺔ ﳍﺎ ﻷن اﳌﺎﻫﻴﺔ ﻣﺎ ﻳﻘﺎل ﰲ ﺟﻮاب ﻣﺎ ﻫﻮ ﻓﻠﻬﺎ ﻻ ﳏﺎﻟﺔ ﻛﺬﻟﻚ وﺟﻮد ﳏﻤﻮﱄ ذو ﻣﻌﲎ ﻣﺴﺘﻘﻞ ﺑﺎﳌﻔﻬﻮﻣﻴﺔ و اﻟﺮاﺑﻂ ﻟﻴﺲ . و ﺛﺎﻧﻴﺎ أن ﲢﻘﻖ اﻟﻮﺟﻮد اﻟﺮاﺑﻂ ﺑﲔ أﻣﺮﻳﻦ ﻳﺴﺘﻠﺰم اﲢﺎدا ﻣﺎ ﺑﻴﻨﻬ ج ﻤﺎ ﻟﻜﻮﻧﻪ واﺣﺪا ﻏﲑ ﺧﺎر ﻣﻦ وﺟﻮدﳘﺎ. و ﺛﺎﻟﺜﺎ أن اﻟﺮاﺑﻂ إﳕﺎ ﻳﺘﺤﻘﻖ ﰲ ﻣﻄﺎﺑﻖ اﳍﻠﻴﺎت اﳌﺮﻛﺒﺔ اﻟﱵ ﺗﺘﻀﻤﻦ ﺛﺒﻮت ﺷﻲ ﻲ ء ﻟﺸ ء و أﻣﺎ اﳍﻠﻴﺎت اﻟﺒﺴﻴﻄﺔ اﻟﱵ ﻻ ﺗﺘﻀﻤﻦ إﻻ ﺛﺒﻮت اﻟﺸﻲ ء و ﻫﻮ ﺛﺒﻮت ﻣﻮﺿﻮﻋﻬﺎ ﻓﻼ راﺑﻂ ﰲ ﻣﻄﺎﺑﻘﻬﺎ إذ ﻻ ﻣﻌﲎ ﻻرﺗﺒﺎط اﻟﺸﻲ ﺎ ء ﺑﻨﻔﺴﻪ و ﻧﺴﺒﺘﻪ إﻟﻴﻬ
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3.1. EXISTENCE-IN-ITSELF AND EXISTENCE-INSOMETHING-ELSE Existence is either existence-in-something-else or its opposite [i.e. existence-in-itself]. To explain, when we consider a true proposition, for instance, ‘Man is a biped,’ we find that there is something in it [i.e. the verb “to be” used as a copula] besides the subject and the predicate that relates them to each other. This relation is absent when we consider solely the subject or the predicate, or when each of them is conceived along with some other thing. Hence that something has existence. Moreover, its existence is not something additional to the existence of the two sides, or something situated between them and existing independently of them, for otherwise it would require two other copulas to relate it to each of the two sides. Then the three would become five and the five would similarly become nine and so on ad infinitum. Hence its existence inheres in the two sides and depends on them, not being extraneous to or independent of them. It has no independent meaning of its own as a concept. We call it “copulative existence” (al-wujûd alrâbith). That which is not such – such as the existence of the subject and that of the predicate – and has an independent meaning as a concept, is called “substantive existence” (al-wujûd al-mahmûlî, lit. predicative existence) or “independent existence” (al-wujud al-mustaqil). Hence existence is divisible into independent and copulative as stated. From what has been said, it becomes clear that: (i) copulative existents have no quiddity; for the quiddity of a thing is what is mentioned in answer to the question, ‘What is it?’ Quiddity has a substantive existence and independent meaning as a concept. Copulative existence is not such. (ii) Second, the occurrence of a copulative existent between two things necessitates a unity between them, for it is united with them and is not external to their existence. (iii) Third, the copulative existent occurs in facts corresponding to “composite propositions” (al-halliyyât al-murakkabah, i.e. propositions of the type ‘A is B’) wherein a thing is affirmed of another thing. Às to “simple propositions” (al-halliyyât al-basîthah, i.e. propositions of the type ‘A is’ or ‘A exists’), in which merely the subsistence of the subject is affirmed, there occurs no copulative existence in the corresponding fact, for there is no sense in a thing’s relation with itself.
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ﻛﻴﻔﻴﺔ اﺧﺘﻼف اﻟﺮاﺑﻂ و اﻟﻤﺴﺘﻘﻞ اﻟﻔﺼﻞ اﻟﺜﺎﻧﻲ اﺧﺘﻠﻔﻮا ﰲ أن اﻻﺧﺘﻼف ﺑﲔ اﻟﻮﺟﻮد اﻟﺮاﺑﻂ و اﳌﺴﺘﻘﻞ ﻫﻞ ﻫﻮ اﺧﺘﻼف ﻧﻮﻋﻲ ﲟﻌﲎ أن اﻟﻮﺟﻮد اﻟﺮاﺑﻂ ذو ﻣﻌﲎ ﺗﻌﻠﻘﻲ ﻻ ﳝﻜﻦ ﺗﻌﻘﻠﻪ ﻋﻠﻰ اﻻﺳﺘﻘﻼل و ﻳﺴﺘﺤﻴﻞ أن ﻳﺴﻠﺦ ﻋﻨﻪ ذﻟﻚ ﻛﺎن ﻣﻌﲎ ﺣﺮﻓﻴﺎ أو ﻻ اﺧﺘﻼف ﻧﻮﻋﻴﺎ اﻟﺸﺄن ﻓﻴﻌﻮد ﻣﻌﲎ اﲰﻴﺎ ﺑﺘﻮﺟﻴﻪ اﻻﻟﺘﻔﺎت إﻟﻴﻪ ﺑﻌﺪ ﻣﺎ ﺑﻴﻨﻬﻤﺎ. و اﳊﻖ ﻫﻮ اﻟﺜﺎﱐ ﳌﺎ ﺳﻴﺄﰐ ﰲ ﻣﺮﺣﻠﺔ اﻟﻌﻠﺔ و اﳌﻌﻠﻮل أن وﺟﻮدات اﳌﻌﺎﻟﻴﻞ راﺑﻄﺔ ﺑﺎﻟﻨﺴﺒﺔ إﱃ ﻋﻠﻠﻬﺎ و ﻣﻦ اﳌﻌﻠﻮم أن ﻣﻨﻬﺎ ﻣﺎ وﺟﻮدﻩ ﺟﻮﻫﺮي و ﻣﻨﻬﺎ ﻣﺎ وﺟﻮدﻩ ﻋﺮﺿﻲ و ﻫﻲ ﲨﻴﻌﺎ وﺟﻮدات ﳏﻤﻮﻟﻴﺔ ﻣﺴﺘﻘﻠﺔ ﲣﺘﻠﻒ ﺣﺎﳍﺎ ﺑﺎﻟﻘﻴﺎس إﱃ ﻋﻠﻠﻬﺎ و أﺧﺬﻫﺎ ﰲ ﻧﻔﺴﻬﺎ ﻓﻬﻲ ﺑﺎﻟﻨﻈﺮ إﱃ ﻋﻠﻠﻬﺎ وﺟﻮدات راﺑﻄﺔ و ﺑﺎﻟﻨﻈﺮ إﱃ أﻧﻔﺴﻬﺎ وﺟﻮدات ﻣﺴﺘﻘﻠﺔ ﻓﺈذن اﳌﻄﻠﻮب ﺛﺎﺑﺖ. و ﻳﻈﻬﺮ ﳑﺎ ﺗﻘﺪم أن اﳌﻔﻬﻮم ﺗﺎﺑﻊ ﰲ اﺳﺘﻘﻼﻟﻪ ﺑﺎﳌﻔﻬﻮﻣﻴﺔ و ﻋﺪﻣﻪ ﻟﻮﺟﻮدﻩ اﻟﺬي ﻳﻨﺘﺰع ﻣﻨﻪ و ﻟﻴﺲ ﻟﻪ ﻣﻦ ﻧﻔﺴﻪ إﻻ اﻹ-ﺎم

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3.2. THE DIFFERENCE BETWEEN COPULATIVE AND INDEPENDENT EXISTENCE The metaphysicians differ concerning the character of the difference between copulative and independent existence, as to whether it is a specific difference. That is, is copulative existence a relational concept inconceivable as a substantive and independent notion, in the sense that it is impossible to divest it of this character by conceiving it as a substantive after its being a non-substantive notion (ma’nî harfî)? Or is it the case that there is no specific difference between it and independent existence? The truth lies with the latter position, for, as will be seen later on in the chapter on cause and effect, the existence of the effect is copulative (râbith) in relation to its cause, although, as we know, effects consist of substances and accidents, both of which have predicative and independent existence. They are copulative existents when viewed in relation to their causes, but are independent existents when considered by themselves. It becomes clear from what has been said that every concept is subject in the independence of its meaning, or the lack of it, to the existence from which it is abstracted, and is in itself indefinite.
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اﻟﻔﺼﻞ اﻟﺜﺎﻟﺚ ﻣﻦ اﻟﻮﺟﻮد ﻓﻲ ﻧﻔﺴﻪ ﻣﺎ ﻫﻮ ﻟﻐﻴﺮﻩ و ﻣﻨﻪ ﻣﺎ ﻫﻮ ﻟﻨﻔﺴﻪ و اﳌﺮاد ﺑﻜﻮن وﺟﻮد اﻟﺸﻲ ء ﻟﻐﲑﻩ أن ﻳﻜﻮن اﻟﻮﺟﻮد اﻟﺬي ﻟﻪ ﰲ ﻧﻔﺴﻪ و ﻫﻮ اﻟﺬي ﻳﻄﺮد ﻋﻦ ﻣﺎﻫﻴﺘﻪ اﻟﻌﺪم ﻫﻮ ﺑﻌﻴﻨﻪ ﻳﻄﺮد ﻋﺪﻣﺎ ﻋﻦ ﺷﻲ ﻛﺎن ء آﺧﺮ ﻻ ﻋﺪم ذاﺗﻪ و ﻣﺎﻫﻴﺘﻪ و إﻻ ﻟﻮﺟﻮد واﺣﺪ ﻣﺎﻫﻴﺘﺎن و ﻫﻮ ﻛﺜﺮة اﻟﻮاﺣﺪ ﺑﻞ ﻋﺪﻣﺎ زاﺋﺪا ﻋﻠﻰ ذاﺗﻪ و ﻣﺎﻫﻴﺘﻪ ﻟﻪ ﻧﻮع ﻣﻘﺎرﻧﺔ ﻟﻪ ﻛﺎﻟﻌﻠﻢ اﻟﺬي ﻳﻄﺮد ﺑﻮﺟﻮدﻩ اﻟﻌﺪم ﻋﻦ ﻣﺎﻫﻴﺘﻪ اﻟﻜﻴﻔﻴﺔ و ﻳﻄﺮد ﺑﻪ ﺑﻌﻴﻨﻪ ﻋﻦ ﻣﻮﺿﻮﻋﻪ اﳉﻬﻞ ﻛﻤﺎ ﺗﻄﺮد ﻋﻦ ﻣﺎﻫﻴﺔ ﻧﻔﺴﻬﺎ اﻟﻌﺪم ﺗﻄﺮد ﺑﻌﻴﻨﻬﺎ ﻛﺎﻟﻘﺪرة ﻓﺈ5ﺎ اﻟﺬي ﻫﻮ ﻧﻮع ﻣﻦ اﻟﻌﺪم ﻳﻘﺎرﻧﻪ و ﻋﻦ ﻣﻮﺿﻮﻋﻬﺎ ﺰ اﻟﻌﺠ. ﻛﻤﺎ ﻳﻄﺮد ﻋﻦ ﻣﺎﻫﻴﺔ ﻛﻼ ﻣﻨﻬﺎ و اﻟﺪﻟﻴﻞ ﻋﻠﻰ ﲢﻘﻖ ﻫﺬا اﻟﻘﺴﻢ وﺟﻮدات اﻷﻋﺮاض ﻓﺈن ﻛﺬﻟﻚ اﻟﺼﻮر اﻟﻨﻮﻋﻴﺔ اﳉﻮﻫﺮﻳﺔ ﻓﺈن ﳍﺎ ﻧﻔﺴﻪ اﻟﻌﺪم ﻳﻄﺮد ﺑﻌﻴﻨﻪ ﻋﻦ ﻣﻮﺿﻮﻋﻪ ﻧﻮﻋﺎ ﻣﻦ اﻟﻌﺪم و ﻧﻮع ﺣﺼﻮل ﳌﻮادﻫﺎ ﺗﻜﻤﻠﻬﺎ و ﺗﻄﺮد ﻋﻨﻬﺎ ﻧﻘﺼﺎ ﺟﻮﻫﺮﻳﺎ و ﻫﺬا اﻟﻨﻮع ﻣﻦ اﻟﻄﺮد ﻫﻮ اﳌﺮاد ﺑﻜﻮن اﻟﻮﺟﻮد ﺎ ﻛﻮﻧﻪ ﻧﺎﻋﺘ ﻟﻐﲑﻩ و . ﻛﺎﻹﻧﺴﺎن و اﻟﻔﺮس و ﻛﺎﻷﻧﻮاع اﻟﺘﺎﻣﺔ اﳉﻮﻫﺮﻳﺔ ﻛﺎن ﻃﺎردا ﻟﻌﺪم ﻧﻔﺴﻪ ﻓﺤﺴﺐ و ﻳﻘﺎﺑﻠﻪ ﻣﺎ ﻳﺴﻤﻰ ﻫﺬا اﻟﻨﻮع ﻣﻦ اﻟﻮﺟﻮد وﺟﻮدا ﻟﻨﻔﺴﻪ ﻓﺈذن اﳌﻄﻠﻮب ﺛﺎﺑﺖ و ذﻟﻚ ﻣﺎ أردﻧﺎﻩ. و رﲟﺎ ﻳﻘﺴﻢ اﻟﻮﺟﻮد ﻟﺬاﺗﻪ إﱃ اﻟﻮﺟﻮد ﺑﺬاﺗﻪ و اﻟﻮﺟﻮد ﺑﻐﲑﻩ و ﻫﻮ ﺑﺎﳊﻘﻴﻘﺔ راﺟﻊ إﱃ اﻟ ﻌﻠﻴﺔ و اﳌﻌﻠﻮﻟﻴﺔ و ﺳﻴﺄﰐ اﻟﺒﺤﺚ ﻋﻨﻬﻤﺎ.
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3.3. EXISTENCE-IN-ITSELF-FOR-ITSELF AND EXISTENCE-IN-ITSELF-FOR-SOMETHING-ELSE By ‘existence for something else’ is meant an existent by itself that in addition to dispelling non-being from its own quiddity, removes a non-being from another thing, though not from its essence and quiddity; for otherwise one existent will possess two quiddities, which implies the multiplicity of that which is one. Hence the non-being removed is one that is extraneous to the thing’s essence and quiddity, having a kind of association with it. An example of it is knowledge, whose existence, in addition to removing nonbeing from its quiddity, removes ignorance from its subject, ignorance being a kind of non-being associated with the subject. Similar is ability, which in addition to removing non-being from its own quiddity removes disability from its subject. The evidence for this kind of existent is provided by accidents (a’râdh), each one of which dispels a kind of non-being from its subject, in addition to dispelling non-being from its own quiddity. The same is true of each of the substantial specific forms (al-shuwar al-naw’iyyah al-jawhariyyah), which in a way actualize their matters (mawâdd), complete them and dispel their substantial deficiency. This is the kind of removal of non-being that is meant by ‘existence for something else’ (al-wujûd li ghayrih) and its being ‘attributive.’ It stands opposed to what is called ‘existence for itself (wujûd li nafsih), which dispels non-being solely from itself, like the various kinds of complete specific substances, such as man, horse, etc. Often metaphysicians divide existence for itself further into that which is existence by itself and existence by something else, but this division relates to causality, which will be discussed later.
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اﻟﻤﺮﺣﻠﺔ اﻟﺮاﺑﻌﺔ ﻓﻲ اﻟﻤﻮاد اﻟﺜﻼث اﻟﻮﺟﻮب و اﻹﻣﻜﺎن و اﻻﻣﺘﻨﺎع و اﻟﺒﺤﺚ ﻋﻨﻬﺎ ﰲ اﳊﻘﻴﻘﺔ ﲝﺚ ﻋﻦ اﻧﻘﺴﺎم اﻟﻮﺟﻮد إﱃ اﻟﻮاﺟﺐ و اﳌﻤﻜﻦ و اﻟﺒﺤﺚ ﻋﻦ اﳌﻤﺘﻨﻊ ﺗﺒﻌﻲ و ﻓﻴﻬﺎ ﺗﺴﻌﺔ ﻓﺼﻮل CHAPTER FOUR: The Three Modes: Necessity, Contingency and Impossibility 9 Units

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اﻟﻔﺼﻞ اﻷول ﻓﻲ ﺗﻌﺮﻳﻒ اﻟﻤﻮاد اﻟﺜﻼث و اﻧﺤﺼﺎرﻫﺎ ﻓﻴﻬﺎ ﻛﻞ ﻣﻔﻬﻮم إذا ﻗﻴﺲ إﱃ اﻟﻮﺟﻮد ,ﺐ ﻓﺈﻣﺎ أن ﳚﺐ ﻟﻪ ﻓﻬﻮ اﻟﻮاﺟ ;ﻊ أو ﳝﺘﻨ ,ﻊ و ﻫﻮ اﳌﻤﺘﻨ ; أو ﻻ ﳚﺐ ﻟﻪ و ﻻ ﳝﺘﻨﻊ ,ﻦ و ﻫﻮ اﳌﻤﻜ ;ﺎ ﻓﺈﻧﻪ إﻣﺎ أن ﻳﻜﻮن اﻟﻮﺟﻮد ﻟﻪ ﺿﺮورﻳ ,ل و ﻫﻮ اﻷو ; أو ﻳﻜﻮن اﻟﻌﺪم ﻟﻪ ﺿﺮورﻳﺎ ,ﱐ و ﻫﻮ اﻟﺜﺎ ;ﺷﻲ و إﻣﺎ أن ﻻ ﻳﻜﻮن ﺎ ء ﻣﻨﻬﻤﺎ ﻟﻪ ﺿﺮورﻳ , و ﻫﻮ اﻟﺜﺎﻟﺚ. ﻛﻠﻴﻬﻤﺎ ﺿﺮورﻳﲔ ﻛﻮن اﻟﻮﺟﻮد و اﻟﻌﺪم و أﻣﺎ اﺣﺘﻤﺎل ,ت ﻓﻤﺮﺗﻔﻊ ﺑﺄدﱏ اﻟﺘﻔﺎ. و ﻫﻲ ﺑﻴﻨﺔ اﳌﻌﺎﱐ ,ﻢ ; ﺎ ﻣﻦ اﳌﻌﺎﱐ اﻟﻌﺎﻣﺔ اﻟﱵ ﻻ ﳜﻠﻮ ﻋﻦ أﺣﺪﻫﺎ ﻣﻔﻬﻮم ﻣﻦ اﳌﻔﺎﻫﻴ 5ﻟﻜﻮ ﻛﺎﻧﺖ ﻻ و ﻟﺬا ﺔ ﺗﻌﺮف إﻻ ﺑﺘﻌﺮﻳﻔﺎت دورﻳ ; ” ﻛﺘﻌﺮﻳﻒ اﻟﻮاﺟﺐ ب ﻣﺎ ﻳﻠﺰم ﻣﻦ ﻓﺮض ﻋﺪﻣﻪ “ ﳏﺎل ن ” ﰒ ﺗﻌﺮﻳﻒ اﶈﺎل و ﻫﻮ اﳌﻤﺘﻨﻊ ب “ ﻣﺎ ﳚﺐ أن ﻻ ﻳﻜﻮ ”أو ﻣﺎ ﻟﻴﺲ ﲟﻤﻜﻦ و ﻻ “ واﺟﺐ ﻪ ” و ﺗﻌﺮﻳﻒ اﳌﻤﻜﻦ ب .” ﻣﺎ ﻻ ﳝﺘﻨﻊ وﺟﻮدﻩ و ﻋﺪﻣ
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4.1. THE THREEFOLD MODES AND THEIR DEFINITIONS Every idea when considered from the viewpoint of existence is either necessary (wâjib), impossible (mumtani’), or contingent (mumkin), i.e. neither necessary nor impossible. In the first case, existence is a necessity; in the second, non-existence is a necessity; in the third, neither existence nor non-existence is a necessity. The meaning of these three modes is self-evident and they are so pervasive that no idea is devoid of any one of them. Hence they cannot be defined, and the definitions that have been offered are circular (like the one that defines the necessary as “a thing the supposition of whose nonexistence entails an impossibility,” the impossible as “that whose nonexistence is necessary” or “that which is neither possible nor necessary,” and the contingent as “that whose existence or non-existence is not impossible”).
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ﻛﻞ ﻣﻦ اﻟﻤﻮاد إﻟﻰ ﻣﺎ ﺑﺎﻟﺬات و ﻣﺎ ﺑﺎﻟﻐﻴﺮ و ﻣﺎ ﺑﺎﻟﻘﻴﺎس اﻟﻔﺼﻞ اﻟﺜﺎﻧﻲ اﻧﻘﺴﺎم ﻛﻞ واﺣﺪة ﻣﻦ اﳌﻮاد ﺛﻼﺛﺔ أﻗﺴﺎم :ت ﻣﺎ ﺑﺎﻟﺬا ,ﲑ و ﻣﺎ ﺑﺎﻟﻐ ,ﲑ و ﻣﺎ ﺑﺎﻟﻘﻴﺎس إﱃ اﻟﻐ ; إﻻ اﻹﻣﻜﺎن , ﻓﻼ إﻣﻜﺎن ﺑﺎﻟﻐﲑ و اﳌﺮاد ت ﲟﺎ ﺑﺎﻟﺬا :ﻪ ﻛﺎﻓﻴﺎ ﰲ ﲢﻘﻘ أن ﻳﻜﻮن وﺿﻊ اﻟﺬات , و إن ﻛﻞ ﻣﺎ ﺳﻮاﻩ ﻗﻄﻊ اﻟﻨﻈﺮ ﻋﻦ ;ﲑ و ﲟﺎ ﺑﺎﻟﻐ ;ﲑ ﻣﺎ ﻳﺘﻌﻠﻖ ﺑﺎﻟﻐ ;ﲑ و ﲟﺎ ﺑﺎﻟﻘﻴﺎس إﱃ اﻟﻐ : أﻧﻪ إذا ﻛﺎن ﻣﻦ اﻟﻮاﺟﺐ أن ﻳﺘﺼﻒ ﺑﻪ ﻗﻴﺲ إﱃ اﻟﻐﲑ . ﻛﻤﺎ ﰲ اﻟﻮاﺟﺐ اﻟﻮﺟﻮد ﻓﺎﻟﻮﺟﻮب ﺑﺎﻟﺬات ,ﱃ ﺗﻌﺎ , ﻓﺈن ذاﺗﻪ ﺑﺬاﺗﻪ ﻳﻜﻔﻲ ﰲ ﺿﺮورة اﻟﻮ ﺟﻮد ﻟﻪ ﻣﻦ ﻏﲑ ﺣﺎﺟﺔ إﱃ ﺷﻲ ﻩ ء ﻏﲑ. ﻛﻤﺎ ﰲ اﳌﻤﻜﻦ اﳌﻮﺟﻮد اﻟﻮاﺟﺐ وﺟﻮدﻩ ﺑﻌﻠﺘﻪ و اﻟﻮﺟﻮب ﺑﺎﻟﻐﲑ . ﻛﻤﺎ ﰲ وﺟﻮد أﺣﺪ اﳌﺘﻀﺎﺋﻔﲔ إذا ﻗﻴﺲ إﱃ وﺟﻮد اﻵﺧﺮ و اﻟﻮﺟﻮب ﺑﺎﻟﻘﻴﺎس إﱃ اﻟﻐﲑ , ﻓﺈن وﺟﻮد اﻟﻌﻠﻮ إذا ﻗﻴﺲ إﻟﻴﻪ وﺟﻮد اﻟﺴﻔﻞ ﻳﺄﰉ إﻻ أن ﻳﻜﻮن ﻟﻠﺴﻔﻞ وﺟﻮد , ﻓﻠﻮﺟﻮد اﻟﺴﻔﻞ وﺟﻮب ﻮ ﺑﺎﻟﻘﻴﺎس إﱃ وﺟﻮد اﻟﻌﻠ ,ﻪ وراء وﺟﻮﺑﻪ ﺑﻌﻠﺘ. و اﻻﻣﺘﻨﺎع ﺑﺎﻟﺬات ,ﺔ ﻛﻤﺎ ﰲ اﶈﺎﻻت اﻟﺬاﺗﻴ ,ي ﻛﺸﺮﻳﻚ اﻟﺒﺎر ,ﻀﲔ و اﺟﺘﻤﺎع اﻟﻨﻘﻴ ; و اﻻﻣﺘﻨﺎع ﺑﺎﻟﻐﲑ ,ﻪ ﻛﻤﺎ ﰲ وﺟﻮد اﳌﻌﻠﻮل اﳌﻤﺘﻨﻊ ﻟﻌﺪم ﻋﻠﺘ ,ﻪ و ﻋﺪﻣﻪ اﳌﻤﺘﻨﻊ ﻟﻮﺟﻮد ﻋﻠﺘ , و اﻻﻣﺘﻨﺎع ﺑﺎﻟﻘﻴﺎس إﱃ اﻟﻐﲑ ,ﻀ ﻛﻤﺎ ﰲ وﺟﻮد أﺣﺪ اﳌﺘ ﺧﺮ ﺎﺋﻔﲔ إذا ﻗﻴﺲ إﱃ ﻋﺪم اﻵ , و ﰲ ﻋﺪﻣﻪ إذا ﻗﻴﺲ إﱃ وﺟﻮد اﻵﺧﺮ. و اﻹﻣﻜﺎن ﺑﺎﻟﺬات ,ﺔ ﻛﻤﺎ ﰲ اﳌﺎﻫﻴﺎت اﻹﻣﻜﺎﻧﻴ , ﺎ ﻻ ﺗﻘﺘﻀﻲ ﺿﺮورة اﻟﻮﺟﻮد T ﻓﺈ5ﺎ ﰲ ذا و ﻻ ﺿﺮورة اﻟﻌﺪم ;ﲑ و اﻹﻣﻜﺎن ﺑﺎﻟﻘﻴﺎس إﱃ اﻟﻐ ,ﲔ ﻛﻤﺎ ﰲ اﻟﻮاﺟﺒﲔ ﺑﺎﻟﺬات اﳌﻔﺮوﺿ , ﻓﻔﺮض وﺟﻮد أﺣﺪﳘﺎ ﻻ ﻳﺄﰉ وﺟﻮد ﻪ اﻵﺧﺮ و ﻻ ﻋﺪﻣ , إذ ﻟﻴﺲ ﺑﻴﻨﻬﻤﺎ ﻋﻠﻴﺔ و ﻣﻌﻠﻮﻟﻴﺔ و ﻻ ﳘﺎ ﻣﻌﻠﻮﻻ ﻋﻠﺔ ﺛﺎﻟﺜﺔ. و أﻣﺎ اﻹﻣﻜﺎن ﺑﺎﻟﻐﲑ ﻓﻤﺴﺘﺤﻴﻞ ,ﲑ ﻷﻧﺎ إذا ﻓﺮﺿﻨﺎ ﳑﻜﻨﺎ ﺑﺎﻟﻐ , ﻓﻬﻮ ﰲ ذاﺗﻪ إﻣﺎ واﺟﺐ ﺑﺎﻟﺬات ,ت أو ﳑﺘﻨﻊ ﺑﺎﻟﺬا ,ت أو ﳑﻜﻦ ﺑﺎﻟﺬا ,ث إذ اﳌﻮاد ﻣﻨﺤﺼﺮة ﰲ اﻟﺜﻼ , و اﻷوﻻن ﻳﻮﺟﺒﺎن اﻻﻧﻘﻼب ,ﻟ و اﻟﺜﺎ ا ﻛﻮن اﻋﺘﺒﺎر اﻹﻣﻜﺎن ﺑﺎﻟﻐﲑ ﻟﻐﻮ ﺚ ﻳﻮﺟﺐ .
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4.2. THE SUB-DIVISIONS OF EACH OF THE MODES Each of the three modes is divisible into three kinds: (i) essential (bi aldzât), i.e., that which is such (i.e. necessary, contingent or impossible) byitself, (ii) accidental (bi al-ghayr), i.e., that which is such by something else, and (iii) relative (bi al-qiyâs ila al-ghayr), i.e., that which is such in relation to something else. An exception here is the ‘contingent,’ for which there is no such subdivision as ‘contingent by something else.’ The exalted Necessary Being, whose existence is necessary by itself, without standing in need of anything else, represents essential necessity. By ‘accidentally contingent’ is meant the contingent whose existence becomes necessary upon the existence of its cause. Relative necessity applies to the existence of each of two correlatives (mutadhâ‘afayn), whose existence is necessary in relation to that of the other correlative, like the higher one and the lower one, the existence of each of which is necessary in relation to that of the other, apart from the necessity arising from their cause. Examples of the essentially impossible are such essential impossibilities as God’s partner (sharîk al-Bârî) and the coming together of two contradictories (ijtimâ’ al-naqidhayn). An example of accidental impossibility is the impossibility of the existence of an effect arising from the non-existence of its cause, and the impossibility of its non-existence upon the existence of its cause. An example of relative impossibility is the impossibility of the existence of one of the two correlatives in relation to non-existence of the other, and that of its non-existence in relation to existence of the other correlative. As to essential contingency (imkân dzâtt), it applies to the contingent quiddities, which in themselves are neither necessarily existent nor necessarily non-existent. As to relative contingency, it applies to two hypothetical necessary beings each of which is essentially necessary, because the supposition of one of them does not preclude the existence or non-existence of the other; for there is neither any relation of causality between them, nor are they effects of a third cause. As to accidental contingency, it is impossible; for if we assume something that is accidentally contingent, it should itself be either: (i) essentially necessary; (ii) essentially impossible; or (iii) essentially contingent, for here the modes are confined to these three. The first two assumptions entail a violation of the law of identity, and the third leads to the absurdity of considering what is essentially contingent as being accidentally contingent.
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اﻟﻔﺼﻞ اﻟﺜﺎﻟﺚ واﺟﺐ اﻟﻮﺟﻮد ﻣﺎﻫﻴﺘﻪ إﻧﻴﺘﻪ واﺟﺐ اﻟﻮﺟﻮد ﻣﺎﻫﻴﺘﻪ إﻧﻴﺘﻪ ﲟﻌﲎ أن ﻻ ﻣﺎﻫﻴﺔ ﻟﻪ وراء وﺟﻮدﻩ اﳋﺎص ﺑﻪ ;أ و ذﻟﻚ ﻧﻪ ﻟﻮ ﻛﺎﻧﺖ ﻟﻪ ﻣﺎﻫﻴﺔ و ذات وراء وﺟﻮدﻩ اﳋﺎص ﺑﻪ ,ﻟﻪ ﻟﻜﺎن وﺟﻮدﻩ زاﺋﺪا ﻋﻠﻰ ذاﺗﻪ ﻋﺮﺿﻴﺎ ,و ﻛﻞ ﻋﺮﺿﻲ ﻣﻌﻠﻞ ﺑﺎﻟﻀﺮورة ,ﻞ ﻓﻮﺟﻮدﻩ ﻣﻌﻠ. و ﻋﻠﺘﻪ إﻣﺎ ﻣﺎﻫﻴﺘﻪ أو ﻏﲑﻫﺎ , ﻛﺎﻧﺖ ﻋﻠﺘﻪ ﻣﺎﻫﻴﺘﻪ ﻓﺈن – و اﻟﻌﻠﺔ ﻣﺘﻘﺪﻣﺔ ﻋﻠﻰ ﻣﻌﻠﻮﳍﺎ ﺑﺎﻟﻮﺟﻮد ﺑﺎﻟﻀﺮورة- د ﻛﺎﻧﺖ اﳌﺎﻫﻴﺔ ﻣﺘﻘﺪﻣﺔ ﻋﻠﻴﻪ ﺑﺎﻟﻮﺟﻮ ;ﻣ و ﺗﻘﺪ د ﻬﺎ ﻋﻠﻴﻪ إﻣﺎ -ﺬا اﻟﻮﺟﻮ , و ﻻزﻣﻪ ﺗﻘﺪم اﻟﺸﻲ ﺎل ء ﻋﻠﻰ ﻧﻔﺴﻪ و ﻫﻮ ﳏ ;ﺧﺮ و إﻣﺎ ﺑﻮﺟﻮد آ , و ﻧﻨﻘﻞ اﻟﻜﻼم إﻟﻴﻪ و ﻳﺘﺴﻠﺴﻞ ;ﻪ ﻛﺎﻧﺖ ﻋﻠﺘﻪ ﻏﲑ ﻣﺎﻫﻴﺘ و إن , ﻓﻴﻜﻮن ﻣﻌﻠﻮﻻ ﻟﻐﲑﻩ و ذﻟﻚ ﻳﻨﺎﰲ وﺟﻮب اﻟﻮﺟﻮد ﺑﺎﻟﺬات .ﻚ و ﻗﺪ ﺗﺒﲔ ﺑﺬﻟ :ﺐ أن اﻟﻮﺟﻮب ﺑﺬاﺗﻪ وﺻﻒ ﻣﻨﺘﺰع ﻣﻦ ﺣﺎق وﺟﻮد اﻟﻮاﺟ , ﻛﺎﺷﻒ ﺔ ﻛﻮن وﺟﻮدﻩ ﲝﺘﺎ ﰲ ﻏﺎﻳﺔ اﻟﺸﺪة ﻏﲑ ﻣﺸﺘﻤﻞ ﻋﻠﻰ ﺟﻬﺔ ﻋﺪﻣﻴ ﻋﻦ , إذ ﻟﻮ اﺷﺘﻤﻞ ﻋﻠﻰ ﺷﻲ م ء ﻣﻦ اﻷﻋﺪا ,ﻪ ﺣﺮم اﻟﻜﻤﺎل اﻟﻮﺟﻮدي اﻟﺬي ﰲ ﻣﻘﺎﺑﻠ ;ﻪ ﻓﻜﺎﻧﺖ ذاﺗﻪ ﻣﻘﻴﺪة ﺑﻌﺪﻣ , ﻛﻤﺎل ﻛﻞ ﻓﻠﻢ ﻳﻜﻦ واﺟﺒﺎ ﺑﺎﻟﺬات ﺻﺮﻓﺎ ﻟﻪ .
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4.3. QUIDDITY AND THE NECESSARY BEING The essence of the Necessary Being is Its existence, in the sense that It has no quiddity besides Its particular existence; for were It to have a quiddity besides Its particular existence, its existence would be additional and accidental to Its essence. Since everything accidental is necessarily caused (ma’lûl), Its existence too would be something caused, its cause being either Its quiddity or something else. Were Its quiddity Its cause, that quiddity would precede It in existence, as the cause is necessarily prior to its effect in terms of existence. This priority of Its quiddity to Its existence would be either with this existence or with another. The first alternative necessarily entails a thing being prior to itself, which is impossible. The second leads to an infinite regress when the same argument is shifted to it. Were Its cause something other than Its quiddity, It would be an effect of something else, which contradicts Its essential necessity. The above discussion reveals that essential necessity is a characteristic derived from the very reality of the Necessary Being, which shows that It is absolute existence, at the extreme of splendour, without possessing any aspect of privation (non-being). For did It possess any kind of privation, it would be devoid of the existential perfection that stands opposed to such a privation, and Its essence would be limited by the absence of that perfection and, consequently, it would not be essentially necessary and absolute, possessing every kind of perfection.
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اﻟﻔﺼﻞ اﻟﺮاﺑﻊ واﺟﺐ اﻟﻮﺟﻮد ﺑﺎﻟﺬات ﺠﻬﺎت واﺟﺐ اﻟﻮﺟﻮد ﻣﻦ ﺟﻤﻴﻊ اﻟ ﻛﺎن ﻏﲑ واﺟﺐ ﺑﺎﻟﻨﺴﺒﺔ إﱃ ﺷﻲ إذ ﻟﻮ م ء ﻣﻦ اﻟﻜﻤﺎﻻت اﻟﱵ ﲤﻜﻦ ﻟﻪ ﺑﺎﻹﻣﻜﺎن اﻟﻌﺎ , ﻛﺎن ذا ﺟﻬﺔ إﻣﻜﺎﻧﻴﺔ ﺑﺎﻟﻨﺴﺒﺔ إﻟﻴﻪ , ﻓﻜﺎن ﺧﺎﻟﻴﺎ ﰲ ذاﺗﻪ ﻋﻨﻪ ﻣﺘﺴﺎوﻳﺔ ﻧﺴﺒﺘﻪ إﱃ وﺟﻮدﻩ و ﻋﺪﻣﻪ ,ﻪ و ﻣﻌﻨﺎﻩ ﺗﻘﻴﺪ ذاﺗﻪ ﲜﻬﺔ ﻋﺪﻣﻴﺔ و ﻗﺪ ﻋﺮﻓﺖ ﰲ اﻟﻔﺼﻞ اﻟﺴﺎﺑﻖ اﺳﺘﺤﺎﻟﺘ.
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4.4. THE NECESSARY BEING IS NECESSARY IN ALL RESPECTS If the Necessary Being were to have a relation of non-necessity with anything pertaining to Its possible perfections, It would have an aspect of contingency in relation to it. That is, in Itself It would be devoid of it, being indifferent to its existence and non-existence. This entails a limit involving privation for Its essence, which is impossible as shown in the preceding section.
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اﻟﻔﺼﻞ اﻟﺨﺎﻣﺲ ﻓﻲ أن اﻟﺸﻲ ء ﻣﺎ ﻟﻢ ﻳﺠﺐ ﻟﻢ ﻳﻮﺟﺪ و ﺑﻄﻼن اﻟﻘﻮل ﺔ ﺑﺎﻷوﻟﻮﻳ ﻻ رﻳﺐ أن اﳌﻤﻜﻦ ,ﻼ اﻟﺬي ﻳﺘﺴﺎوى ﻧﺴﺒﺘﻪ إﱃ اﻟﻮﺟﻮد و اﻟﻌﺪم ﻋﻘ , ﻳﺘﻮﻗﻒ وﺟﻮدﻩ ﻋﻠﻰ
ﺷﻲ ﺎ ء ﻳﺴﻤﻰ ﻋﻠﺔ و ﻋﺪﻣﻪ ﻋﻠﻰ ﻋﺪﻣﻬ. و ﻫﻞ ﻳﺘﻮﻗﻒ وﺟﻮد اﳌﻤﻜﻦ ﻋﻠﻰ أن ﻳﻮﺟﺐ اﻟﻌﻠﺔ وﺟﻮدﻩ , و ﻫﻮ اﻟﻮﺟﻮب ﺑﺎﻟﻐﲑ؟ أو أﻧﻪ ج ﻋﻦ ﺣﺪ اﻻﺳﺘﻮاء ﻳﻮﺟﺪ ﺑﺎﳋﺮو , ﻛﺬا و إن ﱂ ﻳﺼﻞ إﱃ ﺣﺪ اﻟﻮﺟﻮب؟ و اﻟﻘﻮل ﰲ ﺟﺎﻧﺐ اﻟﻌﺪم ,ﺔ و ﻫﻮ اﳌﺴﻤﻰ ﺑﺎﻷوﻟﻮﻳ ; و ﻗﺪ ﻗﺴﻤﻮﻫﺎ إﱃ اﻷوﻟﻮﻳﺔ اﻟﺬاﺗﻴﺔ و ﻫﻲ اﻟﱵ ﻳﻘﺘﻀﻴﻬﺎ ذات اﳌﻤﻜﻦ و ﻣﺎﻫﻴﺘﻪ ,ﺎ و ﻏﲑ اﻟﺬاﺗﻴﺔ و ﻫﻲ ﺧﻼﻓﻬ , ﻛﻼ ﻣﻨﻬﻤﺎ إﱃ ﺔ ” و ﻗﺴﻤﻮا “ ﻛﺎﻓﻴ ﰲ ﲢﻘﻖ ﺔ ” اﳌﻤﻜﻦ و ﻛﺎﻓﻴ .” ﻏﲑ و اﻷوﻟﻮﻳﺔ ﺑﺄﻗﺴﺎﻣﻬﺎ ﺑﺎﻃﻠﺔ: أﻣﺎ اﻷوﻟﻮﻳﺔ اﻟﺬاﺗﻴﺔ ﻓﻸن اﳌﺎﻫﻴﺔ ﻗﺒﻞ اﻟﻮﺟﻮد ﺑﺎﻃﻠﺔ اﻟﺬات ﻻ ﺷﻴﺌﻴﺔ ﳍﺎ ﺣﱴ ﺗﻘﺘﻀﻲ أوﻟﻮﻳﺔ ﻛﺎﻓﻴﺔ ﻛﺎﻓﻴﺔ أو ﻏﲑ اﻟﻮﺟﻮد ;ى و ﺑﻌﺒﺎرة أﺧﺮ :ﻫﻲ اﳌﺎﻫﻴﺔ ﻣﻦ ﺣﻴﺚ ﻫﻲ ﻟﻴﺴﺖ إﻻ , ﻻ ﻣﻮﺟﻮدة و ﻻ ﻣﻌﺪوﻣﺔ و ﻻ أي ﺷﻲ ﺧﺮ ء آ. و أﻣﺎ اﻷوﻟﻮﻳﺔ اﻟﻐﲑﻳﺔ ,ﺔ و ﻫﻲ اﻟﱵ ﺗﺄﰐ ﻣﻦ ﻧﺎﺣﻴﺔ اﻟﻌﻠ , ﻓﻸ5ﺎ ﳌﺎ ﱂ ﺗﺼﻞ إﱃ ﺣﺪ اﻟ ء ج -ﺎ اﳌﻤﻜﻦ ﻣﻦ ﺣﺪ اﻻﺳﺘﻮا ﻮﺟﻮب ﻻ ﳜﺮ ,م و ﻻ ﻳﺘﻌﲔ -ﺎ ﻟﻪ اﻟﻮﺟﻮد أو اﻟﻌﺪ , و ﻻ ﻳﻨﻘﻄﻊ -ﺎ اﻟﺴﺆال :؟ إﻧﻪ ﱂ وﻗﻊ ﻫﺬا دون ذاك ;ﺎ و ﻫﻮ اﻟﺪﻟﻴﻞ ﻋﻠﻰ أﻧﻪ ﱂ ﺗﺘﻢ ﺑﻌﺪ ﻟﻠﻌﻠﺔ ﻋﻠﻴﺘﻬ. ﻓﺘﺤﺼﻞ :ل أن اﻟﱰﺟﻴﺢ إﳕﺎ ﻫﻮ ﺑﺈﳚﺎب اﻟﻌﻠﺔ وﺟﻮد اﳌﻌﻠﻮ , ﲝﻴﺚ ﻳﺘﻌﲔ ﻟﻪ اﻟﻮﺟﻮد و ﻳﺴﺘﺤﻴﻞ ﻋﻠﻴﻪ م اﻟﻌﺪ ,ﻪ أو إﳚﺎ-ﺎ ﻋﺪﻣ ;ﻲ ﻓﺎﻟﺸ ء- ﻦ أﻋﲏ اﳌﻤﻜ- ﺪ ﻣﺎ ﱂ ﳚﺐ ﱂ ﻳﻮﺟ. ﺧﺎﲤﺔ ﻣﺎ ﺗﻘﺪم ﻣﻦ اﻟﻮﺟﻮب ﻫﻮ اﻟﺬي ﻳﺄﰐ اﳌﻤﻜﻦ ﻣﻦ ﻧﺎﺣﻴﺔ ﻋﻠﺘﻪ ; و ﻟﻪ وﺟﻮب آﺧﺮ ﻳﻠﺤﻘﻪ ﺑﻌﺪ ﲢﻘﻖ اﻟﻮﺟﻮد أو اﻟﻌﺪم ,ل و ﻫﻮ اﳌﺴﻤﻰ ﺑﺎﻟﻀﺮورة ﺑﺸﺮط اﶈﻤﻮ ; ﻓﺎﳌﻤﻜﻦ اﳌﻮﺟﻮد ﳏﻔﻮف ﺑﺎﻟﻀﺮورﺗﲔ :ﺔ اﻟﺴﺎﺑﻘﺔ و اﻟﻼﺣﻘ.
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4.5. A THING DOES NOT EXIST UNLESS IT BECOMES NECESSARY There is no doubt that the contingent, which is indifferent to both existence and non-existence, depends for its existence on that which is called the ‘cause,’ without which it cannot exist. Does the existence of the contingent depend on being necessitated by its cause, which makes it accidentally necessary, or does it come into existence by merely emerging out of the state of indifference (to existence and non-existence) without reaching the limit of necessity? The same question can be framed in regard to its non-existence. The ‘theory of preponderance’ (awlawiyyah) upholds the latter view. Its proponents classify ‘preponderance’ into essential and accidental. The former is said to be what is required by the quiddity and essence of a contingent. They further divide each of these kinds into that which is sufficient to actualize the contingent and that which is insufficient. However, the idea of preponderance with all its divisions is a false notion. As to ‘essential preponderance,’ the quiddity of a thing prior to its existence is a vacuity having no entity, so as to require any preponderance, sufficient or insufficient, in favour of its existence. In other words, quiddity as such is neither existent nor non-existent, nor is it anything else. As to accidental preponderance, which derives from the cause, it cannot bring the contingent out of its state of indifference as long as it does not reach the point of necessity. By itself it cannot determine the contingent’s existence or non-existence,’ and the question as to why this has actualized instead of that remains open, which proves that the cause is not yet complete. To sum up, preponderance lies solely in the cause necessitating the existence or non-existence of the effect, in the sense that when the cause determines its existence its non-existence is impossible, and when the cause necessitates non-existence of the contingent, its existence does not become necessary. Hence a thing – that is a contingent – does not exist unless necessitated. Conclusion The aforementioned necessity is one that the contingent derives from its cause. It has another necessity attending its existence or non-existence. This necessity is called ‘necessity imposed by the predicate’ [i.e. existence or non-existence, in the present case]. Thus a contingent is bracketed by two kinds of necessity: prior and attendant.
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اﻟﻔﺼﻞ اﻟﺴﺎدس ﻓﻲ ﻣﻌﺎﻧﻲ اﻹﻣﻜﺎن اﻹﻣﻜﺎن اﳌﺒﺤﻮث ﻋﻨﻪ ﻫﺎﻫﻨﺎ ﻫﻮ ﻻ ﺿﺮورة اﻟﻮﺟﻮد و اﻟﻌﺪم ﺑﺎﻟﻨﺴﺒﺔ إﱃ اﳌﺎﻫﻴﺔ اﳌﺄﺧﻮذة ﻣﻦ ﺣﻴ ﻫﻲ ﺚ , ص ” و ﻫﻮ اﳌﺴﻤﻰ ب “ اﻹﻣﻜﺎن اﳋﺎ ﻲ ”و ”. اﳋﺎﺻ و ﻗﺪ ﻳﺴﺘﻌﻤﻞ اﻹﻣﻜﺎن ﲟﻌﲎ ﺳﻠﺐ اﻟﻀﺮورة ﻋﻦ اﳉﺎﻧﺐ اﳌﺨﺎﻟﻒ , ﻛﺎن اﳉﺎﻧﺐ ﺳﻮاء اﳌﻮاﻓﻖ ﺿﺮورﻳﺎ أو ﻏﲑ ﺿﺮوري ;ﺎل ﻓﻴﻘ :ﻲ اﻟﺸ ﻊ ء اﻟﻔﻼﱐ ﳑﻜﻦ أي ﻟﻴﺲ ﲟﻤﺘﻨ ; و ﻫﻮ اﳌﺴﺘﻌﻤﻞ ﰲ ﻟﺴﺎن اﻟﻌﺎﻣﺔ ,ص أﻋﻢ ﻣﻦ اﻹﻣﻜﺎن اﳋﺎ ; ﺎ ” و ﻟﺬا ﻳﺴﻤﻰ “ إﻣﻜﺎﻧﺎ ﻋﺎﻣﻴ ﺎ ”و ”. ﻋﺎﻣ و ﻗﺪ ﻳﺴﺘﻌﻤﻞ ﰲ ﻣﻌﲎ أﺧﺺ ﻣﻦ ذﻟﻚ , و ﻫﻮ ﺳﻠﺐ اﻟﻀﺮورات اﻟﺬاﺗﻴﺔ و اﻟﻮﺻﻔﻴﺔ و اﻟﻮﻗﺘﻴﺔ ;ﺎ ﻛﻘﻮﻟﻨ :ن ﻛﺎﺗﺐ ﺑﺎﻹﻣﻜﺎ اﻹﻧﺴﺎن ,ﺔ ﺣﻴﺚ إن اﻹﻧﺴﺎﻧﻴﺔ ﻻ ﺗﻘﺘﻀﻲ ﺿﺮورة اﻟﻜﺘﺎﺑ , و ﱂ ﻳﺆﺧﺬ ﰲ اﳌﻮﺿﻮع وﺻﻒ ﻳﻮﺟﺐ اﻟﻀﺮورة ,ﻚ ﻛﺬﻟ و ﻻ وﻗﺖ ; و ﲢﻘﻖ اﻹﻣﻜﺎن -ﺬا اﳌﻌﲎ ﰲ اﻟﻘﻀﻴﺔ ﲝﺴﺐ اﻻﻋﺘﺒﺎر اﻟﻌﻘﻠﻲ ,ع ﲟﻘﺎﻳﺴﺔ اﶈﻤﻮل إﱃ اﳌﻮﺿﻮ , ﻻ ﻳﻨﺎﰲ ﺛﺒﻮت اﻟﻀﺮورة ج ﺑﺜﺒﻮت اﻟﻌﻠﺔ ﲝﺴﺐ اﳋﺎر ; ﺧﺺ ” و ﻳﺴﻤﻰ ”. اﻹﻣﻜﺎن اﻷ و ﻗﺪ ﻳﺴﺘﻌﻤﻞ ﲟﻌﲎ ﺳﻠﺐ اﻟﻀﺮورة ﻣﻦ اﳉﻬﺎت اﻟﺜﻼث و اﻟﻀﺮورة ﺑﺸﺮط اﶈﻤﻮل أﻳ ﻀﺎ ن ” ﻛﻘﻮﻟﻨﺎ ﻛﺎﺗﺐ ﻏﺪا ﺑﺎﻹﻣﻜﺎ اﳌ “ زﻳﺪ و ﳜﺘﺺ ﺑﺎﻷﻣﻮر ﺴﺘﻘﺒﻠﺔ اﻟﱵ ﱂ ﺗﺘﺤﻘﻖ ﺑﻌﺪ ﺣﱴ ﻳﺜﺒﺖ ﻓﻴﻬﺎ اﻟﻀﺮورة ﺑﺸﺮط اﶈﻤﻮل و ﻫﺬا اﻹﻣﻜﺎن إﳕﺎ ﻳﺜﺒﺖ ﲝﺴﺐ اﻟﻈﻦ و اﻟﻐﻔﻠﺔ ﻋﻦ أن غ ﻋﻨﻬﺎ و ﻳﺴﻤﻰ ﻛﻞ ﺣﺎدث ﻣﺴﺘﻘﺒﻞ إﻣﺎ واﺟﺐ أو ﳑﺘﻨﻊ ﻻﻧﺘﻬﺎﺋﻪ إﱃ ﻋﻠﻞ ﻣﻮﺟﺒﺔ ﻣﻔﺮو ﱄ ” ”. اﻹﻣﻜﺎن اﻻﺳﺘﻘﺒﺎ و ﻗﺪ ﻳﺴﺘﻌﻤﻞ اﻹﻣﻜﺎن ﲟﻌﻨﻴﲔ آﺧﺮﻳﻦ: أﺣﺪﳘﺎ : ﻣﺎ ﻳﺴﻤﻰ ﻲ اﻹﻣﻜﺎن اﻟﻮﻗﻮﻋ ,ﻲ ﻛﻮن اﻟﺸ و ﻫﻮ ء ﲝﻴﺚ ﻻ ﻳﻠﺰم ﻣﻦ ﻓﺮض وﻗﻮﻋﻪ ﳏﺎل ,ﲑ أي ﻟﻴﺲ ﳑﺘﻨﻌﺎ ﺑﺎﻟﺬات أو ﺑﺎﻟﻐ ;ﻖ و ﻫﻮ ﺳﻠﺐ اﻻﻣﺘﻨﺎع ﻋﻦ اﳉﺎﻧﺐ اﳌﻮاﻓ , ﻛﻤﺎ أن اﻹﻣﻜﺎن اﻟﻌﺎم ﺳﻠﺐ اﻟﻀﺮورة ﻋﻦ اﳉﺎﻧﺐ اﳌﺨﺎﻟﻒ. و ﺛﺎﻧﻴﻬﻤﺎ :ي اﻹﻣﻜﺎن اﻻﺳﺘﻌﺪاد ,ﻫﻮ و ,ﻩ ﻛﻤﺎ ذﻛﺮو , ً ﻧﻔﺲ اﻻﺳﺘﻌﺪاد ذاﺗﺎ ,و ﻏﲑﻩ اً اﻋﺘﺒﺎر ,ﻲ ﻴﺆ اﻟﺸ ﺧﺮ T ﻓﺈن ء ﻷن ﻳﺼﲑ ﺷﻴﺌﺎ آ ,ﻲ ﻟﻪ ﻧﺴﺒﺔ إﱃ اﻟﺸ ّ ﺪِ ء اﳌﺴﺘﻌ , و ﻧﺴﺒﺔ إﱃ اﻟﺸﻲ ﻟﻪ ّ ﺪَ ء اﳌﺴﺘﻌ ; دا ” ﻓﺒﺎﻻﻋﺘﺒﺎر اﻷول ﻳﺴﻤﻰ ﻼ “ اﺳﺘﻌﺪا ﻓﻴﻘﺎل ﻣﺜ : اﻟﻨﻄﻔﺔ ﳍﺎ اﺳﺘﻌﺪاد أن ﺗﺼﲑ إﻧﺴﺎﻧﺎ ; ي ” و ﺑﺎﻻﻋﺘﺒﺎر اﻟﺜﺎﱐ ﻳﺴﻤﻰ ل “ اﻹﻣﻜﺎن اﻻﺳﺘﻌﺪاد ﻓﻴﻘﺎ :ﻜ اﻹﻧﺴﺎن ﳝ ﻦ أن ﻳﻮﺟﺪ ﰲ اﻟﻨﻄﻔﺔ. و اﻟﻔﺮق ﺑﻴﻨﻪ و ﺑﲔ اﻹﻣﻜﺎن اﻟﺬاﰐ :ﰐ أن اﻹﻣﻜﺎن اﻟﺬا ,ﻲ ﻛﻤﺎ ﺳﻴﺠ ء , اﻋﺘﺒﺎر ﲢﻠﻴﻠﻲ ﻋﻘﻠﻲ ﻳﻠﺤﻖ اﳌﺎﻫﻴﺔ اﳌﺄﺧﻮذة ﻣﻦ ﺣﻴﺚ ﻫﻲ , و اﻹﻣﻜﺎن اﻻﺳﺘﻌﺪادي ﺻﻔﺔ وﺟﻮدﻳﺔ ﺗﻠﺤﻖ
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اﳌﺎﻫﻴﺔ اﳌﻮﺟﻮدة ﻓﺎﻹﻣﻜﺎن اﻟﺬاﰐ ﻳﻠﺤﻖ اﳌﺎﻫﻴﺔ اﻹﻧﺴﺎﻧﻴﺔ اﳌﺄﺧﻮذة ﻣﻦ ﺣﻴﺚ ﻫﻲ و اﻹ ﻣﻜﺎن اﻻﺳﺘﻌﺪادي ﻳﻠﺤﻖ اﻟﻨﻄﻔﺔ اﻟﻮاﻗﻌﺔ ﰲ ﳎﺮى ﺗﻜﻮن اﻹﻧﺴﺎن. ﻛﺎن اﻹﻣﻜﺎن اﻻﺳﺘﻌﺪادي ﻗﺎﺑﻼ ﻟﻠﺸﺪة و اﻟﻀﻌﻒ و ﻟﺬا , ﻓﺈﻣﻜﺎن ﲢﻘﻖ اﻹﻧﺴﺎﻧﻴﺔ ﰲ اﻟﻌﻠﻘﺔ أﻗﻮى ﻣﻨﻪ ﰲ اﻟﻨﻄﻔﺔ ;ﻪ ﲞﻼف اﻹﻣﻜﺎن اﻟﺬاﰐ ﻓﻼ ﺷﺪة و ﻻ ﺿﻌﻒ ﻓﻴ. ﻛﺎن اﻹﻣﻜﺎن اﻻﺳﺘﻌﺪادي و ﻟﺬا أﻳﻀﺎ ,اﳌ ﻳﻘﺒﻞ اﻟﺰوال ﻋﻦ ﻦ ﻤﻜ , ﻓﺈن اﻻﺳﺘﻌﺪاد ﻳﺰول ﺑﻌﺪ ﲢﻘﻖ اﳌﺴﺘﻌﺪ ﻟﻪ ﺑﺎﻟﻔﻌﻞ ;ﺔ ﲞﻼف اﻹﻣﻜﺎن اﻟﺬاﰐ ﻓﺈﻧﻪ ﻻزم اﳌﺎﻫﻴ , ﻫﻮ ﻣﻌﻬﺎ ﺣﻴﺜﻤﺎ ﲢﻘﻘﺖ. ﻛﺎن اﻹﻣﻜﺎن اﻻﺳﺘﻌﺪادي و ﻟﺬا أﻳﻀﺎ ,ﻢ و ﳏﻠﻪ اﳌﺎدة ﺑﺎﳌﻌﲎ اﻷﻋ , ﻳﺘﻌﲔ ﻣﻌﻪ اﳌﻤﻜﻦ اﳌﺴﺘﻌﺪ ﻟﻪ ,ة ﻛﺎﻹﻧﺴﺎﻧﻴﺔ اﻟﱵ ﺗﺴﺘﻌﺪ ﳍﺎ اﳌﺎد ;اﻟ ﲞﻼف اﻹﻣﻜﺎن ﺔ ﺬاﰐ اﻟﺬي ﰲ اﳌﺎﻫﻴ , ﻓﺈﻧﻪ ﻻ ﻳﺘﻌﲔ ﻣﻌﻪ ﳍﺎ اﻟﻮﺟﻮد أو اﻟﻌﺪم. و اﻟﻔﺮق ﺑﲔ اﻹﻣﻜﺎن اﻻﺳﺘﻌﺪادي و اﻟﻮﻗﻮﻋﻲ : أن اﻻﺳﺘﻌﺪادي إﳕﺎ ﻳﻜﻮن ﰲ اﳌﺎدﻳﺎت و اﻟﻮﻗﻮﻋﻲ أﻋﻢ ﻣﻮردا.
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4.6. SOME OTHER MEANINGS OF IMKÂN The imkân discussed above is in the sense of non-necessity of existence or non-existence in relation to quiddity when taken as such. It is called alimkân al-khâshsh or al-khâshshî (special possibility). (i) However, the word imkân is also used in the sense of negation of necessity in relation to the contrary of something, irrespective of whether it be necessary or not. For example, when it is said that such and such a thing is possible, what is meant is that it is not impossible. In this common usage, imkân has a wider meaning than contingency. Hence it is called imkân âmm or âmmî (general possibility). (ii) The word imkân is also used in a narrower sense than that of contingency to mean absence of the threefold logical necessities (darûrah). essential (dzâtiyyah), attributive (wasfiyyah) and time-bound (waqtiyyah). For instance, in the statement, ‘Man may be a writer,’ being human does not necessarily require the ability to write; nor is there a quality that may entail that such a necessity is subsumed in the subject, nor is any particular time associated with it that may entail such a necessity. Possibility, in this sense, arises in a proposition on account of a conceptual consideration wherein the predicate is related to the subject; it does not negate the actualization of necessity in the external world due to the actualization of the cause. Possibility in this sense is called al- imkân al-akhashsh (more special possibility). (iii) Imkân is also used in the sense of absence of necessity imposed by predication and the absence of the three kinds of necessity mentioned above, as in the statement ‘Zayd may be a writer tomorrow.’ It pertains to circumstances pertaining to the future that have not yet occurred so that necessity imposed by the predicate may apply to them. This kind of possibility derives from conjecture and from inattention to the fact that every future event is either necessary or impossible because of its dependence on the presence or absence of its causes. This kind of possibility is called al- imkân al-istiqbâlî (future possibility).’ (iv) The word imkân is also used in two other senses. One of them is the so-called al-imkan al-wuqû’î (possibility of occurrence), which applies to a thing the assumption of whose occurrence does not entail an impossibility. That is, it is neither impossible in itself nor by virtue of something else. It involves a negation of impossibility in regard to the affirmative side of the proposition (e.g. in the proposition ‘A’s existence is possible,’ impossibility is negated in regard to A’s existence), whereas ‘general possibility’ involves a negation of necessity in regard to the converse side. (In the above proposition, the negation of necessity will be in regard to A’s nonexistence.) (v) The second is imkân al-isti’dâdî (potential), which, as mentioned by metaphysicians, is essentially a thing’s potential (e.g., the seed’s potential to become a tree), differing from it only in respect of consideration. The potential of a thing for becoming another thing can be considered in two ways: (i) in relation to the thing possessing that potential and (ii) in relation to that which it has the potential to become. In the first case, it is called ‘potential.’ Hence one may, for instance, say, ‘The embryo has the potential
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to become a human being.’ In the second, it is called ‘possibility by virtue of potential (al-imkân al-isti’dâdî).’ Hence, in the above example, one may say, ‘It is possible for a human being to come forth from the embryo.’ Following are some points of difference between this kind of possibility and essential contingency (al-imkân al-dzâtî), which will be discussed in the next section: (i) Essential contingency is a rational analytic concept (i’tibâr tahlîlî ‘aqlî) associated with quiddity qua quiddity, whereas ‘possibility by virtue of potential’ is an existential quality associated with an existing quiddity. Hence essential contingency is associated with man’s quiddity conceived as such, whereas possibility by virtue of potential is associated with the embryo in the process of becoming a human being. (ii) Accordingly, possibility by virtue of potential is subject to various degrees of strength and weakness, as this possibility is greater in a developed foetus than one in the early stages, unlike essential contingency, which does not vary. (iii) Also, possibility by virtue of potential can disappear with the disappearance of the potential after the thing actually becomes what it had the potential for, unlike essential contingency, which clings to quiddity and remains with it even when it is actualized. (iv) Furthermore, possibility by virtue of potential is found in ‘matter,’ in its most general sense. This possibility determines the end product of the potential, like the human form determined by the potential of the matter (in the form of the embryo). On the contrary, essential contingency, which is associated with quiddity, does not determine its existence or non-existence. The difference between ‘possibility by virtue of potential’ and ‘possibility of occurrence’ is that the former relates solely to material beings, while the latter applies to material as well as immaterial things.
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اﻟﻔﺼﻞ اﻟﺴﺎﺑﻊ ﻓﻲ أن اﻹﻣﻜﺎن اﻋﺘﺒﺎر ﻋﻘﻠﻲ ,ﺔ و أﻧﻪ ﻻزم ﻟﻠﻤﺎﻫﻴ أﻣﺎ أﻧﻪ اﻋﺘﺒﺎر ﻋﻘﻠﻲ , ﻓﻸﻧﻪ ﻳﻠﺤﻖ اﳌﺎﻫﻴﺔ اﳌﺄﺧﻮذة ﻋﻘﻼ ﻣﻊ ﻗﻄﻊ اﻟﻨﻈﺮ ﻋﻦ اﻟﻮﺟﻮد و اﻟﻌﺪم ,ﺐ ﻛﺬﻟﻚ اﻋﺘﺒﺎرﻳﺔ ﺑﻼ رﻳ و اﳌﺎﻫﻴﺔ اﳌﺄﺧﻮذة , ﻓﻤﺎ ﻳﻠﺤﻖ ﻛﺬﻟﻚ ﺑﻼ -ﺎ -ﺬا اﻻﻋﺘﺒﺎر رﻳﺐ ;ﺔ ﺎ ﲝﺴﺐ ﻧﻔﺲ اﻷﻣﺮ إﻣﺎ ﻣﻮﺟﻮدة أو ﻣﻌﺪوﻣ 5ﻛﻮ و ﻫﺬا اﻻﻋﺘﺒﺎر اﻟﻌﻘﻠﻲ ﻻ ﻳﻨﺎﰲ , و ﺎ ﳏﻔﻮﻓﺔ ﺑﻮﺟﻮﺑﲔ أو اﻣﺘﻨﺎﻋﲔ 5ﻛﻮ ﻻزﻣﻪ . ﻛﻮﻧﻪ ﻻزﻣﺎ ﻟﻠﻤﺎﻫﻴﺔ و أﻣﺎ ,ﻫﻲ ﻓﻸﻧﺎ إذا ﺗﺼﻮرﻧﺎ اﳌﺎﻫﻴﺔ ﻣﻦ ﺣﻴﺚ , ﻛﻞ ﻣﻊ ﻗﻄﻊ اﻟﻨﻈﺮ ﻋﻦ ﻣﺎ ﺳﻮاﻫﺎ ,ة ﱂ ﳒﺪ ﻣﻌﻬﺎ ﺿﺮور م وﺟﻮد أو ﻋﺪ ,ﲔ و ﻟﻴﺲ اﻹﻣﻜﺎن إﻻ ﺳﻠﺐ اﻟﻀﺮورﺗ , ﻓﻬﻲ ﺎ ﳑﻜﻨﺔ .ﲔ Tﺑﺬا ﻛﺎن ﻫﺬﻳﻦ اﻟﺴﻠﺒ و أﺻﻞ اﻹﻣﻜﺎن و إن , ﻟﻜﻦ اﻟﻌﻘﻞ ﻳﻀﻊ ﻻزم ﻫﺬﻳﻦ اﻟﺴﻠﺒﲔ ,ﺔ و ﻫﻮ اﺳﺘﻮاء اﻟﻨﺴﺒ ,ﻤﺎ ;ﺎ 5ﻣﻜﺎ ﻓﻴﻌﻮد اﻹﻣﻜﺎن ﻣﻌﲎ ﺛﺒﻮﺗﻴ , ﻛﺎن ﳎﻤﻮع و إن اﻟﺴﻠﺒﲔ ﻣﻨﻔﻴﺎ.
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4.7. CONTINGENCY IS ESSENTIAL TO QUIDDITY Contingency is a conceptual construct (i’tibâr ‘aqlî), for it is associated with quiddity as conceived by the intellect without taking existence or nonexistence into account. Quiddity conceived in this manner is undoubtedly a conceptual construct; hence that which is associated with it is also undoubtedly a mental construct. However, being a conceptual construct does not preclude quiddity’s existence or non-existence in actual fact, nor does being bracketed by two necessities or impossibilities. As to contingency being inseparable from quiddity, when we conceive quiddity as such without taking into account anything else, we do not find in it either the logical necessity of existence or that of non-existence. Contingency is nothing except negation of the two necessities. Hence quiddity is contingent in its essence. Although there are two negations involved here, the intellect substitutes them with their implication – that is, equality of relation to existence and non-existence – and thus contingency becomes a positive concept (ma‘nâ tsubûtiyyan) despite the negative import of the two negations.
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اﻟﻔﺼﻞ اﻟﺜﺎﻣﻦ ﻓﻲ ﺣﺎﺟﺔ اﻟﻤﻤﻜﻦ إﻟﻰ اﻟﻌﻠﺔ و ﻣﺎ ﻫﻲ ﻋﻠﺔ اﺣﺘﻴﺎﺟﻪ إﻟﻴﻬﺎ؟ ﺣﺎﺟﺔ اﳌﻤﻜﻦ إﱃ اﻟﻌﻠﺔ ﻣﻦ اﻟﻀﺮورﻳﺎت اﻷوﻟﻴﺔ , اﻟﱵ ﳎﺮد ﺗﺼﻮر ﻣﻮﺿﻮﻋﻬﺎ و ﳏﻤﻮﳍﺎ ﻛﺎف ﰲ اﻟﺘﺼﺪﻳﻖ ﺎ – ;م ﻓﺈن ﻣﻦ ﺗﺼﻮر اﳌﺎﻫﻴﺔ اﳌﻤﻜﻨﺔ اﳌﺘﺴﺎوﻳﺔ اﻟﻨﺴﺒﺔ إﱃ اﻟﻮﺟﻮد و اﻟﻌﺪ , و ﺗﺼﻮر ﺗﻮﻗﻒ ﺧﺮوﺟﻬﺎ ﻣﻦ ﺣﺪ اﻻﺳﺘﻮاء إﱃ أﺣﺪ اﳉﺎﻧﺒﲔ ﻋﻠﻰ أﻣﺮ آﺧﺮ ﳜﺮﺟﻬﺎ ﻣﻨﻪ إﻟﻴﻪ ﱂ ﻳﻠﺒﺚ أن ﻳﺼﺪق ﺑﻪ. و ﻫﻞ ﻋﻠﺔ ﺣﺎﺟﺔ اﳌﻤﻜﻦ إﱃ اﻟﻌﻠﺔ ﻫﻲ اﻹﻣﻜﺎن ,ل أو اﳊﺪوث؟ اﳊﻖ ﻫﻮ اﻷو , و ﺑﻪ ﻗﺎﻟﺖ اﳊﻜﻤﺎء. و اﺳﺘﺪل ﻋﻠﻴﻪ ﺑﺄن اﳌﺎﻫﻴﺔ ﺑﺎﻋﺘﺒﺎر وﺟﻮدﻫﺎ ﺿﺮورﻳﺔ اﻟﻮﺟﻮد , و ﺑﺎﻋﺘﺒﺎر ﻋﺪﻣﻬﺎ ﺿﺮورﻳﺔ اﻟﻌﺪم ,ل و ﻫﺎﺗﺎن اﻟﻀﺮورﺗﺎن ﺑﺸﺮط اﶈﻤﻮ , و ﻟﻴﺲ اﳊﺪوث إﻻ ﺗﺮﺗﺐ إﺣﺪى اﻟﻀﺮورﺗﲔ ﻋﻠﻰ اﻷﺧﺮى ,ﻲ ﻛﻮن وﺟﻮد اﻟﺸ ﻓﺈﻧﻪ ﻪ ء ﺑﻌﺪ ﻋﺪﻣ , و ﻣﻌﻠﻮم أن اﻟﻀﺮورة ﻣﻨﺎط اﻟﻐﲎ ﻋﻦ اﻟﺴﺒﺐ و ارﺗﻔﺎع اﳊﺎﺟﺔ ,ﻓﻤ ب ﺎ ﱂ ﻳﺮﺗﻔﻊ اﻟﻮﺟﻮ ,ﺔ 5 ﺎ ﱂ ﺗﻌﺘﱪ اﳌﺎﻫﻴﺔ ﺑﺈﻣﻜﺎ و ﱂ ﲢﺼﻞ اﳊﺎﺟﺔ إﱃ اﻟﻌﻠ. ﺑﺮﻫﺎن آﺧﺮ :ﺔ إن اﳌﺎﻫﻴﺔ ﻻ ﺗﻮﺟﺪ إﻻ ﻋﻦ إﳚﺎد ﻣﻦ اﻟﻌﻠ , و إﳚﺎد اﻟﻌﻠﺔ ﳍﺎ ﻣﺘﻮﻗﻒ ﻋﻠﻰ وﺟﻮب اﳌﺎﻫﻴﺔ اﳌﺘﻮﻗﻒ ﻋﻠﻰ إﳚﺎب اﻟﻌﻠﺔ , و ﻗﺪ ﺗﺒﲔ ﳑﺎ ﺗﻘﺪم و إﳚﺎب اﻟﻌﻠﺔ ﻣﺘﻮﻗﻒ ﻋﻠﻰ ﺣﺎﺟﺔ اﳌﺎﻫﻴﺔ إﻟﻴﻬﺎ و ﺎ ;5 ﺣﺎﺟﺔ اﳌﺎﻫﻴﺔ إﻟﻴﻬﺎ ﻣﺘﻮﻗﻔﺔ ﻋﻠﻰ إﻣﻜﺎ إذ ﻟﻮ ﱂ ﲤﻜﻦ ﺑﺄن وﺟﺒﺖ أو اﻣﺘﻨﻌﺖ اﺳﺘﻐﻨﺖ ﻋﻦ اﻟﻌﻠﺔ ﺑﺎﻟﻀﺮورة ;ة ﻓﻠﺤﺎﺟﺘﻬﺎ ﺗﻮﻗﻒ ﻣﺎ ﻋﻠﻰ اﻹﻣﻜﺎن ﺑﺎﻟﻀﺮور ; و ﻟﻮ ﺗﻮﻗﻔﺖ ﻣﻊ ذﻟﻚ ﻋﻠﻰ ﺣﺪوﺛﻬﺎ ,م و ﻫﻮ وﺟﻮدﻫﺎ ﺑﻌﺪ اﻟﻌﺪ , ﻛﺎن اﳊﺪوث ﻋﻠﺔ و ﺳﻮاء اﻹﻣﻜﺎن ﺷﺮﻃﺎ ,ﺎ أو ﻋﺪﻣﻪ ﻣﺎﻧﻌ ,ﺟ ﻛﺎن اﳊﺪوث أو ن ﺰء ﻋﻠﺔ و اﳉﺰء اﻵﺧﺮ ﻫﻮ اﻹﻣﻜﺎ , أو ﻛﺎن اﳊﺪوث ﺷﺮﻃﺎ ,ﺎ أو ﻋﺪﻣﻪ اﻟﻮاﻗﻊ ﰲ ﻣﺮﺗﺒﺘﻪ ﻣﺎﻧﻌ ,ﻲ ﻓﻌﻠﻰ أي ﺣﺎل ﻳﻠﺰم ﺗﻘﺪم اﻟﺸ ء ﻋﻠﻰ ﻧﻔﺴﻪ ﲟﺮاﺗﺐ .ﻪ ﻛﺎن وﺟﻮ-ﺎ أو إﳚﺎب اﻟﻌﻠﺔ ﳍﺎ ﻫﻮ ﻋﻠﺔ اﳊﺎﺟﺔ ﺑﻮﺟ ﻛﺬا ﻟﻮ و . ﻓﻠﻢ ﻳﺒﻖ إﻻ أن ﻳﻜﻮن اﻹﻣﻜﺎن وﺣﺪﻩ ﻋﻠﺔ ﻟﻠﺤﺎﺟﺔ ,ﺔ إذ ﻟﻴﺲ ﰲ ﻫﺬﻩ اﻟﺴﻠﺴﻠ اﳌﺘﺼﻠﺔ .ﺎ5 اﳌﱰﺗﺒﺔ ﻋﻘﻼ ﻗﺒﻞ اﳊﺎﺟﺔ إﻻ اﳌﺎﻫﻴﺔ و إﻣﻜﺎ و ﺑﺬﻟﻚ ﻳﻨﺪﻓﻊ ﻣﺎ اﺣﺘﺞ ﺑﻪ ﺑﻌﺾ اﻟﻘﺎﺋﻠﲔ ﺑﺄن ﻋﻠﺔ اﳊﺎﺟﺔ إﱃ اﻟﻌﻠﺔ ﻫﻮ اﳊﺪوث دون اﻹﻣﻜﺎن ,ث ﻛﺎن اﻹﻣﻜﺎن ﻫﻮ اﻟﻌﻠﺔ دون اﳊﺪو ﻣﻦ أﻧﻪ ﻟﻮ ,ﱐ ﺟﺎز أن ﻳﻮﺟﺪ اﻟﻘﺪﱘ اﻟﺰﻣﺎ , و ﻫﻮ اﻟﺬي ﻻ أول ﻟﻮﺟﻮدﻩ و ﻻ آﺧﺮ ﻟﻪ ; و ﻣﻌﻠﻮ ﺔ م أن ﻓﺮض دوام وﺟﻮدﻩ ﻳﻐﻨﻴﻪ ﻋﻦ اﻟﻌﻠ , إذ ﻻ ﺳﺒﻴﻞ ﻟﻠﻌﺪم إﻟﻴﻪ ﺣﱴ ﳛﺘﺎج إﱃ ارﺗﻔﺎﻋﻪ. وﺟﻪ اﻻﻧﺪﻓﺎع :ﻪ أن اﳌﻔﺮوض أن ذاﺗﻪ ﻫﻮ اﳌﻨﺸﺄ ﳊﺎﺟﺘ , و اﻟﺬات ﳏﻔﻮﻇﺔ ﻣﻊ اﻟﻮﺟﻮد اﻟﺪاﺋﻢ ,ﻪ ﻓﻠﻪ ﻋﻠﻰ ﻓﺮض دوام اﻟﻮﺟﻮد ﺣﺎﺟﺔ داﺋﻤﺔ ﰲ ذاﺗ , ﻛﺎن ﻣﻊ ﺷﺮط اﻟﻮﺟﻮد ﻟﻪ و إن ﺑﻨﺤﻮ اﻟﻀﺮورة ﺑﺸﺮط اﶈ ﺔ ﻤﻮل ﻣﺴﺘﻐﻨﻴﺎ ﻋﻦ اﻟﻌﻠ ,ﺎ ﲟﻌﲎ ارﺗﻔﺎع ﺣﺎﺟﺘﻪ -.
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و أﻳﻀﺎ ﺳﻴﺠﻲ ء :ﺎ ﻛﺎن ﺣﺎدﺛﺎ أو ﻗﺪﳝ أن وﺟﻮد اﳌﻌﻠﻮل ﺳﻮاء ,ﻂ وﺟﻮد راﺑ , ﻣﺘﻌﻠﻖ اﻟﺬات ﺑﻌﻠﺘﻪ ,ﺎ ;ﻟﻪ 5 ﻏﲑ ﻣﺴﺘﻘﻞ دو ﻓﺎﳊﺎﺟﺔ إﱃ اﻟﻌﻠﺔ ذاﺗﻴﺔ ﻣﻼزﻣﺔ .
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4.8. THE CONTINGENT’S NEED FOR A CAUSE The contingent’s need for a cause is one of the primary self-evident propositions, wherein the mere conception of the subject and the predicate is sufficient to affirm its validity. For if one were to conceive the contingent quiddity, which is equally related to existence and non-existence, and its dependence on something else for drawing it from this state of equality toward one of the two sides, one would affirm its need for a cause. However, what is it that makes the contingent require a cause? Is it contingency, or is it coming into existence after being non-existent (hudûts)? The truth is that it is contingency, and this is the view of the philosophers. An argument in favour of this view is that quiddity is necessarily existent when considered in relation to its existence, and necessarily non-existent when considered in relation to its non-existence, each of these necessities being conditioned by predicate; hudûts is nothing except one of these necessities followed by the other, for hudûts means a thing’s coming into existence after being non-existent. It is obvious that necessity is the criterion for the absence of need for a cause. Hence so long as quiddity is not conceived with its contingency, necessity does not disappear and the need for a cause does not actualize. Another argument is that a quiddity does not come into existence unless brought into existence by the cause. Its being brought into existence by the cause depends on the quiddity’s existence becoming necessary, which again depends on its being necessitated by the cause. From what was said earlier, it becomes clear that the cause’s making its existence necessary depends on the quiddity’s need for it and the quiddity’s need for it depends on its contingency. For were it not contingent, and were it necessary or impossible, of necessity it would not need any cause. Hence its need depends necessarily on its contingency. Moreover, if it were to depend as well on its hudûts, i.e., its coming into existence after non-existence, that would entail a thing being prior to itself. To explain, irrespective of whether we consider hudûts as the cause and contingency as a condition; hudûts as the cause and non-existence of contingency as an obstacle; whether hudûts is considered as forming a part of the cause with contingency as the other part; whether we consider contingency as the cause and hudûts as a condition, or contingency; or something else, as the cause and the nonexistence of hudûts as an obstacle, every one of these cases necessitates a thing preceding itself by several stages. The same is true of the case when its necessity or the cause’s necessitating it is assumed to be the reason for its need for a cause. Hence there remains no alternative except to consider contingency as the sole ground of its need, for in this interlinked sequence there is no rational stage prior to the need except that of quiddity and its contingency. On this basis, the argument offered by some theologians that the ground of the need for cause is huduth and not contingency, stands refuted. Their argument is that if the need for cause were due to contingency, the existence of entities without a beginning or end in time (al-qadîm al-zamânî) would be admissible. The assumption of their eternal existence exempts them from
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the need for a cause, for it is never non-existent so as to be brought into existence by a cause. The answer to this objection is as follows. The assumption is that it is a thing’s essence that is the source of the need for a cause, and it retains this essence throughout its eternal existence. If it is assumed to exist eternally, then its need for a cause, which inheres in its essence, will be eternal, though given the condition of existence by way of necessity conditioned by the predicate (al-darûrah bi syarth al-mahmûl) it would not require a cause in the sense of removal of the need for it. Moreover, as will be discussed later on, the existence of an effect (wujûd al-ma’lûl), irrespective of whether it is eternal or comes into existence after being non-existent, is a relative existence (wujûd râbith) essentially dependent on its cause with no independence of its own. Hence the need for a cause is essential to it and inseparable from it.
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ﻛﻤﺎ أﻧﻪ ﻣﺤﺘﺎج إﻟﻴﻬﺎ ﺣﺪوﺛﺎ اﻟﻔﺼﻞ اﻟﺘﺎﺳﻊ اﻟﻤﻤﻜﻦ ﻣﺤﺘﺎج إﻟﻰ ﻋﻠﺘﻪ ﺑﻘﺎء و ذﻟﻚ : ﻷن ﻋﻠﺔ ﺣﺎﺟﺘﻪ إﱃ اﻟﻌﻠﺔ إﻣﻜﺎﻧﻪ ﻪ اﻟﻼزم ﳌﺎﻫﻴﺘ , و ﻫﻲ ﳏﻔﻮﻇﺔ ﻣﻌﻪ ﰲ ﺣﺎل اﻟﺒﻘﺎء ,ث ﺎ ﳏﻔﻮﻇﺔ ﻣﻌﻪ ﰲ ﺣﺎل اﳊﺪو ,ء 5 ﻛﻤﺎ أ ﻓﻬﻮ ﳏﺘﺎج إﱃ اﻟﻌﻠﺔ ﺣﺪوﺛﺎ و ﺑﻘﺎ , ﻣﺴﺘﻔﻴﺾ ﰲ اﳊﺎﻟﲔ ﲨﻴﻌﺎ. ﺑﺮﻫﺎن آﺧﺮ : أن وﺟﻮد اﳌﻌﻠﻮل-ﻲ ﻛﻤﺎ ﺗﻜﺮرت اﻹﺷﺎرة إﻟﻴﻪ و ﺳﻴﺠ ﻪ ء ﺑﻴﺎﻧ- ﻂ وﺟﻮد راﺑ , ﻣﺘﻌﻠﻖ اﻟﺬات ﺑﺎﻟﻌﻠﺔ ,ﺘ ﻣﺘﻘﻮم -ﺎ ﻏﲑ ﻣﺴ ﺎ ;5 ﻘﻞ دو ﻓﺤﺎﻟﻪ ﰲ اﳊﺎﺟﺔ إﱃ اﻟﻌﻠﺔ ﺣﺪوﺛﺎ و ﺑﻘﺎء واﺣﺪ و اﳊﺎﺟﺔ ﻣﻼزﻣﺔ. و ﻗﺪ اﺳﺘﺪﻟﻮا :ﺔ ﻋﻠﻰ اﺳﺘﻐﻨﺎء اﳌﻤﻜﻦ ﻋﻦ اﻟﻌﻠﺔ ﰲ ﺣﺎل اﻟﺒﻘﺎء ﺑﺄﻣﺜﻠﺔ ﻋﺎﻣﻴ ; ﻛﻤﺜﺎل اﻟﺒﻨﺎء و اﻟﺒﻨﺎء ,ء ﺣﻴﺚ إن اﻟﺒﻨﺎء ﳛﺘﺎج ﰲ وﺟﻮدﻩ إﱃ اﻟﺒﻨﺎ ,ﻪ ﺣﱴ إذا ﺑﻨﺎﻩ اﺳﺘﻐﲎ ﻋﻨﻪ ﰲ ﺑﻘﺎﺋ.
ّ و رد :ء ﺑﺄن اﻟﺒﻨﺎ ء ﻟﻴﺲ ﻋﻠﺔ ﻣﻮﺟﺪة ﻟﻠﺒﻨﺎ : ة ﳊﺪوث اﻻﺟﺘﻤﺎع ّ ﺪِ ﻌُ ﺑﻞ ﺣﺮﻛﺎت ﻳﺪﻩ ﻋﻠﻞ ﻣ ﺑﲔ أﺟﺰاء اﻟﺒﻨﺎء ;ء و اﺟﺘﻤﺎع اﻷﺟﺰاء ﻋﻠﺔ ﳊﺪوث ﺷﻜﻞ اﻟﺒﻨﺎ , ﰒ اﻟﻴﺒﻮﺳﺔ ﻋﻠﺔ ﻟﺒﻘﺎﺋﻪ ﻣﺪة ﻳﻌﺘﺪ -ﺎ. ﺧﺎﲤﺔ ﻗﺪ ﺗﺒﲔ ﻣﻦ اﻷﲝﺎث اﻟﺴﺎﺑﻘﺔ : ﻛﻴﻔﻴﺎت ﺛﻼث ﻟﻨﺴﺐ أن اﻟﻮﺟﻮب و اﻹﻣﻜﺎن و اﻻﻣﺘﻨﺎع اﻟﻘﻀﺎﻳﺎ ;ﺟ و أن اﻟﻮ ن ﻮب و اﻹﻣﻜﺎن أﻣﺮان وﺟﻮدﻳﺎ , ج ﳌﻄﺎﺑﻘﺔ اﻟﻘﻀﺎﻳﺎ اﳌﻮﺟﻬﺔ -ﻤﺎ ﻟﻠﺨﺎر ﻣﻄﺎﺑﻘﺔ ﺗﺎﻣﺔ ﲟﺎ ﳍﺎ ﻣﻦ اﳉﻬﺔ ; ﻓﻬﻤﺎ ﻣﻮﺟﻮدان ﻟﻜﻦ ﺑﻮﺟﻮد ﻣﻮﺿﻮﻋﻬﻤﺎ ﻻ ﺑﻮﺟﻮد ﻣﻨﺤﺎز ﻣﺴﺘﻘﻞ ,ﺔ ﻛﺴﺎﺋﺮ اﳌﻌﺎﱐ اﻟﻔﻠﺴﻔﻴ ﻓﻬﻤﺎ ,ة ﻣﻦ اﻟﻮﺣﺪة و اﻟﻜﺜﺮ ,ث و اﻟﻘﺪم و اﳊﺪو , و اﻟﻘﻮة و اﻟﻔﻌﻞ ,ﺎ و ﻏﲑﻫ , أوﺻﺎف وﺟﻮدﻳﺔ ﻣﻮ ﻖ ﺟﻮدة ﻟﻠﻤﻮﺟﻮد اﳌﻄﻠ , ﻛﻮن اﻻﺗﺼﺎف -ﺎ ﰲ ﲟﻌﲎ ج و ﻋﺮوﺿﻬﺎ ﰲ اﻟﺬﻫﻦ اﳋﺎر ; ﺔ ” و ﻫﻲ اﳌﺴﻤﺎة ب ﺔ “ اﳌﻌﻘﻮﻻت اﻟﺜﺎﻧﻴ ﺑﺎﺻﻄﻼح اﻟﻔﻠﺴﻔ. ج ﺑﻮﺟﻮد ﻣﻨﺤﺎز ﻛﻮن اﻟﻮﺟﻮب و اﻹﻣﻜﺎن ﻣﻮﺟﻮدﻳﻦ ﰲ اﳋﺎر و ذﻫﺐ ﺑﻌﻀﻬﻢ إﱃ ﻣﺴﺘﻘﻞ .ﺑﻪ و ﻻ ﻳﻌﺒﺆ .ن ﻫﺬا ﰲ اﻟﻮﺟﻮب و اﻹﻣﻜﺎ , و أﻣﺎ اﻻﻣﺘﻨﺎع ﻓﻬﻮ ﺐ أﻣﺮ ﻋﺪﻣﻲ ﺑﻼ رﻳ. ﻛﻠﻪ ﺑﺎﻟﻨﻈﺮ إﱃ اﻋﺘﺒﺎر اﻟﻌﻘﻞ اﳌﺎﻫﻴﺎت و اﳌﻔﺎﻫﻴﻢ ﻣﻮﺿﻮﻋﺎت ﻟﻸﺣﻜﺎم ﻫﺬا ; و أﻣﺎ ﺑﺎﻟﻨﻈﺮ ﻛﻮن اﻟﻮﺟﻮد ﻫﻮ اﳌﻮﺿﻮع ﳍﺎ ﺣﻘﻴﻘﺔ ﻷﺻﺎﻟﺘﻪ إﱃ ,ب ﻓﺎﻟﻮﺟﻮ : ﺎﻳﺔ اﻟﺸﺪة 5 ﻛﻮن اﻟﻮﺟﻮد ﰲ ﻛﻤﺎ ﺗﻘﺪﻣﺖ اﻹﺷﺎرة إﻟﻴﻪ ﻗﺎﺋﻤﺎ ﺑﻨﻔﺴﻪ ﻣﺴﺘﻘﻼ ﰲ ذاﺗﻪ ﻋﻠﻰ اﻹﻃﻼق ;ن و اﻹﻣﻜﺎ : ﻛﻮ ﻧﻪ ﻣﺘﻌﻠﻖ اﻟﻨﻔﺲ ﺑﻐﲑﻩ ﻣﺘﻘﻮم اﻟﺬات ﺑﺴﻮاﻩ ,ت ﻛﻮﺟﻮد اﳌﺎﻫﻴﺎ , ﻓﺎﻟﻮﺟﻮب و اﻹﻣﻜﺎن وﺻﻔﺎن ﻗﺎﺋﻤﺎن ﺑﺎﻟﻮﺟﻮد ﻏﲑ ﺧﺎرﺟﲔ ﻣﻦ ذات ﻣﻮﺿﻮﻋﻬﻤﺎ.
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4.9. THE CONTINGENT NEEDS A CAUSE EVEN IN CONTINUANCE The reason for the contingent’s need for a cause is contingency, which is inseparable from quiddity, and thac need remains with it in the state of continuance in the same way that it accompanies it while coming into existence (hudûts). Hence it needs the cause for coming into existence as well as for continuance, being dependent on it in both the states. Another proof of it is that the existence of the effect, as mentioned repeatedly earlier and as will be explained further later on, is a relative existence, essentially dependent on the cause and subsisting through it, having no independence of its own. Hence its state of need for the cause is the same in coming into existence as well as continuance, being inseparable from it. Those who consider the contingent’s need for a cause to lie in its hudûts have argued by advancing such commonplace analogies as that of a building and its builder, suggesting that the building needs the builder for coming into existence, but once it is built it does not need him for continuing to exist. But the fact is that the builder is not the creative cause of the building. Rather the movements of his hands are the preparatory causes for bringing together the parts of the building. The bringing together of the parts is the cause for the coming into existence of the building’s form. Thereafter its continuance for any considerable period of time depends on its rigidity and resistance to destructive elements such as moisture, etc. Conclusion It becomes clear from the above discussions that necessity, contingency and impossibility are threefold modes for propositions and that necessity and contingency are existential features. That is because modal propositions completely correspond to external reality in respect of their mode. Hence the two are existent but their existence is implicit in their subject, not something separate and independent. Therefore, they are like other philosophical concepts such as unity and multiplicity, qidam and hudûts, potentiality and actuality, and so on, which are existential attributes that relate to absolute existence, in the sense that the attribution is there in external reality and their predication occurs in the mind. They are called ‘secondary’ intelligibles or concepts (ma‘qûlât al-tsâniyyah) in the terminology of philosophy. Some thinkers have held that necessity and contingency exist externally as separate and independent existents. No serious notice need be taken of this opinion. This was concerning necessity and contingency; as to impossibility, there is no doubt that it is derives from non-existence. The entire discussion above was from the viewpoint of the intellect’s consideration of quiddities and concepts as subjects in judgements. However, from the viewpoint of existence with its fundamental reality being the subject, necessity means: the being of existence at its ultimate strength, self-subsisting, and absolutely independent in itself, as pointed out earlier. Also contingency means: the essential dependence of an existent on something else that sustains it, as in the case of quiddities. Hence necessity
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and contingency are two qualities that depend on existence, and they are not extraneous to the essence of their subjects.
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اﻟﻤﺮﺣﻠﺔ اﻟﺨﺎﻣﺴﺔ ﻓﻲ اﻟﻤﺎﻫﻴﺔ و أﺣﻜﺎﻣﻬﺎ و ﻓﻴﻬﺎ ﺛﻤﺎﻧﻴﺔ ﻓﺼﻮل CHAPTER FIVE: Quiddity and Its Properties 8 Units
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اﻟﻔﺼﻞ اﻷول اﻟﻤﺎﻫﻴﺔ ﻣﻦ ﺣﻴﺚ ﻫﻲ ﻟﻴﺴﺖ إﻻ ﻫﻲ ﻛﺎﻧﺖ ﺗﻘﺒﻞ اﻻﺗﺼﺎف ﺑﺄ5ﺎ ﻣﻮﺟﻮدة أو ﻣﻌﺪوﻣﺔ اﳌﺎﻫﻴﺔ و ﻫﻲ ﻣﺎ ﻳﻘﺎل ﰲ ﺟﻮاب ﻣﺎ ﻫﻮ ﳌﺎ ﺎ ﻣﺴﻠﻮﺑﺔ T ﻛﺎﻧﺖ ﰲ ﺣﺪ ذا ﻛﺬا ﺳﺎﺋﺮ اﻟﺼﻔﺎت اﳌﺘﻘﺎﺑﻠﺔ ﻛﻠﻴﺔ أو ﻓﺮد و ﻛﺜﲑة أو أو واﺣﺪة أو ﻋﻨﻬﺎ اﻟﺼﻔﺎت اﳌﺘﻘﺎﺑﻠﺔ. ﻓﺎﳌﺎﻫﻴﺔ ﻣﻦ ﺣﻴﺚ ﻫﻲ ﻟﻴﺴﺖ إﻻ ﻫﻲ ﻻ ﻣﻮﺟﻮدة و ﻻ ﻻ ﻣﻮﺟﻮدة و ﻻ ﺷﻴﺌﺎ آﺧ ﺮ و ﻫﺬا ﻣﻌﲎ ﻗﻮﳍﻢ إن اﻟﻨﻘﻴﻀﲔ ﻳﺮﺗﻔﻌﺎن ﻋﻦ ﻣﺮﺗﺒﺔ اﳌﺎﻫﻴﺔ ﻳﺮﻳﺪون ﺑﻪ أن ﺷﻴﺌﺎ ﻣﻦ اﻟﻨﻘﻴﻀﲔ ﻏﲑ ﻛﺎﻧﺖ ﰲ اﻟﻮاﻗﻊ ﻏﲑ ﺧﺎﻟﻴﺔ ﻋﻦ أﺣﺪﳘﺎ ﺑﺎﻟﻀﺮورة ﻣﺄﺧﻮذ ﰲ اﳌﺎﻫﻴﺔ و إن . ﻛﺎﻧﺖ إﻣﺎ ﻣﻮﺟﻮدة و إﻣﺎ ﻣﻌﺪوﻣﺔ ﻻ ﻓﻤﺎﻫﻴﺔ اﻹﻧﺴﺎن و ﻫﻲ اﳊﻴﻮان اﻟﻨﺎﻃﻖ ﻣﺜﻼ و إن ﳚﺘﻤﻌﺎن و ﻻ ﻳﺮﺗﻔﻌﺎن ﻟ ﻜﻦ ﺷﻴﺌﺎ ﻣﻦ اﻟﻮﺟﻮد و اﻟﻌﺪم ﻏﲑ ﻣﺄﺧﻮذ ﻓﻴﻬﺎ ﻓﻠﻺﻧﺴﺎن ﻣﻌﲎ و ﻟﻜﻞ ﻛﺬا اﻟﺼﻔﺎت اﻟﻌﺎرﺿﺔ ﺣﱴ ﻋﻮارض اﳌﺎﻫﻴﺔ ﻓﻠﻤﺎﻫﻴﺔ اﻹﻧﺴﺎن ﻣﻦ اﻟﻮﺟﻮد و اﻟﻌﺪم ﻣﻌﲎ آﺧﺮ و ﻣﺜﻼ ﻣﻌﲎ و ﻟﻺﻣﻜﺎن اﻟﻌﺎرض ﳍﺎ ﻣﻌﲎ آﺧﺮ و ﻟﻸرﺑﻌﺔ ﻣﺜﻼ ﻣﻌﲎ و ﻟﻠﺰوﺟﻴﺔ اﻟﻌﺎرﺿﺔ ﳍﺎ ﻣﻌﲎ آﺧﺮ. و ﳏﺼﻞ اﻟﻘﻮل إن اﳌﺎﻫ ﻴﺔ ﳛﻤﻞ ﻋﻠﻴﻬﺎ ﺑﺎﳊﻤﻞ اﻷوﱃ ﻧﻔﺴﻬﺎ و ﻳﺴﻠﺐ ﻋﻨﻬﺎ ﲝﺴﺐ ﻫﺬا ء ذﻟﻚ اﳊﻤﻞ ﻣﺎ ورا.
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5.1. QUIDDITY QUA ITSELF IS NOTHING BUT ITSELF The quiddity of a thing is that which is mentioned in answer to the question, ‘What is it?’ As it is capable of accepting such attributes as ‘existent’ or ‘non-existent,’ ‘one’ or ‘many,’ ‘universal’ or ‘particular,’ and yields to other such opposite descriptions, it is devoid of all opposite attributes in the definition of its essence. Therefore, quiddity qua itself is nothing but itself. It is neither existent nor non-existent, nor is it anything else. Hence the statement of the philosophers: “Both the contradictories are negated at the plane of quiddity.” It means that nothing pertaining to any of the contradictories is subsumed in the concept of quiddity, though in the external world of necessity, quiddity cannot be devoid of either of them. Thus the quiddity of man, for instance, is ‘rational animal,’ and it is either existent or non-existent. These two attributes cannot be affirmed or negated of it simultaneously. However, the notion of existent or nonexistent is not subsumed in the concept of ‘man,’ and hence ‘man’ has a meaning that is different from that of ‘existence’ or ‘non-existence.’ The same applies to accidental characteristics, even those that are predicable of quiddity. Hence the quiddity of ‘man,’ for instance, is one concept, and contingency, with which it is characterized, is another concept. ‘Four,’ for instance, is a concept different from that of ‘evenness,’ with which the former is characterized. That which can be concluded from the above statements is that quiddity is predicated of itself with primary predication (al-haml al-awwalî; as in the statement, ‘Man is a rational animal’) and in respect of this predication everything else is negated of it.
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اﻟﻔﺼﻞ اﻟﺜﺎﻧﻲ ﻓﻲ اﻋﺘﺒﺎرات اﻟﻤﺎﻫﻴﺔ و ﻣﺎ ﻳﻠﺤﻖ ﺑﻬﺎ ﻣﻦ اﻟﻤﺴﺎﺋﻞ ﻟﻠﻤﺎﻫﻴﺔ ﺑﺎﻹﺿﺎﻓﺔ إﱃ ﻣﺎ ﻋﺪاﻫﺎ ﳑﺎ ﻳﺘﺼﻮر ﳊﻮﻗﻪ -ﺎ ﺛﻼث اﻋﺘﺒﺎرات إﻣﺎ أن ﺗﻌﺘﱪ ﺑﺸﺮط ﺷﻲ ﺷﻲ ء أو ﺑﺸﺮط ﻻ أو ﻻ ﺑﺸﺮﻃﻲ ة ء و اﻟﻘﺴﻤﺔ ﺣﺎﺻﺮ أﻣﺎ اﻷول ﻓﺈن ﺗﺆﺧﺬ ﲟﺎ ﻫﻲ ﻣﻘﺎرﻧ ﻤﻮع R ﺔ ﳌﺎ ﻳﻠﺤﻖ -ﺎ ﻣﻦ اﳋﺼﻮﺻﻴﺎت ﻓﺘﺼﺪق ﻋﻠﻰ ا ﻛﺎﻹﻧﺴﺎن اﳌﺄﺧﻮذ ﻣﻊ ﺧﺼﻮﺻﻴﺎت زﻳﺪ ﻓﻴﺼﺪق ﻋﻠﻴﻪ. و أﻣﺎ اﻟﺜﺎﱐ ﻓﺈن ﻳﺸﱰط ﻣﻌﻬﺎ أن ﻻ ﻳﻜﻮن ﻣﻌﻬﺎ ﻏﲑﻫﺎ و ﻫﺬا ﻳﺘﺼﻮر ﻋﻠﻰ ﻗﺴﻤﲔ أﺣﺪﳘﺎ ﻛﻮن اﳌﺎﻫﻴﺔ ﺑﺸﺮط ﻻ ﰲ ﺎ ﻟﻴﺴﺖ إﻻ ﻫﻲ و ﻫﻮ اﳌﺮاد ﻣﻦ 5 ﺎ و أ T أن ﻳﻘﺼﺮ اﻟﻨﻈﺮ ﰲ ذا ﻣﺒﺎﺣﺚ ا ﺎ أي ﻣﻔﻬﻮم 5 ﻛﻤﺎ ﺗﻘﺪم و ﺛﺎﻧﻴﻬﻤﺎ أن ﺗﺆﺧﺬ اﳌﺎﻫﻴﺔ وﺣﺪﻫﺎ ﲝﻴﺚ ﻟﻮ ﻗﺎر ﳌﺎﻫﻴﺔ ﻤﻮع ﻣﺎدة ﻟﻪ ﻏﲑ R ﺎ ﺟﺰء ﻣﻦ ا 5 ﻛﺎن زاﺋﺪا ﻋﻠﻴﻬﺎ ﻏﲑ داﺧﻞ ﻓﻴﻬﺎ ﻓﺘﻜﻮن إذا ﻗﺎر ﻣﻔﺮوض ﳏﻤﻮﻟﺔ ﻋﻠﻴﻪ. و أﻣﺎ اﻟﺜﺎﻟﺚ ﻓﺄن ﻻ ﻳﺸﱰط ﻣﻌﻬﺎ ﺷﻲ ﺷﻲ ﺎ5 ء ﺑﻞ ﺗﺆﺧﺬ ﻣﻄﻠﻘﺔ ﻣﻊ ﲡﻮﻳﺰ أن ﻳﻘﺎر ء أو ﻻ .ﺎ5 ﻳﻘﺎر ﻓ ﺷﻲ ﺎﻟﻘﺴﻢ اﻷول ﻫﻮ اﳌﺎﻫﻴﺔ ﺑﺸﺮط ء و ﺗﺴﻤﻰ اﳌﺨﻠﻮﻃﺔ و اﻟﻘﺴﻢ اﻟﺜﺎﱐ ﻫﻮ اﳌﺎﻫﻴﺔ . ﺮدة و اﻟﻘﺴﻢ اﻟﺜﺎﻟﺚ ﻫﻮ اﳌﺎﻫﻴﺔ ﻻ ﺑﺸﺮط و ﺗﺴﻤﻰ اﳌﻄﻠﻘﺔ R ﺑﺸﺮط ﻻ و ﺗﺴﻤﻰ ا و اﳌﺎﻫﻴﺔ اﻟﱵ ﻫﻲ اﳌﻘﺴﻢ ﻟﻸﻗﺴﺎم اﻟﺜﻼﺛﺔ ﻫﻲ اﻟﻜﻠﻲ اﻟﻄﺒﻴﻌﻲ و ﻫﻲ اﻟﱵ ﺗﻌﺮﺿﻬﺎ اﻟﻜﻠﻴﺔ ﰲ اﻟﺬﻫﻦ ﻓﺘﻘﺒﻞ اﻻﻧﻄﺒﺎق ﻋﻠ ج ﻟﻮﺟﻮد ﻗﺴﻤﲔ ﻣﻦ أﻗﺴﺎﻣﻬﺎ ﻛﺜﲑﻳﻦ و ﻫﻲ ﻣﻮﺟﻮدة ﰲ اﳋﺎر ﻰ أﻋﲏ اﳌﺨﻠﻮﻃﺔ و اﳌﻄﻠﻘﺔ ﻓﻴﻪ و اﳌﻘﺴﻢ ﳏﻔﻮظ ﰲ أﻗﺴﺎﻣﻪ ﻣﻮﺟﻮد ﺑﻮﺟﻮدﻫﺎ. ﻛﺎن واﺣﺪا ﻣﻮﺟﻮدا ﻛﻞ ﻓﺮد ﻏﲑ اﳌﻮﺟﻮد ﻣﻨﻬﺎ ﰲ ﻓﺮد آﺧﺮ ﺑﺎﻟﻌﺪد و ﻟﻮ و اﳌﻮﺟﻮد ﻣﻨﻬﺎ ﰲ ﻛﺜﲑا ﺑﻌﻴﻨﻪ و ﻫﻮ ﺑﻮﺣﺪﺗﻪ ﰲ ﲨﻴﻊ اﻷﻓﺮاد ﻟﻜﺎن اﻟﻮاﺣﺪ ﻛﺎن اﻟﻮاﺣﺪ ﺑﺎﻟﻌﺪد ﻣﺘﺼﻔﺎ ﳏﺎل و ﺑﺼﻔﺎت ﻣﺘﻘﺎﺑﻠﺔ و ﻫﻮ ﳏﺎل.
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5.2. DIFFERENT CONSIDERATIONS (I’TIBARAT) OF QUIDDITY Quiddity can be considered in three different ways in relation to anything else that may be conceived as being associated with it. It may be considered either as being conditioned by something (bi syarthi shay’); with a negative condition (bi syarthi lâ, i.e. with the condition of being dissociated from something); or conceived in a non-conditioned manner (lâ bi syarth). This division is exhaustive. In the first consideration it is taken along with some associated qualities so that it corresponds to the aggregate of them, such as where the quiddity of ‘man’ in combination with the attributes of a particular individual Zayd corresponds to him. In the second consideration, there is a condition that it is not to be accompanied with anything else. There are two aspects to this consideration. In the first, one’s view is confined to quiddity qua itself and as nothing but itself. It was in this negatively conditioned sense (al-mahiyyah bi syarthi lâ) that we dealt with quiddity in the preceding chapter. In the second consideration, quiddity is taken alone, in the sense that any other assumed concept accompanying it would be extraneous and additional to it, whereupon quiddity would be part of the whole and ‘matter’ for it and incapable of being predicated of it (i.e. the whole). In the third consideration, no condition accompanies quiddity, and it is taken in an absolute manner, wherein something may or may not accompany it. In the first consideration, quiddity is called ‘mixed’ quiddity (makhlûthah), or ‘quiddity conditioned by something.’ In the second, it is called ‘divested quiddity’ or ‘negatively conditioned quiddity’ (mujarradah). In the third, it is called ‘absolute quiddity’ or ‘non-conditioned quiddity’ (muthlaqah). The quiddity of which these three kinds are sub-classes is the ‘natural universal’ (al-kullî al-thabî’i), which possesses universality in the mind and is capable of corresponding to a multiplicity of things. It exists in the external world, for two of its divisions, that is, ‘mixed’ and ‘absolute,’ exist there, and a class is preserved in its sub-classes and exists where its sub-classes are found. However, its existence in any individual to which it corresponds is not numerically other than its existence in other individuals. For if something that is one were to exist despite its unity, in all individuals, what is one would be many, and what is numerically one would possess opposite qualities, both of which are impossible.
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اﻟﻔﺼﻞ اﻟﺜﺎﻟﺚ ﻓﻲ ﻣﻌﻨﻰ اﻟﺬاﺗﻲ و اﻟﻌﺮﺿﻲ اﳌﻌﺎﱐ اﳌﻌﺘﱪة ﰲ اﳌﺎﻫﻴﺎت اﳌﺄﺧﻮذة ﰲ ﺣﺪودﻫﺎ و ﻫﻲ اﻟﱵ ﺗﺮﺗﻔﻊ اﳌﺎﻫﻴﺔ ﺑﺎرﺗﻔﺎﻋﻬﺎ ﺗﺴﻤﻰ اﻟﺬاﺗﻴﺎت و ﻣﺎ وراء ذﻟﻚ ﻋﺮﺿﻴﺎت ﳏﻤﻮﻟﺔ ﻓﺈن ﺗﻮﻗﻒ اﻧﺘﺰاﻋﻬﺎ و ﲪﻠﻬﺎ ﻋﻠﻰ اﻧﻀﻤﺎم ﲰﻴﺖ ﳏﻤﻮﻻت ﺑﺎﻟﻀﻤﻴﻤﺔ ﻛﺎﻧﺘﺰاع اﳊﺎر و ﲪﻠﻬﺎ ﻋﻠﻰ اﳉﺴﻢ ﻣﻦ اﻧﻀﻤﺎم اﳊﺮارة إﻟﻴﻪ و إﻻ ﻓﺎﳋﺎرج ﻛﺎﻟﻌﺎﱄ و اﻟﺴﺎﻓﻞ اﶈﻤﻮل . و اﻟﺬاﰐ ﳝﻴﺰ ﻣﻦ ﻏﲑﻩ ﺑﻮﺟﻮﻩ ﻣﻦ ﺧﻮاﺻﻪ : ﺎ ﻟﺬي اﻟﺬاﰐ إﱃ وﺳﻂ T ﻣﻨﻬﺎ أن اﻟﺬاﺗﻴﺎت ﺑﻴﻨﺔ ﻻ ﲢﺘﺎج ﰲ ﺛﺒﻮ ء ﺳﺒ ﺎ ﻻ ﲢﺘﺎج إﱃ ﺳﺒﺐ ورا 5 ﺎ ﻏﻨﻴﺔ ﻋﻦ اﻟﺴﺒﺐ ﲟﻌﲎ أ 5 و ﻣﻨﻬﺎ أ ﺐ ذي اﻟﺬاﰐ ﻓﻌﻠﻪ وﺟﻮد اﳌﺎﻫﻴﺔ ﺑﻌﻴﻨﻬﺎ ﻋﻠﺔ أﺟﺰاﺋﻬﺎ اﻟﺬاﺗﻴﺔ. و ﻣﻨﻬﺎ أن اﻷﺟﺰاء اﻟﺬاﺗﻴﺔ ﻣﺘﻘﺪﻣﺔ ﻋﻠﻰ ذي اﻟﺬاﰐ. و اﻹﺷﻜﺎل ﰲ ﺗﻘﺪم اﻷﺟﺰاء ﻋﻠﻰ اﻟﻜﻞ ﺑﺄن اﻷﺟﺰاء ﻫﻲ اﻟﻜﻞ ﺑﻌﻴﻨﻪ ﻓﻜﻴﻒ ﺗﺘﻘﺪم ﻋﻠﻰ ء ﺑﺎﻷﺳﺮ ﻣﺘﻘﺪﻣﺔ ﻋﻠﻰ اﻷﺟﺰاء ﺑﻮﺻﻒ اﻻ ﻧﻔﺴﻬﺎ ﻣﻨﺪﻓﻊ ﺑﺄن اﻻﻋﺘﺒﺎر ﳐﺘﻠﻒ ﻓﺎﻷﺟﺰا ﺟﺘﻤﺎع و ء ﻟﻜﻮن اﻟﻮاﺣﺪ ﻣﻨﻬﺎ ﺟﺰءا ﻣﻦ اﳊﺪ و إﻻ ﻓﺎﻟﻮاﺣﺪ ﻣﻨﻬﺎ ﻋﲔ ﺎ إﳕﺎ ﲰﻴﺖ أﺟﺰا 5 اﻟﻜﻠﻴﺔ ﻋﻠﻰ أ اﻟﻜﻞ أﻋﲏ ذي اﻟﺬاﰐ.
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5.3. THE MEANING OF ‘ESSENTIAL’ AND ‘ACCIDENTAL’ The concepts which enter into the definition of a certain quiddity, without which the quiddity cannot be conceived, are called its ‘essential parts’ or ‘essentials’ (al-dzâtiyyât, i.e. its genus and differentia). Any besides these are ‘accidental qualities’ (‘aradiyyât), which may be predicated of it. If their abstraction from a subject and their predication depends on their union with the subject, they are called ‘predicates by way of union’ (mahmulât bi al-dhamîmah), such as when ‘hotness’ is abstracted from a hot body and predicated of it by relating hotness to it. Otherwise they are called ‘extraneous to the subject’ (al-khârij al-mahmûl), such as ‘high’ and ‘low.’ There are certain properties that distinguish the ‘essentials’ from whatever is not such. One of these properties is that the ‘essentials’ are self-evident and do not require any intermediary terms in order to be affirmed of that to which they belong. A second property is that they do not require any cause (sabab), in the sense that they need no cause in addition to the cause of that to which they pertain. Hence the cause of a quiddity’s existence is itself the cause of its essentials. A third property is that the essentials are prior to that to which they belong. An objection has been set forth to the priority of the essentials. It says, “The parts are the same as the whole; how can they be prior to themselves?” It is refuted on the ground that the difference is that of consideration (i’tibâr); hence the parts taken individually are prior to parts when taken collectively and as making the whole. Moreover, they have been named ‘parts’ because each one of them is a part of the definition; otherwise, each of them is identical with the whole, of which it is an essential part.
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اﻟﻔﺼﻞ اﻟﺮاﺑﻊ ﻓﻲ اﻟﺠﻨﺲ و اﻟﻔﺼﻞ و اﻟﻨﻮع و ﺑﻌﺾ ﻣﺎ ﻳﻠﺤﻖ ﺑﺬﻟﻚ اﳌﺎﻫﻴﺔ اﻟﺘﺎﻣﺔ اﻟﱵ ﳍﺎ آﺛﺎر ﺧﺎﺻﺔ ﺣﻘﻴﻘﻴﺔ ﻣﻦ ﺣﻴﺚ ﲤﺎﻣﻬﺎ ﺗ ﻛﺎﻹﻧﺴﺎن و ﺴﻤﻰ ﻧﻮﻋﺎ اﻟﻔﺮس. ﻛﺎﳊﻴﻮان ﰒ إﻧﺎ ﳒﺪ ﺑﻌﺾ اﳌﻌﺎﱐ اﻟﺬاﺗﻴﺔ اﻟﱵ ﰲ اﻷﻧﻮاع ﻳﺸﱰك ﻓﻴﻪ أﻛﺜﺮ ﻣﻦ ﻧﻮع واﺣﺪ ﻛﺎﻟﻨﺎﻃﻖ اﳌﺨﺘﺺ ﻛﻤﺎ أن ﻓﻴﻬﺎ ﻣﺎ ﳜﺘﺺ ﺑﻨﻮع اﳌﺸﱰك ﺑﲔ اﻹﻧﺴﺎن و اﻟﻔﺮس و ﻏﲑﳘﺎ ﺑﺎﻹﻧﺴﺎن و ﻳﺴﻤﻰ اﳌﺸﱰك ﻓﻴﻪ ﺟﻨﺴﺎ و اﳌﺨﺘﺺ ﻓﺼﻼ و ﻳﻨﻘﺴﻢ اﳉﻨﺲ و اﻟﻔﺼﻞ إﱃ ﻗﺮﻳﺐ و ﺑﻌﻴﺪ و أﻳﻀﺎ ﻳﻨﻘﺴﻢ اﳉﻨﺲ و اﻟﻨﻮع إﱃ ﻋﺎل و ﻣﺘﻮﺳﻂ و ﺳﺎﻓﻞ و ﻗﺪ ﻓﺼﻞ ذﻟﻚ ﰲ اﳌﻨﻄﻖ ﰒ إﻧﺎ إذا أﺧﺬﻧﺎ ﻣﺎﻫﻴﺔ اﳊﻴﻮان ﻣﺜﻼ و ﻫﻲ ﻣﺸﱰك ﻓﻴﻬﺎ أﻛﺜﺮ ﻣﻦ ﻧﻮع و ﻋﻘﻠﻨﺎﻫﺎ : ﺑﺄ5ﺎ ﺎ ﻣﻦ 5 ﻛﻞ ﻣﺎ ﻳﻘﺎر ﺟﺴﻢ ﻧﺎم ﺣﺴﺎس ﻣﺘﺤﺮك ﺑﺎﻹرادة ﺟﺎز أن ﻧﻌﻘﻠﻬﺎ وﺣﺪﻫﺎ ﲝﻴﺚ ﻳﻜﻮن اﳌﻔﺎﻫﻴﻢ زا ﺎ5 ﻛﻤﺎ أ ﺎ و ﺗﻜﻮن ﻫﻲ ﻣﺒﺎﻳﻨﺔ ﻟﻠﻤﺠﻤﻮع ﻏﲑ ﳏﻤﻮﻟﺔ ﻋﻠﻴﻪ T ﺋﺪا ﻋﻠﻴﻬﺎ ﺧﺎرﺟﺎ ﻣﻦ ذا ﺎ و ﻋﻠﺔ ﻣﺎدﻳﺔ 5 ﻛﺎﻧﺖ اﳌﺎﻫﻴﺔ اﳌﻔﺮوﺿﺔ ﻣﺎدة ﺑﺎﻟﻨﺴﺒﺔ إﱃ ﻣﺎ ﻳﻘﺎر ﻏﲑ ﳏﻤﻮﻟﺔ ﻋﻠﻰ اﳌﻘﺎرن اﻟﺰاﺋﺪ ﻛﺎن ﻧﻌﻘﻞ ﻣﺎﻫﻴﺔ اﳊﻴﻮان ﺑﺄ5ﺎ اﳊﻴﻮان ﻟﻠﻤﺠﻤﻮع و ﺟﺎز أن ﻧﻌﻘﻠﻬﺎ ﻣﻘﻴﺴﺔ إﱃ ﻋﺪة ﻣﻦ اﻷﻧﻮاع اﻟﺬ ي ﻫﻮ إﻣﺎ إﻧﺴﺎن و إﻣﺎ ﻓﺮس و إﻣﺎ ﺑﻘﺮ و إﻣﺎ ﻏﻨﻢ ﻓﺘﻜﻮن ﻣﺎﻫﻴﺔ ﻧﺎﻗﺼﺔ ﻏﲑ ﳏﺼﻠﺔ ﺣﱴ ﻳﻨﻀﻢ إﻟﻴﻬﺎ ﻓﺼﻞ أﺣﺪ ﺗﻠﻚ اﻷﻧﻮاع ﻓﻴﺤﺼﻠﻬﺎ ﻧﻮﻋﺎ ﺗﺎﻣﺎ ﻓﺘﻜﻮن ﻫﻲ ذﻟﻚ اﻟﻨﻮع ﺑﻌﻴﻨﻪ و ﺗﺴﻤﻰ اﳌﺎﻫﻴﺔ اﳌﺄﺧﻮذة -ﺬا اﻻﻋﺘﺒﺎر ﺟﻨﺴﺎ و اﻟﺬي ﳛﺼﻠﻪ ﻓﺼﻼ. و اﻻﻋﺘﺒﺎران ﰲ اﳉﺰء اﳌﺸﱰك ﺟﺎرﻳﺎن ﺑﻌﻴﻨﻬﻤ ﺎ ﰲ اﳉﺰء اﳌﺨﺘﺺ و ﻳﺴﻤﻰ ﺑﺎﻻﻋﺘﺒﺎر اﻷول ﺻﻮرة و ﻳﻜﻮن ﺟﺰءا ﻻ ﳛﻤﻞ ﻋﻠﻰ اﻟﻜﻞ و ﻻ ﻋﻠﻰ اﳉﺰء اﻵﺧﺮ و ﺑﺎﻻﻋﺘﺒﺎر اﻟﺜﺎﱐ ﻓﺼﻼ ﳛﺼﻞ اﳉﻨﺲ و ﻳﺘﻤﻢ اﻟﻨﻮع و ﳛﻤﻞ ﻋﻠﻴﻪ ﲪﻼ أوﻟﻴﺎ. و ﻳﻈﻬﺮ ﳑﺎ ﺗﻘﺪم أوﻻ أن اﳉﻨﺲ ﻫﻮ اﻟﻨﻮع ﻣﺒﻬﻤﺎ و أن اﻟﻔﺼﻞ ﻫﻮ اﻟﻨﻮع ﳏﺼﻼ و اﻟﻨﻮع ﻫﻮ ﻞ اﳌﺎﻫﻴﺔ اﻟﺘﺎﻣﺔ ﻣﻦ ﻏﲑ ﻧﻈﺮ إﱃ إ-ﺎم أو ﲢﺼﻴ. ﻛﻼ ﻣﻦ اﳉﻨﺲ و اﻟﻔﺼﻞ ﳏﻤﻮل ﻋﻠﻰ اﻟﻨﻮع ﲪﻼ أوﻟﻴﺎ و أﻣﺎ اﻟﻨﺴﺒﺔ ﺑﻴﻨﻬﻤﺎ و ﺛﺎﻧﻴﺎ أن أﻧﻔﺴﻬﻤﺎ ﻓﺎﳉﻨﺲ ﻋﺮض ﻋﺎم ﺑﺎﻟﻨﺴﺒﺔ إﱃ اﻟﻔﺼﻞ و اﻟﻔﺼﻞ ﺧﺎﺻﺔ ﺑﺎﻟﻨﺴﺒﺔ إﻟﻴﻪ. ﻛﺬا ﻓﺼﻼن و ﺛﺎﻟﺜﺎ أن ﻣﻦ اﳌﻤﺘﻨﻊ أن ﻳﺘﺤﻘﻖ ﺟﻨﺴﺎن ﰲ ﻣﺮﺗﺒﺔ واﺣﺪة و ﰲ ﻣﺮﺗﺒﺔ واﺣﺪة ﻛﻮن ﻧﻮع واﺣﺪ ﻧﻮﻋﲔ ﻟﻨﻮع ﻻﺳﺘﻠﺰام ذﻟﻚ . ﻛﺎﻧﺖ و راﺑﻌﺎ أن اﳉﻨﺲ و اﳌﺎدة ﻣﺘﺤﺪان ذاﺗﺎ ﳐﺘﻠﻔﺎن اﻋﺘﺒﺎرا ﻓﺎﳌﺎدة إذا أﺧﺬت ﻻ ﺑﺸﺮط ﻛﺬا اﻟﺼﻮرة ﻓﺼﻞ إذا أﺧﺬت ﻻ ﺑﺸﺮط ﻛﺎن ﻣﺎدة و ﻛﻤﺎ أن اﳉﻨﺲ إذا أﺧﺬ ﺑﺸﺮط ﻻ ﺟﻨﺴﺎ ﻛﻤﺎ أن اﻟﻔﺼﻞ ﺻﻮرة إذا أﺧﺬ ﺑﺸﺮط ﻻ.
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و اﻋﻠﻢ ج ﻋﻠﻰ ﻣﺎ ﺳﻴﺄﰐ و أﻣﺎ اﻷﻋﺮاض ﻓﻬﻲ أن اﳌﺎدة ﰲ اﳉﻮاﻫﺮ اﳌﺎدﻳﺔ ﻣﻮﺟﻮدة ﰲ اﳋﺎر ج ﻣﺎ ﺑﻪ اﻻﺷﱰاك ﻓﻴﻬﺎ ﻋﲔ ﻣﺎ ﺑﻪ اﻻﻣﺘﻴﺎز و إﳕﺎ اﻟﻌﻘﻞ ﳚﺪ ﻓﻴﻬﺎ ﺑﺴﻴﻄﺔ ﻏﲑ ﻣﺮﻛﺒﺔ ﰲ اﳋﺎر ﻣﺸﱰﻛﺎت و ﳐﺘﺼﺎت ﻓﻴﻌﺘﱪﻫﺎ أﺟﻨﺎﺳﺎ و ﻓﺼﻮﻻ ﰒ ﻳﻌﺘﱪﻫﺎ ﺑﺸﺮط ﻻ ﻓﺘﺼﲑ ﻣﻮاد و ﺻﻮرا ﻋﻘﻠﻴﺔ.
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5.4. GENUS, DIFFERENTIA AND SPECIES A complete quiddity – i.e., one which possesses certain real special properties, e.g. ‘man,’ ‘horse,’ etc. – is called species (naw’). We find that there are some essential concepts shared by several species, such as the concept of ‘animal’ which is common to ‘man,’ ‘horse’ and other animals. Also, there are essential concepts that are special to each of the species, such as ‘rationality,’ which is specific to man. That which is common to several species is called genus (jins) and that which is specific to each of them is called differentia (fashl). Genus and differentia are divided into ‘proximate’ and ‘remote’; similarly, genus and species are divisible into ‘highest,’ ‘middle,’ and ‘lowest,’ as is discussed in detail in books on logic. Furthermore, when we consider the quiddity ‘animal,’ for instance, which is shared by several species, and conceive it as ‘a growing, sensate body capable of voluntary movement,’ it may be conceived in isolation so that any concept associated with it would be additional and extraneous to its essence. Then it would be different from the aggregate and incapable of becoming its predicate as well as that of anything associated with it and additional to it, and the supposed quiddity would be ‘matter’ in relation to that which is associated with it and the ‘material cause’ of the aggregate. We may conceive this quiddity in comparison to a number of species, as when we conceive the quiddity ‘animal,’ which may be either ‘man’ or ‘horse’ or ‘cow’ or ‘sheep.’ Then it would be an incomplete quiddity, which is not actualized until we unite the differentia of one of these species with it. When that is done, it would be actualized in a complete species and become identical with that species. The supposed quiddity when considered in this manner is the genus and that which actualizes it is the differentia. These two considerations pertaining to the common part apply in an identical manner to the specific ‘part,’ which in view of the first consideration is called ‘form’ (shûrah), in which case it is a ‘part’ that cannot be predicated either of the whole or the other part. In view of the second consideration, it is called ‘differentia,’ which actualizes the genus and completes the species and is predicared of it with a primary predication. From what has been said, the following points become clear: First, genus is undetermined species and differentia is determinate species. The species is a complete quiddity without taking into view determination or non-determination. Second, each of genus and differentia is predicable of the species with primary predication. However, as to the relation between the two, the genus is a ‘general accident’ (‘arad ‘âmm) in relation to the differentia, and differentia is a ‘special accident’ or proprium (khâshshah) in relation to the genus. Third, it is impossible that there should be two genera or two differentiae at one level, for that implies that one species should be two. Fourthly, genus and ‘matter’ are one is essence, being different from the viewpoint of consideration (i’tibâran). Thus when ‘matter’ is conceived in a non-conditioned sense it becomes genus, and genus when conceived in a negatively conditioned manner becomes ‘matter.’ The same applies to ‘form’ which when conceived in a non-conditioned manner is differentia,
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and the differentia when conceived in a negatively conditioned manner is ‘form’. It should be known that ‘matter’ in ‘material substances’ exists in the external world, as will be discussed later.” As to the accidents, they are simple and non-composite in external reality. That is because what they share in (mâ bihi al-isytirâk) is identical with that by which they are distinguished from one another (mâ bihi al-imtiyâz). However, the intellect finds common and specific aspects in them and conceives them as genus and differentia. Then it views them in a negatively conditioned manner, turning them conceptually into ‘forms’ and ‘matters.’
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اﻟﻔﺼﻞ اﻟﺨﺎﻣﺲ ﻓﻲ ﺑﻌﺾ أﺣﻜﺎم اﻟﻔﺼﻞ . ﻳﻨﻘﺴﻢ اﻟﻔﺼﻞ ﻧﻮع اﻧﻘﺴﺎم إﻟﻰ اﻟﻤﻨﻄﻘﻲ و اﻻﺷﺘﻘﺎﻗﻲ ﻓﺎﻟﻔﺼﻞ اﳌﻨﻄﻘﻲ ﻫﻮ أﺧﺺ اﻟﻠﻮازم اﻟﱵ ﺗﻌﺮض اﻟﻨﻮع و أﻋﺮﻓﻬﺎ و ﻫﻮ إﳕﺎ ﻳﺆﺧﺬ و ﻳﻮﺿﻊ ﰲ اﳊﺪود ﻣﻜﺎن اﻟﻔﺼﻮل اﳊﻘﻴﻘﻴﺔ ﻟﺼﻌﻮﺑﺔ اﳊﺼﻮل ﻏﺎﻟﺒﺎ ﻋﻠﻰ اﻟﻔﺼﻞ اﳊﻘﻴﻘﻲ اﻟﺬي ﻳﻘﻮم اﻟﻨﻮع ﻛﺎﻟﻨﺎﻃﻖ ﻟﻺﻧﺴﺎن و اﻟﺼﺎﻫﻞ ﻟﻠﻔﺮس ﻓﺈن اﳌﺮاد ﺑﺎﻟﻨﻄﻖ ﻣﺜﻼ إﻣﺎ اﻟﻨﻄﻖ ﲟﻌﲎ اﻟﺘﻜﻠﻢ و ﻫﻮ ﻣﻦ اﻟﻜﻴﻔﻴﺎت اﳌﺴﻤﻮﻋﺔ و إﻣﺎ اﻟﻨﻄﻖ ﲟﻌﲎ إدراك اﻟﻜﻠﻴﺎت و ﻫﻮ ﻋﻨﺪﻫﻢ ﻣﻦ اﻟﻜﻴﻔﻴﺎت اﻟﻨﻔﺴﺎﻧﻴﺔ ﻛﺎن ﻛﺬا اﻟﺼﻬﻴﻞ و ﻟﺬا رﲟﺎ ﻛﺎﻧﺖ ﻣﻦ اﻷﻋﺮاض و اﻟﻌﺮض ﻻ ﻳﻘﻮم اﳉﻮﻫﺮ و و اﻟﻜﻴﻔﻴﺔ ﻛﻴﻔﻤﺎ ﻛﻤﺎ ﻳﺆﺧﺬ اﳊﺴﺎس و أﺧﺺ اﻟﻠﻮازم أﻛﺜﺮ ﻣﻦ واﺣﺪ ﻓﺘﻮﺿﻊ ﲨﻴﻌﺎ ﻣﻮﺿﻊ اﻟﻔﺼﻞ اﳊﻘﻴﻘﻲ اﳌﺘﺤﺮك ﺑﺎﻹرادة ﲨﻴﻌﺎ ﻓﺼ م ﻛﻤﺎ ﺗﻘﺪ ﻛﺎن ﻓﺼﻼ ﺣﻘﻴﻘﻴﺎ ﱂ ﻳﻜﻦ إﻻ واﺣﺪا ﻼ ﻟﻠﺤﻴﻮان و ﻟﻮ . ﻛﻜﻮن و اﻟﻔﺼﻞ اﻻﺷﺘﻘﺎﻗﻲ ﻣﺒﺪأ اﻟﻔﺼﻞ اﳌﻨﻄﻘﻲ و ﻫﻮ اﻟﻔﺼﻞ اﳊﻘﻴﻘﻲ اﳌﻘﻮم ﻟﻠﻨﻮع ﻛﻮن اﻟﻔﺮس ذا ﻧﻔﺲ ﺻﺎﻫﻠﺔ ﰲ اﻟﻔﺮس اﻹﻧﺴﺎن ذا ﻧﻔﺲ ﻧﺎﻃﻘﺔ ﰲ اﻹﻧﺴﺎن و . ﰒ إن ﺣﻘﻴﻘﺔ اﻟﻨﻮع ﻫﻲ ﻓﺼﻠﻪ اﻷﺧﲑ و ذﻟﻚ ﻷن اﻟﻔﺼﻞ اﳌﻘﻮم ﻫﻮ ﳏﺼﻞ ﻧﻮﻋﻪ ﻓﻤﺎ أﺧﺬ ﰲ أﺟﻨﺎﺳﻪ و ﻓﺼﻮﻟﻪ اﻵﺧﺮ ﻋﻠﻰ ﳓﻮ اﻹ-ﺎم ﻣﺄﺧﻮذ ﻓﻴﻪ ﻋﻠﻰ وﺟﻪ اﻟﺘﺤﺼﻞ. ﻛﺬا و ﻳﺘﻔﺮع ﻋﻠﻴﻪ أن ﻫﺬﻳﺔ اﻟﻨﻮع ﺑﻪ ﻓﻨﻮﻋﻴﺔ اﻟﻨﻮع ﳏﻔﻮﻇﺔ ﺑﻪ و ﻟﻮ ﺗﺒﺪل ﺑﻌﺾ أﺟﻨﺎﺳﻪ و ﻟﻮ ﲡﺮدت ﺻﻮرﺗﻪ اﻟﱵ ﻫﻲ اﻟﻔﺼﻞ ﺑﺸﺮط ﻻ ﻋﻦ اﳌﺎدة اﻟﱵ ﻫﻲ اﳉﻨﺲ ﺑﺸﺮط ﻻ ﺑﻘﻲ اﻟﻨﻮع ﻋﻠﻰ ﺣﻘﻴﻘﺔ ن ﻛﻤﺎ ﻟﻮ ﲡﺮدت اﻟﻨﻔﺲ اﻟﻨﺎﻃﻘﺔ ﻋﻦ اﻟﺒﺪ ﻧﻮﻋﻴﺘﻪ . ج ﲢﺖ ﺟﻨﺴﻪ ﲟﻌﲎ أن اﳉﻨﺲ ﻏﲑ ﻣﺄﺧﻮذ ﰲ ﺣﺪﻩ و إﻻ اﺣﺘﺎج ﰒ إن اﻟﻔﺼﻞ ﻏﲑ ﻣﻨﺪر إﱃ ﻓﺼﻞ ﻳﻘﻮﻣﻪ و ﻧﻨﻘﻞ اﻟﻜﻼم إﻟﻴﻪ و ﻳﺘﺴﻠﺴﻞ ﺑﱰﺗﺐ ﻓﺼﻮل ﻏﲑ ﻣﺘﻨﺎﻫﻴﺔ.
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5.5. SOME CHARACTERISTICS OF DIFFERENTIA According to one classification, differentia is divided into two kinds: logical (manthiqî) and derivative (isytiqâqî). The logical differentia consists of one of the more special and well-known properties associated with a certain species. It is taken and substituted in definitions for the real differentia often due to the difficulty of obtaining the real differentia that gives subsistence to a species. Examples of logical differentiae are ‘rational’ (nâthiq; derived from nuthq which means ‘speech’ as well as ‘rationality’) for man and ‘neighing’ for the horse. However, if by ‘nuthq,’ for instance, is meant speech, it is an audible quality, and if what is meant by it is ‘rationality’ in the sense of the faculty of cognition of universals, it is regarded by the philosophers as one of the ‘psychic qualities.’ Quality, of whatever kind, is an accident, and an accident does not give subsistence to a substance. The same applies to ‘neighing’ as the differentia of ‘horse,’ defined as a ‘neighing animal.’ Often such special properties are more than one, and they are together substituted for the real differentia, as is the case with ‘sensate’ and ‘voluntarily mobile’ which are taken together as the differentia of ‘animal.’ But had they been the real differentia, they would not have been more than one, as stated in the preceding section. The ‘derivative’ differentia (al-fashl al-isytiqâqî) is the source of the logical differentia. It is the real differentia that gives subsistence to the species, like the ‘rational soul’ in the case of ‘man’ and the ‘neighing soul’ in the case of the horse. The reality of a species is realized by its ultimate differentia, for the differentia that gives subsistence to a species is the one that actualizes it, and that which is subsumed in its other genera and differentiae in an undetermined manner is subsumed in it in a determined way. A corollary to the above is that the identity of a species is due to the ultimate differentia by which its specificity (naw‘iyyah) is maintained, and should any of its genera undergo a change, or should its form – that is, differentia negatively conditioned – separate from its ‘matter’ – that is, genus negatively conditioned – the species maintains its specific identity, as in the case of the rational soul on separation from the body. Further, the differentia does not fall under its genus, in the sense that genus is not subsumed in its definition; otherwise it would require a differentia to give it subsistence and that, on transferring our argument to it, results in an indefinite regress requiring an infinite number of differentiae.
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اﻟﻔﺼﻞ اﻟﺴﺎدس ﻓﻲ اﻟﻨﻮع و ﺑﻌﺾ أﺣﻜﺎﻣﻪ
ﻛﻞ ﻣﻨﻬﺎ و ﺑﲔ اﻟﻨﻮع ج ﺑﻮﺟﻮد واﺣﺪ ﻷن اﳊﻤﻞ ﺑﲔ اﳌﺎﻫﻴﺔ اﻟﻨﻮﻋﻴﺔ ﺗﻮﺟﺪ أﺟﺰاؤﻫﺎ ﰲ اﳋﺎر أوﱄ و اﻟﻨﻮع ﻣﻮﺟﻮد ﺑﻮﺟﻮد واﺣﺪ و أﻣﺎ ﰲ اﻟﺬﻫﻦ ﻓﻬﻲ ﻣﺘﻐﺎﻳﺮة ﺑﺎﻹ-ﺎم و اﻟﺘﺤﺼﻞ و ﻟﺬﻟ ﻚ ﻛﻞ ﻣ ﻛﺎن م ﻛﻤﺎ ﺗﻘﺪ ﻦ اﳉﻨﺲ و اﻟﻔﺼﻞ ﻋﺮﺿﻴﺎ ﻟﻶﺧﺮ زاﺋﺪا ﻋﻠﻴﻪ . و ﻣﻦ ﻫﻨﺎ ﻣﺎ ذﻛﺮوا أﻧﻪ ﻻ ﺑﺪ ﰲ اﳌﺮﻛﺒﺎت اﳊﻘﻴﻘﻴﺔ أي اﻷﻧﻮاع اﳌﺎدﻳﺔ اﳌﺆﻟﻔﺔ ﻣﻦ ﻣﺎدة و ﺻﻮرة أن ﻳﻜﻮن ﺑﲔ أﺟﺰاﺋﻬﺎ ﻓﻘﺮ و ﺣﺎﺟﺔ ﻣﻦ ﺑﻌﻀﻬﺎ إﱃ ﺑﻌﺾ ﺣﱴ ﺗﺮﺗﺒﻂ و ﺗﺘﺤﺪ ﺣﻘﻴﻘﺔ واﺣﺪة و ﻗﺪ ﻋﺪوا اﳌﺴﺄﻟﺔ ﺿﺮورﻳﺔ ﻻ ﺗﻔﺘﻘﺮ إﱃ ﺑ ن ﺮﻫﺎ. و ﳝﺘﺎز اﳌﺮﻛﺐ اﳊﻘﻴﻘﻲ ﻣﻦ ﻏﲑﻩ ﺑﺎﻟﻮﺣﺪة اﳊﻘﻴﻘﻴﺔ و ذﻟﻚ ﺑﺄن ﳛﺼﻞ ﻣﻦ ﺗﺄﻟﻒ اﳉﺰﺋﲔ ﻛﺎﻷﻣﻮر اﳌﻌﺪﻧﻴﺔ اﻟﱵ ﻛﻞ واﺣﺪ ﻣﻨﻬﻤﺎ ﻟﻪ آﺛﺎر ﺧﺎﺻﺔ ﻏﲑ آﺛﺎرﳘﺎ اﳋﺎﺻﺔ ﻣﺜﻼ أﻣﺮ ﺛﺎﻟﺚ ﻏﲑ ﻛﺎﻟﻌﺴﻜﺮ اﳌﺮﻛﺐ ﻣﻦ أﻓﺮاد و اﻟﺒﻴﺖ اﳌﺆﻟﻒ ﻣﻦ اﻟﻠﱭ و ﳍﺎ آﺛﺎر ﺧﺎﺻﺔ ﻏﲑ آﺛﺎر ﻋﻨﺎﺻﺮﻫﺎ ﻻ ا ﺎ ﳉﺺ و ﻏﲑﳘ. ﻛﻤﺎ و ﻣﻦ ﻫﻨﺎ أﻳﻀﺎ ﻳﱰﺟﺢ اﻟﻘﻮل ﺑﺄن اﻟﱰﻛﻴﺐ ﺑﲔ اﳌﺎدة و اﻟﺼﻮرة اﲢﺎدي ﻻ اﻧﻀﻤﺎﻣﻲ ﺳﻴﺄﰐ. ﻛﺎﻷﻧﻮاع اﻟﱵ ﳍﺎ ﺗﻌﻠﻖ ﻣﺎ ﺑﺎﳌﺎدة ﻣﺜﻞ ﻛﺜﲑة اﻷﻓﺮاد ﰒ إن ﻣﻦ اﳌﺎﻫﻴﺎت اﻟﻨﻮﻋﻴﺔ ﻣﺎ ﻫﻲ ﺮدة ﲡﺮدا ﺗﺎﻣﺎ ﻣﻦ اﻟﻌﻘﻮل R ﻛﺎﻷﻧﻮاع ا اﻹﻧﺴﺎن و ﻣﻨﻬﺎ ﻣﺎ ﻫﻮ ﻣﻨﺤﺼﺮ ﰲ ﻓﺮد ﻛﺜﺮة و ذﻟﻚ ﻷن أﻓﺮاد اﻟﻨﻮع إﻣﺎ أن ﺗﻜﻮن ﲤﺎم ﻣﺎﻫﻴﺔ اﻟﻨﻮع أو ﺑﻌﻀﻬﺎ أو ﻻزﻣﺔ ﳍﺎ و ﻋﻠﻰ ﲨﻴﻊ ﻫﺬﻩ اﻟﺘﻘﺎدﻳﺮ ﻻ ﻛﺜﺮة إﻻ ﻣﻊ اﻵﺣﺎد ﻫﺬا ﺧﻠﻒ و ﻛﻞ ﻣﺎ ﺻﺪﻗﺖ ﻋﻠﻴﻪ و ﻻ ﻳﺘﺤﻘﻖ ﳍﺎ ﻓﺮد ﻟﻮﺟﻮب اﻟﻜﺜﺮة ﰲ إﻣﺎ أن ﺗﻜﻮن ﻟﻌﺮض ﻣﻔﺎرق ﻳﺘﺤﻘﻖ ﺑﺎﻧﻀﻤﺎﻣﻪ و ﻋﺪم اﻧﻀﻤﺎﻣﻪ اﻟﻜﺜﺮة و ﻣﻦ اﻟﻮاﺟﺐ ﺣﻴﻨﺌﺬ ﻛﻤﺎ ﺳﻴﺄﰐ ﻓﻜﻞ أن ﻳﻜﻮن ﰲ اﻟﻨﻮع إﻣﻜﺎن اﻟﻌﺮوض و اﻻﻧﻀﻤﺎم و ﻻ ﻳﺘﺤﻘﻖ ذﻟﻚ إﻻ ﲟﺎدة ﺮد ﻟﻴﺲ ﺑﻜﺜﲑ R ﻛﺜﲑ اﻷﻓﺮاد ﻓﻬﻮ ﻣﺎدي و ﻳﻨﻌﻜﺲ إﱃ أن ﻣﺎ ﻻ ﻣﺎدة ﻟﻪ و ﻫﻮ اﻟﻨﻮع ا ﻧﻮع اﻷﻓﺮاد و ﻫﻮ اﳌﻄﻠﻮب.
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5.6. SOME CHARACTERISTICS OF SPECIES The parts of a specific quiddity (al-mâhiyyât al-naw’iyyah) exist in external reality with a single existence, for the predication between each of them and the species is of the primary kind and the species exists with a single existence. However, in the mind they are distinguished from each other by being indefinite and determinate, and hence each of the two, genus and differentia, is an accident in relation to the other and additional to it, as explained earlier.’ Hence the metaphysicians state that there exists a mutual need between the parts in the ‘real composites’ (al-murakkabât al-haqqiyyah), that is, the material species, which are composed of ‘matter’ and ‘form,’ so that they may join and unite to form a.single entity. They consider this as a selfevident truth that does not stand in need of a proof. The ‘real composites’ are distinguished from other kinds of composites by a real union wherein two constituents, for instance, combine to produce a third entity different from either of the two and possessing properties different from those belonging to each. An example of this kind of union is provided by chemical compounds, which possess properties different from their constituent elements. It is not like the composition of an army, which is made up of individual soldiers, nor like that of a house, which is made up of bricks, mortar, etc. This lends weight to the opinion that the combination of matter and form is a union, not a composition, as will be explained later. Furthermore, there are some specific quiddities that have a multiplicity of individuals, like the species associated with matter, e.g. ‘man.’ There are some of them that are confined to a single individual, such as the immaterial species (al-anwâ’ al-mujarradah), which are completely immaterial (i.e. in essence and in act); e.g. the Immaterial Intellects (‘uqûl). That is because a species has a multiplicity of individuals either as a result of multiplicity constituting the totality of its quiddity, or a part of it, or its proprium or a separable accident. In the first three assumptions, individuation is never realized, as multiplicity will be necessary in anything that corresponds to it. Yet multiplicity cannot be realized without individuals and the impossibility of individuation contradicts the assumption. Since the above three assumptions are inadmissible, multiplicity must arise in separable accidents (‘arâd mufâriq) and their association or absence of association with the quiddity. However, in this case it is necessary that there exists the capacity (imkân isti’dâdî) for such association in the species, and such a capacity is not realized except in matter, as will be explained later on. Hence every species with a multiplicity of individuals is material. From this follows the converse that immaterial species, which are devoid of ‘matter,’ do not have a multiplicity of individuals.
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اﻟﻔﺼﻞ اﻟﺴﺎﺑﻊ ﻓﻲ اﻟﻜﻠﻲ و اﻟﺠﺰﺋﻲ و ﻧﺤﻮ وﺟﻮدﻫﻤﺎ رﲟﺎ ﻇﻦ أن اﻟﻜﻠﻴﺔ و اﳉﺰﺋﻴﺔ إﳕﺎ ﳘﺎ ﰲ ﳓﻮ اﻹدراك ﻓﺎﻹدراك اﳊﺴﻲ ﻟﻘﻮﺗﻪ ﻳﺪرك اﻟﺸﻲ ء ﺑﻨﺤﻮ ﳝﺘﺎز ﻣﻦ ﻏﲑﻩ ﻣﻄﻠﻘﺎ و اﻹدراك اﻟﻌﻘﻠﻲ ﻟﻀﻌﻔﻪ ﻳﺪرﻛﻪ ﺑﻨﺤﻮ ﻻ ﳝﺘﺎز ﻣﻄﻠﻘﺎ و ﻳﻘﺒﻞ ﻛﺎﻟﺸﺒﺢ اﳌﺮﺋﻲ ﻣﻦ ﺑﻌﻴﺪ اﶈﺘﻤﻞ أن ﻳﻜﻮن ﻫﻮ زﻳﺪا أو ﻋﻤﺮا أو اﻻﻧﻄﺒﺎق ﻋﻠﻰ أﻛﺜﺮ ﻣﻦ واﺣﺪ ﻛﺎﻟﺪرﻫﻢ اﳌﻤﺴﻮح اﻟﻘﺎﺑﻞ اﻻﻧﻄﺒﺎق ﻋﻠﻰ ﺧﺸﺒﺔ ﻣﻨﺼﻮﺑﺔ أو ﻏﲑ ذﻟﻚ و ﻫﻮ أﺣﺪﻫﺎ ﻗﻄﻌﺎ و دراﻫﻢ ﳐﺘﻠﻔﺔ. ﻛﺎﻹﻧﺴﺎن ﻣﺜ و ﻳﺪﻓﻌﻪ أن ﻻزﻣﻪ أن ﻻ ﻳﺼﺪق اﳌﻔﺎﻫﻴﻢ اﻟﻜﻠﻴﺔ ﻼ ﻋﻠﻰ أزﻳﺪ ﻣﻦ واﺣﺪ ﻣﻦ أﻓﺮادﻫﺎ ﺣﻘﻴﻘﺔ و أن ﻳﻜﺬب اﻟﻘﻮاﻧﲔ اﻟﻜﻠﻴﺔ اﳌﻨﻄﺒﻘﺔ ﻋﻠﻰ ﻣﻮاردﻫﺎ اﻟﻼ ﻣﺘﻨﺎﻫﻴﺔ إﻻ ﰲ واﺣﺪ ﻛﻞ ﳑﻜﻦ ﻓﻠﻮﺟﻮدﻩ ﻋﻠﺔ و ﺻﺮﻳﺢ اﻟﻮﺟﺪان ﻳﺒﻄﻠﻪ ﻓﺎﳊﻖ أن اﻟﻜﻠﻴﺔ ﻛﻘﻮﻟﻨﺎ اﻷرﺑﻌﺔ زوج و ﻣﻨﻬﺎ و اﳉﺰﺋﻴﺔ ﳓﻮان ﻣﻦ وﺟﻮد اﳌﺎﻫﻴﺎت.
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5.7. THE UNIVERSAL, AND THE PARTICULAR AND THEIR MODES OF EXISTENCE Some have thought that the universal and the particular are two different modes of cognition. In sense perception (al-idrâk al-hissî), they say, due to its being strong and vivid, a thing is perceived in such a way that it is absolutely distinguished from anything else. However, in rational cognition (al-idrâk al-‘aqlî), due to its being weak and vague, a thing is apprehended in such a way that it is not absolutely distinguishable and so is capable of corresponding to more than one thing. It is like an apparition seen from a far distance which may be either Zayd or ‘Amr or the stump of a tree or something else, but is definitely only one of them, or like an abraded coin which may resemble different coins of its type. This view stands refuted, for it implies that the universals, such as ‘man,’ do not really correspond to more than one member of their class and that universal laws, such as ‘All fours are even’ and ‘Every contingent needs a cause to exist,’ which apply to an unlimited number of their instance, be false except only in one of those instances. Both of these implications are false prima facie. The truth is that the universal and the particular are two different modes of existence of quiddity.
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اﻟﻔﺼﻞ اﻟﺜﺎﻣﻦ ﻓﻲ ﺎ ﺗﻤﻴﺰ اﻟﻤﺎﻫﻴﺎت و ﺗﺸﺨﺼﻬ
ﻛﺘﻤﻴﺰ اﻹﻧﺴﺎن ﺎ ﳍﺎ ﲝﻴﺚ ﻻ ﺗﺘﺼﺎدﻗﺎن T ﲤﻴﺰ ﻣﺎﻫﻴﺔ ﻣﻦ ﻣﺎﻫﻴﺔ أﺧﺮى ﺑﻴﻨﻮﻧﺘﻬﺎ ﻣﻨﻬﺎ و ﻣﻐﺎﻳﺮ ﻛﺜﲑﻳﻦ ﻛﻮن اﳌﺎﻫﻴﺔ ﲝﻴﺚ ﳝﺘﻨﻊ ﺻﺪﻗﻬﺎ ﻋﻠﻰ ﻣﻦ اﻟﻔﺮس ﺑﺎﺷﺘﻤﺎﻟﻪ ﻋﻠﻰ اﻟﻨﺎﻃﻖ و اﻟﺘﺸﺨﺺ ﻛﺘﺸﺨﺺ اﻹﻧﺴﺎن اﻟﺬي ﻫﻮ زﻳﺪ. و ﻣﻦ ﻫﻨﺎ ﻳﻈﻬﺮ أوﻻ أن اﻟﺘﻤﻴﺰ وﺻﻒ إﺿﺎﰲ ﻟﻠﻤﺎ ﻫﻴﺔ ﲞﻼف اﻟﺘﺸﺨﺺ ﻓﺈﻧﻪ ﻧﻔﺴﻲ ﻏﲑ إﺿﺎﰲ. ﻛﻠﻲ ﻻ ﻳﻮﺟﺐ اﳉﺰﺋﻴﺔ و ﻻ ﻳﻨﺘﻬﻲ ﻛﻠﻲ إﱃ و ﺛﺎﻧﻴﺎ أن اﻟﺘﻤﻴﺰ ﻻ ﻳﻨﺎﰲ اﻟﻜﻠﻴﺔ ﻓﺈن اﻧﻀﻤﺎم إﻟﻴﻬﺎ و إن ﺗﻜﺮر ﲞﻼف اﻟﺘﺸﺨﺺ. ﻛﺎن ﺑﲔ ﻛﺎﻷﺟﻨﺎس اﻟﻌﺎﻟﻴﺔ اﻟﺒﺴﻴﻄﺔ إذ ﻟﻮ ﰒ إن اﻟﺘﻤﻴﺰ ﺑﲔ ﻣﺎﻫﻴﺘﲔ إﻣﺎ ﺑﺘﻤﺎم ذاﺗﻴﻬﻤﺎ ﺟﻨﺴﲔ ﻋﺎﻟﻴﲔ ﻣﺸﱰك ذاﰐ ﻛﺎن ﺟﻨﺴﺎ ﳍﻤﺎ واﻗﻌﺎ ﻓﻮﻗﻬﻤﺎ و ﻗﺪ ﻓﺮﺿﺎ ﺟﻨﺴﲔ ﻋﺎﻟﻴﲔ ﻫﺬا
ﺧﻠﻒ. ﻛﺎﻹﻧﺴﺎن و ﻛﺎن ﺑﻴﻨﻬﻤﺎ ﺟﻨﺲ ﻣﺸﱰك ﻓﺘﺘﻤﺎﻳﺰان ﺑﻔﺼﻠﲔ و إﻣﺎ ﺑﺒﻌﺾ اﻟﺬات و ﻫﺬا ﻓﻴﻤﺎ اﻟﻔﺮس. ج ﻣﻦ اﻟﺬات و ﻫﺬا ﻓﻴﻤﺎ إذا اﺷﱰﻛﺘﺎ ﰲ اﳌﺎﻫﻴﺔ اﻟﻨﻮﻋﻴﺔ ﻓﺘﺘﻤﺎﻳﺰان ﺑﺎﻷﻋﺮاض و إﻣﺎ ﺑﺎﳋﺎر ﻛﺎﻹﻧﺴﺎن اﻟﻄﻮﻳﻞ اﳌ اﳌﻔﺎرﻗﺔ ﲑ ﺘﻤﻴﺰ ﺑﻄﻮﻟﻪ ﻣﻦ اﻹﻧﺴﺎن اﻟﻘﺼ. و ﻫﺎﻫﻨﺎ ﻗﺴﻢ راﺑﻊ أﺛﺒﺘﻪ ﻣﻦ ﺟﻮز اﻟﺘﺸﻜﻴﻚ ﰲ اﳌﺎﻫﻴﺔ و ﻫﻮ اﺧﺘﻼف ﻧﻮع واﺣﺪ ﺑﺎﻟﺸﺪة و اﻟﻀﻌﻒ و اﻟﺘﻘﺪم و اﻟﺘﺄﺧﺮ و ﻏﲑﻫﺎ ﰲ ﻋﲔ رﺟﻮﻋﻬﺎ إﱃ ﻣﺎ ﺑﻪ اﻻﺷﱰاك و اﳊﻖ أن ﻻ ﺗﺸﻜﻴﻚ إﻻ ﰲ ﺣﻘﻴﻘﺔ اﻟﻮﺟﻮد و ﻓﻴﻬﺎ ﳚﺮي ﻫﺬا اﻟﻘﺴﻢ ﻣﻦ اﻻﺧﺘﻼف و اﻟﺘﻤﺎﻳﺰ. ﺮد ﻣﻨﺤﺼﺮ R ﺮدة ﻣﻦ ﻟﻮازم ﻧﻮﻋﻴﺘﻬﺎ ﳌﺎ ﻋﺮﻓﺖ أن اﻟﻨﻮع ا R و أﻣﺎ اﻟﺘﺸﺨﺺ ﻓﻬﻮ ﰲ اﻷﻧﻮاع ا ﺎ اﻟﺬاﰐ و ﰲ اﻷﻧﻮاع 5 ﺎ ﻣﻜﺘﻔﻴﺔ ﺑﺎﻟﻔﺎﻋﻞ ﺗﻮﺟﺪ ﲟﺠﺮد إﻣﻜﺎ 5 ﰲ ﻓﺮد و ﻫﺬا ﻣﺮادﻫﻢ ﺑﻘﻮﳍﻢ إ ﺎ اﻷﻳﻦ و ﻣﱴ و اﻟﻮﺿﻊ و ﻫﻲ ﺗﺸﺨﺺ اﻟﻨﻮع T ﻛﺎﻟﻌﻨﺼﺮﻳﺎت ﺑﺎﻷﻋﺮاض اﻟﻼﺣﻘﺔ و ﻋﻤﺪ اﳌﺎدﻳﺔ ﺑﻠ ﻛﺎﻟﻔﺮد ﻣﻦ اﻹﻧﺴﺎن اﻟﻮاﻗﻊ ﺑﲔ ﺣﺠﻢ ﺤﻮﻗﻬﺎ ﺑﻪ ﰲ ﻋﺮض ﻋﺮﻳﺾ ﺑﲔ ﻣﺒﺪإ ﺗﻜﻮﻧﻪ إﱃ ﻣﻨﺘﻬﺎﻩ ﻛﺬا و ﻋﻠﻰ ﻫﺬا اﻟﻘﻴﺎس ﻫﺬا ﻫﻮ اﳌﺸﻬﻮر ﻛﺬا و ﻣﺒﺪأ زﻣﺎﱐ ﻛﺬا إﱃ ﻣﺒﺪإ زﻣﺎﱐ ﻛﺬا و ﺣﺠﻢ ﻋﻨﺪﻫﻢ. ﻛﻤﺎ ذﻫﺐ إﻟﻴﻪ اﳌﻌﻠﻢ اﻟﺜﺎﱐ و ﺗﺒﻌﻪ ﺻﺪر اﳌﺘﺄﳍﲔ أن اﻟﺘﺸﺨﺺ ﺑﺎﻟﻮﺟﻮد ﻷن و اﳊﻖ اﻧﻀﻤﺎم اﻟﻜ ﻠﻲ إﱃ اﻟﻜﻠﻲ ﻻ ﻳﻔﻴﺪ اﳉﺰﺋﻴﺔ ﻓﻤﺎ ﲰﻮﻫﺎ أﻋﺮاﺿﺎ ﻣﺸﺨﺼﺔ ﻫﻲ ﻣﻦ ﻟﻮازم اﻟﺘﺸﺨﺺ و أﻣﺎراﺗﻪ.
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5.8. DISTINCTION AND INDIVIDUATION The distinction (tamayyuz) between one quiddity and another lies in its being different from others, so that two of them do not correspond to one thing, like the distinction of ‘man’ from ‘horse’ by virtue of the former’s ‘rationality.’ Individuation (tasyakhkhush) means quiddity’s being such that its correspondence to a multiplicity of individuals be impossible, like the individuality of a particular man Zayd. From this the following points become clear. First, distinction is a relative attribute of a quiddity, as opposed to individuation, which is due to itself and non-relative. Second, distinction is not incompatible with universality, for appending one universal to another does not lead to particularity (juziyyah), not even when the process of adding further universals is repeated indefinitely. This is not the case with individuation. Furthermore, the distinction between two quiddities can possibly be conceived as arising in one or more of the following four ways: (i) Either with the totality of their essential parts, as in the case of the highest simple genera (i.e. substance and the accidents); for if two highest genera were to have common essential parts, there would be a genus above them, and this contradicts the supposition that the two genera are the highest ones. (ii) The distinction between them is by virtue of one of their essential parts, as is the case when they have a common genus and are made distinct by two differentiae, for instance, ‘man’ and ‘horse.’ (iii) The distinction is by virtue of something extraneous to their essence, as when they share a common specific quiddity and are distinguished from one another by virtue of separable accidents like ‘tall man’ distinguished from ‘short man’ on account of height. (iv) There is a fourth kind of distinction believed in by those who consider gradation (tasykîk) in quiddity as permissible. Gradation is a distinction introduced in a species due to strength and weakness, priority and posteriority and so on, while that which is common to it is maintained. But the truth is that there is no gradation except in existence from which this kind of difference and distinction derives. As to individuation, it may pertain to material and immaterial species. In immaterial species, it is implied in its specificity, for, as we have seen, an immaterial species is confined to one individual, and this is what is meant by the statement of the metaphysicians that “All they require is the agent, and their mere essential contingency is enough to bring them into existence.” As to the material species, such as the elements, individuation arises in them by the associated accidents (al-a’râd al-lâhiqah), which are mainly: ‘where,’ ‘when’ and ‘position,’ and these are what individualize the species by being associated with it (e.g. ‘Man in such and such a place and such and such a time’ as the description of a certain individual). This is the prevalent view among the metaphysicians. However, the correct view, as held by Farabi, who was followed therein by Sadr al-Mutaallihîn, is that individuation is produced by existence; for
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the annexation of a universal to another does not produce particularity, and the so-called ‘individuating accidents’ are inseparable implications of individuation and its signs.
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اﻟﻤﺮﺣﻠﺔ اﻟﺴﺎدﺳﺔ ﻓﻲ اﻟﻤﻘﻮﻻت اﻟﻌﺸﺮ وﻫﻲ اﻷﺟﻨﺎس اﻟﻌﺎﻟﻴﺔ اﻟﺘﻲ إﻟﻴﻬﺎ ﺗﻨﺘﻬﻲ أﻧﻮاع اﻟﻤﺎﻫﻴﺎت وﻓﻴﻬﺎ أﺣﺪ ﻋﺸﺮ ﻓﺼﻼ CHAPTER SIX: The Categories 11 Units

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اﻟﻔﺼﻞ اﻷول ﺗﻌﺮﻳﻒ اﻟﺠﻮﻫﺮ واﻟﻌﺮض- ت ﻋﺪد اﻟﻤﻘﻮﻻ – ﺗﻨﻘﺴﻢ اﳌﺎﻫﻴﺔ – إﻧﻘﺴﺎﻣﺎ أوﻟﻴﺎ “ ﻓﺈ5ﺎ إﻣﺎ أن ﺗﻜﻮن ﲝﻴﺚ ، إﱃ ﺟﻮﻫﺮ وﻋﺮض إذا “ وﺟﺪت ﰲ اﳋﺎرج وﺟﺪت ﻻ ﰲ ﻣﻮﺿﻮع ﻣﺴﺘﻐﻦ ﻋﻨﻬﺎ ﰲ وﺟﻮدﻩ ﺳﻮاء وﺟﺪت ﻻ ﰲ ، أو وﺟﺪت ﰲ ﻣﻮﺿﻮع ﻻ ﻳﺴﺘﻐﲏ ﻋﻨﻬﺎ ﰲ ، ﻛﺎﳉﻮاﻫﺮ اﻟﻌﻘﻠﻴﺔ اﻟﻘﺎﺋﻤﺔ ﺑﻨﻔﺴﻬﺎ ﻣﻮﺿﻮع أﺻﻼ وإﻣﺎ أن ﺗﻜﻮن ﲝﻴﺚ ، ﻛﺎﻟﺼﻮر اﻟﻌﻨﺼﺮﻳﺔ اﳌﻨﻄﺒﻌﺔ ﰲ اﳌﺎدة اﳌﺘﻘﻮﻣﺔ -ﺎ “ وﺟﻮدﻩ إذا وﺟﺪت “ ﰲ اﳋﺎرج وﺟﺪت ﰲ ﻣﻮﺿﻮع ﻣﺴﺘﻐﻦ ﻋﻨﻬﺎ ﻛﻤﺎﻫﻴﺔ اﻟﻘﺮب واﻟﺒﻌﺪ ﺑﲔ اﻷﺟﺴﺎم وﻛﺎﻟﻘﻴﺎم واﻟﻘﻌﻮد واﻻﺳﺘﻘﺒﺎل واﻻﺳﺘﺪﺑﺎر ﻣﻦ اﻻﻧﺴﺎن . ﻓﻤﻦ أﻧﻜﺮ وﺟﻮد اﳉ ، ووﺟﻮد اﻟﻘﺴﻤﲔ ﰲ اﳉﻤﻠﺔ ﺿﺮوري ، ﻮﻫﺮ ﻟﺰﻣﻪ ﺟﻮﻫﺮﻳﺔ اﻷﻋﺮاض ﻓﻘﺎل ﺑﻮﺟﻮدﻩ ﻣﻦ ﺣﻴﺚ ﻻ ﻳﺸﻌﺮ . ﻻ، وﻣﻔﻬﻮم اﻟﻌﺮض ﻋﺮض ﻋﺎم ﳍﺎ ، ﻫﻲ اﳌﻘﻮﻻت واﻷﺟﻨﺎس اﻟﻌﺎﻟﻴﺔ ، واﻷﻋﺮاض ﺗﺴﻌﺔ وﻟﻴﺲ ﲜﻨﺲ ﳍﺎ ، ﻛﻤﺎ أن اﳌﻔﻬﻮم ﻣﻦ اﳌﺎﻫﻴﺔ ﻋﺮض ﻋﺎم ﳉﻤﻴﻊ اﳌﻘﻮﻻت اﻟﻌﺸﺮ ، ﺟﻨﺲ ﻓﻮﻗﻬﺎ . واﳌﻘﻮﻻت اﻟﺘﺴﻊ اﻟﻌﺮﺿﻴﺔ ﻫﻲ :وا ، اﻟﻜﻢ ، واﳉﺪة ، واﻟﻮﺿﻊ ، وﻣﱴ ، واﻷﻳﻦ ، ﻟﻜﻴﻒ . وأن ﻳﻨﻔﻌﻞ ، وأن ﻳﻔﻌﻞ ، واﻹﺿﺎﻓﺔ وﻣﺴﺘﻨﺪﻫﻢ ، ﻫﺬا ﻣﺎ ﻋﻠﻴﻪ اﳌﺸﺎؤون ﻣﻦ ﻋﺪد اﳌﻘﻮﻻت ﻓﻴﻪ اﻻﺳﺘﻘﺮاء . – ﲜﻌﻞ اﳌﻘﻮﻻت اﻟﻨﺴﺒﻴﺔ ، ﺎ أرﺑﻊ 5 وذﻫﺐ ﺑﻌﻀﻬﻢ إﱃ أ – وﻫﻲ اﳌﻘﻮﻻت اﻟﺴﺒﻊ اﻷﺧﲑة واﺣﺪة .ﺲ ﺎ ﲬ ﺔ 5 وذﻫﺐ ﺷﻴﺦ اﻹﺷﺮاق إﱃ أ . وزاد ﻋﻠﻰ ﻫﺬﻩ اﻷرﺑﻌﺔ اﳊﺮﻛ ، ، ﺎ إﱃ اﻷﻧﻮاع اﳌﻨﺪرﺟﺔ ﲢﺘﻬﺎ ﻃﻮﻳﻠﺔ اﻟﺬﻳﻞ ﺟﺪا T واﻷﲝﺎث ﰲ ﻫﺬﻩ اﳌﻘﻮﻻت واﻧﻘﺴﺎﻣﺎ . ﻣﻊ إﺷﺎرات إﱃ ﻏﲑﻩ ، وﳓﻦ ﻧﻠﺨﺺ اﻟﻘﻮل ﻋﻠﻰ ﻣﺎ ﻫﻮ اﳌﺸﻬﻮر ﻣﻦ ﻣﺬﻫﺐ اﳌﺸﺎﺋﲔ
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6.1. DEFINITIONS OF SUBSTANCE AND ACCIDENT AND THE NUMBER OF THE CATEGORIES Quiddity is divided in the first classification into substance and accident. That is, it is either such that, when existing externally, it does not exist in a locus that has no need of it for existing. This is irrespective of whether it does not exist in a locus at all (as in the case of self-sustaining intellectual substances), or exists in a locus that needs it for existing (as in the case of the elemental forms impressed in the ‘matter,’ which sustains them). Or, it is such that when existing externally it exists in a locus that does not need it for existing, such as the quiddities of ‘nearness’ and ‘remoteness’ between bodies, and ‘standing’ and ‘sitting,’ ‘facing’ and ‘having one’s back towards something’ for man. The existence of these two kinds is necessary, and one who denies the existence of the substance is forced to consider accident as substances, thus unwittingly admitting its existence. The accidents are nine. They are categories and constitute the highest genera. Their common name ‘accident’ is a general accident for them and there is no genus above them,’ in the same way as the concept ‘quiddity’ is a general accident for all the ten categories, which do not have a genus. The nine accidental categories are: ‘quantity,’ ‘quality,’ ‘place.’ ‘time,’ ‘position,’ ‘possession,’ ‘relation,’ ‘action’ and ‘affection.’ This is the opinion of the Peripatetics concerning the number of the categories and inductive evidence forms its basis. Some philosophers have held the accidents to be four. They put the relative categories, the last seven, into one group. Suhrawardi held them to be five, adding the category of motion to these four.’ The discussions concerning the categories and their classification into the kinds that fall under them are very elaborate and here we will give a summary based on the prevailing opinion amongst the Aristotelians, while referring to the other positions.
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اﻟﻔﺼﻞ اﻟﺜﺎﻧﻲ [ ]ﺮ ﻓﻲ أﻗﺴﺎم اﻟﺠﻮﻫ – ﻗﺴﻤﻮا اﳉﻮﻫﺮ – ﺗﻘﺴﻴﻤﺎ أوﻟﻴﺎ إﱃ ﲬﺴﺔ أﻗﺴﺎم : اﳌﺎدة واﻟﺼﻮرة واﳉﺴﻢ واﻟﻨﻔﺲ واﻟﻌﻘ ﻞ . ء ﻣﺎ ﻗﺎم ﻋﻠﻰ وﺟﻮدﻩ اﻟﱪﻫﺎن ﻣﻦ اﳉﻮاﻫﺮ وﻣﺴﺘﻨﺪ ﻫﺬا اﻟﺘﻘﺴﻴﻢ ﰲ اﳊﻘﻴﻘﺔ اﺳﺘﻘﺮا . “ : ﻓﺎﻟﻌﻘﻞ ﻫﻮ “ ﺮد ﻋﻦ اﳌﺎدة ذاﺗﺎ وﻓﻌﻼ R اﳉﻮﻫﺮ ا “ : واﻟﻨﻔﺲ ﻫﻲ ، ﺮد ﻋﻦ R اﳉﻮﻫﺮ ا “ اﳌﺎدة ذاﺗﺎ اﳌﺘﻌﻠﻖ -ﺎ ﻓﻌﻼ “ : واﳌﺎدة ﻫﻲ ، “ اﳉﻮﻫﺮ اﳊﺎﻣﻞ ﻟﻠﻘﻮة واﻟﺼﻮرة اﳉﺴﻤﻴﺔ ، “ : ﻫﻲ “ اﳉﻮﻫﺮ اﳌﻔﻴﺪ ﻟﻔﻌﻠﻴﺔ اﳌﺎدة ﻣﻦ ﺣﻴﺚ اﻻﻣﺘﺪادات اﻟﺜﻼﺛﺔ “ : واﳉﺴﻢ ﻫﻮ ، اﳉﻮﻫﺮ اﳌﻤﺘﺪ ﰲ ﺟﻬﺎﺗﻪ اﻟﺜﻼث ” . ﻷن اﻟﺼﻮرة ﻫﻲ اﻟﻔﺼﻞ ﻣﺄﺧﻮذا ، ودﺧﻮل اﻟﺼﻮرة اﳉﺴﻤﻴﺔ ﰲ اﻟﺘﻘﺴﻴﻢ دﺧﻮل ﺑﺎﻟﻌﺮض وإن ﺻﺪق ﻋﻠﻴﻬﺎ اﳉﻮﻫﺮ ، وﻓﺼﻮل اﳉﻮاﻫﺮ ﻏﲑ ﻣﻨﺪرﺟﺔ ﲢﺖ ﻣﻘﻮﻟﺔ اﳉﻮﻫﺮ ، ﺑﺸﺮط ﻻ ﻛﻤﺎ وﳚﺮي ﻧﻈﲑ اﻟﻜﻼم ﰲ اﻟﻨﻔﺲ ، ﻋﺮﻓﺖ ﰲ ﲝﺚ اﳌﺎﻫﻴﺔ

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6.2. THE CLASSIFICATION OF SUBSTANCE The metaphysicians first divide substance into five kinds: ‘matter’ (mâdddah), ‘form’ (shûrah), ‘body’ (jism), ‘soul’ (nafs) and ‘intellect’ (‘aql). Inductive evidence for the existence of these substances forms the basis of this classification. ‘Intellect’ is a substance devoid of ‘matter’ both in its essence and in act. ‘Soul’ is a substance devoid of ‘matter’ essentially but associated with it in act. ‘Matter’ is a substance that possesses potentiality. ‘Bodily form’ (alshûrat al-jismiyyah) is a substance that gives actuality to ‘matter’ in respect to the three dimensions. ‘Body’ is a substance extended in three dimensions. The inclusion of ‘bodily form’ in this classification is an accidental one, for ‘form’ is differentia negatively conditioned and the differentiae of substances do not fall under the category of substance, though the term substance may be predicable of it (in the sense of technical predication), as was seen in the discussion on quiddity.” The same applies to ‘soul.’
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اﻟﻔﺼﻞ اﻟﺜﺎﻟﺚ ﻓﻲ اﻟﺠﺴﻢ ﻻ رﻳﺐ أن ﻫﻨﺎك أﺟﺴﺎﻣﺎ ﳐﺘﻠﻔﺔ ﺗﺸﱰك ﰲ أﺻﻞ اﳉﺴﻤﻴﺔ اﻟﱵ ﻫﻲ اﳉﻮﻫﺮ اﳌﻤﺘﺪ ﰲ وﻟﻪ وﺣﺪة ، ﻓﺎﳉﺴﻢ ﲟﺎ ﻫﻮ ﺟﺴﻢ ﻗﺎﺑﻞ ﻟﻼﻧﻘﺴﺎم ﰲ ﺟﻬﺎﺗﻪ اﳌﻔﺮوﺿﺔ ، اﳉﻬﺎت اﻟﺜﻼث اﺗﺼﺎﻟﻴﺔ ﻋﻨﺪ اﳊﺲ . ء ﻛﻤﺎ ﻫﻮ ﻋﻨﺪ اﳊﺲ أو ﳎﻤﻮﻋﺔ أﺟﺰا ﻓﻬﻞ ﻫﻮ ﻣﺘﺼﻞ واﺣﺪ ﰲ اﳊﻘﻴﻘﺔ ذات ﻓﻮاﺻﻞ ﻋﻠﻰ ﺧﻼف ﻣﺎ ﻋﻨﺪ اﳊﺲ ؟ ﻓﻬﻞ ، أو ﻏﲑ ﻣﺘﻨﺎﻫﻴﺔ ؟ وﻋﻠﻰ اﻟﺜﺎﱐ ، ﻓﻬﻞ اﻷﻗﺴﺎم اﻟﱵ ﻟﻪ ﺑﺎﻟﻘﻮة ﻣﺘﻨﺎﻫﻴﺔ ، وﻋﻠﻰ اﻷول – اﻷﻗﺴﺎم اﻟﱵ ﻫﻲ ﺑﺎﻟﻔﻌﻞ اﻻ – وﻫﻲ اﻟﱵ اﻧﺘﻬﻰ اﻟﺘﺠﺰي إﻟﻴﻬﺎ ﻻ ﺗﻘﺒﻞ ﻟﻜﻦ ، ﻧﻘﺴﺎم ﺧﺎرﺟﺎ ﺎ ﻻ ﺗﻘﺒﻞ اﻻﻧﻘﺴﺎم ﻻ ﺧﺎرﺟﺎ 5 أو أ ، ﺎ أﺟﺴﺎﻣﺎ ﺻﻐﺎرا ذوات ﺣﺠﻢ 5 ﻟﻜﻮ ، ﺗﻘﺒﻠﻪ وﳘﺎ وﻋﻘﻼ وﻫﻲ ﻣﺘﻨﺎﻫﻴﺔ أو ، وإﳕﺎ ﺗﻘﺒﻞ اﻹﺷﺎرة اﳊﺴﻴﺔ ، ﻟﻌﺪم اﺷﺘﻤﺎﳍﺎ ﻋﻠﻰ ﺣﺠﻢ ، وﻻ وﳘﺎ وﻻ ﻋﻘﻼ ﻏﲑ ﻣﺘﻨﺎﻫﻴﺔ ؟ وﻟﻜﻞ ﻣﻦ اﻟﺸﻘﻮق اﳌﺬﻛﻮرة ﻗﺎﺋﻞ . ﻓﺎﻷﻗﻮال ﲬﺴﺔ . اﻷول : وﻟﻪ أﺟﺰاء ﺑﺎﻟﻘﻮة ، ﻛﻤﺎ ﻫﻮ ﻋﻨﺪ اﳊﺲ ، أن اﳉﺴﻢ ﻣﺘﺼﻞ واﺣﺪ ﲝﺴﺐ اﳊﻘﻴﻘﺔ . وﻧﺴﺐ إﱃ اﻟﺸﻬﺮﺳﺘﺎﱐ ، ﻣﺘﻨﺎﻫﻴﺔ اﻟﺜﺎﱐ : وﻫﻮ ﻣﻨﻘﺴﻢ اﻧﻘﺴﺎﻣﺎت ﻏﲑ ﻣﺘﻨﺎﻫﻴﺔ ، ﻛﻤﺎ ﻫﻮ ﻣﺘﺼﻞ ﺣﺴﺎ – أﻧﻪ ﻣﺘﺼﻞ ﺣﻘﻴﻘﺔ ﱴ – ﲟﻌﲎ ﻻ ﻳﻘﻒ ﺣ، أي إﻧﻪ ﻳﻘﺒﻞ اﻻﻧﻘﺴﺎم اﳋﺎرﺟﻲ ﺑﻘﻄﻊ أو ﺑﺎﺧﺘﻼف ﻋﺮﺿﲔ وﳓﻮﻩ ، ﺣﱴ إذا ﻋﺠﺰ ﻋﻦ ﺗﺼﻮرﻩ ، ﻗﺴﻤﻪ اﻟﻮﻫﻢ ، إذا ﱂ ﻳﻌﻤﻞ اﻵﻻت اﻟﻘﻄﺎﻋﺔ ﰲ ﺗﻘﺴﻴﻤﻪ ﻟﺼﻐﺮﻩ ﻛﺎن اﳉﺰء اﳊﺎﺻﻞ ء ﻛﻠﻤﺎ ﻗﺴﻢ إﱃ أﺟﺰا ﻛﻠﻴﺎ ﺑﺄﻧﻪ – ﺣﻜﻢ اﻟﻌﻘﻞ ، ﻟﺼﻐﺮﻩ اﻟﺒﺎﻟﻎ ﻟﻜﻮﻧﻪ ذا – ﻟﻪ ﻃﺮف ﻏﲑ ﻃﺮف ، ﺣﺠﻢ ﻓﺈن ورود اﻟﻘﺴﻤﺔ ﻻ ﻳﻌﺪم ، ﻳﻘﺒﻞ اﻟﻘﺴﻤﺔ ﻣﻦ ﻏﲑ وﻗﻮف وﻧﺴﺐ إﱃ اﳊﻜ ء ، اﳊﺠﻢ ﻤﺎ . اﻟﺜﺎﻟﺚ : ﺗﻘﺒﻞ اﻟﻘﺴﻤﺔ اﻟﻮﳘﻴﺔ واﻟﻌﻘﻠﻴﺔ ، أﻧﻪ ﳎﻤﻮﻋﺔ أﺟﺰاء ﺻﻐﺎر ﺻﻠﺒﺔ ﻻ ﲣﻠﻮ ﻣﻦ ﺣﺠﻢ . وﻧﺴﺐ إﱃ ذي ﻣﻘﺮاﻃﻴﺲ ، دون اﳋﺎرﺟﻴﺔ ، اﻟﺮاﺑﻊ : وإﳕﺎ ﺗﻘﺒﻞ اﻹﺷﺎرة ، ﻻ ﺧﺎرﺟﺎ وﻻ وﳘﺎ وﻻ ﻋﻘﻼ ، أﻧﻪ ﻣﺆﻟﻒ ﻣﻦ أﺟﺰاء ﻻ ﺗﺘﺠﺰأ ، وﻫﻲ ﻣﺘﻨﺎﻫﻴﺔ ذوات ﻓﻮاﺻﻞ ﰲ اﳉﺴﻢ ، اﳊﺴﻴﺔ ، ﲤﺮ اﻵﻟﺔ اﻟﻘﻄﺎﻋﺔ ﻣﻦ ﻣﻮاﺿﻊ اﻟﻔﺼﻞ وﻧﺴﺐ إﱃ ﲨﻬﻮر اﳌﺘﻜﻠﻤﲔ . اﳋﺎﻣﺲ : – ﺗﺄﻟﻴﻒ اﳉﺴﻢ ﻣﻨﻬﺎ – ﻛﻤﺎ ﰲ اﻟﻘﻮل اﻟﺮاﺑﻊ . ﺎ ﻏﲑ ﻣﺘﻨﺎﻫﻴﺔ 5 إﻻ أ وﻳﺪﻓﻊ اﻟﻘﻮﻟﲔ اﻟﺮاﺑﻊ واﳋﺎﻣﺲ : ، إن ﱂ ﺗﻜﻦ ذوات ﺣﺠﻢ ، أن ﻣﺎ ادﻋﻲ ﻣﻦ اﻷﺟﺰاء اﻟﱵ ﻻ ﺗﺘﺠﺰأ اﻣﺘﻨﻊ أن ﻳﺘﺤﻘﻖ ﻣﻦ اﺟﺘﻤﺎﻋﻬﺎ ﺟﺴﻢ ﻟﺰﻣﻬﺎ ، ﻛﺎﻧﺖ ذوات ﺣﺠﻢ وإن ، ذو ﺣﺠﻢ ﺑﺎﻟﻀﺮورة . وإن ﻓﺮض ﻋﺪم اﻧﻘﺴﺎﻣﻬﺎ اﳋﺎرﺟﻲ ﻟﻨﻬﺎﻳﺔ ﺻﻐﺮﻫﺎ ، اﻻﻧﻘﺴﺎم اﻟﻮﳘﻲ واﻟﻌﻘﻠﻲ ﺑﺎﻟﻀﺮورة
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ﻛﺎن اﳉﺴﻢ اﳌﺘﻜﻮن ﻣﻦ اﺟﺘﻤﺎﻋﻬﺎ ﻏﲑ ﻣﺘﻨﺎﻫﻲ اﳊﺠﻢ ﻛﺎﻧﺖ ﻏﲑ ﻣﺘﻨﺎﻫﻴﺔ ﺎ ﻟﻮ 5 ﻋﻠﻰ أ ﺑﺎﻟﻀﺮورة .ﻣ وﻗﺪ أﻗﻴﻤﺖ ﻋﻠﻰ ﺑﻄﻼن اﳉﺰء اﻟﺬي ﻻ ﻳﺘﺠﺰأ وﺟﻮﻩ ﻦ اﻟﱪاﻫﲔ ﻣﺬﻛﻮرة ﰲ اﳌﻄﻮﻻت . ﻛﻮن اﳉﺴﻢ اﻟﺒﺴﻴﻂ ذا اﺗﺼﺎل واﺣﺪ وﻳﺪﻓﻊ اﻟﻘﻮل اﻟﺜﺎﱐ وﻫﻦ اﻟﻮﺟﻮﻩ اﻟﱵ أﻗﻴﻤﺖ ﻋﻠﻰ وﻗﺪ ﺗﺴﻠﻢ ﻋﻠﻤﺎء اﻟﻄﺒﻴﻌﺔ أﺧﲑا ﺑﻌﺪ ﲡﺮﺑﺎت ، ﻛﻤﺎ ﻫﻮ ﻋﻨﺪ اﳊﺲ ﺟﻮﻫﺮي ﻣﻦ ﻏﲑ ﻓﻮاﺻﻞ ﻻ، ء أﺧﺮى ﻋﻠﻤﻴﺔ ﳑﺘﺪة أن اﻷﺟﺴﺎم ﻣﺆﻟﻔﺔ ﻣﻦ أﺟﺰاء ﺻﻐﺎر ذرﻳﺔ ﻣﺆﻟﻔﺔ ﻣﻦ أﺟﺰا ﲣﻠﻮ ﻣﻦ . وﻟﻴﻜﻦ أﺻﻼ ﻣﻮﺿﻮﻋﺎ ﻟﻨﺎ ، ﻧﻮاة ﻣﺮﻛﺰﻳﺔ ذات ﺟﺮم وﻳﺪﻓﻊ اﻟﻘﻮل اﻷول : ﳉﻤﻌﻪ ﺑﲔ ، أﻧﻪ ﻳﺮد ﻋﻠﻴﻪ ﻣﺎ ﻳﺮد ﻋﻠﻰ اﻟﻘﻮل اﻟﺜﺎﱐ واﻟﺮاﺑﻊ واﳋﺎﻣﺲ ﺎ5 وﺑﲔ اﻧﻘﺴﺎﻣﻪ ﺑﺎﻟﻘﻮة إﱃ أﺟﺰاء ﻣﺘﻨﺎﻫﻴﺔ ﺗﻘﻒ اﻟﻘﺴﻤﺔ دو ، اﻟﻘﻮل ﺑﺎﺗﺼﺎل اﳉﺴﻢ ﺑﺎﻟﻔﻌﻞ ﻋﻠﻰ اﻹﻃﻼق . ﻓﺎﳉﺴﻢ اﻟﺬي ﻫﻮ ﺛﺎﺑﺖ ﻻ ، ﺟﻮﻫﺮ ذو اﺗﺼﺎل ﳝﻜﻦ أن ﻳﻔﺮض ﻓﻴﻪ اﻻﻣﺘﺪادات اﻟﺜﻼﺛﺔ ﻟﻜﻦ ﻣﺼﺪاﻗﻪ اﻷﺟﺰاء اﻷوﻟﻴﺔ اﻟﱵ ﳛﺪث ﻓﻴﻬﺎ اﻻﻣﺘﺪاد اﳉﺮﻣﻲ وإﻟﻴﻬﺎ ﺗﺘﺠﺰأ ، رﻳﺐ ﻓﻴﻪ وﻫﻮ ﻗﻮل ذي ﻣﻘﺮاﻃﻴﺲ ﻣﻊ ، دون ﻏﲑﻫﺎ ﻋﻠﻰ ﻣﺎ ﺗﻘﺪﻣﺖ اﻹﺷﺎرة إﻟﻴﻪ ، اﻷﺟﺴﺎم اﻟﻨﻮﻋﻴﺔ إﺻﻼح ﻣﺎ .
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6.3. BODY There is no doubt that there are various bodies sharing in bodiness as substances extended in three dimensions. Hence body qua body is divisible in the supposed dimensions and is perceived as having a continuous unity by the senses. But is it really a single continuum as it appears to the senses or a collection of particles separated by interstices, contrary to what is perceived by the senses? If it is a continuous unit, are its potential divisions finite or infinite? If it is a collection of discrete particles, are its actual divisions – i.e. the smallest particles which represent a limit to division, not being susceptible to further division externally – capable of further division in the imagination on account of their being small bodies with a certain volume? Or are they incapable of any further division, externally as well as in the imagination, due to not possessing any volume, though they are capable of being pointed at sensibly? Further, in the last case, is their number finite or infinite? Each of these alternatives has had supporters. In all there are five theories. (i) According to one of the views, bodies are in fact continuous units as they appear to the senses and consist of potentially finite parts. This view is ascribed to Shahristani. (ii) According to a second view, bodies are really the continuous units they appear to be to the senses and susceptible to an indefinite number of divisions. When actual division stops due to the smallness of size and the inadequacy of cutting instruments, they can be divided in the imagination, and when imagination fails as a result of extreme smallness, they are susceptible to division by the intellect in accordance with its universal judgement that whenever anything is divided into parts, the resulting parts are divisible as they possess volume and two distinct sides. Thus there is no end to this process, for division does not exhaust volume. This opinion has been ascribed to the philosophers. (iii) According to a third view, a body is a collection of small unbreakable particles that are not devoid of volume. They are susceptible to division in the imagination and the intellect though not in external reality. This theory has been ascribed to Democritus. (iv) A fourth view is that bodies are composed of parts that are indivisible, externally as well as in the imagination and the intellect. They are susceptible to being pointed at sensibly and are finite, separated by interstices through which the cutting instrument passes. This opinion is ascribed to a majority of the theologians (mutakallimûn). (v) According to a fifth view, bodies are composed as described in the fourth theory, with the difference that it holds the particles to be infinite in number. The fourth and the fifth views stand refuted on the ground that if the indivisible particles they hypothesize do not have any volume, their aggregate, of necessity, cannot produce a body possessing volume, and if they possess volume, they are of necessity susceptible to further division by the imagination and the intellect if, supposedly, their external division is not possible due to extreme smallness.
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Further, if the particles were infinite in number, the body formed by their collection would also necessarily have an infinite volume. Other arguments have been advanced against the theory of indivisible particles in elaborate works. As to the second theory, it is unacceptable due to the weakness of reasons advanced to prove that simple bodies’ are substances consisting of a single continuum without interstices, as they appear to be to the senses. In recent times physicists have accepted after extensive experiments that bodies are composed of small atomic parts, which are themselves constituted by other particles and have a nucleus possessing mass at their centre. However, this is a premise derived from disciplines outside philosophy. The first view is also unacceptable as it is prone to the objections that arise against the second, fourth and fifth views, for it relieves in the actual continuity of a body and its potential divisibility into a finite number of parts whereat division ceases absolutely (i.e. externally as well in the imagination and the intellect). Hence the existence of ‘body’ as a continuous substance extended in three dimensions is undoubtedly affirmed, but this conception corresponds only to the fundamental particles possessing extended mass, into which all specific bodies are reducible, as pointed out above. This is same as the view of Democritus with some modification.
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اﻟﻔﺼﻞ اﻟﺮاﺑﻊ ﻓﻲ إﺛﺒﺎت اﻟﻤﺎدة اﻷوﻟﻰ واﻟﺼﻮرة ﺔ اﻟﺠﺴﻤﻴ – إن اﳉﺴﻢ ﻣﻦ ﺣﻴﺚ ﻫﻮ ﺟﺴﻢ وﻧﻌﲏ ﺑﻪ ﻣﺎ ﳛﺪث ﻓﻴﻪ اﻻﻣﺘﺪاد اﳉﺮﻣﻲ أوﻻ وﺑﺎﻟﺬات – “ أﻣﺮ “ ﺑﺎﻟﻔﻌﻞ وﻣﻦ ﺣﻴﺚ ﻣﺎ ﳝﻜﻦ أن ﻳﻠﺤﻖ ﺑﻪ ﺷﺊ ﻣﻦ اﻟﺼﻮر اﻟﻨﻮﻋﻴﺔ وﻟﻮاﺣﻘﻬﺎ أﻣﺮ ، “ “ ﺑﺎﻟﻘﻮة واﻟﻘﻮة ﻣﺘﻘﻮﻣﺔ ، ﻷن اﻟﻔﻌﻞ ﻣﺘﻘﻮم ﺑﺎﻟﻮﺟﺪان ، وﺣﻴﺜﻴﺔ اﻟﻔﻌﻞ ﻏﲑ ﺣﻴﺜﻴﺔ اﻟﻘﻮة ، ﺑﺎﻟﻔﻘﺪان . ﲝﻴﺚ إﻧﻪ ﻟﻴﺲ ﻟﻪ ﻣﻦ اﻟﻔﻌﻠﻴﺔ إﻻ ﻓﻌﻠﻴﺔ أﻧﻪ ، ﻓﻔﻴﻪ ﺟﻮﻫﺮ ﻫﻮ ﻗﻮة اﻟﺼﻮر اﳉﺴﻤﺎﻧﻴﺔ ﻓﺘﺒﲔ أن اﳉﺴﻢ ، واﳉﺴﻤﻴﺔ اﻟﱵ -ﺎ اﻟﻔﻌﻠﻴﺔ ﺻﻮرة ﻣﻘﻮﻣﺔ ﳍﺎ ، وﻫﺬا ﳓﻮ وﺟﻮدﻫﺎ ، ﻗﻮة ﳏﻀﺔ . ﻤﻮع اﳌﺮﻛﺐ ﻣﻨﻬﻤﺎ ﻫﻮ اﳉﺴﻢ R وا ، ﻣﺆﻟﻒ ﻣﻦ ﻣﺎدة وﺻﻮرة ﺟﺴﻤﻴﺔ ﺗﺘﻤﺔ : ﻓﻬﺬﻩ ﻫﻲ اﳌﺎدة اﻟﺸﺎﺋﻌﺔ ﰲ “ : وﺗﺴﻤﻰ ، اﳌﻮﺟﻮدات اﳉﺴﻤﺎﻧﻴﺔ ﲨﻴﻌﺎ “ اﳌﺎدة اﻷوﱃ “و “ اﳍﻴﻮﱃ اﻷوﱃ . ﺔ “ : وﺗﺴﻤﻰ ، ﰒ ﻫﻲ ﻣﻊ اﻟﺼﻮرة اﳉﺴﻤﻴﺔ ﻣﺎدة ﻗﺎﺑﻠﺔ ﻟﻠﺼﻮر اﻟﻨﻮﻋﻴﺔ اﻟﻼﺣﻘﺔ اﳌﺎدة اﻟﺜﺎﻧﻴ ”
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6.4 PRIME MATTER AND BODILY FORM Body qua body – i.e., that which primarily and essentially possesses extended mass – has an actuality, and it has a potentiality n insofar as it can receive specific forms (al-shûwar al-naw’iyyah) and their properties. The mode of actuality is different from the mode of potentiality, for actuality is marked by possession and potentiality by non-possession. Hence there is a substance in body with the potentiality for receiving specific forms, and it is such that it has no actuality except sheer potentiality and that is its mode of existence. The ‘bodiness’ by virtue of which it has actuality is a form that gives subsistence to that potentiality. This shows that ‘body’ is composed of ‘matter’ and ‘bodily form,’ the aggregate of two. This ‘matter’ is present in all bodily existents and is called ‘prime matter’ (al-mâddât al-ûlâ or hayûlâ). Moreover, ‘prime matter’ along with ‘bodily form’ constitutes a ‘matter’ for receiving ‘specific forms,’ and is called ‘second matter’ (al-mâddât al-tsâniyah).
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اﻟﻔﺼﻞ اﻟﺨﺎﻣﺲ ﻓﻲ إﺛﺒﺎت اﻟﺼﻮر اﻟﻨﻮﻋﻴﺔ ج ﲣﺘﻠﻒ اﻷﺟﺴﺎم اﳌﻮﺟﻮدة ﰲ اﳋﺎر وﻫﺬﻩ ، اﺧﺘﻼﻓﺎ ﺑﻴﻨﺎ ﻣﻦ ﺣﻴﺚ اﻷﻓﻌﺎل واﻵﺛﺎر ﻷن ﺷﺄ5ﺎ اﻟﻘﺒﻮل واﻻﻧﻔﻌﺎل دون ، وﻟﻴﺲ ﻫﻮ اﳌﺎدة اﻷوﱃ ، اﻷﻓﻌﺎل ﳍﺎ ﻣﺒﺪأ ﺟﻮﻫﺮي ﻻ ﳏﺎﻟﺔ ﻓﻠﻬﺎ ﻣﺒﺎد ، ﻛﺜﲑة ﳐﺘﻠﻔﺔ ﺎ واﺣﺪة ﻣﺸﱰﻛﺔ وﻫﺬﻩ اﻷﻓﻌﺎل 5 ﻷ ، وﻻ اﳉﺴﻤﻴﺔ اﳌﺸﱰﻛﺔ ، اﻟﻔﻌﻞ ﻛﺎﻧﺖ ﻫﺬﻩ اﳌﺒﺎدئ أﻋﺮاﺿ وﻟﻮ ، ﳐﺘﻠﻔﺔ وﻟﻴﺴﺖ ، ﺎ ﳐﺘﻠﻔﺔ وﺟﺐ اﻧﺘﻬﺎؤﻫﺎ إﱃ ﺟﻮاﻫﺮ ﳐﺘﻠﻔﺔ ، ﻓﻬﻲ ﺟﻮاﻫﺮ ﻣﻨﻮﻋﺔ ﺗﺘﻨﻮع -ﺎ اﻷﺟﺴﺎم ، ﳌﺎ ﲰﻌﺖ ﻣﻦ اﺷﱰاﻛﻬﺎ ﺑﲔ اﳉﻤﻴﻊ ، ﻫﻲ اﳉﺴﻤﻴﺔ ﺔ “ : ﺗﺴﻤﻰ اﻟﺼﻮر اﻟﻨﻮﻋﻴ ” . ﺗﺘﻤﺔ : – أول ﻣﺎ ﺗﺘﻨﻮع اﳉﻮاﻫﺮ اﳌﺎدﻳﺔ – ﺑﻌﺪ اﳉﺴﻤﻴﺔ اﳌﺸﱰﻛﺔ إﳕﺎ ﻫﻮ ﺑﺎﻟﺼﻮر اﻟﻨﻮﻋﻴﺔ اﻟﱵ ﺗﺘﻜﻮن -ﺎ وﻛﺎن اﻟﻘﺪﻣﺎء ﻣﻦ ﻋﻠﻤﺎء ، ﰒ اﻟﻌﻨﺎﺻﺮ ﻣﻮاد ﻟﺼﻮر أﺧﺮى ﺗﻠﺤﻖ -ﺎ ، اﻟﻌﻨﺎﺻﺮ ﺎﻫﺎ اﻟﺒﺎﺣﺜﻮن 5 وﻗﺪ أ ، وأﺧﺬ اﻹﳍﻴﻮن ذﻟﻚ أﺻﻼ ﻣﻮﺿﻮﻋﺎ ، اﻟﻄﺒﻴﻌﺔ ﻳﻌﺪون اﻟﻌﻨﺎﺻﺮ أرﺑﻌﺎ أﺧﲑا إﱃ ﻣﺎ ﻳﻘﺮب ﻣﻦ ﻣﺎﺋﺔ وﺑﻀﻊ ﻋﻨﺼﺮ .
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6.5. SPECIFIC FORMS The bodies existing in the external world differ manifestly from one another in respect of their properties and actions. These actions must inevitably originate in some substance that cannot be prime matter, for its main feature is receptivity and affection, not action. Neither can it be their common bodiness, for it is a feature in which they share while the actions are multiple and various. Hence they must originate in different sources. If these sources were different accidents, they would yield different substances, and, as said, the cause of variance cannot be bodiness, which is common to them all. Hence it is the variety of substances that produces the variety of bodies. These substances are called ‘specific forms.’ The first variety of material substances, following their common bodiness, is the one produced by specific forms, which give rise to the elements. The elements then form ‘matters’ for other forms that unite with them. The ancients considered the elements to be four, and the metaphysicians took it as an extra-philosophical postulate. Recent research has brought the number of elements to more than a hundred.
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اﻟﻔﺼﻞ اﻟﺴﺎدس ﻓﻲ ﺗﻼزم اﻟﻤﺎدة واﻟﺼﻮرة . ﻻ ﺗﻨﻔﻚ إﺣﺪاﳘﺎ ﻋﻦ اﻷﺧﺮى ، اﳌﺎدة اﻷوﱃ واﻟﺼﻮرة ﻣﺘﻼزﻣﺘﺎن ﺎ ﺑﺎﻟﻘﻮة ﻣﻦ ﲨﻴﻊ 5 ﻓﻸن اﳌﺎدة اﻷوﱃ ﺣﻘﻴﻘﺘﻬﺎ أ ، أﻣﺎ أن اﳌﺎدة ﻻ ﺗﺘﻌﺮى ﻋﻦ اﻟﺼﻮرة ، إذ ﻻ ﲢﻘﻖ ﳌﻮﺟﻮد إﻻ ﺑﻔﻌﻠﻴﺔ ، ﻓﻼ ﺗﻮﺟﺪ إﻻ ﻣﺘﻘﻮﻣﺔ ﺑﻔﻌﻠﻴﺔ ﺟﻮﻫﺮﻳﺔ ﻣﺘﺤﺪة -ﺎ ، اﳉﻬﺎت . ﻓﺈذن اﳌﻄﻠﻮب ﺛﺎﺑﺖ ، واﳉﻮﻫﺮ اﻟﻔﻌﻠﻲ اﻟﺬي ﻫﺬا ﺷﺄﻧﻪ ﻫﻮ اﻟﺼﻮرة ﻓﻸن ﺷﻴﺌﺎ ﻣﻦ اﻷﻧﻮاع اﻟﱵ ، وأﻣﺎ أن اﻟﺼﻮرة اﻟﱵ ﻣﻦ ﺷﺄ5ﺎ أن ﺗﻘﺎرن اﳌﺎدة ﻻ ﺗﺘﺠﺮد ﻋﻨﻬﺎ ﻳﻨﺎﳍﺎ اﳊﺲ واﻟﺘﺠﺮﺑﺔ ﻻ وﻫﺬا أﺻﻞ ﻣﻮﺿﻮع ﻣﺄﺧﻮذ ﻣﻦ ، ﳜﻠﻮ ﻣﻦ ﻗﻮة اﻟﺘﻐﲑ وإﻣﻜﺎن اﻻﻧﻔﻌﺎل . ﻓﺈذن اﳌﻄﻠﻮب ﺛﺎﺑﺖ ، وﻣﺎ ﻓﻴﻪ اﻟﻘﻮة واﻹﻣﻜﺎن ﻻ ﳜﻠﻮ ﻣﻦ ﻣﺎدة ، اﻟﻌﻠﻮم اﻟﻄﺒﻴﻌﻴﺔ
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6.6. THE INSEPARABILITY OF MATTER AND FORM Prime matter and form are inseparable from each other. Matter cannot be without form, because prime matter is potentiality in all aspects. It is not found but as subsisting by the means of the actuality of a substance united with it, for an existent is not actualized except with actuality, and the actual substance that possesses this feature is form, Q.E.D. As to the forms that are inherently associated with matter, they cannot be dissociated from it, for none of the kinds accessible to perception and experience is without the potential for change and Affection – a postulate derived from the natural sciences – and that which possesses potentiality and potential for change is not devoid of matter.
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ﻛﻼ ﻣﻦ اﻟﻤﺎدة واﻟﺼﻮرة ﻣﺤﺘﺎﺟﺔ إﻟﻰ اﻷﺧﺮى اﻟﻔﺼﻞ اﻟﺴﺎﺑﻊ ﻓﻲ أن ﺑﻴﺎن ذﻟﻚ أﻣﺎ إﲨﺎﻻ :ﺎد ﻓﺈن اﻟﱰﻛﻴﺐ ﺑﲔ اﳌﺎدة واﻟﺼﻮرة ﺗﺮﻛﻴﺐ ﺣﻘﻴﻘﻲ إﲢ ذو وﺣﺪة ، ي . وﻗﺪ ﺗﻘﺪم أن ﺑﻌﺾ أﺟﺰاء اﳌﺮﻛﺐ اﳊﻘﻴﻘﻲ ﳏﺘﺎج إﱃ ﺑﻌﺾ ، ﺣﻘﻴﻘﻴﺔ وأﻣﺎ ﺗﻔﺼﻴﻼ : ﻓﺈن اﻟﺼﻮرة إﳕﺎ ﻳﺘﻌﲔ ﻧﻮﻋﻬﺎ ، ﻓﺎﻟﺼﻮرة ﳏﺘﺎﺟﺔ إﱃ اﳌﺎدة ﰲ ﺗﻌﻴﻨﻬﺎ . وﻫﻜﺬا ، وﻫﻲ ﺗﻘﺎرن ﺻﻮرة ﺳﺎﺑﻘﺔ ، ﺑﺎﺳﺘﻌﺪاد ﺳﺎﺑﻖ ﲢﻤﻠﻪ اﳌﺎدة وأﻳﻀﺎ :أ ، ﻫﻲ ﳏﺘﺎﺟﺔ إﱃ اﳌﺎدة ﰲ ﺗﺸﺨﺼﻬﺎ ﻣﻦ ﺣﻴﺚ ، ي ﰲ وﺟﻮدﻫﺎ اﳋﺎص -ﺎ ﻣﻼزﻣﺘﻬﺎ ﻟﻠﻌﻮارض اﳌﺴﻤﺎة ﺑ ” “ اﻟﻌﻮارض اﳌﺸﺨﺼﺔ ﻣﻦ اﻟﺸﻜﻞ واﻟﻮﺿﻊ واﻷﻳﻦ وﻣﱴ وﻏﲑﻫﺎ . ، ﻓﻬﻲ ﻣﺘﻮﻗﻔﺔ اﻟﻮﺟﻮد ﺣﺪوﺛﺎ وﺑﻘﺎء ﻋﻠﻰ ﺻﻮرة ﻣﺎ ﻣﻦ اﻟﺼﻮر اﻟﻮاردة ﻋﻠﻴﻬﺎ ، وأﻣﺎ اﳌﺎدة ﳊﺎﺟ ، وﻟﻴﺴﺖ اﻟﺼﻮرة ﻋﻠﺔ ﺗﺎﻣﺔ وﻻ ﻋﻠﺔ ﻓﺎﻋﻠﻴﺔ ﳍﺎ ، ﺗﺘﻘﻮم -ﺎ ﺘﻬﺎ ﰲ ﺗﻌﻴﻨﻬﺎ وﰲ ﺗﺸﺨﺼﻬﺎ ﻓﺎﻟﻔﺎﻋﻞ ﻟﻮﺟﻮد اﳌﺎدة ﺟﻮﻫﺮ ﻣﻔﺎرق ، واﻟﻌﻠﺔ اﻟﻔﺎﻋﻠﻴﺔ إﳕﺎ ﺗﻔﻌﻞ ﺑﻮﺟﻮدﻫﺎ اﻟﻔﻌﻠﻲ ، إﱃ اﳌﺎدة وﻫﻮ ﻳﺴﺘﺤﻔﻈﻬﺎ ﺑﺎﻟﺼﻮرة ﺑﻌﺪ ، ﻓﻬﻮ ﻋﻘﻞ ﳎﺮد أوﺟﺪ اﳌﺎدة ، ﻟﻠﻤﺎدة ﻣﻦ ﲨﻴﻊ اﳉﻬﺎت اﻟﺼﻮرة اﻟﱵ ﻳﻮﺟﺪﻫﺎ ﰲ اﳌﺎدة . وﺷﺮﻳﻜﺔ اﻟ ، ﻓﺎﻟﺼﻮرة ﺟﺰء ﻟﻠﻌﻠﺔ اﻟﺘﺎﻣﺔ . وﺷﺮط ﻟﻔﻌﻠﻴﺔ وﺟﻮدﻫﺎ ، ﻌﻠﺔ ﻟﻠﻤﺎدة وﻗﺪ ﺷﺒﻬﻮا ﺮد اﳌﺎدة ﺑﺼﻮرة ﻣﺎ ﲟﻦ ﻳﺴﺘﺤﻔﻆ ﺳﻘﻒ ﺑﻴﺖ ﺑﺄﻋﻤﺪة ﻣﺘﺒﺪﻟﺔ ﻓﻼ ﻳﺰال ﻳﺰﻳﻞ R اﺳﺘﺒﻘﺎء اﻟﻌﻘﻞ ا ﻋﻤﻮدا وﻳﻨﺼﺐ ﻣﻜﺎﻧﻪ آﺧﺮ . واﻋﱰض ﻋﻠﻴﻪ : ﻓﻜﻮن ﺻﻮرة ﻣﺎ ، ﻛﻮن ﻫﻴﻮﱃ ﻋﺎﱂ اﻟﻌﻨﺎﺻﺮ واﺣﺪة ﺑﺎﻟﻌﺪد ﺑﺄ5ﻢ ذﻫﺒﻮا إﱃ – ﺷ – وﻫﻲ واﺣﺪة ﺑﺎﻟﻌﻤﻮم ﻛﻮن اﻟﻮاﺣﺪ ﺑﺎﻟﻌﻤﻮم ﻋﻠﺔ ﻟﻠﻮاﺣﺪ ﺑﺎﻟﻌﺪد ﺮﻳﻜﺔ اﻟﻌﻠﺔ ﳍﺎ ﻳﻮﺟﺐ . ﻣﻊ أن اﻟﻌﻠﺔ ﳚﺐ أن ﺗﻜﻮن أﻗﻮى ﻣﻦ ﻣﻌﻠﻮﳍﺎ ، وﻫﻮ أﻗﻮى وﺟﻮدا ﻣﻦ اﻟﻮاﺣﺪ ﺑﺎﻟﻌﻤﻮم ﻓﻼ رﻳﺐ أن ﺗﺒﺪل اﻟﺼﻮر ﻳﺴﺘﻮﺟﺐ ﺑﻄﻼن اﻟﺼﻮرة اﻟﺴﺎﺑﻘﺔ ، وﻟﻮ أﻏﻤﻀﻨﺎ ﻋﻦ ذﻟﻚ وإذ ﻓﺮض أن اﻟﺼﻮرة ﺟﺰء اﻟﻌﻠﺔ ، وﲢﻘﻖ اﻟﻼﺣﻘﺔ ﰲ ﳏﻠﻬﺎ ﺎ ﻳﻮﺟﺐ 5 ﻓﺒﻄﻼ ، اﻟﺘﺎﻣﺔ ﻟﻠﻤﺎدة – ﺑﻄﻼن اﻟﻜﻞ – أﻋﲏ اﻟﻌﻠﺔ اﻟﺘﺎﻣﺔ ﻓﺄﺧﺬ ﺻﻮرة ﻣﺎ ﺷﺮﻳﻜﺔ اﻟﻌﻠﺔ ﻟﻮﺟﻮد ، وﻳﺒﻄﻞ ﺑﺬﻟﻚ اﳌﺎدة اﳌﺎدة ﻳﺆدي إﱃ ﻧﻔﻲ اﳌﺎدة . واﳉﻮاب : أﻧﻪ ﺳﻴﺄﰐ ﰲ ﻣﺮﺣﻠﺔ اﻟﻘﻮة واﻟﻔﻌﻞ أن ﺗﺒﺪل اﻟﺼﻮر ﰲ اﳉﻮاﻫﺮ اﳌﺎدﻳﺔ ﻟﻴﺲ ﺑﺎﻟﻜﻮن واﻟﻔﺴﺎد وﺑﻄﻼن ﺻﻮرة وﺣﺪوث ﺑﻞ اﻟﺼﻮر اﳌﺘﺒﺪﻟﺔ ﻣﻮﺟﻮدة ﺑﻮﺟﻮد واﺣﺪ ، أﺧﺮى ﻓﻬﻲ ، وﻛﻞ واﺣﺪ ﻣﻨﻬﺎ ﺣﺪ ﻣﻦ ﺣﺪود ﻫﺬﻩ اﳊﺮﻛﺔ اﳉﻮﻫﺮﻳﺔ ، ﺳﻴﺎل ﻳﺘﺤﺮك اﳉﻮﻫﺮ اﳌﺎدي ﻓﻴﻪ ﻛﺎﻧﺖ وﺣﺪة ﻣﺒﻬﻤﺔ (ة 5 ) ﻣﻮﺟﻮدة ﻣﺘﺼﻠﺔ واﺣﺪة ﺑﺎﳋﺼﻮص وإن ﺗﻨﺎﺳﺐ إ-ﺎم ذات اﳌﺎد
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“ : وﻗﻮﻟﻨﺎ ، اﻟﱵ ﻫﻲ ﻗﻮة ﳏﻀﺔ إن ﺻﻮرة ﻣﺎ واﺣﺪة ﺑﺎﻟﻌﻤﻮم “ ﺷﺮﻳﻜﺔ اﻟﻌﻠﺔ ﻟﻠﻤﺎدة إﳕﺎ ﻫﻮ ﺑﺎﻋﺘﺒﺎر ﻣﺎ ﻳﻄﺮأ ﻋﻠﻴﻬﺎ ﻣﻦ اﻟﻜﺜﺮة ﺑﺎﻻﻧﻘﺴﺎم .
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6.7. MUTUAL NEED BETWEEN MATTER AND FORM To explain briefly, the composition of matter and form is a real composition by the way of union, possessing a real unity, and, as explained earlier,’ there is a mutual need between the parts of a real composite (almurakkab al-haqîqî). To give a more elaborate explanation, form needs matter for its determination, for its species is determined by the prior potential (isti’dâd) carried by matter, which is again associated with its prior form. The same is true of the prior form, and so on and so forth. Also, form needs matter for its individuation, that is, for existing as a particular individual with its accompanying accidents, called ‘individuating accidents’ (al-‘awârid al-musyakhkhishah) such as shape, position, place, time, etc. For coming into existence and for continuing to exist, the existence of matter depends on some form or another from among the forms that it assumes and which it sustains. The form is neither a ‘complete cause’ nor an ‘efficient cause’ of matter, for it Deeds matter for its own determination and individuation. The efficient cause is one that acts with its actual existence. Accordingly, the ‘agent’ responsible for bringing matter into existence an immaterial substance, immaterial in all aspects. Hence it is an immaterial Intellect that creates matter and preserves it through consecutive forms it creates therein. Thus form is part of the complete cause and a participant in the cause of matter, as well as the condition for the actuality of its existence. The sustaining of matter by the immaterial Intellect through some form or another has been likened to keeping a tent erect while changing its poles: whenever a pole is removed, another replaces it. An objection has been raised here. The metaphysicians hold prime matter of the world of elements to be a numerical unity They make form, which is a ‘general unity’ participate in its cause thus making a general unity the cause of a numerical unity, although the latter is stronger in respect of existence than a general unity and the cause must necessarily be stronger than its effect. Moreover, even if the above difficulty is overlooked, there is doubt that the change of forms necessitates the disappearance of a preceding form and the appearance of the succeeding one in its place. However, when form is supposed to be part of matter’s complete cause, the disappearance of the preceding form necessitates the disappearance of the whole, the complete cause, which leads to the disappearance of matter. Hence taking form as a participant in the cause of existence of matter leads to its negation. The answer to this objection is that, as will be explained in the chapter on potentiality and actuality,’ the change of forms in material substances is not by the way of coming into existence and going out of existence and through the disappearance of a certain form and the appearance of another form. Rather, the changing forms exist through one fluid existence in which the material substance moves. Each of the forms is a limit along the course of this substantial movement. Hence the forms make up a continuum that is a ‘particular unity,’ though that unity is ambiguous in proportion to the
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essential ambiguity of matter, which is pure potentiality. As to the statement that form, which is a ‘general unity.’ participates in the cause of matter, that generality is cast upon it due to the multiplicity introduced by division of what is a single continuum.
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اﻟﻔﺼﻞ اﻟﺜﺎﻣﻦ اﻟﻨﻔﺲ واﻟﻌﻘﻞ ﻣﻮﺟﻮدان – أﻣﺎ اﻟﻨﻔﺲ – ﺮد ﻣﻦ اﳌﺎدة ذاﺗﺎ اﳌﺘﻌﻠﻖ -ﺎ ﻓﻌﻼ R وﻫﻲ اﳉﻮﻫﺮ ا ﻓﻠﻤﺎ ﳒﺪ ﰲ اﻟﻨﻔﻮس وﺳﻴﺄﰐ ﰲ ﻣﺮﺣﻠﺔ اﻟﻌﺎﻗﻞ واﳌﻌﻘﻮل أن اﻟﺼﻮر اﻟﻌﻠﻤﻴﺔ ﳎﺮدة ﻣﻦ ، اﻻﻧﺴﺎﻧﻴﺔ ﻣﻦ ﺧﺎﺻﺔ اﻟﻌﻠﻢ وﻟﻮﻻ ﲡﺮد اﻟﻌﺎﱂ ﺑﺘﻨ ، اﳌﺎدة ﻣﻮﺟﻮدة ﻟﻠﻌﺎﱂ ﺣﺎﺿﺮة ﻋﻨﺪﻩ ، ﺰﻫﻪ ﻋﻦ اﻟﻘﻮة وﳏﻮﺿﺘﻪ ﰲ اﻟﻔﻌﻠﻴﺔ وﻫﻲ ﺟﻮﻫﺮ ، ﻓﺎﻟﻨﻔﺲ اﻻﻧﺴﺎﻧﻴﺔ اﻟﻌﺎﻗﻠﺔ ﳎﺮدة ﻣﻦ اﳌﺎدة ، ﱂ ﻳﻜﻦ ﻣﻌﲎ ﳊﻀﻮر ﺷﺊ ﻋﻨﺪﻩ . وﺻﻮرة اﳉﻮﻫﺮ ﺟﻮﻫﺮ ﻋﻠﻰ ﻣﺎ ﺗﻘﺪم ، ﺎ ﺻﻮرة ﻟﻨﻮع ﺟﻮﻫﺮي 5ﻟﻜﻮ
ﻓﻠﻤﺎ ﺳﻴﺄﰐ أن اﻟﻨﻔﺲ ﰲ ﻣﺮﺗﺒﺔ اﻟﻌﻘﻞ اﳍﻴﻮﻻﱐ أﻣﺮ ﺑﺎﻟﻘﻮة ﺑﺎﻟﻨﺴﺒﺔ إﱃ اﻟﺼﻮ ، وأﻣﺎ اﻟﻌﻘﻞ ر وﻻ أي ، ﻓﺎﻟﺬي ﻳﻔﻴﺾ ﻋﻠﻴﻬﺎ اﻟﻔﻌﻠﻴﺔ ﻓﻴﻬﺎ ﳝﺘﻨﻊ أن ﻳﻜﻮن ﻧﻔﺴﻬﺎ وﻫﻲ ﺑﺎﻟﻘﻮة ، اﳌﻌﻘﻮﻟﺔ ﳍﺎ . وﻫﻮ اﻟﻌﻘﻞ ، ﻓﻤﻔﻴﻀﻬﺎ ﺟﻮﻫﺮ ﳎﺮد ﻣﻨﺰﻩ ﻋﻦ اﻟﻘﻮة واﻹﻣﻜﺎن ، أﻣﺮ ﻣﺎدي ﻣﻔﺮوض ﺗﻘﺪم أن ﻣﻔﻴﺾ اﻟﻔﻌﻠﻴﺔ ﻟﻸﻧﻮاع اﳌﺎدﻳﺔ ﲜﻌﻞ اﳌﺎدة واﻟﺼﻮرة واﺳﺘﺤﻔﺎظ اﳌﺎدة ، وأﻳﻀﺎ ﻋﻘﻞ ﳎ ﺖ ، ﺑﺎﻟﺼﻮرة . ﻓﺎﳌﻄﻠﻮب ﺛﺎﺑ ، ﺮد . ﺳﺘﺄﰐ اﻹﺷﺎرة إﱃ ﺑﻌﻀﻬﺎ ، وﻋﻠﻰ وﺟﻮدﳘﺎ ﺑﺮاﻫﲔ ﻛﺜﲑة اﺧﺮ ﺧﺎﲤﺔ : ﻷن ﻣﻦ ﺷﺮط اﻟﺘﻀﺎد ﲢﻘﻖ ﻣﻮﺿﻮع ﻳﻌﺘﻮرﻩ اﻟﻀﺪان ، ﻣﻦ ﺧﻮاص اﳉﻮﻫﺮ أﻧﻪ ﻻ ﺗﻀﺎد ﻓﻴﻪ . وﻻ ﻣﻮﺿﻮع ﻟﻠﺠﻮﻫﺮ ،
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6.8. SOUL AND INTELLECT The soul is a substance essentially devoid of matter but dependent upon it in action. We find in human souls the property of knowledge, and – as will be explained later on in the chapter on the knower and the known’ – the intelligible forms are immaterial, existing for the knower and present for him. If the knower were Dot immaterial by virtue of his being devoid of potentiality and his possession of sheer actuality, there would be no sense in anything being present for him. Hence the intelligent human soul is immaterial. It is a substance because it is the form of a substantial species, the form of substance being a substance, as mentioned above.” As will be explained later on,”” the soul on the plane of the material intellect (al-‘aql al-hayûlânî) is something in potentia in relation to its intelligible forms. That which gives it actuality in their respect cannot be the soul itself while it is in potentia, nor can it be anything material that may be supposed. Hence that which produces intelligible forms in the soul is a immaterial substance free from potentiality, and that is the Intellect. Also that which gives actuality to the material species, by creating matter and form and preserving matter through form, is an immaterial Intellect. There are many other proofs for existence of the soul and the intellect, and later on we will refer to some of them. Conclusion Of the properties of substance is that there is no contrariety (tadhâdd) in it, for the condition for contrariety is the existence of a locus (mawdû’) that alternates between two contraries, and substance has no locus.
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اﻟﻔﺼﻞ اﻟﺘﺎﺳﻊ ﻓﻲ اﻟﻜﻢ واﻧﻘﺴﺎﻣﺎﺗﻪ وﺧﻮاﺻﻪ اﻟﻜﻢ ﻋﺮض ﻳﻘﺒﻞ اﻟﻘﺴﻤﺔ اﻟﻮﳘﻴﺔ ﺑﺎﻟﺬات .ﻞ وﻗﺪ ﻗﺴﻤﻮﻩ ﻗﺴﻤﺔ أوﻟﻴﺔ إﱃ اﳌﺘﺼﻞ واﳌﻨﻔﺼ. واﳌﺘﺼﻞ ﻣﺎ ﳝﻜﻦ أن ﻳﻔﺮض ﻓﻴﻪ أﺟﺰاء ﺑﻴﻨﻬﺎ ﺣﺪ ﻣﺸﱰك واﳊﺪ اﳌﺸﱰك ﻣﺎ إن اﻋﺘﱪ ﺑﺪاﻳﺔ ﻷﺣﺪ اﳉﺰﺋﲔ أﻣﻜﻦ أن ﻳﻌﺘﱪ ﺎﻳﺔ 5 ﺎﻳﺔ ﻷﺣﺪﳘﺎ أﻣﻜﻦ أن ﻳﻌﺘﱪ 5 وإن اﻋﺘﱪ ، ﺑﺪاﻳﺔ ﻟﻶﺧﺮ واﻟﺴﻄﺢ ﺑﲔ ﺟﺰﺋﻲ اﳉﺴﻢ ، واﳋﻂ ﺑﲔ ﺟﺰﺋﻲ اﻟﺴﻄﺢ ، ﻛﺎﻟﻨﻘﻄﺔ ﺑﲔ ﺟﺰﺋﻲ اﳋﻂ ، ﻟﻶﺧﺮ . واﻵن ﺑﲔ ﺟﺰﺋﻲ اﻟﺰﻣﺎن ، اﻟﺘﻌﻠﻴﻤﻲ ﻓﺈ5ﺎ إن ﻗﺴﻤﺖ إﱃ ﺛﻼﺛﺔ واﺛﻨﲔ ﱂ ﻳﻮﺟﺪ ، ﻛﺎﳋﻤﺴﺔ ﻣﺜﻼ ، ﻛﺎن ﲞﻼﻓﻪ واﳌﻨﻔﺼﻞ ﻣﺎ ﻓﻴﻬﺎ ﺣ ﻛﺎن واﺣﺪا ﻣﻦ وإن ، ﻛﺎن واﺣﺪا ﻣﻨﻬﺎ ﻋﺎدت اﳋﻤﺴﺔ أرﺑﻌﺔ وإﻻ ﻓﺈن ، ﺪ ﻣﺸﱰك ﻫﺬا ﺧﻠﻒ ، ج ﻋﺎدت ﺳﺘﺔ ﺧﺎر . – اﻟﺜﺎﱐ – أﻋﲏ اﳌﻨﻔﺼﻞ ﻛﺎن اﻟﻮاﺣﺪ ﻧﻔﺴﻪ وإن ، ﻫﻮ اﻟﻌﺪد اﳊﺎﺻﻞ ﻣﻦ ﺗﻜﺮر اﻟﻮاﺣﺪ ﻛﻞ واﺣﺪة ﻣﻦ ﻣﺮاﺗﺐ اﻟﻌﺪد ﻧﻮﻋﺎ ﻋﻠﻰ وﻗﺪ ﻋﺪوا ، ﻟﻌﺪم ﺻﺪق ﺣﺪ اﻟﻜﻢ ﻋﻠﻴﻪ ، ﻟﻴﺲ ﺑﻌﺪد ص ، ﺣﺪة ﻻﺧﺘﻼف اﳋﻮا . – واﻷول – أﻋﲏ اﳌﺘﺼﻞ ﻳﻨﻘﺴﻢ إﱃ : ﻗﺎر وﻏﲑ ﻗﺎر . “ : واﻟﻘﺎر ﻣﺎ ﻷﺟﺰاﺋﻪ اﳌﻔﺮوﺿﺔ “ اﺟﺘﻤﺎع ﰲ اﻟﻮﺟﻮد ﻛﺎﳋﻂ ﻣﺜﻼ . ﻛﻞ ﺟﺰء ﻣﻨﻪ ﻓﺈن ، وﻫﻮ اﻟﺰﻣﺎن ، وﻏﲑ اﻟﻘﺎر ﲞﻼﻓﻪ ﻣﻔﺮوض ﻻ ﻳﻮﺟﺪ إﻻ وﻗﺪ اﻧﺼﺮم اﻟﺴﺎﺑﻖ ﻋﻠﻴﻪ وﳌﺎ ﻳﻮﺟﺪ اﳉﺰء اﻟﻼﺣﻖ . واﳌﺘﺼﻞ اﻟﻘﺎ ر ﻋﻠﻰ ﺛﻼﺛﺔ أﻗﺴﺎم : وﻫﻮ اﻟﻜﻤﻴﺔ اﻟﺴﺎرﻳﺔ ﰲ اﳉﻬﺎت ، ﺟﺴﻢ ﺗﻌﻠﻴﻤﻲ ﺎﻳﺔ اﳉﺴﻢ اﻟﺘﻌﻠﻴﻤﻲ اﳌﻨﻘﺴﻤﺔ ﰲ 5 وﻫﻮ ، وﺳﻄﺢ ، اﻟﺜﻼث ﻣﻦ اﳉﺴﻢ اﻟﻄﺒﻴﻌﻲ اﳌﻨﻘﺴﻤﺔ ﻓﻴﻬﺎ . ﺎﻳﺔ اﻟﺴﻄﺢ اﳌﻨﻘﺴﻤﺔ ﰲ ﺟﻬﺔ واﺣﺪة 5 وﻫﻮ ، وﺧﻂ ، ﺟﻬﺘﲔ ﻞ – وﻟﻠﻘﺎﺋﻠﲔ ﺑﺎﳋﻼء ﻛﻞ ﻣﻮﺟﻮد ﺷﺎﻏ ﲟﻌﲎ اﻟﻔﻀﺎء اﳋﺎﱄ ﻣﻦ – ﳝﻠﺆﻩ ﺷﻚ ﰲ اﻟﻜﻢ . ﻟﻜﻦ اﻟﺸﺄن ﰲ إﺛﺒﺎت اﳋﻼء -ﺬا اﳌﻌﲎ ، اﳌﺘﺼﻞ اﻟﻘﺎر ﺗﺘﻤﺔ : ﳜﺘﺺ اﻟﻜﻢ ﲞﻮاص : اﻷوﱃ : ﻟﻌﺪم اﺷﱰاﻛﻬﺎ ﰲ ، أﻧﻪ ﻻ ﺗﻀﺎد ﺑﲔ ﺷﺊ ﻣﻦ أﻧﻮاﻋﻪ . واﻻﺷﱰاك ﰲ اﳌﻮﺿﻮع ﻣﻦ ﺷﺮط اﻟﺘﻀﺎد ، اﳌﻮﺿﻮع اﻟﺜﺎﻧﻴﺔ :م ﻛﻤﺎ ﺗﻘﺪ ﻗﺒﻮل اﻟﻘﺴﻤﺔ اﻟﻮﳘﻴﺔ ﺑﺎﻟﻔﻌﻞ . اﻟﺜﺎ ﻟﺜﺔ : – وﺟﻮد ﻣﺎ ﻳﻌﺪﻩ – أي ﻳﻔﻨﻴﻪ ﺑﺈﺳﻘﺎﻃﻪ ﻣﻨﻪ ﻣﺮة ﺑﻌﺪ ﻣﺮة – ﻓﺎﻟﻜﻢ اﳌﻨﻔﺼﻞ ، ، – وﻫﻮ اﻟﻌﺪد ﻣﻊ أن ﺑﻌﺾ أﻧﻮاﻋﻪ ﻋﺎد ﻟﺒﻌ ﺾ ، وﻫﻮ ﻋﺎد ﳉﻤﻴﻊ أﻧﻮاﻋﻪ ، ﻣﺒﺪؤﻩ اﻟﻮاﺣﺪ ﻓﺎﳉﺰء ﻣﻨﻪ ﻳﻌﺪ اﻟﻜﻞ ، ء واﻟﻜﻢ اﳌﺘﺼﻞ ﻣﻨﻘﺴﻢ ذو أﺟﺰا ، واﻟﺜﻼﺛﺔ ﻟﻠﺘﺴﻌﺔ ، ﻛﺎﻻﺛﻨﲔ ﻟﻸرﺑﻌﺔ اﻟﺮاﺑﻌﺔ : اﳌﺴﺎو ﻪ . وﺗﻌﺮﺿﺎن ﻏﲑﻩ ﺑﻌﺮﺿ ، وﳘﺎ ﺧﺎﺻﺘﺎن ﻟﻠﻜﻢ ، اة واﻟﻼ ﻣﺴﺎواة
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اﳋﺎﻣﺴﺔ :ﺎ ﻛﺴﺎﺑﻘﺘﻴﻬﻤ . وﳘﺎ ، ﺎﻳﺔ 5 اﻟﻨﻬﺎﻳﺔ واﻟﻼ
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6.9. QUANTITY, ITS KINDS AND PROPERTIES Quantity is an accident that is essentially susceptible to division in the imagination.’ The metaphysicians divide it in a first classification into continuous and discrete. A continuous quantity is that which can be supposed to have parts with a common boundary. The common boundary is that which, if considered the extremity of one of the two parts, can be considered to be the extremity of the other part as well – such as a point between two parts of a line, a line between two parts of a plane, a plane between two parts of a threedimensional geometrical form and an instant between two parts of time. A discrete quantity is the contrary of a continuous quantity, and is represented by integers, such as 5, which if divided into 3 and 2 does not have a common boundary. Otherwise, if the common boundary be a unit from among them, the rest would be four, while if it be a unit from outside, the whole would be 6. But both cases would contradict our original supposition. The discrete quantity is a number obtained through the repetition of ‘one,’ although ‘one’ itself is not a number because the definition of, quantity (as something essentially susceptible to imaginary division) does not apply to it. The metaphysicians have counted every one of the numbers as a separate species due to their different characteristics. The continuous quantity is divided into ‘static’ (qârr) and ‘non-static’ (ghayr qârr). A static quantity is one all of whose supposed parts coexist, e.g. a line. A ‘non-static’ quantity is its contrary and is represented by time, for each of its supposed parts comes into being when the preceding part has elapsed and its subsequent part has not yet come into being. The static continua are of three kinds: three-dimensional geometrical form overlapping a natural body divisible in the three dimensions; plane, which is the extremity of a three-dimensional geometrical body divided in two directions; line, which is the extremity of a plane divided in one direction. Those who believe in the existence of vacuum, in the sense of a space devoid of any existent that may occupy it, question the existence of static continuous quantities. But it is difficult to establish the existence of vacuum in this sense. Quantity has certain properties. (i) There is no contrariety (tadhâdd) between any of its kinds, for they do not pertain to the same object (mawdhû’), and a condition of : contrariety is that there should be a common object. (ii) It accepts actual imaginary division, as mentioned earlier. (iii) It has a unit of measurement, i.e. something that exhausts its on repetition. The source of a discrete quantity is the ‘unit,’ which measures all kinds of it, though some of them measure some others, e.g. ‘two’ is a measure for ‘four’ and ‘three’ for ‘nine.’ As for a continuous quantity, it is divisible into parts and a part of it serves is die measuring unit for the whole. (iv) Equality and non-equality are characteristics of quantity, which also apply to anything marked by quantity.
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(v) The same is true of finiteness and infiniteness.
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اﻟﻔﺼﻞ اﻟﻌﺎﺷﺮ ﻓﻲ اﻟﻜﻴﻒ “ وﻫﻮ .” ﻋﺮض ﻻ ﻳﻘﺒﻞ اﻟﻘﺴﻤﺔ وﻻ اﻟﻨﺴﺒﺔ ﻟﺬاﺗﻪ وﻗﺪ ﻗﺴﻤﻮﻩ ﺑﺎﻟﻘﺴﻤﺔ اﻷوﻟﻴﺔ إﱃ أر ﺑﻌﺔ أﻗﺴﺎم : أﺣﺪﻫﺎ :ء ﻛﺎﻟﻌﻠﻢ واﻹرادة واﳉﱭ واﻟﺸﺠﺎﻋﺔ واﻟﻴﺄس واﻟﺮﺟﺎ . ، اﻟﻜﻴﻔﻴﺎت اﻟﻨﻔﺴﺎﻧﻴﺔ وﺛﺎﻧﻴﻬﺎ : ﻛﺎﻻﺳﺘﻘﺎﻣﺔ واﻻﳓﻨﺎء واﻟﺸﻜﻞ ﳑﺎ ﳜﺘﺺ ﺑﺎﻟﻜﻢ ، اﻟﻜﻴﻔﻴﺎت اﳌﺨﺘﺼﺔ ﺑﺎﻟﻜﻤﻴﺎت . وﻛﺎﻟﺰوﺟﻴﺔ واﻟﻔﺮدﻳﺔ ﰲ اﻷﻋﺪاد ﳑﺎ ﳜﺘﺺ ﺑﺎﻟﻜﻢ اﳌﻨﻔﺼﻞ ، اﳌﺘﺼﻞ وﺛﺎﻟﺜﻬﺎ :اﻻ اﻟﻜﻴﻔﻴﺎت “ : وﺗﺴﻤﻰ أﻳﻀﺎ ، ﺳﺘﻌﺪادﻳﺔ “ اﻟﻘﻮة واﻟﻼ ﻗﻮة ﻛﺎﻻﺳﺘﻌﺪاد ﻛﺎﻟﺼﻼﺑﺔ واﻻﺳﺘﻌﺪاد اﻟﺸﺪﻳﺪ ﳓﻮ اﻟﻼ اﻧﻔﻌﺎل ، ﻛﺎﻟﻠﲔ اﻟﺸﺪﻳﺪ ﳓﻮ اﻻﻧﻔﻌﺎل . وﻳﻨﺒﻐﻲ أن ﻳﻌﺪ ﻣﻨﻬﺎ ﻣﻄﻠﻖ اﻻﺳﺘﻌﺪاد اﻟﻘﺎﺋﻢ ﺑﺎﳌﺎدة . وﻧﺴﺒﺔ اﻻﺳﺘﻌﺪاد إﱃ اﻟﻘﻮة اﳉﻮﻫﺮﻳﺔ اﻟﱵ ﻫﻲ اﳌﺎدة ﻧﺴﺒﺔ اﳉﺴﻢ اﻟﺘﻌﻠﻴﻤﻲ اﻟﺬي ﻫﻮ ﻓﻌﻠﻴﺔ اﻻﻣﺘﺪاد ﰲ اﳉﻬﺎت اﻟﺜﻼث إﱃ اﳉﺴﻢ اﻟﻄﺒﻴﻌﻲ اﻟﺬي ﻓﻴﻪ إﻣﻜﺎﻧﻪ . وراﺑﻌﻬﺎ : ﻛﺎﻧﺖ ﺳﺮﻳﻌﺔ اﻟﺰوال وﻫﻲ إن ، اﻟﻜﻴﻔﻴﺎت اﶈﺴﻮﺳﺔ ﺑﺎﳊﻮاس اﳋﻤﺲ اﻟﻈﺎﻫﺮة “ : ﲰﻴﺖ ، ﻛﺤﻤﺮة اﳋﺠﻞ وﺻﻔﺮة اﻟﻮﺟﻞ “ اﻧﻔﻌﺎﻻت ﻛﺼﻔﺮة ، ﻛﺎﻧﺖ راﺳﺨﺔ وإن ، ﻴ “ : ﲰﻴﺖ ، اﻟﺬﻫﺐ وﺣﻼوة اﻟﻌﺴﻞ اﻧﻔﻌﺎﻟ ت ﺎ ” . ج ﻋﻠﻰ ﻣﺎ ﻛﻮن اﻟﻜﻴﻔﻴﺎت اﶈﺴﻮﺳﺔ ﻣﻮﺟﻮدة ﰲ اﳋﺎر وﻟﻌﻠﻤﺎء اﻟﻄﺒﻴﻌﺔ اﻟﻴﻮم ﺗﺸﻜﻴﻚ ﰲ ﻛﺘﺒﻬﻢ ح ﰲ . ﻣﺸﺮو ، ﻫﻲ ﻋﻠﻴﻪ ﰲ اﳊﺲ
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6.10. QUALITY Quality (kayfiyyah) is an accident essentially unsusceptible to division or relation. The metaphysicians divide it in a primary classification into four kinds. (i) The psychic qualities (al-kayfiyyât al-nafsâniyyah), e.g. knowledge, will, cowardice, courage, hope and despair. (ii) The qualities associated with quantities (al-kayfiyyât almukhtashshah bil-kammiyyât), e.g. straightness, curvature, figure shape) and whatever is associated with continuous quantities, as well as qualities associated with numbers and discrete quantities, such as evenness and oddness. (iii) The ‘qualities of potency’ (al-kayfiyyât al-isti’dâdiyyah), also referred to as ‘potency’ (quwwah) and impotency (lâ quwwah), such as the receptivity associated with plasticity and the absence of it associated with rigidity. In fact one may include among these absolutely all the potencies that are sustained by matter. The relation of this potency to the substantial potentiality represented by prime matter is similar to the relation between a three-dimensional geometrical body, as the actuality of extension in three dimensions, to a physical mass possessing the potential for it. ‘ (iv) The sensible qualities (al-kayfiyyât al-mahsûsah), which are perceived through the five senses. If transitory – as in the case a blush arising from bashfulness, or a paleness resulting from fear – they are called ‘affections’ (infi’âlât). But if they are stable, such as the yellowness of gold and the sweetness of honey, the’ are called ‘dispositions’ (infi’âliyyât). Nowadays natural scientists have cast doubts on the belief heir earlier that the sensible qualities exist externally in the manner they appear to exist to the senses. The related details can be found in their books.
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اﻟﻔﺼﻞ اﻟﺤﺎدي ﻋﺸﺮ ﻓﻲ اﻟﻤﻘﻮﻻت اﻟﻨﺴﺒﻴﺔ وﻫﻲ :ل . واﻻﻧﻔﻌﺎ ، واﻟﻔﻌﻞ ، واﻹﺿﺎﻓﺔ ، واﳉﺪة ، واﻟﻮﺿﻊ ، وﻣﱴ ، اﻷﻳﻦ أﻣﺎ اﻷﻳﻦ :إﱃ ﻓﻬﻮ ﻫﻴﺌﺔ ﺣﺎﺻﻠﺔ ﻣﻦ ﻧﺴﺒﺔ اﻟﺸﺊ ن اﳌﻜﺎ وأﻣﺎ ﻣﱴ : ﻛﻮﻧﻪ ﰲ وﻛﻮﻧﻪ ﻓﻴﻪ أﻋﻢ ﻣﻦ ، ﻓﻬﻮ ﻫﻴﺌﺔ ﺣﺎﺻﻠﺔ ﻣﻦ ﻧﺴﺒﺔ اﻟﺸﺊ إﱃ اﻟﺰﻣﺎن ﻣﻦ ، ﻛﺎﳌﻮﺟﻮدات اﻵﻧﻴﺔ اﻟﻮﺟﻮد ، وﻫﻮ اﻵن ، أو ﰲ ﻃﺮﻓﻪ ، ﻛﺎﳊﺮﻛﺎت ، ﻧﻔﺲ اﻟﺰﻣﺎن ﻛﺎﳊﺮﻛﺔ ، ﻛﻮﻧﻪ ﻋﻠﻰ وﺟﻪ اﻻﻧﻄﺒﺎق وأﻋﻢ أﻳﻀﺎ ﻣﻦ ، اﻻﺗﺼﺎل واﻻﻧﻔﺼﺎل واﳌﻤﺎﺳﺔ وﳓﻮﻫﺎ أو ﺔ ، اﻟﻘﻄﻌﻴﺔ ﻛﺎﳊﺮﻛﺔ اﻟﺘﻮﺳﻄﻴ . ، ﻻ ﻋﻠﻰ وﺟﻬﻪ وأﻣﺎ اﻟﻮﺿﻊ : ﻤﻮع إﱃ R وا ، ﻓﻬﻮ ﻫﻴﺌﺔ ﺣﺎﺻﻠﺔ ﻣﻦ ﻧﺴﺒﺔ أﺟﺰاء اﻟﺸﺊ ﺑﻌﻀﻬﺎ إﱃ ﺑﻌﺾ ، ﻛﺎﻟﻘﻴﺎم اﻟﺬي ﻫﻮ ﻫﻴﺌﺔ ﺣﺎﺻﻠﺔ ﻟﻺﻧﺴﺎن ﻣﻦ ﻧﺴﺒﺔ ﺧﺎﺻﺔ ﺑﲔ أﻋﻀﺎﺋﻪ ﻧﻔﺴﻬﺎ ، ج اﳋﺎر ﻛﻮن رأﺳﻪ إﱃ ﻓﻮق وﻗﺪﻣﻴﻪ إﱃ ﲢﺖ ﻣﻦ، ج وﺑﻴﻨﻬﺎ وﺑﲔ اﳋﺎر . – وأﻣﺎ اﳉﺪة “ : وﻳﻘﺎل ﳍﺎ : – “ اﳌﻠﻚ ، ﻓﻬﻲ ﻫﻴﺌﺔ ﺣﺎﺻﻠﺔ ﻣﻦ إﺣﺎﻃﺔ ﺷﺊ ﺑﺸﺊ أو ، ﻛﺎﻟﺘﺠﻠﺒﺐ ، ﻛﺎﻧﺖ اﻹﺣﺎﻃﺔ إﺣﺎﻃﺔ ﺗﺎﻣﺔ ﺳﻮاء ، ﲝﻴﺚ ﻳﻨﺘﻘﻞ اﶈﻴﻂ ﺑﺎﻧﺘﻘﺎل اﶈﺎط ﻛﺎﻟﺘﻘﻤﺺ واﻟﺘﻨﻌﻞ . ، إﺣﺎﻃﺔ ﻧﺎﻗﺼﺔ وأﻣﺎ اﻹﺿﺎﻓﺔ : ﻓﺈن ﳎﺮد اﻟﻨﺴﺒﺔ ﻻ ، ﻓﻬﻲ ﻫﻴﺌﺔ ﺣﺎﺻﻠﺔ ﻣﻦ ﺗﻜﺮر اﻟﻨﺴﺒﺔ ﺑﲔ ﺷﻴﺌﲔ ﻳﻮﺟﺐ إﺿﺎ وإﳕﺎ ﺗﻔﻴﺪﻫﺎ ﻧﺴﺒﺔ اﻟﺸﺊ اﳌﻠﺤﻮظ ﻣﻦ ﺣﻴﺚ إﻧﻪ ﻣﻨﺘﺴﺐ إﱃ ﺷﺊ ﻫﻮ ، ﻓﺔ ﻣﻘﻮﻟﻴﺔ ﻛﺎﻷب اﳌﻨﺴﻮب – ، ﻣﻨﺘﺴﺐ إﻟﻴﻪ ﳍﺬا اﳌﻨﺘﺴﺐ – ﻣﻦ ﺣﻴﺚ إﻧﻪ أب ﳍﺬا اﻻﺑﻦ إﻟﻴﻪ ﻣﻦ ﺣﻴﺚ إﻧﻪ اﺑﻦ ﻟﻪ . ﻛﺎﻷﺑﻮة وﳐﺘﻠﻔﺔ اﻷﻃﺮاف ، ﻛﺎﻻﺧﻮة واﻻﺧﻮة وﺗﻨﻘﺴﻢ اﻹﺿﺎﻓﺔ إﱃ ﻣﺘﺸﺎ-ﺔ اﻷﻃﺮاف
واﻟﻔﻮ ﺔ ، واﻟﺒﻨﻮة ﻗﻴﺔ واﻟﺘﺤﺘﻴ . وﻣﻦ ﺧﻮاص اﻹﺿﺎﻓﺔ : ﻻ ﳜﺘﻠﻔﺎن ، وﻓﻌﻼ وﻗﻮة ، أن اﳌﻀﺎﻓﲔ ﻣﺘﻜﺎﻓﺌﺎن وﺟﻮدا وﻋﺪﻣﺎ . واﻟﻔﻌﻞ واﻟﻘﻮة ، ﻣﻦ ﺣﻴﺚ اﻟﻮﺟﻮد واﻟﻌﺪم وﻳﺴﻤﻰ ، ﻛﺎﻷﺑﻮة واﻟﺒﻨﻮة “ : واﻋﻠﻢ أن اﳌﻀﺎف ﻗﺪ ﻳﻄﻠﻖ ﻋﻠﻰ ﻧﻔﺲ اﻹﺿﺎﻓﺔ اﳌﻀﺎف “ اﳊﻘﻴﻘﻲ و، ﻛﺎﻷب واﻹﺑﻦ وﻗﺪ ﻳﻄﻠﻖ ﻋﻠﻰ ﻣﻌﺮوﺿﻬﺎ ، ي “ : ﻳﺴﻤﻰ اﳌﻀﺎف اﳌﺸﻬﻮر ” . وأﻣﺎ اﻟﻔﻌﻞ : ﻛﺎﳍﻴﺌﺔ اﳊﺎﺻﻠﺔ ﻣﻦ ﺗﺴﺨﲔ ، ﻓﻬﻮ اﳍﻴﺌﺔ اﳊﺎﺻﻠﺔ ﻣﻦ ﺗﺄﺛﲑ اﳌﺆﺛﺮ ﻣﺎ دام ﻳﺆﺛﺮ اﳌﺴﺨﻦ ﻣﺎ دام ﻳﺴﺨﻦ . وأﻣﺎ اﻻﻧﻔﻌﺎل : ﻛﺎﳍﻴﺌﺔ اﳊﺎﺻﻠﺔ ﻣﻦ ، ﻓﻬﻮ اﳍﻴﺌﺔ اﳊﺎﺻﻠﺔ ﻣﻦ ﺗﺄﺛﺮ اﳌﺘﺄﺛﺮ ﻣﺎ دام ﻳﺘﺄﺛﺮ ﺗﺴﺨﻦ اﳌﺘﺴﺨﻦ ﻣﺎ دام ﻳﺘﺴﺨﻦ .ﺎ واﻋﺘﺒ ﻞ ج اﻟﻔﻌ ج ﰲ ﺗﻌﺮﻳﻒ اﻟﻔﻌﻞ واﻻﻧﻔﻌﺎل ﻻﺧﺮا ر اﻟﺘﺪر
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ﻛﻔﻌﻞ اﻟﻮاﺟﺐ ) ، واﻻﻧﻔﻌﺎل إﻻ ﺑﺪاﻋﻴﲔ ﺗﻌﺎﱃ ( ﺮد ﻣﻦ اﻟﻌﺪم إﱃ R ج اﻟﻌﻘﻞ ا ﺑﺎﺧﺮا . واﻧﻔﻌﺎل اﻟﻌﻘﻞ ﲞﺮوﺟﻪ ﻣﻦ اﻟﻌﺪم إﱃ اﻟﻮﺟﻮد ﲟﺠﺮد إﻣﻜﺎﻧﻪ اﻟﺬاﰐ ، اﻟﻮﺟﻮد
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6.11. THE RELATIVE CATEGORIES These are: ‘place,’ ‘time,’ ‘position,’ ‘possession,’ ‘relation,’ ‘action’ and ‘affection.’ ‘Place’ is a mode that arises from a thing’s relation to place. ‘Time’ is a mode that arises from a thing’s relation to time and its being in it, both when it is in a duration of time, as is the case with all motions, and when it is instantaneous, as in the case of such instantaneous events as reaching, separating, touching and the like. Further, it includes both its being by way of correspondence, as in the case of ‘traversing motion’ (alharakât al-qath’iyyah) and otherwise, as in the case of ‘mediating motion’ (al-harakât al-tawassutiyyah)’ ‘Position’ is a mode of being which arises from the relation of a thing’s parts to each other and the relation of the aggregate to its external surroundings, e.g. ‘standing,’ which is a mode that arises for a man due to the particular relation it brings about between his bodily members themselves and between them and the external surroundings, due to his head being above and his feet being below. ‘Possession’ (jidah, also called mulk) is a mode that arises due to a thing’s being surrounded by something else, so that the thing that surrounds it moves along with it, whether the envelopment is complete, as in the case of a woman wearing chariot, or incomplete, as with someone wearing a shirt or shoe. Categorical relation’ (idhâfah) is a mode of being that arises from k reciprocity of relation (nisbah) between two things, for a mere don is not necessarily categorical. It means that the referent is related to the relatum, which in turn is related to the referent; e.g. a father’s relation to his son. Relations are either symmetrical (e.g. the relation between two brothers) or asymmetrical (e.g. the relation between a father and a, and the relation between something higher and something lower). A property of the categorical relation is that there is a parity between the referent and the relatum (together referred to as mudhâfayn) in terms of existence and non-existence, actuality and potentiality, and they do not differ in respect of existence and a- existence, actuality and potentiality. It should be known that the term mudhâf also applied to the relation itself, e.g. that of fatherhood and sonhood, whereat it is called al-mudhâf alhaqîqî. The term is applied as well to the referent id relatum – father and son, in the example – whereat it is called al-mudhâf al-masyhûri. ‘Action’ is a mode that arises in something affecting something se as long as it continues to affect the latter, like the act of heating by a heater, as long as it continues to heat. ‘Affection’ is a mode that arises from being affected, as long as le thing affected continuous to be affected, such as the heating f something as long as it continues to be heated. The ‘gradualneess” (tadrîj, i.e. a process extended in time) which is subsumed in le definitions of ‘action’ and ‘affection’ is for the sake of excluding ‘creative action’ and ‘creative affection’ – such as the action of the exalted Necessary Being in bringing into existence the immaterial Intellect from non-existence, and the
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‘affection’ of the Intellect in emerging from non-existence into existence solely by virtue of its essential contingency.
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اﻟﻤﺮﺣﻠﺔ اﻟﺴﺎﺑﻌﺔ ﻓﻲ اﻟﻌﻠﺔ و اﻟﻤﻌﻠﻮل و ﻓﻴﻬﺎ أﺣﺪ ﻋﺸﺮ ﻓﺼﻼ CHAPTER SEVEN: The Cause and the Effect 11 Units
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اﻟﻔﺼﻞ اﻷول ﻓﻲ إﺛﺒﺎت اﻟﻌﻠﻴﺔ و اﻟﻤﻌﻠﻮﻟﻴﺔ و أﻧﻬﻤﺎ ﻓﻲ اﻟﻮﺟﻮد ﺎ ﰲ رﺟﺤﺎن 5 ﺎ ﳑﻜﻨﺔ ﺗﺴﺘﻮي ﻧﺴﺒﺘﻬﺎ إﱃ اﻟﻮﺟﻮد و اﻟﻌﺪم و أ T ﻗﺪ ﺗﻘﺪم أن اﳌﺎﻫﻴﺔ ﰲ ذا أﺣﺪ اﳉﺎﻧﺒﲔ ﳏﺘﺎﺟﺔ إﱃ ﻏﲑﻫﺎ و ﻋﺮﻓﺖ أن اﻟﻘﻮل ﲝﺎﺟﺘﻬﺎ ﰲ رﺟﺤﺎن ﻋﺪﻣﻬﺎ إﱃ ﻏﲑﻫﺎ ﻧﻮع
ﲡﻮز و إﳕﺎ اﳊﺎﺟﺔ ﰲ اﻟﻮ ﺎ ﺟﻮد ﻓﻠﻮﺟﻮدﻫﺎ ﺗﻮﻗﻒ ﻋﻠﻰ ﻏﲑﻫ. و ﻫﺬا اﻟﺘﻮﻗﻒ ﻻ ﳏﺎﻟﺔ ﻋﻠﻰ وﺟﻮد اﻟﻐﲑ ﻓﺈن اﳌﻌﺪوم ﻣﻦ ﺣﻴﺚ ﻫﻮ ﻣﻌﺪوم ﻻ ﺷﻴﺌﻴﺔ ﻟﻪ ﻓﻬﺬا اﳌﻮﺟﻮد اﳌﺘﻮﻗﻒ ﻋﻠﻴﻪ ﰲ اﳉﻤﻠﺔ ﻫﻮ اﻟﺬي ﻧﺴﻤﻴﻪ ﻋﻠﺔ و اﳌﺎﻫﻴﺔ اﳌﺘﻮﻗﻔﺔ ﻋﻠﻴﻪ ﰲ وﺟﻮدﻫﺎ ﻣﻌﻠﻮﻟﺘﻬﺎ. ﻌﻮل ﻟﻠﻌﻠﺔ و اﻷﺛﺮ اﻟﺬي ﺗﻀﻌﻪ ﰲ اﳌﻌﻠﻮل إﻣﺎ R ﰒ إن ا أن ﻳﻜﻮن ﻫﻮ وﺟﻮدﻩ أو ﻣﺎﻫﻴﺘﻪ أو ﺎ اﻋﺘﺒﺎرﻳﺔ و 5 ﻌﻮل ﻫﻮ اﳌﺎﻫﻴﺔ ﳌﺎ ﺗﻘﺪم أ R ﺻﲑورة ﻣﺎﻫﻴﺘﻪ ﻣﻮﺟﻮدة ﻟﻜﻦ ﻳﺴﺘﺤﻴﻞ أن ﻳﻜﻮن ا اﻟﺬي ﻟﻠﻤﻌﻠﻮل ﻣﻦ ﻋﻠﺘﻪ أﻣﺮ أﺻﻴﻞ ﻋﻠﻰ أن اﻟﺬي ﺗﺴﺘﻘﺮ ﻓﻴﻪ ﺣﺎﺟﺔ اﳌﺎﻫﻴﺔ اﳌﻌﻠﻮﻟﺔ و ﻳﺮﺗﺒﻂ .ﺎT ﺑﺎﻟﻌﻠﺔ ﻫﻮ وﺟﻮدﻫﺎ ﻻ ذا
ﻌﻮل ﻫﻮ اﻟﺼﲑ R و ﻳﺴﺘﺤﻴﻞ أن ﻳﻜﻮن ا ﺎ ﻣﻌﲎ ﻧﺴﱯ ﻗﺎﺋﻢ ﺑﻄﺮﻓﻴﻪ و ﻣﻦ اﶈﺎل أن 5 ورة ﻷ ﻌﻮل ﻣﻦ اﳌﻌﻠﻮل و اﻷﺛﺮ اﻟﺬي R ﻳﻘﻮم أﻣﺮ أﺻﻴﻞ ﺧﺎرﺟﻲ ﺑﻄﺮﻓﲔ اﻋﺘﺒﺎرﻳﲔ ﻏﲑ أﺻﻴﻠﲔ ﻓﺎ ﺗﻔﻴﺪﻩ اﻟﻌﻠﺔ ﻫﻮ وﺟﻮدﻩ ﻻ ﻣﺎﻫﻴﺘﻪ و ﻻ ﺻﲑورة ﻣﺎﻫﻴﺘﻪ ﻣﻮﺟﻮدة و ﻫﻮ اﳌﻄﻠﻮب.
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7.1. CAUSALITY INHERES IN EXISTENCE It was mentioned earlier that quiddity is contingent in its essence, i.e. indifferent to existence and non-existence, and that it needs something else in order to incline it towards one of these two sides. It was noted earlier that there is a kind of figurative usage involved in speaking of quiddity as needing something other than itself in its non-existence, for need resides in existence. Hence it is the existence of quiddity that depends on something other than itself. That dependence also inevitably relates to the existence of the other thing, for a non-existent as such has no entity (syay’iyyah, thingness). The existent on which the existence of quiddity depends is called the ‘cause’ (‘illah), and the quiddity whose existence depends on it is called the ‘effect’ (ma’lûl, lit. caused). Furthermore, that which the cause brings about and the result it leaves on the effect is either (i) the existence of the effect, or (ii) its quiddity, or (iii) its quiddity’s becoming existent. But it is impossible that what is caused be the quiddity, for, as mentioned earlier, it is derivative (i’tibârî), whereas what is caused by the cause is something fundamental, because that in which the need of the effect-quiddity resides and which is related to the cause is the existence of the quiddity, not it essence (dzât, that is because quiddity in itself is what it is without being related to anything beyond itself) Also it is impossible that what is caused by the cause be the quiddity’s becoming (shayrûrah) existent, for becoming is a relative concept that depends on its two sides and it is impossible that something fundamental with an external reality should depend on two sides that are derivative (i’tibârî) and non-fundamental (ghayr ashîl). Hence what the cause brings about in respect to the effect and the outcome produced by the cause in it is the existence of the effect, neither its quiddity nor its quiddity’s becoming existent.
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اﻟﻔﺼﻞ اﻟﺜﺎﻧﻲ ﻓﻲ اﻧﻘﺴﺎﻣﺎت اﻟﻌﻠﺔ ﺗﻨﻘﺴﻢ اﻟﻌﻠﺔ إﱃ ﺗﺎﻣﺔ و ﻧﺎﻗﺼﺔ ﻓﺈ5ﺎ إﻣﺎ أن ﺗﺸﺘﻤﻞ ﻋﻠﻰ ﲨﻴﻊ ﻣﺎ ﻳﺘﻮﻗﻒ ﻋﻠﻴﻪ وﺟﻮد اﳌﻌﻠﻮل ﲝﻴﺚ ﻻ ﻳﺒﻘﻰ ﻟﻠﻤﻌﻠﻮل ﻣﻌﻬﺎ إﻻ أن ﻳﻮﺟﺪ و ﻫﻲ اﻟﻌﻠﺔ اﻟﺘﺎﻣﺔ و إﻣﺎ أن ﺗﺸﺘﻤﻞ ﻋﻠﻰ اﻟﺒﻌﺾ دون اﳉﻤﻴﻊ و ﻫﻲ اﻟﻌﻠﺔ اﻟﻨﺎﻗﺼﺔ و ﺗﻔﱰﻗﺎن ﻣﻦ ﺣﻴﺚ إن اﻟﻌﻠﺔ اﻟﺘﺎﻣﺔ ﻳﻠﺰم ﻣﻦ وﺟﻮدﻫﺎ وﺟﻮد اﳌﻌﻠﻮل و ﻣﻦ ﻋﺪﻣﻬﺎ ﻋﺪﻣﻪ و اﻟﻌﻠﺔ اﻟﻨﺎﻗﺼﺔ ﻻ ﻳﻠﺰم ﻣﻦ وﺟﻮدﻫﺎ وﺟﻮد اﳌﻌﻠﻮل و ﻟﻜﻦ ﻳﻠﺰم ﻣﻦ ﻋﺪﻣﻬﺎ ﻪ ﻋﺪﻣ. و ﺗﻨﻘﺴﻢ أﻳﻀﺎ إﱃ اﻟﻮاﺣﺪة و اﻟﻜﺜﲑة و ﺗﻨﻘﺴﻢ أﻳﻀﺎ إﱃ اﻟﺒﺴﻴﻄﺔ و ﻫﻲ ﻣﺎ ﻻ ﺟﺰء ﳍﺎ و ﺮد و اﻷﻋﺮاض و أﻣﺎ R ﻛﺎﻟﻌﻘﻞ ا اﳌﺮﻛﺒﺔ و ﻫﻲ ﲞﻼﻓﻬﺎ و اﻟﺒﺴﻴﻄﺔ إﻣﺎ ﺑﺴﻴﻄﺔ ﲝﺴﺐ اﳋﺎرج ﲝﺴﺐ اﻟﻌﻘﻞ و ﻫﻲ ﻣﺎ ﻻ ﺗﺮﻛﻴﺐ ﻓﻴﻪ ﺧﺎرﺟﺎ ﻣﻦ ﻣﺎدة و ﺻﻮرة و ﻻ ﻋﻘﻼ ﻣﻦ ﺟﻨﺲ و ﻓﺼﻞ و أﺑﺴﻂ اﻟﺒ ﻪ ﺴﺎﺋﻂ ﻣﺎ ﱂ ﻳﱰﻛﺐ ﻣﻦ وﺟﻮد و ﻣﺎﻫﻴﺔ و ﻫﻮ اﻟﻮاﺟﺐ ﻋﺰ اﲰ. و ﺗﻨﻘﺴﻢ أﻳﻀﺎ إﱃ ﻗﺮﻳﺒﺔ و ﺑﻌﻴﺪة و اﻟﻘﺮﻳﺒﺔ ﻣﺎ ﻻ واﺳﻄﺔ ﺑﻴﻨﻬﺎ و ﺑﲔ ﻣﻌﻠﻮﳍﺎ و اﻟﺒﻌﻴﺪة ﻛﻌﻠﺔ اﻟﻌﻠﺔ ﲞﻼﻓﻬﺎ . و ﺗﻨﻘﺴﻢ اﻟﻌﻠﺔ إﱃ داﺧﻠﻴﺔ و ﺧﺎرﺟﻴﺔ و اﻟﻌﻠﻞ اﻟﺪاﺧﻠﻴﺔ و ﺗﺴﻤﻰ أﻳﻀﺎ ﻋﻠﻞ اﻟﻘﻮام ﻫﻲ اﳌﺎدة و اﻟﺼﻮرة اﳌﻘﻮﻣ ﺘﺎن ﻟﻠﻤﻌﻠﻮل و اﻟﻌﻠﻞ اﳋﺎرﺟﻴﺔ و ﺗﺴﻤﻰ أﻳﻀﺎ ﻋﻠﻞ اﻟﻮﺟﻮد و ﻫﻲ اﻟﻔﺎﻋﻞ و اﻟﻐﺎﻳﺔ و رﲟﺎ ﲰﻲ اﻟﻔﺎﻋﻞ ﻣﺎ ﺑﻪ اﻟﻮﺟﻮد و اﻟﻐﺎﻳﺔ ﻣﺎ ﻷﺟﻠﻪ اﻟﻮﺟﻮد. و ﺗﻨﻘﺴﻢ اﻟﻌﻠﺔ إﱃ اﻟﻌﻠﻞ اﳊﻘﻴﻘﻴﺔ و اﳌﻌﺪات و ﰲ ﺗﺴﻤﻴﺔ اﳌﻌﺪات ﻋﻠﻼ ﲡﻮز ﻓﻠﻴﺴﺖ ﻋﻠﻼ ﺣﻘﻴﻘﻴﺔ و إﳕﺎ ﻫﻲ ﻣﻘﺮﺑﺎت ﺗﻘﺮب اﳌﺎدة إﱃ إﻓﺎ ﻛﻞ ﺣﺪ ﻣﻦ ﻛﻮرود اﳌﺘﺤﺮك ﰲ ﺿﺔ اﻟﻔﺎﻋﻞ ﻛﺎﻧﺼﺮام اﻟﻘﻄﻌﺎت اﻟﺰﻣﺎﻧﻴﺔ ﻓﺈﻧﻪ ﻳﻘﺮب ﺣﺪود اﳌﺴﺎﻓﺔ ﻓﺈﻧﻪ ﻳﻘﺮﺑﻪ إﱃ اﻟﻮرود ﰲ ﺣﺪ ﻳﺘﻠﻮﻩ و ﻣﻮﺿﻮع اﳊﺎدث إﱃ ﻓﻌﻠﻴﺔ اﻟﻮﺟﻮد.
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7.2. KINDS OF CAUSES Causes are classified into complete and incomplete. If a cause includes all the prerequisites upon which the existence of the effect depends, so that the effect cannot fail to exist when it is there, it is a complete cause. If a cause includes only some of those prerequisites it is an incomplete cause. The two differ in the respect that the existence of a complete cause necessitates the existence of the effect, and its non-existence the nonexistence of the effect. But the existence of an incomplete cause does not necessitate the effect’s existence, though its non-existence does necessitate the effect’s non-existence. Similarly, causes are classified into ‘single’ (wâhid) and ‘multiple’ (katsîr) and into ‘simple’ (basîth) and ‘composite’ (murakkab). A simple cause is one that has no parts, and a composite cause is its contrary. A simple cause is either simple in respect of external reality such as the immaterial Intellect and the accidents, or it is simple from the viewpoint of the Intellect, i.e. neither composed of matter and form in external reality nor of genus and differentia in the intellect. The simplest of entities is that which is not composed of existence and quiddity, and that is the Necessary Being, exalted is His Name. Causes are also classified into ‘proximate’ and ‘remote.’ A proximate cause is one in which there is no intermediary term between it and its effect. A remote cause, such as the cause of a cause, is its contrary. Causes are also classified into ‘internal’ and ‘external.’ The internal causes (al-‘ilal al-dâkhiliyyah, also called ‘ilal al-qiwâm, i.e., the constituting causes) are matter and form, whereby the effect is constituted and sustained. The external causes (al- ‘ilal al-khârijiyyah, also called ‘ilal al-wujûd, the causes of existence) are the ‘agent’ (al-fail, i.e. efficient cause) and the ‘end’ (al-ghâyah, i.e. the final caust) The agent is sometimes called ‘mâ bihi al-wujûd (that on which the effect’s existence depends) and the end is called ‘mâ li ajalihi wujûd (the raison d’etre). Cause are also classified into ‘real’ (al-‘ilal al-haqîqiyyah) and ‘preparatory’ causes (al-mu’iddât). There is a kind of figurative usage involved in naming the preparatory factors as ’causes,’ for they not real causes. They are only facilitating factors (muqarribât) that bring matter closer to efficient action by the agent, such as the entry of a moving thing into a certain stage of its track which brings it closer to its entry in the succeeding stage, or the passage of intervals of time which brings an expected event closer to the actuality of its existence.
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اﻟﻔﺼﻞ اﻟﺜﺎﻟﺚ ﻓﻲ و ﺟﻮب اﻟﻤﻌﻠﻮل ﻋﻨﺪ وﺟﻮد اﻟﻌﻠﺔ اﻟﺘﺎﻣﺔ و وﺟﻮب وﺟﻮد اﻟﻌﻠﺔ ﻋﻨﺪ وﺟﻮد اﻟﻤﻌﻠﻮل ﻛﺎﻧﺖ اﻟﻌﻠﺔ اﻟﺘﺎﻣﺔ ﻣﻮﺟﻮدة وﺟﺐ وﺟﻮد ﻣﻌﻠﻮﳍﺎ و إﻻ ﺟﺎز ﻋﺪﻣﻪ ﻣﻊ وﺟﻮدﻫﺎ و ﻻزﻣﻪ إذا ﲢﻘﻖ ﻋﺪﻣﻪ اﳌﻌﻠﻮل ﻟﻌﺪم اﻟﻌﻠﺔ ﻣﻦ دون ﻋﻠﺔ. ﻛﺎن اﳌﻌﻠﻮل ﻣﻮﺟﻮدا وﺟﺐ وﺟﻮد ﻋﻠﺘﻪ و إﻻ ﺟﺎز ﻋﺪﻣﻬﺎ ﻣﻊ وﺟﻮد اﳌﻌ و إذا ﻠﻮل و ﻗﺪ ﻛﺎﻧﺖ ﺗﺎﻣﺔ أو ﻧﺎﻗﺼﺔ ﻳﻠﺰم ﻣﻦ ﻋﺪﻣﻬﺎ ﻋﺪم اﳌﻌﻠﻮل ﺗﻘﺪم أن اﻟﻌﻠﺔ ﺳﻮاء . ﻛﻤﺎ أن اﻟﻌﻠﺔ اﻟﺘﺎﻣﺔ ﻻ ﺗﻨﻔﻚ و ﻣﻦ ﻫﻨﺎ ﻳﻈﻬﺮ أن اﳌﻌﻠﻮل ﻻ ﻳﻨﻔﻚ وﺟﻮدﻩ ﻋﻦ وﺟﻮد ﻋﻠﺘﻪ ﻋﻦ ﻣﻌﻠﻮﳍﺎ. ﻛﺎﻧﺖ ﻋﻠﺘﻪ ﻣﻮﺟﻮدة واﺟﺒﺔ ﰲ ذﻟﻚ اﻟﺰﻣﺎن ﻛﺎن اﳌﻌﻠﻮل زﻣﺎﻧﻴﺎ ﻣﻮﺟﻮدا ﰲ زﻣﺎن ﺑﻌﻴﻨﻪ ﻓﻠﻮ ﺑﻌﻴﻨﻪ ﻷن ﺗﻮﻗﻒ وﺟﻮدﻩ ﻋﻠﻰ اﻟﻌﻠﺔ ﰲ ذﻟﻚ اﻟﺰﻣﺎن ﻓﱰﺟﻴﺢ اﻟﻌﻠﺔ ﻟﻮﺟﻮدﻩ و إﻓﺎﺿﺘﻬﺎ ﻟﻪ ﰲ ﻛﺎﻧﺖ اﻟﻌﻠﺔ ﻣﻮﺟﻮدة ﰲ زﻣﺎن آﺧﺮ ﻣﻌﺪوﻣﺔ ﰲ زﻣﺎن وﺟﻮد اﳌﻌﻠﻮل و ذﻟﻚ اﻟﺰﻣﺎن و ﻟﻮ ﻛﺎﻧﺖ ﻣﻔﻴﻀﺔ ﻟﻠﻤﻌﻠﻮل و ﻫﻲ ﻣﻌﺪوﻣﺔ ﻫﺬا ﳏﺎل اﻹﻓﺎﺿﺔ ﻗﺎﺋﻤﺔ ﺑﻮﺟﻮدﻫﺎ . ﺑﺮﻫﺎن آﺧﺮ ﺣﺎﺟﺔ اﳌﺎﻫﻴﺔ اﳌﻌﻠﻮﻟﺔ إﱃ اﻟﻌﻠﺔ ﻟﻴﺴ ﺖ إﻻ ﺣﺎﺟﺔ وﺟﻮدﻫﺎ إﱃ اﻟﻌﻠﺔ و ﻟﻴﺴﺖ اﳊﺎﺟﺔ ﺧﺎرﺟﺔ ﻣﻦ وﺟﻮدﻫﺎ ﲟﻌﲎ أن ﻳﻜﻮن ﻫﻨﺎك وﺟﻮد و ﺣﺎﺟﺔ ﺑﻞ ﻫﻲ ﻣﺴﺘﻘﺮة ﰲ ﺣﺪ ذات وﺟﻮدﻫﺎ ﻓﻮﺟﻮدﻫﺎ ﻋﲔ اﳊﺎﺟﺔ و اﻻرﺗﺒﺎط ﻓﻬﻮ وﺟﻮد راﺑﻂ ﺑﺎﻟﻨﺴﺒﺔ إﱃ ﻋﻠﺘﻪ ﻻ اﺳﺘﻘﻼل ﻟﻪ ﻛﺎن ﻫﺬا ﺷﺄﻧﻪ اﺳﺘﺤﺎل أن ﻳﻮﺟﺪ إﻻ ﻣﺘﻘﻮﻣ ﺎ و ﻫﻲ ﻣﻘﻮﻣﺔ ﻟﻪ و ﻣﺎ 5دو ﺎ ﺑﻌﻠﺘﻪ ﻣﻌﺘﻤﺪا ﻋﻠﻴﻬﺎ ﻓﻌﻨﺪ وﺟﻮد اﳌﻌﻠﻮل ﳚﺐ وﺟﻮد ﻋﻠﺘﻪ و ﻫﻮ اﳌﻄﻠﻮب.
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7.3. MUTUAL NECESSITY BETWEEN CAUSE AND EFFECT When the complete cause exists, the existence of its effect becomes necessary; otherwise its non-existence would be admissible despite the existence of the cause, which implies that the non-existence of the effect, which is caused by the non-existence of the cause, actualizes without a cause. Also, when the effect exists, the existence of its cause becomes necessary; otherwise its non-existence would be admissible despite the effect’s existence. As mentioned above, the non-existence of the cause, whether complete or incomplete, necessitates the non-existence of the effect. From this it becomes clear that the existence of the effect is inseparable from that of its cause, in the same way as the complete cause is inseparable from its effect. Hence if the effect is temporal and exists in time, its cause should also necessarily exist in the same time, for the existence of the effect depends on the cause’s being in that time; for it is in that (particular) time that the cause bestows existence upon it. If the cause were to exist in some other period of time, being non-existent during the period of existence of the effect, which receives its existence from the existence of the cause, it would be giving existence to the effect while it is itself non-existence, and this is impossible.’ Another Proof The need of the effect-quiddity for the cause is nothing except the need of its existence for the cause, and that need is not separate from its existence. Rather, the need resides within the very essence of its existence; hence its existence is need and relation per se. Hence the effect is a ‘relative existence’ (wujûd râbith) in relation to its cause. It does not possess any independence of its own and in isolation from the cause, which sustains it. Something that is such cannot exist without being sustained by its cause and without depending on it. Hence when the effect exists, it is necessary for its cause also to exist.
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اﻟﻔﺼﻞ اﻟﺮاﺑﻊ ﻗﺎﻋﺪة اﻟﻮاﺣﺪ اﻟﻮاﺣﺪ ﻻ ﻳﺼﺪر ﻋﻨﻪ إﻻ اﻟﻮاﺣﺪ و ذﻟﻚ أن ﻣﻦ اﻟﻮاﺟﺐ أن ﻳﻜﻮن ﺑﲔ اﻟﻌﻠﺔ و ﻣﻌﻠﻮﳍﺎ ﻛﻞ ﺷﻲ ﻛﻮن ﺳﻨﺨﻴﺔ ذاﺗﻴﺔ ﻟﻴﺴﺖ ﺑﲔ اﻟﻮاﺣﺪ ﻣﻨﻬﻤﺎ و ﻏﲑ اﻵﺧﺮ و إﻻ ﺟﺎز ء ﻋﻠﺔ ﻟﻜﻞ ﺷﻲ ﺷﻲ ﻛﻞ ء و ﺷﻲ ء ﻣﻌﻠﻮﻻ ﻟﻜﻞ ﻫﻲ ء ﻓﻔﻲ اﻟﻌﻠﺔ ﺟﻬﺔ ﻣﺴﺎﳔﺔ ﳌﻌﻠﻮﳍﺎ اﳌﺨﺼﺼﺔ ﻟﺼﺪورﻩ ﺎ إﻻ ﺟﻬﺔ واﺣﺪة ﻣﻌﺎﻟﻴﻞ T ﻋﻨﻬﺎ ﻓﻠﻮ ﺻﺪرت ﻋﻦ اﻟﻌﻠﺔ اﻟﻮاﺣﺪة و ﻫﻲ اﻟﱵ ﻟﻴﺴﺖ ﳍﺎ ﰲ ذا ﻛﺜﲑة ﻣﺘﺒﺎﻳﻨﺔ ﻏﲑ راﺟﻌﺔ إﱃ ﺟﻬﺔ واﺣﺪة ﺑﻮﺟﻪ ﻣﻦ اﻟﻮﺟﻮﻩ ﻟﺰﻣﻪ ﺗﻘﺮر ﺟﻬﺎ ت ﻛﺜﲑة ﲟﺎ ﻫﻲ . ﺎ و ﻫﻲ ذات ﺟﻬﺔ واﺣﺪة و ﻫﺬا ﳏﺎل T ﻛﺜﲑة ﰲ ذا و ﻳﺘﺒﲔ ﺑﺬﻟﻚ أن ﻣﺎ ﻳﺼﺪر ﻋﻨﻪ اﻟﻜﺜﲑ ﻛﺜﺮة و ﻳﺘﺒﲔ ﻛﺜﲑ ﻓﺈن ﰲ ذاﺗﻪ ﺟﻬﺔ ﻣﻦ ﺣﻴﺚ ﻫﻮ أﻳﻀﺎ أن اﻟﻌﻠﻞ اﻟﻜﺜﲑة ﻻ ﺗﺘﻮارد ﻋﻠﻰ ﻣﻌﻠﻮل واﺣﺪ.
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7.4. THE RULE OF THE ONE Nothing except ‘one’ can emanate from ‘one.’ That is because it is necessary that there be an essential affinity (sinkhiyyah) between die cause and the effect, which none of them shares with something else. Otherwise anything could be the cause of anything, and anything could be the effect of any thing. Hence there is an aspect of affinity between the cause and its effect that particularly marks the latter’s emanation (shudûr) from the former. Therefore, if multiple effects – as multiple and disparate entities whose multiplicity is irreducible to any single aspect whatsoever – were to emanate from a cause which is ‘one,’ which in itself has only a single ontological aspect, it would imply that something which has a single aspect should incorporate multiple aspects within itself, and this is impossible. From this it follows that a cause from which multiple effects qua multiple entities emanate, possesses an aspect of multiplicity in its essence. It also follows from the above that multiple causes do not give rise to an effect that is ‘one.’
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اﻟﻔﺼﻞ اﻟﺨﺎﻣﺲ ﻓﻲ اﺳﺘﺤﺎﻟﺔ اﻟﺪور و اﻟﺘﺴﻠﺴﻞ ﻓﻲ اﻟﻌﻠﻞ أﻣﺎ اﺳﺘﺤﺎﻟﺔ اﻟﺪور و ﻫﻮ ﺗﻮﻗﻒ وﺟﻮد اﻟﺸﻲ ﻗ ء ﻋﻠﻰ ﻣﺎ ﻳﺘﻮ ﻒ ﻋﻠﻴﻪ وﺟﻮدﻩ إﻣﺎ ﺑﻼ واﺳﻄﺔ ح و إﻣﺎ ﺑﻮاﺳﻄﺔ أو أﻛﺜﺮ و ﻫﻮ اﻟﺪور اﳌﻀﻤﺮ ﻓﻸﻧﻪ ﻳﺴﺘﻠﺰم ﺗﻮﻗﻒ وﺟﻮد و ﻫﻮ اﻟﺪور اﳌﺼﺮ اﻟﺸﻲ ﻲ ء ﻋﻠﻰ ﻧﻔﺴﻪ و ﻻزﻣﻪ ﺗﻘﺪم اﻟﺸ ء ﻋﻠﻰ ﻧﻔﺴﻪ ﺑﺎﻟﻮﺟﻮد ﻟﺘﻘﺪم وﺟﻮد اﻟﻌﻠﺔ ﻋﻠﻰ وﺟﻮد اﳌﻌﻠﻮل ﺑﺎﻟﻀﺮورة. ﺎﻳﺔ ﻓ 5 و أﻣﺎ اﺳﺘﺤﺎﻟﺔ اﻟﺘﺴﻠﺴﻞ و ﻫﻮ ﺗﺮﺗﺐ اﻟﻌﻠﻞ ﻻ إﱃ ﻤﻦ أﺳﺪ اﻟﱪاﻫﲔ ﻋﻠﻴﻬﺎ ﻣﺎ أﻗﺎﻣﻪ اﻟﺸﻴﺦ ﰲ إﳍﻴﺎت اﻟﺸﻔﺎء و ﳏﺼﻠﻪ أﻧﺎ إذا ﻓﺮﺿﻨﺎ ﻣﻌﻠﻮﻻ و ﻋﻠﺘﻪ و ﻋﻠﺔ ﻋﻠﺘﻪ و أﺧﺬﻧﺎ ﻫﺬﻩ ﻛﻼ ﻣﻦ اﻟﺜﻼﺛﺔ ذا ﺣﻜﻢ ﺿﺮوري ﳜﺘﺺ ﺑﻪ ﻓﺎﳌﻌﻠﻮل اﳌﻔﺮوض ﻣﻌﻠﻮل ﻓﻘﻂ و اﳉﻤﻠﺔ وﺟﺪﻧﺎ ﻋﻠﺘﻪ ﻋﻠﺔ ﳌﺎ ﺑﻌﺪﻫﺎ ﻣﻌﻠﻮﻟﺔ ﳌﺎ ﻗﺒﻠﻬﺎ و ﻋﻠﺔ اﻟﻌﻠﺔ ﻋﻠﺔ ﻓﻘﻂ ﻏﲑ ﻣﻌﻠﻮﻟ ﺔ ﻓﻜﺎن ﻣﺎ ﻫﻮ ﻣﻌﻠﻮل ﻛﺎن ﻣﺎ ﻫﻮ ﻋﻠﺔ و ﻣﻌﻠﻮل ﻣﻌﺎ وﺳﻄﺎ ﺑﲔ ﻃﺮﻓﲔ ﰒ ﻓﻘﻂ ﻃﺮﻓﺎ و ﻣﺎ ﻫﻮ ﻋﻠﺔ ﻓﻘﻂ ﻃﺮﻓﺎ آﺧﺮ و ﻛﺎن اﻻﺛﻨﺎن اﻟﻮاﻗﻌﺎن ﻛﺎن ﻟﻠﻄﺮﻓﲔ ﻣﺎ ﺗﻘﺪم ﻣﻦ ﺣﻜﻢ اﻟﻄﺮﻓﲔ و إذا ﻓﺮﺿﻨﺎ اﳉﻤﻠﺔ أرﺑﻌﺔ ﻣﱰﺗﺒﺔ ﺑﲔ اﻟﻄﺮﻓﲔ ﻣﺸﱰﻛﲔ ﰲ ﺣﻜﻢ اﻟﻮﺳﻂ و ﻫﻮ أن ﳍﻤﺎ اﻟﻌﻠﻴﺔ و اﳌﻌﻠﻮﻟﻴﺔ ﻣﻌﺎ ﺑﺎﻟﺘﻮﺳﻂ ﺑﲔ ﻛﺎن اﻷﻣﺮ ﺟﺎرﻳﺎ ﻋﻠﻰ ﳎﺮى واﺣﺪ و ﺎﻳﺔ ﻟﻪ 5 ﻛﻠﻤﺎ زدﻧﺎ ﰲ ﻋﺪد اﳉﻤﻠﺔ إﱃ ﻣﺎ ﻻ ﻃﺮﻓﲔ ﰒ ﻛﻞ واﺣﺪ ﻣﻦ آﺣﺎدﻫﺎ ﻋﻠﺔ و ﻣﻌﻠﻮل ﻣﻌﺎ وﺳﻄﺎ ﻛﺎن ﳎﻤﻮع ﻣﺎ ﺑﲔ اﻟﻄﺮﻓﲔ و ﻫﻲ اﻟﻌﺪة اﻟﱵ ﻟﻪ ﺣﻜﻤﻪ. ﻛﺎن ﻣﺎ وراء اﳌﻌﻠﻮل ﻓﻠﻮ ﻓﺮﺿﻨﺎ ﺳﻠﺴﻠﺔ ﻣﻦ اﻟﻌﻠﻞ ﻣﱰﺗﺒﺔ إﱃ ﻏﲑ اﻟﻨﻬﺎﻳﺔ اﻷﺧﲑ ﻣﻦ اﳉﻤﻠﺔ ﻏﲑ اﳌﺘﻨﺎﻫﻴﺔ وﺳﻄﺎ ﻻ ﻃﺮف ﻟﻪ و ﻫﻮ ﳏﺎل. ﻛﻞ ﺳﻠﺴﻠﺔ ﻣﱰﺗﺒﺔ ﻣﻦ اﻟﻌﻠﻞ اﻟﱵ ﻻ ﺗﻔﺎرق وﺟﻮدﻫﺎ وﺟﻮد اﳌﻌﻠﻮل و ﻫﺬا اﻟﱪﻫﺎن ﳚﺮي ﰲ ﻛﺎﻧﺖ ﺗﺎﻣﺔ أو ﻧﺎﻗﺼﺔ دون اﻟﻌﻠﻞ اﳌﻌﺪة ﺳﻮاء . و ﻳﺪل ﻋﻠﻰ وﺟﻮب ﺗﻨﺎﻫﻲ اﻟﻌﻠﻞ اﻟﺘﺎﻣﺔ ﺧﺎﺻﺔ ﻣﺎ ﺗﻘﺪم أن وﺟﻮد اﳌﻌﻠﻮل وﺟﻮد راﺑﻂ ﺑﺎﻟ ﻨﺴﺒﺔ إﱃ ﻋﻠﺘﻪ ﻓﺈﻧﻪ ﻟﻮ ﺗﺮﺗﺒﺖ اﻟﻌﻠﻴﺔ و اﳌﻌﻠﻮﻟﻴﺔ ﰲ ﺳﻠﺴﻠﺔ ﻏﲑ ﻣﺘﻨﺎﻫﻴﺔ ﻣﻦ ﻏﲑ أن ﺗﻨﺘﻬﻲ إﱃ ﻛﺎﻧﺖ وﺟﻮدات راﺑﻄﺔ ﻣﺘﺤﻘﻘﺔ ﻣﻦ ﻏﲑ وﺟﻮد ﻧﻔﺴﻲ ﻣﺴﺘﻘﻞ ﺗﻘﻮم ﺑﻪ و ﻫﻮ ﻋﻠﺔ ﻏﲑ ﻣﻌﻠﻮﻟﺔ ﳏﺎل. و ﳍﻢ ﻋﻠﻰ اﺳﺘﺤﺎﻟﺔ اﻟﺘﺴﻠﺴﻞ ﺣﺠﺞ أﺧﺮى ﻣﺬﻛﻮرة ﰲ اﳌﻄﻮﻻت.
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7.5. IMPOSSIBILITY OF AN INFINITE REGRESS AND VICIOUS CIRCLE IN CAUSALITY A vicious circle (dawr) – which means a thing’s dependence for its existence on something whose existence depends on it – may be either with or without an intermediary. If there is no intermediary; it is called an ‘overt circle’ (al-dawr al-musharrath), and if there are one or more intermediaries it is called a ‘covert circle’ (al-dawr al-mudhmir). It is considered logically impossible because it necessarily implies the dependence of a thing’s existence on itself, which implies a thing’s preceding itself existentially, for the existence of the cause necessarily precedes the existence of the effect. As to the impossibility of an infinite regress – which means an endless series of causes dependent on one another – the most conclusive of arguments concerning it is the one offered by Ibn Sina in his work al-Syifâ’, in the part on metaphysics. The gist of’ this argument is that when we consider an effect, its cause and the cause of its cause, we find that there is a necessary rule that applies specifically to each term of this set. The supposed effect is solely an effect; its cause is the cause of its subsequent term and the effect of its preceding term. The cause of the cause is solely a cause and not an effect of anything. Hence that which is solely an effect stands on one side and that which is solely a cause stands on the other side. That which is both a cause and an effect lies between the two sides. Now when we assume a set of four consecutive terms, the rule applicable to the two sides in the above case will apply to the two sides in this case also. The rule applicable to the middle terms will apply to both the middle terms in this case. That is, as intermediary terms, they will be both causes and effects. When the number of terms in the supposed set is increased indefinitely, the same rule will continue to apply; the group between the two extreme sides, which consists of terms each of which is both a cause and an effect, will make up the middle and share in the rule applicable to middle terms. But when we assume a series of infinite number of causes, the entire group of an infinite number of causes will make up a middle that has no side except the last effect and this is impossible. This argument applies to every series of consecutive causes whose existence is not separable from the existence of the effect, respective of whether they are complete or incomplete causes (though it does not apply to preparatory causes). The necessity of the finiteness of the series of complete causes is particularly borne out by the remark made earlier’ that the existence of an effect is relative in relation to its cause. If an infinite causal series were not to end in a cause that is not an effect, it would mean that relative existents can actualize without needing a self-subsisting and independent existent that might sustain them, and this is impossible. The metaphysicians have offered other proofs in favour of the impossibility of an infinite regress that are mentioned in elaborate works.
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اﻟﻔﺼﻞ اﻟﺴﺎدس اﻟﻌﻠﺔ اﻟﻔﺎﻋﻠﻴﺔ و أﻗﺴﺎﻣﻬﺎ اﻟﻌﻠﺔ اﻟﻔﺎﻋﻠﻴﺔ و ﻫﻲ اﻟﱵ ﺗﻔﻴﺾ وﺟﻮد اﳌﻌﻠﻮل و ﺗﻔﻌﻠﻪ ﻋﻠﻰ أﻗﺴﺎم و ﻗﺪ ذﻛﺮوا ﰲ وﺟﻪ ﺿﺒﻄﻬﺎ أن اﻟﻔﺎﻋﻞ إﻣﺎ أن ﻳﻜﻮن ﻟﻪ ﻋﻠﻢ ﺑﻔﻌﻠﻪ أو ﻻ و اﻟﺜﺎﱐ إﻣﺎ أن ﻳﻼﺋﻢ ﻓﻌﻠﻪ ﻃﺒﻌﻪ و ﻫﻮ اﻟﻔﺎﻋﻞ ﺑﺎﻟﻄﺒﻊ أو ﻻ ﻳﻼﺋﻢ و ﻫﻮ اﻟﻔﺎﻋﻞ ﺑﺎﻟﻘﺴﺮ و اﻷ ول و ﻫﻮ اﻟﺬي ﻟﻪ ﻋﻠﻢ ﺑﻔﻌﻠﻪ إن ﱂ ﻛﺎن -ﺎ ﻓﺈﻣﺎ أن ﻳﻜﻮن ﻋﻠﻤﻪ ﺑﻔﻌﻠﻪ ﰲ ﻣﺮﺗﺒﺔ ﻓﻌﻠﻪ ﻳﻜﻦ ﻓﻌﻠﻪ ﺑﺈرادﺗﻪ ﻓﻬﻮ اﻟﻔﺎﻋﻞ ﺑﺎﳉﱪ و إن ﺑﻞ ﻋﲔ ﻓﻌﻠﻪ و ﻫﻮ اﻟﻔﺎﻋﻞ ﺑﺎﻟﺮﺿﺎ و إﻣﺎ أن ﻳﻜﻮن ﻋﻠﻤﻪ ﺑﻔﻌﻠﻪ ﻗﺒﻞ ﻓﻌﻠﻪ و ﺣﻴﻨﺌﺬ إﻣﺎ أن ﻳﻜﻮن ﻋﻠﻤﻪ ﻣﻘﺮوﻧﺎ ﺑﺪاع زاﺋﺪ و ﻫﻮ اﻟﻔﺎﻋﻞ ﺑﺎﻟﻘﺼﺪ و إﻣﺎ أن ﻻ ﻳﻜﻮن ﻋﻠﻤﻪ ﻣﻘﺮوﻧﺎ ﺑﺪاع زاﺋﺪ ﺑﻞ ﻳﻜﻮن ﻧﻔﺲ اﻟﻌﻠﻢ ﻓﻌﻠﻴﺎ ﻣﻨﺸﺄ ﻟﺼﺪور اﳌﻌﻠﻮل و ﺣﻴﻨﺌﺬ ﻓﺈﻣﺎ أن ﻳﻜﻮن ﻋﻠﻤﻪ زاﺋﺪا ﻋﻠﻰ ذاﺗﻪ و ﻫﻮ اﻟﻔﺎﻋﻞ ﺑﺎﻟﻌﻨﺎﻳﺔ أو ﻏﲑ زاﺋﺪ ﻋﻠﻰ ذاﺗﻪ و ﻫﻮ اﻟﻔﺎﻋﻞ ﺑﺎﻟﺘﺠﻠﻲ و اﻟﻔﺎﻋﻞ ﰲ ﻣﺎ ﺗﻘﺪم إذا ﻛﺎن ﻓﺎﻋﻼ ﺑﺎﻟﺘ ﻧﺴﺐ إﱃ ﻓﻌﻠﻪ ﻣﻦ ﺟﻬﺔ أﻧﻪ و ﻓﻌﻠﻪ ﻓﻌﻞ ﻟﻔﺎﻋﻞ آﺧﺮ ﲑ ﺴﺨ. ﻓﻠﻠﻔﺎﻋﻞ أﻗﺴﺎم ﲦﺎﻧﻴﺔ : ﻛﺎﻟﻨﻔﺲ ﻛﻮن اﻟﻔﻌﻞ ﻣﻼﺋﻤﺎ ﻟﻄﺒﻌﻪ أﺣﺪﻫﺎ اﻟﻔﺎﻋﻞ ﺑﺎﻟﻄﺒﻊ و ﻫﻮ اﻟﺬي ﻻ ﻋﻠﻢ ﻟﻪ ﺑﻔﻌﻠﻪ ﻣﻊ ﰲ ﻣﺮﺗﺒﺔ اﻟﻘﻮى اﻟﺒﺪﻧﻴﺔ اﻟﻄﺒﻴﻌﻴﺔ ﺗﻔﻌﻞ أﻓﻌﺎﳍﺎ ﺑﺎﻟﻄﺒﻊ. ﻛﺎﻟﻨﻔﺲ ﰲ اﻟﺜﺎﱐ اﻟﻔﺎﻋﻞ ﺑﺎﻟﻘﺴﺮ و ﻫﻮ اﻟﺬي ﻻ ﻋﻠﻢ ﻟﻪ ﺑﻔﻌﻠﻪ و ﻻ ﻓﻌﻠﻪ ﻣﻼﺋﻢ ﻟﻄﺒﻌﻪ ﻣﺮﺗﺒﺔ اﻟﻘﻮى ﻋﻨﺪ ة اﳌﺮض ﻓﺈن اﻷﻓﻌﺎل ﺗﻨﺤﺮف ﻓﻴﻪ ﻋﻦ ﳎﺮى اﻟﺼﺤﺔ ﻟﻌﻮاﻣﻞ ﻗﺎﺳﺮ. ﻛﺎﻹﻧﺴﺎن ﻳﻜﺮﻩ ﻋﻠﻰ ﻓﻌﻞ ﻣﺎ اﻟﺜﺎﻟﺚ اﻟﻔﺎﻋﻞ ﺑﺎﳉﱪ و ﻫﻮ ﻣﺎ ﻟﻪ ﻋﻠﻢ ﺑﻔﻌﻠﻪ و ﻟﻴﺲ ﺑﺈرادﺗﻪ ﻻ ﻳﺮﻳﺪﻩ. اﻟﺮاﺑﻊ اﻟﻔﺎﻋﻞ ﺑﺎﻟﺮﺿﺎ و ﻫﻮ اﻟﺬي ﻟﻪ إرادة و ﻋﻠﻤﻪ اﻟﺘﻔﺼﻴﻠﻲ ﺑﺎﻟﻔﻌﻞ ﻋﲔ اﻟﻔﻌﻞ و ﻟﻴﺲ ﻟﻪ ﻗﺒﻞ اﻟﻔﻌﻞ إﻻ ﻋﻠﻢ إﲨﺎﱄ ﺑﻪ ﻛﺎﻹﻧﺴﺎن ﻳﻔﻌﻞ اﻟﺼﻮر اﳋﻴﺎﻟﻴﺔ و ﻋﻠﻤﻪ اﻟﺘﻔﺼﻴﻠﻲ ﺑﻌﻠﻤﻪ ﺑﺬاﺗﻪ ﻛﻔﺎﻋﻠﻴﺔ اﻟﻮاﺟﺐ ﻟﻸﺷﻴﺎء ﻋﻨﺪ اﻹﺷﺮاﻗﻴﲔ -ﺎ ﻋﻴﻨﻬﺎ و ﻟﻪ ﻗﺒﻠﻬﺎ ﻋﻠﻢ إﲨﺎﱄ -ﺎ ﺑﻌﻠﻤﻪ ﺑﺬاﺗﻪ و .

ﻛﺎﻹﻧﺴﺎن اﳋﺎﻣﺲ اﻟﻔﺎﻋﻞ ﺑﺎﻟﻘﺼﺪ و ﻫﻮ اﻟﺬي ﻟﻪ إرادة و ﻋﻠﻢ ﺑﻔﻌﻠﻪ ﻗﺒﻞ اﻟﻔﻌﻞ ﺑﺪاع زاﺋﺪ ﰲ أﻓﻌﺎﻟﻪ اﻻﺧﺘﻴﺎرﻳﺔ. اﻟﺴﺎد س اﻟﻔﺎﻋﻞ ﺑﺎﻟﻌﻨﺎﻳﺔ و ﻫﻮ اﻟﺬي ﻟﻪ إرادة و ﻋﻠﻢ ﺳﺎﺑﻖ ﻋﻠﻰ اﻟﻔﻌﻞ زاﺋﺪ ﻋﻠﻰ ذات ﻛﺎﻹﻧﺴﺎن اﻟﻮاﻗﻊ ﻋﻠﻰ اﻟﻔﺎﻋﻞ ﻧﻔﺲ اﻟﺼﻮرة اﻟﻌﻠﻤﻴﺔ ﻣﻨﺸﺄ ﻟﺼﺪور اﻟﻔﻌﻞ ﻣﻦ ﻏﲑ داع زاﺋﺪ ﻛﺎﻟﻮاﺟﺐ ﰲ إﳚﺎدﻩ ﻋﻠﻰ ﻗﻮل ﺟﺬع ﻋﺎل ﻓﺈﻧﻪ ﲟﺠﺮد ﺗﻮﻫﻢ اﻟﺴﻘﻮط ﻳﺴﻘﻂ ﻋﻠﻰ اﻷرض و اﳌﺸﺎﺋﲔ.
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اﻟﺴﺎﺑﻊ اﻟﻔﺎﻋﻞ ﺑﺎﻟﺘﺠﻠﻲ و ﻫﻮ اﻟﺬي ﻳﻔﻌﻞ اﻟﻔﻌﻞ و ﻟﻪ ﻋﻠﻢ ﺳﺎﺑﻖ ﺗﻔﺼﻴﻠﻲ ﺑﻪ ﻫﻮ ﻋﲔ ﻛﺎﻧﺖ ﻛﺎﻧﺖ اﻟﺼﻮرة اﻷﺧﲑة ﻟﻨﻮﻋﻬﺎ ﺮدة ﻓﺈ5ﺎ ﳌﺎ R ﻛﺎﻟﻨﻔﺲ اﻹﻧﺴﺎﻧﻴﺔ ا ﻋﻠﻤﻪ اﻹﲨﺎﱄ ﺑﺬاﺗﻪ ﺎ و ﻋﻠﻤﻬﺎ اﳊﻀﻮري T ﺎ و آﺛﺎرﻫﺎ اﻟﻮاﺟﺪة ﳍﺎ ﰲ ذا T ﻛﻤﺎﻻ ﻋﻠﻰ ﺑﺴﺎﻃﺘﻬﺎ ﻫﻲ اﳌﺒﺪأ ﳉﻤﻴﻊ ﺎ و إن ﱂ T ﻛﻤﺎﻻ ﺎ ﻋﻠﻢ ﺑﺘﻔﺎﺻﻴﻞ Tﺑﺬا ﻛﺎﻟﻮاﺟﺐ ﺗﻌﺎﱃ ﺑﻨﺎء ﻋﻠﻰ ﻣﺎ ﻳﺘﻤﻴﺰ ﺑﻌﻀﻬﺎ ﻣﻦ ﺑﻌﺾ و ﺳﻴﺠﻲ ﻲ ء ﻣﻦ أن ﻟﻪ ﺗﻌﺎﱃ ﻋﻠﻤﺎ إﲨﺎﻟﻴﺎ ﰲ ﻋﲔ اﻟﻜﺸﻒ اﻟﺘﻔﺼﻴﻠ. اﻟﺜﺎﻣﻦ اﻟﻔﺎﻋﻞ ﺑﺎﻟﺘﺴﺨﲑ و ﻫﻮ اﻟﻔﺎﻋﻞ إذا ﻧﺴﺐ إﻟﻴﻪ ﻓﻌﻠﻪ ﻣﻦ ﺟﻬﺔ أن ﻟﻨﻔﺲ اﻟﻔﺎﻋﻞ ﻛﺎﻟﻘﻮى اﻟﻄﺒﻴﻌﻴﺔ و اﻟﻨ ﻓﺎﻋﻼ آﺧﺮ إﻟﻴﻪ ﻳﺴﺘﻨﺪ ﻫﻮ و ﻓﻌﻠﻪ ﻓﻬﻮ ﻓﺎﻋﻞ ﻣﺴﺨﺮ ﰲ ﻓﻌﻠﻪ ﺒﺎﺗﻴﺔ و ﻛﺎﻟﻔﻮاﻋﻞ اﻟﻜﻮﻧﻴﺔ اﳌﺴﺨﺮة ﻟﻠﻮاﺟﺐ ﺗﻌﺎﱃ ﰲ اﳊﻴﻮاﻧﻴﺔ اﳌﺴﺨﺮة ﰲ أﻓﻌﺎﳍﺎ ﻟﻠﻨﻔﺲ اﻹﻧﺴﺎﻧﻴﺔ و أﻓﻌﺎﳍﺎ. ﻛﻮن اﻟﻔﺎﻋﻞ ﺑﺎﳉﱪ و اﻟﻔﺎﻋﻞ ﺑﺎﻟﻌﻨﺎﻳﺔ ﻣﺒﺎﻳﻨﲔ ﻟﻠﻔﺎﻋﻞ ﺑﺎﻟﻘﺼﺪ ﻣﺒﺎﻳﻨﺔ ﻧﻮﻋﻴﺔ ﻋﻠﻰ ﻣﺎ و ﰲ ﻛﻼم ﻳﻘﺘﻀﻴﻪ اﻟﺘﻘﺴﻴﻢ .
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7.6. THE EFFICIENT CAUSE AND ITS KINDS The efficient cause, i.e. one that gives existence to the effect, has various kinds. According to the metaphysicians, the ‘agent’ has either knowledge of its action or it does not. In the latter case, the agent is either such that its action accords with its ‘nature’ or it does not. In the first case, it is called an ‘agent by nature,’ and in the second an ‘agent by constraint.’ An agent that has knowledge of its action is either such that its action is willed by it, or it is not. If it is not, it is an ‘agent by coercion.’ If its action is willed by it, either (i) its knowledge of its action coincides with its action or, rather, is the same as its action, in which case it is an ‘agent by agreement;’ (ii) its knowledge of its action precedes its action. In the latter case, its knowledge is either linked to an additional ‘motive,’ in which case it is an ‘agent by intention,’ or it is not linked to such an additional ‘motive,’ i.e. the very active knowledge of the action’ is the source of emanation of the effect. In this case, either that knowledge is something additional to the essence (dzât) jf the agent, or it is not. If it is, then the agent is an ‘agent by foreknowledge;’ if not, it is an ‘agent by manifestation.’ In the foregoing, if the agent is associated with its action in such a manner that itself and its action are actions of another agent, it is an ‘agent by subjection.’ Thus there are eight kinds of agents. (i) The ‘agent by nature’ (al-fâ’il bi al-thab) is one which has no knowledge of its action though it accords with its nature. An example of it is the soul on the plane of its natural bodily faculties: it performs its actions in accordance with its nature. (ii) The ‘agent by constraint’ (al-fâ’il bi al-qasr) is one which has no knowledge of its action and its action does not accord with its nature. An example of it is the soul on the plane of its faculties at the time of illness, during which its actions are disoriented from their healthy course due to constraining factors. (iii) The ‘agent by coercion’ (al-fâ’il bi al-jabr) is one which has knowledge of its action but carries it out unwillingly. An example of it is a person who is forced to do something he does not want to do. (iv) The ‘agent by agreement’ (al-fâ’il bi al-ridhâ) is one which has will, and its detailed knowledge of its action is the same as its action. Before the action it does not possess any except a non-detailed knowledge of it, a knowledge that the agent possesses by virtue of its own essence. Divine creativity is of this kind in the view of the Emanationists. (v) The ‘agent by intention’ (al-fâ’il bi al-qashd) is one which has will and foreknowledge of its action along with an additional motive for acting. An example of it is man in his voluntary actions. (vi) The ‘agent by foreknowledge’ (al-fâ’il bi al-‘inâyah) has will and a foreknowledge of its action additional to the agent’s essence. The very intelligible form (al-shûrat al-‘ilmiyyah) is the source of emergence of the action without there being any additional motive. An example of it is a man standing on a high tower, the very idea of falling being sufficient to make him fall to the ground. Divine creation is of this kind in the opinion of the Peripatetics.
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(vii) The ‘agent by manifestation’ (al-fâ’il bi al-tajallî) has detailed foreknowledge of its action, a foreknowledge that is the same as the ‘simple’ knowledge that it possesses of its essence. An example of it is the immaterial human soul, which, being the ultimate form for its species, despite its simplicity, is the source of all its perfections and properties that it possesses in its essence. Its immediate knowledge (‘ilm hudhûrî) of itself is a detailed knowledge of its perfections, though they are not distinguished from one an-other. Another example is the exalted Necessary Being in accordance with that which will be mentioned later on,’ that the Necessary Being possesses an undifferentiated knowledge that at the ; same time discloses details (‘ilman ijmâliyyan fî ‘ayn al-kasyf al-tafshîlî). (viii) The ‘agent by subjection’ (al-fâ’il bi al-taskhîr) is one whose action is ascribed to it from the point of view that the agent itself is an act of another agent, on which the agent itself and its action depend. Therefore such an agent is subject in its action to the higher agent. Examples of it are the physical, vegetative and animal faculties subject to the human soul in their actions, and the cosmic agents subject in their actions to the Necessary Being. However, we have reservations in regarding ‘agent by coercion’ and ‘agent by foreknowledge’ as being different in kind from ‘agent by intention,’ as implied by the above division.
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اﻟﻔﺼﻞ اﻟﺴﺎﺑﻊ ﻓﻲ اﻟﻌﻠﺔ اﻟﻐﺎﺋﻴﺔ و ﻫﻲ اﻟﻜﻤﺎل اﻷﺧﲑ اﻟﺬي ﻳﺘﻮﺟﻪ إﻟﻴﻪ اﻟﻔﺎﻋﻞ ﰲ ﻓﻌﻠﻪ. ﻛﺎﻧﺖ اﻟﻐﺎﻳﺔ ﻣﺮادة ﻟﻠﻔﺎﻋﻞ ﰲ ﻓﻌﻠﻪ و إن ﻛﺎن ﻟﻌﻠﻢ اﻟﻔﺎﻋﻞ دﺧﻞ ﰲ ﻓﺎﻋﻠﻴﺘﻪ ﻓﺈن ﺷﺌﺖ ﻛﺎن اﻟﻔﻌﻞ ﻣﺮادا ﻟﻪ ﻷﺟﻠﻬﺎ و ﳍﺬا ﻗﻴﻞ إن اﻟﻐﺎﻳﺔ ﻣﺘﻘﺪﻣﺔ ﻋﻠﻰ اﻟﻔﻌﻞ ﺗﺼﻮرا و ﻣﺘﺄﺧﺮة ﻋﻨﻪ ﻓﻘﻞ وﺟﻮدا. ﻛﺎﻧﺖ اﻟﻐﺎﻳﺔ ﻣﺎ ﻳﻨﺘﻬﻲ إﻟﻴﻪ اﻟﻔﻌﻞ و ذﻟﻚ أن و إن ﱂ ﻳﻜﻦ ﻟﻠﻌﻠﻢ دﺧﻞ ﰲ ﻓﺎﻋﻠﻴﺔ اﻟﻔﺎﻋﻞ ﻟﻜﻤﺎل اﻟﺸﻲ ﺜ ء ﻧﺴﺒﺔ ﺛﺎﺑﺘﺔ إﻟﻴﻪ ﻓﻬﻮ ﻣﻘﺘﺾ ﻟﻜﻤﺎﻟﻪ و ﻣﻨﻌﻪ ﻣﻦ ﻣﻘﺘﻀﺎﻩ داﺋﻤﺎ أو ﰲ أﻛ ﺮ ﻛﻤﺎﻟﻪ اﻟﺬي ﻛﻞ ﳑﻜﻦ إﱃ أوﻗﺎت وﺟﻮدﻩ ﻗﺴﺮ داﺋﻤﻲ أو أﻛﺜﺮي ﻳﻨﺎﰲ اﻟﻌﻨﺎﻳﺔ اﻹﳍﻴﺔ ﺑﺈﻳﺼﺎل أودع ﻓﻴﻪ اﺳﺘﺪﻋﺎؤﻩ ﻓﻠﻜﻞ ﺷﻲ ﻛﻤﺎﻟﻪ اﻷﺧﲑ اﻟﺬي ﻳﻘﺘﻀﻴﻪ و أﻣﺎ اﻟﻘﺴﺮ اﻷﻗﻠﻲ ء ﻏﺎﻳﺔ ﻫﻲ ﻓﻬﻮ ﺷﺮ ﻗﻠﻴﻞ ﻳﺘﺪارﻛﻪ ﻣﺎ ﲝﺬاﺋﻪ ﻣﻦ اﳋﲑ اﻟﻜﺜﲑ و إﳕﺎ ﻳﻘﻊ ﻓﻴﻤﺎ ﻳﻘﻊ ﰲ ﻧﺸﺄة اﳌﺎدة ﲟﺰاﲪﺔ اﻷ ﺔ ﺳﺒﺎب اﳌﺨﺘﻠﻔ.
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7.7. THE FINAL CAUSE It is its ultimate perfection (kamâl) towards which the agent is oriented in its action. If the agent’s knowledge has a role in its efficiency, the end is the agent’s purpose in his action. Alternately, one may say that his purpose is the action for the sake of reaching die end. Hence it is said that end precedes action conceptually but follows it externally. But if knowledge has no role in the agent’s efficiency, the end is that in which the action ultimately terminates. To explain, a thing’s perfection has a permanent relationship with it, and it requires that perfection. Restraining it from attaining that requirement of its nature either always (i.e., through a permanent restraint) or through most of its lifespan (i.e. through a major restraint) contradicts Divine Providence, which makes every contingent attain the perfection that it seeks. Hence everything has an end that is the ultimate perfection it requires. As to a minor restraint (which restrains a thing from attaining perfection during a minor part of its life), it is a minor evil that is compensated by an abundance of good. Moreover, this restraint, in cases where it is present, occurs only in the realm of matter due to disparate conflicting factors.
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اﻟﻔﺼﻞ اﻟﺜﺎﻣﻦ ﻓﻲ إﺛﺒﺎت اﻟﻐﺎﻳﺔ ﻓﻴﻤﺎ ﻳﻌﺪ ﻟﻌﺒﺎ أو ﺟﺰاﻓﺎ أو ﺑﺎﻃﻼ و اﻟﺤﺮﻛﺎت اﻟﻄﺒﻴﻌﻴﺔ و ﻏﻴﺮ ذﻟﻚ رﲟﺎ ﻳﻈﻦ أن اﻟﻔﻮاﻋﻞ اﻟﻄﺒﻴﻌﻴﺔ ﻻ ﻏﺎﻳﺔ ﳍﺎ ﰲ أﻓﻌﺎﳍﺎ ﻇﻨﺎ أن اﻟﻐﺎﻳﺔ ﳚﺐ أن ﺗﻜﻮن ﻣﻌﻠﻮﻣﺔ ﻣﺮادة ﻟﻠﻔﺎﻋﻞ ﻟﻜﻨﻚ ﻋﺮﻓﺖ أن اﻟﻐﺎﻳﺔ أﻋﻢ ﻣﻦ ذﻟﻚ و أن ﻟﻠﻔﻮاﻋﻞ اﻟﻄﺒﻴﻌﻴﺔ ﻏﺎﻳﺔ ﰲ أﻓﻌﺎﳍﺎ ﻫﻲ ﻣﺎ ﺎ .T ﻳﻨﺘﻬﻰ إﻟﻴﻪ ﺣﺮﻛﺎ ﻛﻤﻼﻋﺐ اﻟﺼﺒﻴﺎن ﲝ ﺮﻛﺎت ﻻ ﻏﺎﻳﺔ ﻛﺜﲑا ﻣﻦ اﻷﻓﻌﺎل اﻻﺧﺘﻴﺎرﻳﺔ ﻻ ﻏﺎﻳﺔ ﳍﺎ و رﲟﺎ ﻳﻈﻦ أن ﻛﺎﻧﺘﻘﺎل اﳌﺮﻳﺾ اﻟﻨﺎﺋﻢ ﻣﻦ ﺟﺎﻧﺐ إﱃ ﺟﺎﻧ ﺐ و ﻛﺎﻟﺘﻨﻔﺲ و ﻛﺎﻟﻠﻌﺐ ﺑﺎﻟﻠﺤﻴﺔ و ﳍﻢ ﻓﻴﻬﺎ و ﻛﻮﻗﻮف اﳌﺘﺤﺮك إﱃ ﻏﺎﻳﺔ ﻋﻦ ﻏﺎﻳﺘﻪ ﺑﻌﺮوض ﻣﺎﻧﻊ ﳝﻨﻌﻪ ﻋﻦ ذﻟﻚ إﱃ ﻏﲑ ذﻟﻚ ﻣﻦ ا ﺔ ﻷﻣﺜﻠ. و اﳊﻖ أن ﺷﻴﺌﺎ ﻣﻦ ﻫﺬﻩ اﻷﻓﺎﻋﻴﻞ ﻻ ﳜﻠﻮ ﻋﻦ ﻏﺎﻳﺔ ﺗﻮﺿﻴﺢ ذﻟﻚ أن ﰲ اﻷﻓﻌﺎل اﻹرادﻳﺔ ﻣﺒﺪأ ﻗﺮﻳﺒﺎ ﻟﻠﻔﻌﻞ ﻫﻮ اﻟﻘﻮة اﻟﻌﺎﻣﻠﺔ اﳌﻨﺒﺜﺔ ﰲ اﻟﻌﻀﻼت و ﻣﺒﺪأ ﻣﺘﻮﺳﻄﺎ ﻗﺒﻠﻪ و ﻫﻮ اﻟﺸﻮق اﳌﺴﺘﺘﺒﻊ ﻟﻺرادة و اﻹﲨﺎع و ﻣﺒﺪأ ﺑﻌﻴﺪا ﻗﺒﻠﻪ ﻫﻮ اﻟﻌﻠﻢ و ﻫﻮ ﺗﺼﻮر اﻟﻔﻌﻞ ﻋﻠﻰ وﺟﻪ ﺟﺰﺋﻲ اﻟ ﻞ ﺬي رﲟﺎ ﻗﺎرن اﻟﺘﺼﺪﻳﻖ ﺑﺄن اﻟﻔﻌﻞ ﺧﲑ ﻟﻠﻔﺎﻋ. و ﻟﻜﻞ ﻣﻦ ﻫﺬﻩ اﳌﺒﺎدي اﻟﺜﻼﺛﺔ ﻏﺎﻳﺔ و رﲟﺎ ﺗﻄﺎﺑﻘﺖ أﻛﺜﺮ ﻣﻦ واﺣﺪ ﻣﻨﻬﺎ ﰲ اﻟﻐﺎﻳﺔ و رﲟﺎ ﱂ ﻳﺘﻄﺎﺑﻖ. ﻛﺎن ﲣﻴﻼ ﻛﺎن ﻟﻠﻔﻌﻞ اﻹرادي ﻏﺎﻳﺔ ﻓﻜﺮﻳﺔ و إذا ﻛﺎن اﳌﺒﺪأ اﻷول و ﻫﻮ اﻟﻌﻠﻢ ﻓﻜﺮﻳﺎ ﻓﺈذا ﻛﺎن ﲣﻴﻼ ﻓﻘﻂ ﰒ ﻣﻦ ﻏﲑ ﻓﻜﺮ ﻓﺮﲟﺎ ﺗﻌﻠﻖ ﺑﻪ اﻟﺸﻮق ﰒ ﺣﺮﻛﺖ اﻟﻌﺎﻣﻠﺔ ﳓﻮﻩ اﻟﻌﻀﻼت و ﻛﻤﺎ رﲟﺎ ﺗﺼﻮر اﻟﺼﱯ ﺣﺮﻛﺔ ﻣﻦ اﳊﺮﻛﺎت ﻓﻴﺸﺘﺎق إﻟﻴﻬﺎ ﻓﻴﺄﰐ -ﺎ و ﻳﺴﻤﻰ اﻟﻔﻌﻞ ﻋﻨﺪﺋﺬ ﺟﺰاﻓﺎ ﻛﻠﻬﺎ ﻣﺎ اﻧﺘﻬﺖ إﻟﻴﻪ اﳊﺮﻛﺔ ﺣﻴﻨﺌﺬ ﻏﺎﻳﺔ ﻟﻠﻤﺒﺎدي . ﻛﺎن ﲣﻴﻼ ﻣﻊ ﻛﺎﻟﻌﺒﺚ ﺑﺎﻟﻠﺤﻴﺔ و ﻳﺴﻤﻰ ﻋﺎدة و رﲟﺎ ﻛﺎن ﲣﻴﻼ ﻣﻊ ﺧﻠﻖ و ﻋﺎدة و رﲟﺎ ﻃﺒﻴ ﻛﻞ ﻣﻦ ﻫﺬﻩ ﻛﺎﻟﺘﻨﻔﺲ أو ﲣﻴﻼ ﻣﻊ ﻣﺰاج ﻛ ﺤ ﺮﻛﺎت اﳌﺮﻳﺾ و ﻳﺴﻤﻰ ﻗﺼﺪا ﺿﺮورﻳﺎ و ﰲ ﻌﺔ ﺎ ﻣﺎ اﻧﺘﻬﺖ إﻟﻴﻪ اﳊﺮة و أﻣﺎ اﻟﻐﺎﻳﺔ اﻟﻔﻜﺮﻳﺔ ﻓﻠﻴﺲ 5 ﺎ و ﻗﺪ ﺗﻄﺎﺑﻘﺖ ﰲ أ T اﻷﻓﻌﺎل ﳌﺒﺎدﻳﻬﺎ ﻏﺎﻳﺎ ﳍﺎ ﻣﺒﺪأ ﻓﻜﺮي ﺣﱴ ﺗﻜﻮن ﻟﻪ ﻏﺎﻳﺘﻪ. ﻛﻞ ﻣﺒﺪإ ﻣﻦ ﻫﺬﻩ اﳌﺒﺎدي إذا ﱂ ﻳﻮﺟﺪ ﻏﺎﻳﺘﻪ ﻻﻧﻘﻄﺎع اﻟﻔﻌﻞ و غ إﱃ اﻟﻐﺎﻳﺔ دون اﻟﺒﻠﻮ ﺑﻌﺮوض ﻣﺎﻧﻊ ﻣﻦ اﳌﻮاﻧﻊ ﲰﻲ اﻟﻔﻌﻞ ﺑﺎﻟﻨﺴﺒﺔ إﻟﻴﻪ ﺑﺎﻃﻼ و اﻧﻘﻄﺎع اﻟﻔﻌﻞ ﺑﺴﺒﺐ ﻣﺎﻧﻊ ﳛﻮل ﺑﻴﻨﻪ ﻛﻮن اﻟﻔﺎﻋﻞ ﻻ ﻏﺎﻳﺔ ﻟﻪ ﰲ ﻓﻌﻠﻪ و ﺑﲔ اﻟﻮﺻﻮل إﱃ اﻟﻐﺎﻳﺔ ﻏﲑ .
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7.8. THE UNIVERSALITY OF THE FINAL CAUSE At times it is imagined that physical agents have no end in their actions. It is presumed that an end necessarily involves conscious purpose on the agent’s part. However, as we have seen, the idea of end is more general than that, and the end of physical agents in their actions is that in which their motions terminate. Sometimes it is imagined that many voluntary actions have no end, such as children in play, wherein their movements have no final goal. Other instances of it are such acts as stroking one’s beard, breathing, the listless movements of a sick person in sleep turning from one side to another, the interruption of an object’s movement in the middle of its journey towards its destination. Actually none of these agents are devoid of an end. To explain, there are three causal sources involved in voluntary actions. The proximate source of action is the motor faculty present in the muscles. Then there is the intermediate source, which precedes the first one. It is desire, followed by will and execution. The remote causal source is ideation, which entails the formation of the particular idea of the action in the mind, which is also often accompanied by a judgement that the action entails some benefit for the agent. Every one of these sources possesses an end. Often there is a coincidence of ends in one or more of these sources, and at times there is no such coincidence. Hence if the first stage involves ideation, which is knowledge, the voluntary action will have a ideated end. But if it involves only imagination, without there being any forethought, and is followed by desire and motor action of the muscles, the action is called a ‘capricious act.’ This happens in the case of play, where a child first fancies some activity, then its desire is aroused to perform it, whereupon it proceeds to carry it out. That in which the movements terminate is then the end of all the three causal sources. At times, imagination is accompanied with disposition and habit, as in the case of stroking one’s beard. Then the act resulting is called ‘habitual’ (al-‘âdah). At times, imagination is accompanied with nature (tabî’ah), as in the case of voluntary breathing. At other times, imagination is accompanied by a disturbed condition of the health, as in the case of the actions of a sick person, in which case it is called ‘action by natural intention.’ In each of these actions there are causal sources with ends, and they all correspond to that in which the action terminates. As to a ideated end, these actions do not have an ideational causal source that may have such an end. When the end is not realized for any of these causal sources due to the interruption of the action by some hindrance that stops it short of its end, the action is named ‘vain’ (bathîl) in relation to the end. The interruption of action due to a hindrance that keeps it from reaching its end is something other than the agent not possessing an end in its action.
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اﻟﻔﺼﻞ اﻟﺘﺎﺳﻊ ﻓﻲ ﻧﻔﻲ اﻟﻘﻮل ﺑﺎﻻﺗﻔﺎق و ﻫﻮ اﻧﺘﻔﺎء اﻟﺮاﺑﻄﺔ ﺑﻴﻦ ﻣﺎ ﻳﻌﺪ ﻏﺎﻳﺔ ﻟﻸﻓﻌﺎل و ﺑﻴﻦ اﻟﻌﻠﻞ اﻟﻔﺎﻋﻠﻴﺔ رﲟﺎ ﻳﻈﻦ أن ﻣﻦ اﻟﻐﺎﻳﺎت اﳌﱰﺗﺒﺔ ﻋﻠﻰ اﻷﻓﻌﺎل ﻣﺎ ﻫﻲ ﻏ ﲑ ﻣﻘﺼﻮدة ﻟﻔﺎﻋﻠﻬﺎ و ﻻ ﻣﺮﺗﺒﻄﺔ ﺑﻪ ﻛﻨﺰ و اﻟﻌﺜﻮر ﻋﻠﻰ اﻟﻜﻨﺰ ﻟﻴﺲ ﻏﺎﻳﺔ ﳊﻔﺮ و ﻣﺜﻠﻮا ﻟﻪ ﲟﻦ ﳛﻔﺮ ﺑﺌﺮا ﻟﻴﺼﻞ إﱃ اﳌﺎء ﻓﻴﻌﺜﺮ ﻋﻠﻰ اﻟﺒﺌﺮ ﻣﺮﺗﺒﻄﺔ ﺑﻪ و ﻳﺴﻤﻰ ﻫﺬا اﻟﻨﻮع ﻣﻦ اﻻﺗﻔﺎق ﲞﺘﺎ ﺳﻌﻴﺪا و ﲟﻦ ﻳﺄوي إﱃ ﺑﻴﺖ ﻟﻴﺴﺘﻈﻞ ﻓﻴﻨﻬﺪم ﻋﻠﻴﻪ ﻓﻴﻤﻮت و ﻳﺴﻤﻰ ﻫﺬا اﻟﻨﻮع ﻣﻦ اﻻﺗﻔﺎق ﲞﺘﺎ ﺷﻘﻴﺎ. ﻛﻴﻨﻮﻧﺔ اﻟﻌﺎﱂ ﻓﻘﺎل إن ﻋﺎﱂ اﻷﺟﺴﺎم ﻣﺮﻛﺒﺔ ﻣﻦ و ﻋﻠﻰ ذﻟﻚ ﺑﲎ ﺑﻌﺾ ﻋﻠﻤﺎء اﻟﻄﺒﻴﻌﺔ أﺟﺰاء ﺻﻐﺎر ذرﻳﺔ ﻣﺒﺜﻮﺛﺔ ﰲ ﺧﻼء ﻏﲑ ﻣﺘﻨﺎﻩ و ﻫﻲ داﺋﻤﺔ اﳊﺮﻛﺔ ﻓﺎﺗﻔﻖ أن ﺗﺼﺎدﻣﺖ ﲨﻠﺔ ﻣﻨﻬﺎ ﻓﺎﺟﺘﻤﻌﺖ ﻓﻜﺎﻧﺖ اﻷﺟﺴﺎم ﻓﻤﺎ ﺻﻠﺢ ﻟﻠﺒﻘﺎء ﺑﻘﻲ و ﻣﺎ ﱂ ﻳﺼﻠﺢ ﻟﺬﻟﻚ ﻓﲎ ﺳﺮﻳﻌﺎ أو ﺑﻄﻴﺌﺎ. و اﳊﻖ أن ﻻ ا ﺗﻔﺎق ﰲ اﻟﻮﺟﻮد و ﻟﻨﻘﺪم ﻟﺘﻮﺿﻴﺢ ذﻟﻚ ﻣﻘﺪﻣﺔ ﻫﻲ أن اﻷﻣﻮر اﻟﻜﺎﺋﻨﺔ ﳝﻜﻦ أن ﺗﺘﺼﻮر ﻋﻠﻰ وﺟﻮﻩ أرﺑﻌﺔ ﻣﻨﻬﺎ ﻣﺎ ﻫﻮ داﺋﻤﻲ اﻟﻮﺟﻮد و ﻣﻨﻬﺎ ﻣﺎ ﻫﻮ أﻛﺜﺮي اﻟﻮﺟﻮد و ﻣﻨﻬﺎ ﻛﻮﺟﻮد ﻛﻘﻴﺎم زﻳﺪ و ﻗﻌﻮدﻩ ﻣﺜﻼ و ﻣﻨﻬﺎ ﻣﺎ ﳛﺼﻞ ﻧﺎدرا و ﻋﻠﻰ اﻷﻗﻞ ﻣﺎ ﳛﺼﻞ ﺑﺎﻟﺘﺴﺎوي اﻹﺻﺒﻊ اﻟﺰاﺋﺪ ﰲ اﻹﻧﺴﺎن. و اﻷﻣﺮ اﻷﻛﺜﺮي اﻟﻮﺟﻮد ﻳﻔﺎرق اﻟﺪاﺋﻤﻲ اﻟﻮﺟﻮد ﺑﻮﺟﻮد ﻣﻌﺎرض ﻳﻌﺎرﺿﻪ ﰲ ﺑﻌﺾ اﻷﺣﻴﺎن ﻛﻌﺪد أﺻﺎﺑﻊ اﻟﻴﺪ ﻓﺈ5ﺎ ﲬﺴﺔ ﻋﻠﻰ اﻷﻏﻠﺐ و رﲟﺎ أﺻﺎﺑﺖ اﻟﻘﻮة اﳌﺼﻮرة ﻟﻺﺻﺒﻊ ﻣﺎدة زاﺋﺪة ﻛﻮن اﻷﺻﺎﺑﻊ ﲬﺴﺔ ﻣﺸﺮوط ﺑﻌﺪم ﺎ إﺻﺒﻌﺎ و ﻣﻦ ﻫﻨﺎ ﻳﻌﻠﻢ أن T ﺻﺎﳊﺔ ﻟﺼﻮرة اﻹﺻﺒﻊ ﻓﺼﻮر ﻣﺎدة زاﺋﺪة و أن اﻷ ﻣﺮ -ﺬا اﻟﺸﺮط داﺋﻤﻲ اﻟﻮﺟﻮد ﻻ أﻛﺜﺮﻳﻪ و أن اﻷﻗﻠﻲ اﻟﻮﺟﻮد ﻣﻊ اﺷﱰاط ﻛﺎن اﻷﻛﺜﺮي و اﻷﻗﻠﻲ داﺋﻤﻴﲔ ﺑﺎﳊﻘﻴﻘﺔ اﳌﻌﺎرض اﳌﺬﻛﻮر أﻳﻀﺎ داﺋﻤﻲ اﻟﻮﺟﻮد ﻻ أﻗﻠﻴﻪ و إذا ﻛﻠﻬﺎ داﺋﻤﻴﺔ اﻟﻮﺟﻮد ﺟﺎرﻳﺔ ﻋﻠﻰ ﻧﻈﺎم ﺛﺎﺑﺖ ﻻ ﳜﺘﻠﻒ و ﻻ ﻓﺎﻷﻣﺮ ﰲ اﳌﺴﺎوي ﻇﺎﻫﺮ ﻓﺎﻷﻣﻮر ﻳﺘﺨﻠﻒ. ﻛﺬ ﻛﺎن و إذا ﻛﻤﺎﱄ ﻣﱰﺗﺐ ﻋﻠﻰ ﻓﻌﻞ ﻓﺎﻋﻞ ﺗﺮﺗﺒﺎ داﺋﻤﻴﺎ ﻻ ﳜﺘﻠﻒ و ﻻ ﻟﻚ ﻓﻠﻮ ﻓﺮض أﻣﺮ ﻳﺘﺨﻠﻒ ﺣﻜﻢ اﻟﻌﻘﻞ ﺣﻜﻤﺎ ﺿﺮورﻳﺎ ﻓﻄﺮﻳﺎ ﺑﻮﺟﻮد راﺑﻄﺔ وﺟﻮدﻳﺔ ﺑﲔ اﻷﻣﺮ اﻟﻜﻤﺎﱄ اﳌﺬﻛﻮر و ﺑﲔ ﻓﻌﻞ اﻟﻔﺎﻋﻞ راﺑﻄﺔ ﺗﻘﻀﻲ ﺑﻨﻮع ﻣﻦ اﻻﲢﺎد اﻟﻮﺟﻮدي ﺑﻴﻨﻬﻤﺎ ﻳﻨﺘﻬﻲ إﻟﻴﻪ ﻗﺼﺪ اﻟﻔﺎﻋﻞ ﻟﻔﻌﻠﻪ و ﻫﺬا ﻫﻮ اﻟﻐﺎﻳﺔ. و ﻟﻮ ﺟ ﺎز ﻟﻨﺎ أن ﻧﺮﺗﺎب ﰲ ارﺗﺒﺎط ﻏﺎﻳﺎت اﻷﻓﻌﺎل ﺑﻔﻮاﻋﻠﻬﺎ ﻣﻊ ﻣﺎ ذﻛﺮ ﻣﻦ دوام اﻟﱰﺗﺐ ﺟﺎز ﻟﻨﺎ أن ﻧﺮﺗﺎب ﰲ ارﺗﺒﺎط اﻷﻓﻌﺎل ﺑﻔﻮاﻋﻠﻬﺎ و ﺗﻮﻗﻒ اﳊﻮادث و اﻷﻣﻮر ﻋﻠﻰ ﻋﻠﺔ ﻓﺎﻋﻠﻴﺔ إذ
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ﻛﺜﲑ ﻣﻦ اﻟﻘﺎﺋﻠﲔ ﻟﻴﺲ ﻫﻨﺎك إﻻ ﻣﻼزﻣﺔ وﺟﻮدﻳﺔ و ﺗﺮﺗﺐ داﺋﻤﻲ و ﻣﻦ ﻫﻨﺎ ﻣﺎ أﻧﻜﺮ ﺑﺎﻻﺗﻔﺎق اﻟﻌﻠﺔ اﻟﻔﺎﻋﻠﻴ ﻲ ﻛﻤﺎ أﻧﻜﺮ اﻟﻌﻠﺔ اﻟﻐﺎﺋﻴﺔ و ﺣﺼﺮ اﻟﻌﻠﻴﺔ ﰲ اﻟﻌﻠﺔ اﳌﺎدﻳﺔ و ﺳﺘﺠ ﺔ ء اﻹﺷﺎرة إﻟﻴﻪ. ﻓﻘﺪ ﺗﺒﲔ ﻣﻦ ﲨﻴﻊ ﻣﺎ ﺗﻘﺪم أن اﻟﻐﺎﻳﺎت اﻟﻨﺎدرة اﻟﻮﺟﻮد اﳌﻌﺪودة ﻣﻦ اﻻﺗﻔﺎق ﻏﺎﻳﺎت داﺋﻤﻴﺔ ﻛﻨﺰ ﻳﻌﺜﺮ ﻋﻠﻰ اﻟﻜﻨﺰ داﺋﻤﺎ ذاﺗﻴﺔ ﻟﻌﻠﻠﻬﺎ و إﳕﺎ ﺗﻨﺴﺐ إﱃ ﻏﲑﻫﺎ ﺑﺎﻟﻌﺮض ﻓﺎﳊﺎﻓﺮ ﻷرض ﲢﺘﻬﺎ و ﻫﻮ ﻏﺎﻳ ﺔ ﻟﻪ ﺑﺎﻟﺬات و إﳕﺎ ﺗﻨﺴﺐ إﱃ اﳊﺎﻓﺮ ﻟﻠﻮﺻﻮل إﱃ اﳌﺎء ﺑﺎﻟﻌﺮض و ﻛﺬا اﻟﺒﻴﺖ اﻟﺬي ﺪام ﻳﻨﻬﺪم ﻋﻠﻰ ﻣﻦ ﻓﻴﻪ داﺋﻤﺎ و ﻫﻮ ﻏﺎﻳﺔ ﻟﻠﻤﺘﻮﻗﻒ ﻓﻴﻪ ﺑﺎﻟﺬات و 5 اﺟﺘﻤﻌﺖ ﻋﻠﻴﻪ أﺳﺒﺎب اﻻ إﳕﺎ ﻋﺪت ﻏﺎﻳﺔ ﻟﻠﻤﺴﺘﻈﻞ ﺑﺎﻟﻌﺮض ﻓﺎﻟﻘﻮل ﺑﺎﻻﺗﻔﺎق ﻣﻦ اﳉﻬﻞ ﺑﺎﻟﺴﺒﺐ.
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7.9. REFUTATION OF CHANCE At times it is conjectured that there are some ends that are unwittingly achieved by an agent’s action without being aimed at by it. This is illustrated by the example of a man who digs a well for water but comes upon a treasure trove. Finding a treasure is not consequential to one’s digging a well. These kinds of occurrences are called cases of ‘good luck.’ Another example is the case of a man who takes shelter under a roof for the sake of its shade and is killed due to the roof collapsing upon him. Such occurrences are called incidents of ‘bad luck.’ Some natural philosophers have based their view of the universe on this conjecture, holding that the world of physical bodies was composed of small atomic particles scattered in an infinite space in which they were in constant motion. By chance a group of them collided and collocated to form the bodies, of which those that are capable of enduring endure while others are subject to rapid or gradual annihilation. The truth is that there is no chance in the world of existence. Here it will be beneficial to give a brief introduction for the sake of explanation. We can conceive phenomena as falling into four classes. A group of them occurs invariably. Another group of them consists of those that occur most of the time. Some ail those that occur half of the time (like someone’s standing or sitting), while there are others that occur only rarely (like the possession of a sixth finger on one’s hand). Those which occur most of the time differ from those which occur always due to the occasional existence of a conflicting factor, as in the case of the number of fingers on the hand, which is five most of the time. However, occasionally, the fashioning principle of the fingers (in the foetus) comes upon a surplus matter possessing the capacity to assume the form of a finger and it shapes that into a finger. From this it is known that the fingers’ being five is conditional upon the non-existence of surplus matter, and this phenomenon with this condition occurs invariably, not most of the time. That which occurs rarely will also occur invariably and always on condition of presence of the conflicting factor. Hence if the phenomena that occur mostly or rarely in fact occur invariably on the presence of the requisite conditions, the case of the phenomena that occur half of the time is quite obvious. Hence all phenomena involve causal invariability and follow a fixed system that neither changes nor is violated. Such being the case, if we suppose a certain perfection to be unalterably and inexorably consequential to the action of an agent, the natural and selfevident judgement of the intellect is that there exists an existential relationship implying a kind of existential union between the agent and that perfection. That perfection is what the agent aims at by its action, and this is what ‘the end’ means. If we may entertain a doubt concerning the existence of relationship between ends of actions and their agents despite what has been said concerning the invariability of this relationship, we may as well doubt concerning the relationship of actions to their agents and the dependence of events and phenomena upon efficient causes, for here too there is nothing except an invariable association and a mutual existential necessity between
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the agent and its action. It is for this reason that many of those who believe in chance have denied the existence of the efficient cause in the same way as they have rejected the final cause, confining causality exclusively to material causes, as will be pointed out in the next section. From the above discussion it becomes clear that the rare outcomes that are reckoned as instances of chance are invariable and essential ends of their causes, which are only accidentally ascribed to something else. Hence one who digs the ground under which a treasure lies invariably finds the treasure, and that is an essential end of his action, though it is accidentally ascribed to one digging for water. Similarly, a roof that possesses all the prerequisites for collapsing collapses invariably over someone under it, and that is the essential end of his action, though it is accidentally reckoned is the end of one seeking shelter from the sun. On the basis of this, the belief in chance arises from ignorance of causes.
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اﻟﻔﺼﻞ اﻟﻌﺎﺷﺮ ﻓﻲ اﻟﻌﻠﺔ ﺔ اﻟﺼﻮرﻳﺔ و اﻟﻤﺎدﻳ أﻣﺎ اﻟﻌﻠﺔ اﻟﺼﻮرﻳﺔ ﻓﻬﻲ اﻟﺼﻮرة ﲟﻌﲎ ﻣﺎ ﺑﻪ اﻟﺸﻲ ء ﻫﻮ ﻫﻮ ﺑﺎﻟﻔﻌﻞ ﺑﺎﻟﻨﺴﺒﺔ إﱃ اﻟﻨﻮع اﳌﺮﻛﺐ ﻣﻨﻬﺎ و ﻣﻦ اﳌﺎدة ﻓﺈن ﻟﻮﺟﻮد اﻟﻨﻮع ﺗﻮﻗﻔﺎ ﻋﻠﻴﻬﺎ ﺑﺎﻟﻀﺮورة و أﻣﺎ ﺑﺎﻟﻨﺴﺒﺔ إﱃ اﳌﺎدة ﻓﻬﻲ ﺻﻮرة و ﺷﺮﻳﻜﺔ اﻟﻌﻠﺔ اﻟﻔﺎﻋﻠﻴﺔ ﻋﻠﻰ ﻣﺎ ﺗﻘﺪم و ﻗﺪ ﺗﻄﻠﻖ اﻟﺼﻮرة ﻋﻠﻰ ﻣﻌﺎن أﺧ ﺎ ﺮ ﺧﺎرﺟﺔ ﻣﻦ ﻏﺮﺿﻨ. و أﻣﺎ اﻟﻌﻠﺔ اﳌﺎدﻳﺔ ﻓﻬﻲ اﳌﺎدة ﺑﺎﻟﻨﺴﺒﺔ إﱃ اﻟﻨﻮع اﳌﺮﻛﺐ ﻣﻨﻬﺎ و ﻣﻦ اﻟﺼﻮرة ﻓﺈن ﻟﻮﺟﻮد اﻟﻨﻮع ﺗﻮﻗﻔﺎ ﻋﻠﻴﻬﺎ ﺑﺎﻟﻀﺮورة و أﻣﺎ ﺑﺎﻟﻨﺴﺒﺔ إﱃ اﻟﺼﻮرة ﻓﻬﻲ ﻣﺎدة ﻗﺎﺑﻠﺔ ﻣﻌﻠﻮﻟﺔ ﳍﺎ ﻋﻠﻰ ﻣﺎ ﺗﻘﺪم. و ﻗﺪ ﺣﺼﺮ ﻗﻮم ﻣﻦ اﻟﻄﺒﻴﻌﻴﲔ اﻟﻌﻠﺔ ﰲ اﳌﺎدة و اﻷﺻﻮل اﳌﺘﻘﺪﻣﺔ ﺗﺮدﻩ ء ﻓﺈن اﳌﺎدة ﺳﻮا ﻛﺎﻧﺖ اﻷوﱃ أو اﻟﺜﺎﻧﻴﺔ ﺣﻴﺜﻴﺘﻬﺎ اﻟﻘﻮة و ﻻزﻣﻬﺎ اﻟﻔﻘﺪان و ﻣﻦ اﻟﻀﺮوري أﻧﻪ ﻻ ﻳﻜﻔﻲ ﻹﻋﻄﺎء ﻓﻌﻠﻴﺔ اﻟﻨﻮع و إﳚﺎدﻫﺎ ﻓﻼ ﻳﺒﻘﻰ ﻟﻠﻔﻌﻠﻴﺔ إﻻ أن ﺗﻮﺟﺪ ﻣﻦ ﻏﲑ ﻋﻠﺔ و ﻫﻮ ﳏﺎل. و أﻳﻀﺎ ﻗﺪ ﺗﻘﺪم أن اﻟﺸﻲ ء ﻣﺎ ﱂ ﳚﺐ ﱂ ﻳﻮﺟﺪ و اﻟﻮﺟﻮب اﻟﺬي ﻫﻮ اﻟﻀﺮورة و اﻟﻠﺰوم ﻻ ﳎﺎل ﻻﺳﺘﻨﺎدﻩ إﱃ اﳌﺎدة اﻟﱵ ﺣﻴﺜﻴﺘﻬﺎ اﻟﻘﺒﻮل و اﻹﻣﻜﺎن ﻓﻮراء اﳌﺎدة أﻣﺮ ﻳﻮﺟﺐ اﻟﺸﻲ ء و ﻳﻮﺟﺪﻩ و ﻟﻮ اﻧﺘﻔﺖ راﺑﻄﺔ اﻟﺘﻼزم اﻟﱵ إﳕﺎ ﺗﺘﺤﻘﻖ ﺑﲔ اﻟﻌﻠﺔ و اﳌﻌﻠﻮل أو ﺑﲔ ﻣﻌﻠﻮﱄ ﻋﻠﺔ ﺛﺎﻟﺜﺔ و ارﺗﻔﻌﺖ ﻣﻦ ﺑﲔ اﻷﺷﻴﺎء ﺑﻄﻞ اﳊﻜﻢ ﺑﺎﺳﺘﺘﺒﺎع أي ﺷﻲ ﺷﻲ ء ﻷي إ ء و ﱂ ﳚﺰ اﻻﺳﺘﻨﺎد ﱃ ﺣﻜﻢ ﺛﺎﺑﺖ و ﻫﻮ ﺧﻼف اﻟﻀﺮورة اﻟﻌﻘﻠﻴﺔ و ﻟﻠﻤﺎدة ﻣﻌﺎن أﺧﺮ ﻏﲑ ﻣﺎ ﺗﻘﺪم ﺧﺎرﺟﺔ ﻣﻦ ﻏﺮﺿﻨﺎ.
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7.10. FORMAL AND MATERIAL CAUSE The formal cause (al-‘illat al-shûriyyah) is the ‘form,’ which makes a thing what it is in actuality. It is a ’cause’ in relation to the species, which is a composite of form and matter, for the existence of species necessarily depends upon it. However, in relation to ‘matter’ it is ‘form’ and a participant in the efficient cause, as mentioned earlier.’ There are other meanings of the term ‘form’ with which we are not concerned here. The material cause (al-‘illat al-mâddiyyah) is ‘matter’ in relation to the species, which is a composite of it and ‘form,’ for the existence of species necessarily depends upon it. However, in relation to the ‘form’ it is ‘matter,’ which receives it and is its effect, as mentioned earlier. A group of natural philosophers have confined causation to matter, but the above-mentioned principles refute such a view. That is because matter, whether ‘prime’ or ‘secondary’ (e.g. sperm or seed), is the bearer of potentiality, which necessarily entails ‘privation’ (fuqdân), and it is selfevident that it is not sufficient to give actuality to the species and bring it into existence. (Thus if the role of the efficient, final and formal causes is denied), the only alternative that remains is to admit that actuality comes into being without a cause, which is impossible. Moreover, as mentioned earlier, a thing does not come into existence until it is necessitated, and there remains no ground for deriving such a necessity except matter, whose mode of being is receptivity and potentiality. Therefore, there must be something beyond matter that necessitates the thing and brings it into existence. If the nexus of necessity between the cause and the effect or between two effects of a third cause be eliminated from things, everything would be the cause of everything else, the law of causality would be invalid and one could not take recourse in any fixed law. Such a position is contrary to what is regarded as self-evident by the intellect. There are other meanings of the tern: ‘matter’ with which we are not concerned here.
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اﻟﻔﺼﻞ اﻟﺤﺎدي ﻋﺸﺮ ﻓﻲ اﻟﻌﻠﺔ اﻟﺠﺴﻤﺎﻧﻴﺔ اﻟﻌﻠﻞ اﳉﺴﻤﺎﻧﻴﺔ ﻣﺘﻨﺎﻫﻴﺔ أﺛﺮا ﻣﻦ ﺣﻴﺚ اﻟﻌﺪة و اﳌﺪة و اﻟﺸﺪة ﻗﺎﻟﻮا ﻷن اﻷﻧﻮاع اﳉﺴﻤﺎﻧ ﻴﺔ ﻛﻞ ﻣﺘ ﺤ ﺮﻛﺔ ﺑﺎﳊﺮﻛﺔ اﳉﻮﻫﺮﻳﺔ ﻓﺎﻟﻄﺒﺎﺋﻊ و اﻟﻘﻮى اﻟﱵ ﳍﺎ ﻣﻨﺤﻠﺔ ﻣﻨﻘﺴﻤﺔ إﱃ ﺣﺪود و أﺑﻌﺎض ﻣﻨﻬﺎ ﳏﻔﻮف ﺑﺎﻟﻌﺪﻣﲔ ﳏﺪود ذاﺗﺎ و أﺛﺮا. ﺎ ﳌﺎ 5 و أﻳﻀﺎ اﻟﻌﻠﻞ اﳉﺴﻤﺎﻧﻴﺔ ﻻ ﺗﻔﻌﻞ إﻻ ﻣﻊ وﺿﻊ ﺧﺎص ﺑﻴﻨﻬﺎ و ﺑﲔ اﳌﺎدة ﻗﺎﻟﻮا ﻷ اﺣﺘﺎﺟﺖ ﰲ وﺟﻮدﻫﺎ إﱃ اﳌﺎدة اﺣﺘﺎﺟﺖ ﰲ إﳚﺎدﻫﺎ إﻟﻴﻬ ﺎ و اﳊﺎﺟﺔ إﻟﻴﻬﺎ ﰲ اﻹﳚﺎد ﻫﻲ ﺑﺄن ﻛﺎن ﻟﻠﻘﺮب و اﻟﺒﻌﺪ و اﻷوﺿﺎع اﳋﺎﺻﺔ ﳛﺼﻞ ﳍﺎ ﺑﺴﺒﺒﻬﺎ وﺿﻊ ﺧﺎص ﻣﻊ اﳌﻌﻠﻮل و ﻟﺬﻟﻚ دﺧﻞ ﰲ ﺗﺄﺛﲑ اﻟﻌﻠﻞ اﳉﺴﻤﺎﻧﻴﺔ.
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7.11. THE BODILY CAUSE The bodily causes have a limited efficiency from the viewpoint of number, duration and existential intensity (of the effects they can produce). The metaphysicians hold that bodily species are in substantial motion (alharakât al-jawhariyyah); hence their specific forms and faculties are divisible and analyzable into limits and stages, each of which is bracketed by two non-beings. They are finite in themselves as well as in their external effects. Also, bodily causes do not act without there being a special configuratation between them and the matter of the thing affected. The metaphysicians state that since the bodily cause needs matter for its existence, it also needs matter for bringing something else into existence. Its need for matter in bringing into existence lies in its attaining through matter a special position in relation to the thing affected. Hence proximity and remoteness and special configurations interfere in the effectiveness of bodily causes.
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اﻟﻤﺮﺣﻠﺔ اﻟﺜﺎﻣﻨﺔ ﻓﻲ اﻧﻘﺴﺎم اﻟﻤﻮﺟﻮد إﻟﻰ اﻟﻮاﺣﺪ و اﻟﻜﺜﻴﺮ و ﻓﻴﻬﺎ ﻋﺸﺮة ﻓﺼﻮل CHAPTER EIGHT: The Division of Existence into One and Many 10 Units
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اﻟﻔﺼﻞ اﻷول ﻓﻲ ﻣﻌﻨﻰ اﻟﻮاﺣﺪ و اﻟﻜﺜﻴﺮ اﳊﻖ أن ﻣﻔﻬﻮﻣﻲ اﻟﻮﺣﺪة و اﻟﻜﺜﺮة ﻣﻦ اﳌﻔﺎﻫﻴﻢ اﻟﻌﺎﻣﺔ اﻟﱵ ﺗﻨﺘﻘﺶ ﰲ اﻟﻨﻔﺲ اﻧﺘﻘﺎﺷﺎ أوﻟﻴﺎ ﻛﺎن ﺗﻌﺮﻳﻔﻬﻤﺎ ﺑﺄن اﻟﻮاﺣﺪ ﻣﺎ ﻻ ﻳﻨﻘﺴﻢ ﻛﻤﻔﻬﻮم اﻟﻮﺟﻮد و ﻣﻔﻬﻮم اﻹﻣﻜﺎن و ﻧﻈﺎﺋﺮﳘﺎ و ﻟﺬا ﻣﻦ ﺣﻴﺚ إﻧﻪ ﻻ ﻳﻨﻘﺴﻢ و اﻟﻜﺜﲑ ﻣﺎ ﻳﻨﻘﺴﻢ ﻣﻦ ﺣﻴﺚ ﻛﺎﻧﺎ إﻧﻪ ﻳﻨﻘﺴﻢ ﺗﻌﺮﻳﻔﺎ ﻟﻔﻈﻴﺎ و ﻟﻮ ﺗﻌﺮﻳﻔﲔ ﺣﻘﻴﻘﻴﲔ ﱂ ﳜﻠﻮا ﻣﻦ ﻓﺴﺎد ﻟﺘﻮﻗﻒ ﺗﺼﻮر ﻣﻔﻬﻮم اﻟﻮاﺣﺪ ﻋﻠﻰ ﺗﺼﻮر ﻣﻔﻬﻮم ﻣﺎ ﻳﻨﻘﺴﻢ و ﻫﻮ ﻣﻔﻬﻮم اﻟﻜﺜﲑ و ﺗﻮﻗﻒ ﺗﺼﻮر ﻣﻔﻬﻮم اﻟﻜﺜﲑ ﻋﻠﻰ ﺗﺼﻮر ﻣﻔﻬﻮم اﳌﻨﻘﺴﻢ اﻟﺬي ﻫﻮ ﻋﻴﻨﻪ و ﺑﺎﳉﻤﻠﺔ اﻟﻮﺣﺪة ﻫﻲ ﺣﻴﺜﻴﺔ ﻋﺪم اﻻﻧﻘﺴﺎم و اﻟﻜﺜﺮة ﺣﻴﺜﻴﺔ اﻻﻧﻘﺴﺎم. ﺗﻨﺒﻴﻪ ﺎ ﺗﺒﺎﻳﻨﻪ ﻣﻔﻬﻮﻣﺎ ﻓﻜﻞ ﻣﻮﺟﻮد ﻓﻬﻮ ﻣﻦ ﺣﻴﺚ إﻧﻪ 5 ﻛﻤﺎ أ اﻟﻮﺣﺪة ﺗﺴﺎوق اﻟﻮﺟﻮد ﻣﺼﺪاﻗﺎ ﻛﻞ واﺣﺪ ﻓﻬﻮ ﻣﻦ ﺣﻴﺚ إﻧﻪ واﺣﺪ ﻣﻮﺟﻮد ﻛﻤﺎ أن ﻣﻮﺟﻮد واﺣﺪ ﻛﺎﻟﻮاﺣﺪ ﻛﻮن اﻟﻜﺜﲑ ﻣﻮﺟﻮدا ﻓﺈن ﻗﻠﺖ اﻧﻘﺴﺎم اﳌﻮﺟﻮد اﳌﻄﻠﻖ إﱃ اﻟﻮاﺣﺪ و اﻟﻜﺜﲑ ﻳﻮﺟﺐ ﻛﻮن اﻟﻜ ﻷﻧﻪ ﻣﻦ أﻗﺴﺎم اﳌﻮﺟﻮد و ﻳﻮﺟﺐ أﻳﻀﺎ ﻤﺎ ﻗﺴﻴﻤﺎن و 5 ﺜﲑ ﻏﲑ اﻟﻮاﺣﺪ ﻣﺒﺎﻳﻨﺎ ﻟﻪ ﻷ ﻛﺜﲑ ﻟﻴﺲ ﺑﻮاﺣﺪ و اﻟﻘﺴﻴﻤﺎن ﻣﺘﺒﺎﻳﻨﺎن ﺑﺎﻟﻀﺮورة ﻓﺒﻌﺾ اﳌﻮﺟﻮد و ﻫﻮ اﻟﻜﺜﲑ ﻣﻦ ﺣﻴﺚ ﻫﻮ ﻛﻞ ﻣﻮﺟﻮد ﻓﻬﻮ واﺣﺪ ﻫﻮ ﻳﻨﺎﻗﺾ اﻟﻘﻮل ﺑﺄن . ﻗﻠﺖ ﻟﻠﻮاﺣﺪ اﻋﺘﺒﺎران اﻋﺘﺒﺎرﻩ ﰲ ﻧﻔﺴﻪ ﻣﻦ دون ﻗﻴﺎس اﻟﻜﺜﲑ إﻟﻴﻪ ﻓﻴﺸﻤﻞ اﻟﻜﺜﲑ ﻓﺈن
اﻟﻜﺜﲑ ﻣﻦ ﺣﻴﺚ ﻫﻮ ﻣﻮﺟﻮ د ﻓﻬﻮ واﺣﺪ ﻟﻪ وﺟﻮد واﺣﺪ و ﻟﺬا ﻳﻌﺮض ﻟﻪ اﻟﻌﺪد ﻓﻴﻘﺎل ﻣﺜﻼ ت و اﻋﺘﺒﺎرﻩ ﻣﻦ ﺣﻴﺚ ﻳﻘﺎﺑﻞ اﻟﻜﺜﲑ ﻓﻴﺒﺎﻳﻨﻪ ﻛﺜﺮا ﻛﺜﺮة واﺣﺪة و ﻋﺸﺮة واﺣﺪة و ﻋﺸﺮات و . ﻛﻤﺎ ﻧﺄﺧﺬ اﻟﻮﺟﻮد ﺗﺎرة ﻣﻦ ﺣﻴﺚ ﻧﻔﺴﻪ و وﻗﻮﻋﻪ ﻗﺒﺎل ﻣﻄﻠﻖ اﻟﻌﺪم ﺗﻮﺿﻴﺢ ذﻟﻚ أﻧﺎ ﻓﻴﺼﲑ ﻋﲔ اﳋﺎرﺟﻴﺔ و ﺣﻴﺜﻴﺔ ﺗﺮﺗﺐ اﻵﺛﺎر و ﻧﺄﺧﺬﻩ ﺗﺎرة أﺧﺮى ﻓﻨﺠﺪﻩ ﰲ ﺣﺎل ﺗﱰﺗﺐ ﻋﻠﻴﻪ آﺛﺎرﻩ و ﰲ ﺣﺎل أﺧﺮى ﻻ ﺗﱰﺗﺐ ﻋﻠﻴﻪ ﺗﻠﻚ اﻵﺛﺎر و إن ﺗﺮﺗﺒﺖ ﻋﻠﻴﻪ آﺛﺎر أﺧﺮى ﻓﻨﻌﺪ وﺟﻮدﻩ اﳌﻘﻴﺲ وﺟﻮدا ذﻫﻨﻴﺎ ﻻ ﺗﱰﺗﺐ ﻋﻠﻴﻪ اﻵﺛﺎر و وﺟﻮدﻩ اﳌﻘﻴﺲ ﻋﻠﻴﻪ وﺟﻮدا ﺧﺎرﺟﻴﺎ ﺗﱰﺗﺐ ﻋﻠﻴﻪ اﻵﺛﺎر و ﻻ ﻳﻨﺎﰲ ذﻟﻚ ﻗﻮﻟﻨﺎ إن اﻟﻮﺟﻮد ﻳﺴﺎوق اﻟﻌﻴﻨﻴﺔ و اﳋﺎرﺟ ر ﻴﺔ و إﻧﻪ ﻋﲔ ﺗﺮﺗﺐ اﻵﺛﺎ. ﻛﺬﻟﻚ رﲟﺎ ﻧﺄﺧﺬ ﻣﻔﻬﻮم اﻟﻮاﺣﺪ ﺑﺈﻃﻼﻗﻪ ﻣﻦ ﻏﲑ ﻗﻴﺎس ﻓﻨﺠﺪﻩ ﻳﺴﺎوق اﻟﻮﺟﻮد ﻣﺼﺪاﻗﺎ ﻓﻜﻞ ﻣﺎ ﻫﻮ ﻣﻮﺟﻮد ﻓﻬﻮ ﻣﻦ ﺣﻴﺚ وﺟﻮدﻩ واﺣﺪ و ﳒﺪﻩ ﺗﺎرة أﺧﺮى و ﻫﻮ ﻣﺘﺼﻒ ﺑﺎﻟﻮﺣﺪة ﻛﺎﻹﻧﺴﺎن اﻟﻮاﺣﺪ ﺑﺎﻟﻌﺪد و اﻹﻧﺴﺎن اﻟﻜﺜﲑ ﺑﺎﻟﻌﺪد ﰲ ﺣﺎل و ﻏﲑ ﻣﺘﺼﻒ -ﺎ ﰲ ﺣﺎل أﺧﺮى اﳌ ﻛﺜﲑا ﻣﻘﺎﺑﻼ ﻟﻠﻮاﺣﺪ اﻟﺬي ﻫﻮ ﻗﺴﻴﻤﻪ و ﻻ ﻳﻨﺎﰲ ذﻟﻚ ﻘﻴﺲ إﱃ اﻟﻮاﺣﺪ ﺑﺎﻟﻌﺪد ﻓﻨﻌﺪ اﳌﻘﻴﺲ ﻗﻮﻟﻨﺎ اﻟﻮاﺣﺪ ﻳﺴﺎوق اﳌﻮﺟﻮد اﳌﻄﻠﻖ و اﳌﺮاد ﺑﻪ اﻟﻮاﺣﺪ ﲟﻌﻨﺎﻩ اﻷﻋﻢ اﳌﻄﻠﻖ ﻣﻦ ﻏﲑ ﻗﻴﺎس.
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8.1. THE MEANING OF ‘ONE’ AND ‘MANY’ The truth is that the concepts of unity (wahdah) and multiplicity (katsrah) – as with the concepts of existence, contingency and the like – are general concepts, which are impressed on the mind with a primary impression (i.e. without the mediation of any intermediary concepts). Hence such definitions of them as have been suggested – such as, “The one is that which is indivisible, from the aspect of its indivisibility,” and “The many is that which is divisible, from the aspect of its divisibility” – are verbal definitions. For it they were taken to be true definitions, they would not be free from defect due to the dependence of the concept of ‘one’ on that of ‘what is divisible,’ which is the same as ‘many,’ and the dependence of the concept of ‘many1 on that of ‘divisible,’ which is identical with it. Unity is the mode of indivisibility, and multiplicity that of divisibility. Note Unity coincides with existence from the viewpoint of extension (mishdâq), but differs from it in respect of intension (mafhûm). Hence every existent qua existent is one, in the same way as every ‘one’ qua ‘one’ is existent. An objection may be raised here which may be stated as follows: The division of unconditioned (muthlaq) existence into ‘one’ and ‘many’ implies that what is ‘many’ should as well be existent like the ‘one,’ for it is a division of existence. It also implies that ‘many’ is other than ‘one,’ being different from it; for the two are divisions, and divisions necessarily exclude one another. It follows that some existents that are ‘many’ in respect of their multiplicity are not ‘one.’ This contradicts the statement that “every existent is one.” The answer to this objection is that ‘one’ here possesses two different considerations (i’tibâr). In one consideration it is considered in itself, without comparing it with ‘many,’ and this includes that which is ‘many.’ Therefore, ‘many’ qua existent is ‘one,’ and it has one existence. That is why it yields to enumeration, as when we say, for instance, one dozen, two dozen and so on, or one set, two sets, three sets and so on. There is another consideration for ‘one’ wherein it is opposed to ‘many’ and contrary to it. To explain, at one time we consider existence in itself and as being opposed to absolute non-existence. In this consideration it becomes identical with ‘externality’ and the mode of possession of external properties (atsâr). At another time we consider it in a manner wherein we either find it as possessing its external properties or lacking these properties (though in the latter case, too, it. possesses certain other properties). Accordingly, we consider this latter kind of existence when compared to external as ‘mental,’ which does not possess the external properties, and the existence to which it is compared as ‘external existence,’ which possesses the external properties. Yet this does not contradict the statement that ‘existence coincides with reality and externality,’ which is identical with the possession of properties. In the same way, at times we take the concept of ‘one’ in a nonconditional and non-comparative sense, wherein we find it as coinciding with ‘existence’ extensionally. Hence everything that is existent is ‘one’ in respect of its existence. At other times, we view being as marked with unity
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in a certain state and without being marked with it in another state (for instance, a numerically single man, and a number of men who make up a multitude when compared to one man, and make up a multitude in opposition to one, which is a unit of the multitude). This does not contradict the previous statement that ‘one’ coincides with non-conditioned existence, and ‘one’ here has a general and absolute meaning that is non-comparative.
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اﻟﻔﺼﻞ اﻟﺜﺎﻧﻲ ﻓﻲ أﻗﺴﺎم اﻟﻮاﺣﺪ اﻟﻮاﺣﺪ إﻣﺎ ﺣﻘﻴﻘﻲ و إﻣﺎ ﻏﲑ ﺣﻘﻴﻘﻲ و اﳊﻘﻴﻘﻲ ﻣﺎ اﺗﺼﻒ ﺑﺎ ﻟﻮﺣﺪة ﺑﻨﻔﺴﻪ ﻣﻦ ﻏﲑ ﻛﺎﻹﻧﺴﺎن و اﻟﻔﺮس اﳌﺘﺤﺪﻳﻦ ﰲ ﻛﺎﻹﻧﺴﺎن اﻟﻮاﺣﺪ و ﻏﲑ اﳊﻘﻴﻘﻲ ﲞﻼﻓﻪ واﺳﻄﺔ ﰲ اﻟﻌﺮوض اﳊﻴﻮاﻧﻴﺔ. و اﻟﻮاﺣﺪ اﳊﻘﻴﻘﻲ إﻣﺎ ذات ﻣﺘﺼﻔﺔ ﺑﺎﻟﻮﺣﺪة و إﻣﺎ ذات ﻫﻲ ﻧﻔﺲ اﻟﻮﺣﺪة اﻟﺜﺎﱐ ﻫﻲ ﻛﻞ ﺷﻲ ﻛﻮﺣﺪة اﻟﺼﺮف ﻣﻦ اﻟﻮﺣﺪة اﳊﻘﺔ ﺣ ﻛﺎﻧﺖ ﻋﲔ اﻟﺬات ﻓﺎﻟﻮاﺣﺪ و اﻟﻮ ء و إذا ﺪة ﻓﻴﻪ ﺷﻲ ﺣﺪ ﻛﺎﻹﻧﺴﺎن اﻟﻮا ء واﺣﺪ و اﻷول ﻫﻮ اﻟﻮاﺣﺪ ﻏﲑ اﳊﻖ . و اﻟﻮاﺣﺪ ﺑﺎﻟﻮﺣﺪة ﻏﲑ اﳊﻘﺔ إﻣﺎ واﺣﺪ ﺑﺎﳋﺼﻮص و إﻣﺎ واﺣﺪ ﺑﺎﻟﻌﻤﻮم و اﻷول ﻫﻮ اﻟﻮاﺣﺪ ﺑﺎﻟﻌﺪد و ﻫﻮ اﻟﺬي ﻳﻔﻌﻞ ﺑﺘﻜﺮرﻩ اﻟﻌﺪد و اﻟﺜﺎﱐ ﻛﺎﻟﻨﻮع اﻟﻮاﺣﺪ و اﳉﻨﺲ اﻟﻮاﺣﺪ. و اﻟﻮاﺣﺪ ﺑﺎﳋﺼﻮص إﻣﺎ أن ﻻ ﻳﻨﻘﺴﻢ ﻣﻦ ﺣﻴﺚ ﻛﻤﺎ ﻻ اﻟﻄﺒﻴﻌﺔ اﳌﻌﺮوﺿﺔ ﻟﻠﻮﺣﺪة أﻳﻀﺎ ﻳﻨﻘﺴﻢ ﻣﻦ ﺣﻴﺚ وﺻﻒ وﺣﺪﺗﻪ و إﻣﺎ أن ﻳﻨﻘﺴﻢ و اﻷول إﻣﺎ ﻧﻔﺲ ﻣﻔﻬﻮم اﻟﻮﺣﺪة و ﻋﺪم ﻛﺎﳌﻔﺎرق و ﻫﻮ إﻣﺎ ﻛﺎﻟﻨﻘﻄﺔ اﻟﻮاﺣﺪة و إﻣﺎ ﻏﲑ وﺿﻌﻲ اﻻﻧﻘﺴﺎم و إﻣﺎ ﻏﲑﻩ و ﻏﲑﻩ إﻣﺎ وﺿﻌﻲ ﻛﺎﻟﻌﻘﻞ ﻛﺎﻟﻨﻔﺲ و إﻣﺎ ﻏﲑ ﻣﺘﻌﻠﻖ ﻣﺘﻌﻠﻖ ﺑﺎﳌﺎدة ﺑﻮﺟﻪ و اﻟﺜﺎﱐ و ﻫﻮ ﻛﺎﳌﻘﺪار اﻟﺬي ﻳﻘﺒﻞ اﻻﻧﻘﺴﺎم ﲝﺴﺐ ﻃﺒﻴﻌﺘﻪ اﳌﻌﺮوﺿﺔ إﻣﺎ أن ﻳﻘﺒﻠﻪ ﺑﺎﻟﺬات ﻛﺎﳉﺴﻢ اﻟﻄﺒﻴﻌﻲ اﻟﻮاﺣﺪ ﻣﻦ ﺟﻬﺔ ﻣﻘﺪارﻩ اﻟﻮاﺣﺪ و إﻣﺎ أن ﻳﻘﺒﻠﻪ ﺑﺎﻟﻌﺮض . و اﻟﻮاﺣﺪ ﺑﺎﻟﻌﻤﻮم إﻣﺎ واﺣﺪ ﺑﺎﻟﻌﻤﻮم اﳌﻔﻬﻮﻣﻲ و إﻣﺎ واﺣﺪ ﺑﺎﻟﻌﻤﻮم ﲟﻌﲎ اﻟﺴﻌﺔ اﻟﻮﺟﻮدﻳﺔ ﻛﻮﺣﺪة اﻹﻧﺴﺎن و و اﻷول إﻣﺎ واﺣﺪ ﻧﻮﻋﻲ ﻛﻮﺣﺪة اﳊﻴﻮان و إﻣﺎ واﺣﺪ إﻣﺎ واﺣﺪ ﺟﻨﺴﻲ ﻛﺎﻟﻮﺟﻮد اﳌﻨﺒﺴﻂ ﻛﻮﺣﺪة اﳌﺎﺷﻲ و اﻟﻀﺎﺣﻚ و اﻟﻮاﺣﺪ ﺑﺎﻟﻌﻤﻮم ﲟﻌﲎ اﻟﺴﻌﺔ اﻟﻮﺟﻮدﻳﺔ ﻋﺮﺿﻲ . و اﻟﻮاﺣﺪ ﻏﲑ اﳊﻘﻴﻘﻲ ﻣﺎ اﺗﺼﻒ ﺑﺎﻟﻮﺣﺪة ﺑﻌﺮض ﻏﲑﻩ ﺑﺄن ﻳﺘﺤﺪ ﻧﻮع اﲢﺎد ﻣﻊ واﺣﺪ ﻛﺰﻳﺪ و ﻋﻤﺮو ﻓﺈ5ﻤﺎ واﺣﺪ ﰲ اﻹﻧﺴﺎن و اﻹﻧﺴﺎن و اﻟﻔﺮس ﻓ ﺣﻘﻴﻘﻲ ﺈ5ﻤﺎ واﺣﺪ ﰲ اﳊﻴﻮان و ﲣﺘﻠﻒ أﲰﺎء اﻟﻮاﺣﺪ ﻏﲑ اﳊﻘﻴﻘﻲ ﺑﺎﺧﺘﻼف ﺟﻬﺔ اﻟﻮﺣﺪة ﺑﺎﻟﻌﺮض ﻓﺎﻟﻮﺣﺪة ﰲ ﻣﻌﲎ اﻟﻨﻮع ﺗﺴﻤﻰ ﲤﺎﺛﻼ و ﰲ ﻣﻌﲎ اﳉﻨﺲ ﲡﺎﻧﺴﺎ و ﰲ اﻟﻜﻴﻒ ﺗﺸﺎ-ﺎ و ﰲ اﻟﻜﻢ ﺗﺴﺎوﻳﺎ و ﰲ اﻟﻮﺿﻊ ﺗﻮازﻳﺎ و ﰲ اﻟﻨﺴﺒﺔ ﺗﻨﺎﺳﺒﺎ ﻛﺬا ﻗﺮروا ﻛﻞ ﻣﻦ اﻷﻗﺴﺎم اﳌﺬﻛﻮرة ﻇﺎﻫﺮ و وﺟﻮد .
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8.2. THE KINDS OF ‘ONE’ ‘One’ is either: (i) ‘literal’ (haqîqî), or: (ii) ‘figurative’ (ghayr haqîqî). The ‘literal one’ is something which is itself qualified with unity, without needing the mediation of an intermediary in such qualification, e.g. an individual human being. The ‘figurative^ one’ is the contrary of it, e.g. man and horse when reckoned as ‘one’ by virtue of their being animals. The ‘literal one’ is either: (ia) such that its essence (dzât) is qualified with unity, or: (ib) its essence is unity itself. The first kind of ‘literal one’ (ia) is called ‘non-true one’ (al-wahîd gbayr al-haqq), e.g. one man. The second (ib) is called ‘true unity’ (al-wahdat al-haqqah), such as the unity of anything taken in its absoluteness, whereat unity becomes identical with its essence. Therefore, one and unity are one thing in it. The one with a non-true unity is either: (ia l) a ‘particularized one,’ or: (ia 2) a ‘generalized one.’ The first is what is numerically one, and it is that which forms a number through repetition. Instances of the second are one species and one genus. The ‘particularized one’ is either: (ia 1a) such that it is indivisible from the aspect of the nature qualified with unity, apart from being indivisible from the aspect of its unity, or: (ia 1b) it is divisible. Of the first is: (ia 1a1) the concept of unity and indivisibility itself or (ia la 2) something else. That something else either (ia la 2a) has a spatial location, e.g. a (geometric) point, or ( ia la 2b) it does not e.g. something which is immaterial. That which is immaterial is either: (ia la 2b l) attached in some manner to matter, e.g. the soul, or (ia la 2b 2) it is not, e.g. the Intellect. The second ( i.e., ia lb), which accepts division from the aspect of its nature (qualified with unity), either (ia lb l) yields to division by itself, e.g. a unit quantity, or (ia lb 2) yields to it accidentally, e.g. a natural body from the aspect of its quantity. The ‘generalized one’ (ia 2) is either: (ia 2a) a generalized one in terms of concept, or is: (ia 2b) generalized in terms of existential expanse. The first is either: (ia 2a l) specific (such as the unity of ‘man’), or (ia 2a 2) generic (such as the unity of ‘animal’), or (ia 2a 3) accidental (such as the unity of ‘walker’ and ‘laugher’). The ‘generalized one in the sense of existential expanse’ is the allpervading existence. As to that which is one figuratively – i.e. that which is qualified by unity accidentally through something else – it has a kind of union with that which is literally one, e.g. Zayd and Amr, who are one in respect of belonging to the species ‘man,’ or man and horse, which are one in respect of belonging to the genus ‘animal.’ The terms for the figurative one differ in accordance with the aspect of the accidental unity. Thus unity in the sense of belonging to a certain species is called ‘homospecific’ (tamâtsul), in the sense of belonging to a genus ‘homogeny’ ( tajânus), with respect to quality ‘similarity’ (tasyâbuh), with respect to quantity ‘equality’ (tasâwî), with respect to position ‘homology’ (tawâzî), and with respect to relation ‘symmetry of relation’ (tanâsub). It is evident that every one of these divisions exists. This is how the philosophers have described this classification.
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اﻟﻔﺼﻞ اﻟﺜﺎﻟﺚ اﻟﻬﻮﻫﻮﻳﺔ ﻞ و ﻫﻮ اﻟﺤﻤ ﻛﻤﺎ أن ﻣﻦ ﻋﻮارض اﻟﻜﺜﺮة اﻟﻐﲑﻳﺔ ﰒ اﳍﻮﻫﻮﻳﺔ ﻫﻲ اﻻﲢﺎد ﰲ ﻣﻦ ﻋﻮارض اﻟﻮﺣﺪة اﳍﻮﻫﻮﻳﺔ ﻛﻞ ﳐﺘﻠﻔﲔ ﺟﻬﺔ ﻣﺎ ﻣﻊ اﻻﺧﺘﻼف ﻣﻦ ﺟﻬﺔ ﻣﺎ و ﻫﺬا ﻫﻮ اﳊﻤﻞ و ﻻزﻣﻪ ﺻﺤﺔ اﳊﻤﻞ ﰲ ﺑﻴﻨﻬﻤﺎ اﲢﺎد ﻣﺎ ﻟﻜﻦ اﻟﺘﻌﺎرف ﺧﺺ إﻃﻼق اﳊﻤﻞ ﻋﻠﻰ ﻣﻮردﻳﻦ ﻣﻦ اﻻﲢﺎد ﺑﻌﺪ اﻻﺧﺘﻼف. أﺣﺪﳘﺎ أن ﻳﺘﺤﺪ اﳌﻮﺿﻮع و اﶈﻤﻮل ﻣﻔﻬﻮﻣﺎ و ﻣﺎﻫﻴﺔ و ﳜﺘﻠﻔﺎ ﺑﻨﻮع ﻣﻦ اﻻﻋﺘﺒﺎر ﻛﺎﻻﺧﺘﻼف ﺑﺎﻹﲨﺎل و اﻟﺘﻔﺼﻴﻞ ﰲ ﻗﻮﻟﻨﺎ اﻹﻧﺴﺎن ﺣﻴﻮان ﻧﺎﻃﻖ ﻓﺈن اﳊﺪ ﻋﲔ اﶈﺪود ﻛﺎﻻﺧﺘﻼف ﺑﻔﺮض اﻧﺴﻼب اﻟﺸﻲ ﻣﻔﻬﻮﻣﺎ و إﳕﺎ ﳜﺘﻠﻔﺎن ﺑﺎﻹﲨﺎل و اﻟﺘﻔﺼﻴﻞ و ء ﻋﻦ ﻧﻔﺴﻪ ﻓﺘﻐﺎﻳﺮ ﻧﻔﺴﻪ ﻧﻔﺴﻪ ﰒ ﳛﻤﻞ ﻋﻠﻰ ﻧﻔ ﺴﻪ ﻟﺪﻓﻊ ﺗﻮﻫﻢ اﳌﻐﺎﻳﺮة ﻓﻴﻘﺎل اﻹﻧﺴﺎن إﻧﺴﺎن و ﻳﺴﻤﻰ ﻫﺬا اﳊﻤﻞ ﺑﺎﳊﻤﻞ اﻟﺬاﰐ اﻷوﱄ. ﻛﻘﻮﻟﻨﺎ اﻹﻧﺴﺎن ﺿﺎﺣﻚ و زﻳﺪ ﻗﺎﺋﻢ و و ﺛﺎﻧﻴﻬﻤﺎ أن ﳜﺘﻠﻒ أﻣﺮان ﻣﻔﻬﻮﻣﺎ و ﻳﺘﺤﺪا وﺟﻮدا ﻳﺴﻤﻰ ﻫﺬا اﳊﻤﻞ ﺑﺎﳊﻤﻞ اﻟﺸﺎﺋﻊ اﻟﺼﻨﺎﻋﻲ.
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8.3. PREDICATION Identity (al-huwa huwiyyah, lit. it-is-itness) is one of the characteristics of unity, in the same way as otherness (ghayriyyah) is among the characteristics of multiplicity. Further, identity signifies unity in a certain aspect by the side of difference in some other aspect. This is what predication is, and it implies that predication is correct between any two different things that have some kind of unity between them. Common usage has however restricted predication to two cases wherein unity is subsequent to difference. One of them is when the subject and the predicate are one in respect of intension and quiddity, but differ in respect of some consideration, such as the difference of brevity and elaborateness in such statements as ‘man is a rational animal.’ Here the defining term and the term defined are identical in meaning, but differ only in respect .of brevity and elaborateness. Another example is the difference involved in such statements as ‘man is man,’ wherein any doubt concerning the violability of the law of identity is dispelled. This kind of predication is called ‘primary essential predication’ (al-haml al-dzâtî al-awwalî) The second kind of predication occurs in statements where two terms differ in meaning but are united in respect to existence, e.g., the statement ‘Man is risible’ or ‘Zayd is standing’ This kind of predication is called ‘common technical predication.’
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اﻟﻔﺼﻞ اﻟﺮاﺑﻊ ﺗﻘﺴﻴﻤﺎت ﻟﻠﺤﻤﻞ اﻟﺸﺎﺋﻊ و ﻳﻨﻘﺴﻢ اﳊﻤﻞ اﻟﺸﺎﺋﻊ إﱃ ﲪﻞ ﻫﻮ ﻫﻮ و ﻫﻮ أن ﳛﻤﻞ اﶈﻤﻮل ﻋﻠﻰ اﳌﻮﺿﻮع ﺑﻼ اﻋﺘﺒﺎر أﻣﺮ زاﺋﺪ ﳓﻮ اﻹﻧﺴﺎن ﺿﺎﺣﻚ و ﻳﺴﻤﻰ أﻳﻀﺎ ﲪﻞ اﳌﻮاﻃﺎة و ﲪﻞ ذي ﻫﻮ و ﻫﻮ أن ﻳﺘﻮﻗﻒ ﻛﺰﻳﺪ ﻋﺪل أي ذو ﻋﺪل ﻛﺘﻘﺪﻳﺮ ذي أو اﻻﺷﺘﻘﺎق اﲢﺎد اﶈﻤﻮل ﻣﻊ اﳌﻮﺿﻮع ﻋﻠﻰ اﻋﺘﺒﺎر زاﺋﺪ أو ﻋﺎدل. ﻛﺎﻧﺖ ﳌﻮﺿﻮﻋﻪ أﻓﺮاد ﳏﻘﻘﺔ ﻳﺼﺪق ﻋﻠﻴﻬﺎ و ﻳﻨﻘﺴﻢ أﻳﻀﺎ إﱃ ﺑﱵ و ﻏﲑ ﺑﱵ و اﻟﺒﱵ ﻣﺎ ﻛﺎ ﻛﺎﻹﻧﺴﺎن ﺿﺎﺣﻚ و اﻟﻜﺎﺗﺐ ﻣﺘﺤﺮك اﻷﺻﺎﺑﻊ و ﻏﲑ اﻟﺒﱵ ﻣﺎ ﻋﻨﻮاﻧﻪ ﻧﺖ ﳌﻮﺿﻮﻋﻪ أﻓﺮاد ﻛﻞ اﺟﺘﻤﺎع اﻟﻨﻘﻴﻀﲔ ﳏﺎل ﻛﻞ ﻣﻌﺪوم ﻣﻄﻠﻖ ﻓﺈﻧﻪ ﻻ ﳜﱪ ﻋﻨﻪ و ﻛﻘﻮﻟﻨﺎ ﻣﻘﺪرة ﻏﲑ ﳏﻘﻘﺔ . و ﻳﻨﻘﺴﻢ أﻳﻀﺎ إﱃ ﺑﺴﻴﻂ و ﻣﺮﻛﺐ و ﻳﺴﻤﻴﺎن اﳍﻠﻴﺔ اﻟﺒﺴﻴﻄﺔ و اﳍﻠﻴﺔ اﳌﺮﻛﺒﺔ و اﳍﻠﻴﺔ ﻛﺎن ﻛﻘﻮﻟﻨﺎ اﻹﻧﺴﺎن ﻣﻮﺟﻮد و اﳌﺮﻛﺒﺔ ﻣﺎ ﻛﺎن اﶈﻤﻮل ﻓﻴﻬﺎ وﺟﻮد اﳌﻮﺿﻮع اﻟﺒﺴﻴﻄﺔ ﻣﺎ اﶈﻤﻮل ﻛﻘﻮﻟﻨﺎ اﻹﻧﺴﺎن ﺿﺎﺣﻚ ﻓﻴﻬﺎ أﺛﺮا ﻣﻦ آﺛﺎر وﺟﻮدﻩ . و ﺑﺬﻟﻚ ﻳﻨﺪﻓﻊ ﻣﺎ اﺳﺘﺸﻜﻞ ﻋﻠﻰ ﻗﺎﻋﺪة اﻟﻔﺮﻋﻴﺔ و ﻫﻲ أن ﺛﺒﻮت ﺷﻲ ﻲ ء ﻟﺸ ء ﻓﺮع ﺛﺒﻮت اﳌﺜﺒﺖ ﻟﻪ ﺑﺄن ﺛﺒﻮت اﻟﻮﺟﻮد ﻟﻺﻧﺴﺎن ﻣﺜﻼ ﰲ ﻗﻮﻟﻨﺎ اﻹﻧﺴﺎن ﻣﻮﺟﻮد ﻓﺮع ﺛﺒﻮت اﻹﻧﺴﺎن ﻗﺒﻠﻪ ﻓﻠﻪ وﺟﻮد ﻗﺒﻞ ﺛﺒﻮت اﻟﻮﺟﻮد ﻟﻪ و ﲡﺮي ﻓﻴﻪ ﻗﺎﻋﺪة ﻞ اﻟﻔﺮﻋﻴﺔ و ﻫﻠﻢ ﺟﺮا ﻓﻴﺘﺴﻠﺴ. وﺟﻪ اﻻﻧﺪﻓﺎع أن ﻗﺎﻋﺪة اﻟﻔﺮﻋﻴﺔ إﳕﺎ ﲡﺮي ﰲ ﺛﺒﻮت ﺷﻲ ﻲ ء ﻟﺸ ء و ﻣﻔﺎد اﳍﻠﻴﺔ اﻟﺒﺴﻴﻄﺔ ﺛﺒﻮت اﻟﺸﻲ ﺷﻲ ء ﻻ ﺛﺒﻮت ﻲ ء ﻟﺸ ة ء ﻓﻼ ﲡﺮي ﻓﻴﻬﺎ اﻟﻘﺎﻋﺪ.
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8.4. KINDS OF COMMON PREDICATION Common predication is classified into ‘non-derivative’ (haml hû hû, also called haml al-muwâthât) and ‘derivative’ (haml dzî hû). In non-derivative predication, the predicate is predicated to the subject without the use of any additional expression (such as a proposition), e.g. ‘Man is risible.’ In derivative predication the agreement of the predicate with the subject depends on the use of an additional element or a derivative. Predication is also classified into ‘actualized’ (battî, lit. definite) and ‘non-actualized’ (ghayr battî, lit. non-definite). In an actualized predication, the subject refers to actual individual instances to which the term representing the subject applies, e.g. ‘Men are risible’ and ‘Horses are quadrupeds.’ In non-actualized predication individuals subsumed in the subject are non-actualized, as in such statements as ‘All absolute nonexistents are predícateless’ and ‘The co-presence of two contradictories is impossible.’ Predication is also classified into ‘simple’ (basîth) and composite (murakkab). In simple predication, the predicate signifies the existence of the subject, e.g. ‘Man is existent.’ In composite predication, the predicate denotes one of the properties of the subject, e.g. ‘Man is risible.’ On the basis of the above discussion we can refute an objection which is raised on the basis of the Rule of Subordination (which states that the affirmation of a quality for something is subordinate to the subsistence of the thing of which the quality is posited) may be refuted. The objection states that the statement ‘Man is existent,’ for instance, is a corollary to the prior subsistence of man, which implies that ‘man’ has existence prior to the affirmation of his existence in accordance with the Rule of Subordination, and this involves an indefinite regress. The refutation of this objection is that the said rule applies to cases where one thing is affirmed of another, whereas the import of a simple predication is the affirmation of a thing’s subsistence, not affirmation of one thing in regard to another. Hence the Rule of Subordination does not apply in such a case.’
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اﻟﻔﺼﻞ اﻟﺨﺎﻣﺲ ﻓﻲ اﻟﻐﻴﺮﻳﺔ و اﻟﺘﻘﺎﺑﻞ ﻗﺪ ﺗﻘﺪم أن ﻣﻦ ﻋﻮارض اﻟﻜﺜﺮة اﻟﻐﲑﻳﺔ و ﻫﻲ ﺗﻨﻘﺴﻢ إﱃ ﻏﲑﻳﺔ ذاﺗﻴﺔ و ﻏﲑ ذاﺗﻴﺔ و اﻟﻐﲑﻳﺔ ﻛﻮن اﳌﻐﺎﻳﺮة ﺑﲔ اﻟﺸﻲ اﻟﺬاﺗﻴﺔ ﻫﻲ ﻛﺎﳌﻐﺎﻳﺮة ﺑﲔ اﻟﻮﺟﻮد و اﻟﻌﺪم و ﺗﺴﻤﻰ ﺗﻘﺎﺑﻼ ء و ﻏﲑﻩ ﻟﺬاﺗﻪ و اﻟﻐﲑﻳﺔ ﻲ ﻛﻮن اﳌﻐﺎﻳﺮة ﻷﺳﺒﺎب أﺧﺮ ﻏﲑ ذات اﻟﺸ ﻏﲑ اﻟﺬاﺗﻴﺔ ﻫﻲ ﻛﺎﻓﱰاق اﳊﻼوة و ء اﻟﺴﻮاد ﰲ اﻟﺴﻜﺮ و اﻟﻔﺤﻢ و ﺗﺴﻤﻰ ﺧﻼﻓﺎ. و ﻳﻨﻘﺴﻢ اﻟﺘﻘﺎﺑﻞ و ﻫﻮ اﻟﻐﲑﻳﺔ اﻟﺬاﺗﻴﺔ و ﻗﺪ ﻋﺮﻓﻮﻩ ﺑﺎﻣﺘﻨﺎع اﺟﺘﻤﺎع ﺷﻴﺌﲔ ﰲ ﳏﻞ واﺣﺪ ﻣﻦ ﺟﻬﺔ واﺣﺪة ﰲ زﻣﺎن واﺣﺪ إﱃ أرﺑﻌﺔ أﻗﺴﺎم ﻓﺈن اﳌﺘﻘﺎﺑﻠﲔ إﻣﺎ أن ﻳﻜﻮﻧﺎ وﺟﻮدﻳﲔ أو ﻻ و ﻛﺎﻟﻌﻠﻮ و اﻟﺴﻔﻞ ﻓﻬﻤﺎ ﻛﻞ ﻣﻨﻬﻤﺎ ﻣﻌﻘﻮﻻ ﺑﺎﻟﻘﻴﺎس إﱃ اﻵﺧﺮ ﻋﻠﻰ اﻷول إﻣﺎ أن ﻳﻜﻮن ﻛﺎﻟﺴﻮاد و اﻟﺒﻴﺎض ﻓﻬﻤﺎ ﻣﺘﻀﺎدان و ﻛﺬﻟﻚ ﻣﺘﻀﺎﺋﻔﺎن و اﻟﺘﻘﺎﺑﻞ ﺗﻘﺎﺑﻞ اﻟﺘﻀﺎﻳﻒ أو ﻻ ﻳﻜﻮﻧﺎ اﻟﺘﻘﺎﺑﻞ ﺗﻘﺎﺑﻞ اﻟﺘﻀﺎد و ﻋﻠﻰ اﻟﺜﺎﱐ ﻳﻜﻮن أﺣﺪﳘﺎ وﺟﻮدﻳﺎ و اﻵﺧﺮ ﻋﺪﻣﻴﺎ إذ ﻻ ﺗﻘﺎ ﺑﻞ ﺑﲔ ﻛﺎﻟﻌﻤﻰ و اﻟﺒﺼﺮ و ﻳﺴﻤﻰ ﻋﺪﻣﻴﲔ و ﺣﻴﻨﺌﺬ إﻣﺎ أن ﻳﻜﻮن ﻫﻨﺎك ﻣﻮﺿﻮع ﻗﺎﺑﻞ ﻟﻜﻞ ﻣﻨﻬﻤﺎ ﻛﺎﻟﻨﻔﻲ و اﻹﺛﺒﺎت و ﻳﺴﻤﻴﺎن ﻛﺬﻟﻚ ﺗﻘﺎﺑﻠﻬﻤﺎ ﺗﻘﺎﺑﻞ اﻟﻌﺪم و اﳌﻠﻜﺔ و إﻣﺎ أن ﻻ ﻳﻜﻮن ﻛﺬا ﻗﺮروا ﻣﺘﻨﺎﻗﻀﲔ و ﺗﻘﺎﺑﻠﻬﻤﺎ ﺗﻘﺎﺑﻞ اﻟﺘﻨﺎﻗﺾ .
و ﻣﻦ أﺣﻜﺎم ﻣﻄﻠﻖ اﻟﺘﻘﺎﺑﻞ أﻧﻪ ﻳﺘﺤﻘﻖ ﺑﲔ ﻃﺮﻓﲔ ﻷﻧﻪ ﻧﻮ ع ﻧﺴﺒﺔ ﺑﲔ اﳌﺘﻘﺎﺑﻠﲔ و اﻟﻨﺴﺒﺔ ﺗﺘﺤﻖ ﺑﲔ ﻃﺮﻓﲔ.
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8.5. OTHERNESS AND OPPOSITION We said above that otherness (ghayriyyah) is a characteristic of multiplicity. Otherness is classified into ‘innate’ (dzâtî) and ‘extrinsic’ ghayr dzâtî). ‘Innate otherness’ is one that arises between a thing and something else by virtue of its essence – such as the otherness between existence and non-existence. It is also called ‘opposition’ (taqâbul). ‘Extrinsic otherness’ is one that derives from a cause extrinsic to a thing, like the difference between sweetness and blackness. It is also called disparity (khilâf). The metaphysicians define opposition, i.e. innate otherness, as the impossibility of co-presence of two entities in one place, in one aspect, and at one time. It is classified into four kinds, as the opposites are either (i) both ‘positive’ (wujûdî), or (ii) one of them is ‘positive’ and the other ‘negative’ (‘adamî), there being no opposition between two negatives. (ia) In the first case, if each of them is conceivable only in relation to the other, such as highness and lowness, the opposites are called ‘correlatives’ (mutadhâ’ifân) and the opposition is said to be that of ‘correlation’ (tadhâyuf). (ib) If they are not such – e.g. blackness and whiteness – the opposites are called ‘contraries’ (mutadâddân), and the opposition is said to be one of ‘contrariety’ (tadhâdd). (iia) In the second case, if there is a locus (mawdhû’) that accepts each of them – e.g. blindness and eyesight in a person – the opposition is called ‘the opposition of privation and possession’ (taqâbul al-‘adam wa al-malakah). (iib) If there is no such locus involved, as in the case of affirmation and negation, they are called ‘contradictories’ (mutanâqidân) and their opposition is said to be one of contradiction (al-tanâqud). This is how the metaphysicians have described opposition and the opposites. One of the properties of opposition in general is that it occurs between two sides, for it is a kind of relation between the opposites, and a relation requires two sides.
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اﻟﻔﺼﻞ اﻟﺴﺎدس ﻓﻲ ﺗﻘﺎﺑﻞ اﻟﺘﻀﺎﻳﻒ
ﻛﺎن ﻣﻦ أﺣﻜﺎم اﻟﺘﻀﺎﻳﻒ أن اﳌﺘﻀﺎﻳﻔﲔ ﻣﺘﻜﺎﻓﺌﺎن وﺟﻮدا و ﻋﺪﻣﺎ و ﻗﻮة و ﻓﻌﻼ ﻓﺈذا ﻛﺎن اﻵﺧﺮ ﻣﻌﺪوﻣﺎ ﻛﺎن أﺣﺪﳘﺎ ﻣﻌﺪوﻣﺎ ﻛﺎن اﻵﺧﺮ ﻣﻮﺟﻮدا ﺑﺎﻟﻀﺮورة و إذا أﺣﺪﳘﺎ ﻣﻮﺟﻮدا ﻛﺎن اﻵ ﻛﺎن أﺣﺪﳘﺎ ﺑﺎﻟﻔﻌﻞ أو ﺑﺎﻟﻘﻮة ﺑﺎﻟﻀﺮورة و إذا ﻤﺎ5 ﻛﺬﻟﻚ ﺑﺎﻟﻀﺮورة و ﻻزم ذﻟﻚ أ ﺧﺮ ﻣﻌﺎن ﻻ ﻳﺘﻘﺪم أﺣﺪﳘﺎ ﻋﻠﻰ اﻵﺧﺮ ﻻ ذﻫﻨﺎ و ﻻ ﺧﺎرﺟﺎ.
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8.6. CORRELATION One of the properties pertaining to correlation is that there is a parity between the correlatives in respect of existence and non-existence, potentiality and actuality. Accordingly, if one of them is existent the other is also necessarily existent, and if one of them is non-existent, the other is also necessarily non-existent. Furthermore, when one of them is in the state of actuality, or when it is in the state of potentiality, the other is also necessarily such. It follows from this that they are concomitants and none of them precedes the other, neither in the mind nor in external reality.
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اﻟﻔﺼﻞ اﻟﺴﺎﺑﻊ ﻓﻲ ﺗﻘﺎﺑﻞ اﻟﺘﻀﺎد اﻟﺘﻀﺎد ﻋﻠﻰ ﻣﺎ ﲢﺼﻞ ﻣﻦ اﻟﺘﻘﺴﻴﻢ اﻟ ﻛﻮن أﻣﺮﻳﻦ وﺟﻮدﻳﲔ ﻏﲑ ﻣﺘﻀﺎﺋﻔﲔ ﻣﺘﻐﺎﻳﺮﻳﻦ ﺴﺎﺑﻖ ﺑﺎﻟﺬات أي ﻏﲑ ﳎﺘﻤﻌﲔ ﺑﺎﻟﺬات. و ﻣﻦ أﺣﻜﺎﻣﻪ أن ﻻ ﺗﻀﺎد ﺑﲔ اﻷﺟﻨﺎس اﻟﻌﺎﻟﻴﺔ ﻣﻦ اﳌﻘﻮﻻت اﻟﻌﺸﺮ ﻓﺈن اﻷﻛﺜﺮ ﻣﻦ واﺣﺪ ﻛﻞ ﻣﻨﻬﺎ ﻣﻊ ﻛﺬا أﻧﻮاع ﻛﺎﻟﻜﻢ و اﻟﻜﻴﻒ و ﻏﲑﳘﺎ ﰲ اﻷﺟﺴﺎم و ﻣﻨﻬﺎ ﲡﺘﻤﻊ ﰲ ﳏﻞ واﺣﺪ ﻛﺬا ﺑﻌﺾ أﻧﻮاع ﻏﲑﻩ و ﻛﺎﻟﻠﻮن ﻣﻊ اﻟﻄﻌﻢ اﻷﺟﻨﺎس اﳌﻨﺪرﺟﺔ ﲢﺖ اﻟﻮاﺣﺪ ﻣﻨﻬﺎ ﻣﻊ ﺑﻌﺾ آﺧﺮ ﻛﺎﻟﺴﻮاد ﻣﺜﻼ ﻓﺎﻟﺘﻀﺎد ﺑﺎﻻﺳﺘﻘﺮاء إﳕﺎ ﻳﺘﺤﻘﻖ ﺑﲔ ﻧﻮﻋﲔ أﺧﲑﻳﻦ ﻣﻨﺪرﺟﲔ ﲢﺖ ﺟﻨﺲ ﻗﺮﻳﺐ ﻛﺬا ﻗﺮروا و اﻟﺒﻴﺎض اﳌﻨﺪرﺟﲔ ﲢﺖ اﻟﻠﻮن . و ﻣﻦ أﺣﻜﺎﻣﻪ أﻧﻪ ﳚﺐ أن ﻳﻜﻮن ﻫﻨﺎك ﻣﻮﺿﻮع ﻳﺘﻮاردان ﻋﻠﻴﻪ إذ ﻟﻮ ﻻ ﻣﻮﺿﻮع ﺷﺨﺼﻲ ﻣﺸ ﺧﺮ ﻛﻮﺟﻮد اﻟﺴﻮاد ﰲ ﺟﺴﻢ و اﻟﺒﻴﺎض ﰲ آ ﱰك ﱂ ﳝﺘﻨﻊ ﲢﻘﻘﻬﻤﺎ ﰲ اﻟﻮﺟﻮد . و ﻻزم ذﻟﻚ أن ﻻ ﺗﻀﺎد ﺑﲔ اﳉﻮاﻫﺮ إذ ﻻ ﻣﻮﺿﻮع ﳍﺎ ﺗﻮﺟﺪ ﻓﻴﻪ ﻓﺎﻟﺘﻀﺎد إﳕﺎ ﻳﺘﺤﻘﻖ ﰲ اﻷﻋﺮاض و ﻗﺪ ﺑﺪل ﺑﻌﻀﻬﻢ اﳌﻮﺿﻮع ﺑﺎﶈﻞ ﺣﱴ ﻳﺸﻤﻞ ﻣﺎدة اﳉﻮاﻫﺮ و ﻋﻠﻰ ﻫﺬا ﻳﺘﺤﻘﻖ اﻟﺘﻀﺎد ﺑﲔ اﻟﺼﻮر اﳉﻮﻫﺮﻳﺔ اﳊﺎﻟ ة ﺔ ﰲ اﳌﺎد. ﻛﺎن ﻫﻨﺎك أﻣﻮر وﺟﻮدﻳﺔ ﻣﺘﻐﺎﻳﺮة ﺑﻌﻀﻬﺎ و ﻣﻦ أﺣﻜﺎﻣﻪ أن ﻳﻜﻮن ﺑﻴﻨﻬﻤﺎ ﻏﺎﻳﺔ اﳋﻼف ﻓﻠﻮ أﻗﺮب إﱃ ﺑﻌﻀﻬﺎ ﻣﻦ ﺑﻌﺾ ﻓﺎﳌﺘﻀﺎدان ﳘﺎ اﻟﻄﺮﻓﺎن اﻟﻠﺬان ﺑﻴﻨﻬﻤﺎ ﻏﺎﻳﺔ اﻟﺒﻌﺪ و اﳋﻼف ﻛﺎﻟﺴﻮاد و اﻟﺒﻴﺎض اﻟﻮاﻗﻊ ﺑﻴﻨﻬﻤﺎ أﻟﻮان أﺧﺮى ﻣﺘﻮﺳﻄﺔ ﺑﻌﻀﻬﺎ أﻗﺮب إﱃ أﺣﺪ اﻟﻄﺮﻓﲔ ﻣﻦ ﻛﺎﻟ ﺑﻌﺾ ﻼ ﺼﻔﺮة اﻟﱵ ﻫﻲ أﻗﺮب إﱃ اﻟﺒﻴﺎض ﻣﻦ اﳊﻤﺮة ﻣﺜ. و ﳑﺎ ﺗﻘﺪم ﻳﻈﻬﺮ ﻣﻌﲎ ﺗﻌﺮﻳﻔﻬﻢ اﳌﺘﻀﺎدﻳﻦ ﺑﺄ5ﻤﺎ أﻣﺮان وﺟﻮدﻳﺎن ﻣﺘﻮاردان ﻋﻠﻰ ﻣﻮﺿﻮع واﺣﺪ داﺧﻼن ﲢﺖ ﺟﻨﺲ ﻗﺮﻳﺐ ﺑﻴﻨﻬﻤﺎ ﻏﺎﻳﺔ اﳋﻼف.
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8.7. CONTRARIETY Contrariety, in accordance with the above classification, arises between two existing entities that are not correlatives and which are intrinsically different from one another or mutually exclusive. One of the properties pertaining to contrariety is that there is no contrariety between any of the highest genera pertaining to the ten categories, for more than one of them are present in one place (e.g. quantity, quality, etc. in bodies) and various kinds of each of these categories is found in association with the kinds of other categories. So also are some genera that fall under each of them, which occur in association with some others, e.g. colour and taste. Hence contrariety, as revealed by induction, occurs between the ultimate species falling under the proximate genus, e.g. blackness and whiteness, which fall under colour. So have the metaphysicians stated. Another property pertaining to contrariety is that there is a locus (maudhû’) where they occur alternately; for if there is no common particular locus, their simultaneous occurrence will not be impossible, such as the existence of blackness in one body and of whiteness in another. It follows from the above that there is no contrariety between substances, for they do not need a locus for existing and that contrariety is found only in accidents. Therefore, some philosophers have substituted ‘place’ (mahall) for ‘locus’ (maudhû’) in order to include the ‘matter’ of substance. In accordance with such a no¬tion, contrariety occurs between substantial forms (al-shuwar al-jawhariyyah) assumed by matter. Another property pertaining to contrariety is that there should be an extreme difference between the contraries. Hence if there were a range of existent entities (amrân wujudiyyân) of which some are closer to some than others, the contraries will be at the extremities, between which there is utmost distance and difference, like blackness and whiteness, between which there are other intermediate colours, some of which are closer than others to one of the .two extreme sides, such as yellow, for instance, which is closer to white than red. The above discussion clarifies the meaning of the definition of contraries as “two existent entities that alternately occur to a single locus (or subject) and which fall under the same proximate genus, and between which there is an extreme difference.”
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اﻟﻔﺼﻞ اﻟﺜﺎﻣﻦ ﻓﻲ ﺗﻘﺎﺑﻞ اﻟﻌﺪم و اﻟﻤﻠﻜﺔ و ﻳﺴﻤﻰ أﻳﻀﺎ ﺗﻘﺎﺑﻞ اﻟﻌﺪم و اﻟﻘﻨﻴﺔ و ﳘﺎ أﻣﺮ وﺟﻮدي ﳌﻮﺿﻮع ﻣﻦ ﺷﺄﻧﻪ أن ﻳﺘﺼﻒ ﺑﻪ و ﻛﺎﻟﺒﺼﺮ و اﻟﻌﻤﻰ اﻟﺬي ﻫﻮ ﻓﻘﺪ اﻟﺒﺼﺮ ﻟﻠﻤﻮﺿﻮع ﻋﺪم ذﻟﻚ اﻷﻣﺮ اﻟﻮﺟﻮدي ﰲ ذﻟﻚ اﳌﻮﺿﻮع اﻟﺬي ﻣﻦ ﺷﺄﻧﻪ أن ﻳﻜﻮن ذا ﺑﺼﺮ. ﻓﺈن أﺧﺬ ﻣﻮﺿﻮع اﳌﻠﻜﺔ ﻫﻮ اﻟﻄﺒﻴﻌ ﺔ اﻟﺸﺨﺼﻴﺔ أو اﻟﻨﻮﻋﻴﺔ أو اﳉﻨﺴﻴﺔ اﻟﱵ ﻣﻦ ﺷﺄ5ﺎ أن ﺗﺘﺼﻒ ﺑﺎﳌﻠﻜﺔ ﰲ اﳉﻤﻠﺔ ﻣﻦ ﻏﲑ ﺗﻘﻴﻴﺪ ﺑﻮﻗﺖ ﺧﺎص ﲰﻴﺎ ﻣﻠﻜﻪ و ﻋﺪﻣﺎ ﺣﻘﻴﻘﻴﲔ ﻓﻌﺪم اﻟﺒﺼﺮ ﰲ اﻟﻌﻘﺮب ﻋﻤﻰ و ﻋﺪم ﻣﻠﻜﺔ ﻟﻜﻮن ﺟﻨﺴﻪ و ﻫﻮ اﳊﻴﻮان ﻣﻮﺿﻮﻋﺎ ﻗﺎﺑﻼ ﻟﻠﺒﺼﺮ و إن ﻛﺬا ﻣﺮودة اﻹﻧﺴﺎن ﻗﺒﻞ أ ﻛﻤﺎ ﻗﻴﻞ و ﻛﺎن ﻧﻮﻋﻪ ﻏﲑ ﻗﺎﺑﻞ ﻟﻪ وان اﻟﺘﺤﺎﺋﻪ ﻣﻦ ﻋﺪم اﳌﻠﻜﺔ و إن ﻛﺎن ﺻﻨﻔﻪ ﻏﲑ ﻗﺎﺑﻞ ﻟﻼﻟﺘﺤﺎء ﻗﺒﻞ أوان اﻟﺒﻠﻮغ. و إن أﺧﺬ اﳌﻮﺿﻮع ﻫﻮ اﻟﻄﺒﻴﻌﺔ اﻟﺸﺨﺼﻴﺔ و ﻗﻴﺪ ﺑﻮﻗﺖ اﻻﺗﺼﺎف ﲰﻴﺎ ﻋﺪﻣﺎ و ﻣﻠﻜﺔ ﻛﺬا اﳌﺮودة ﻟﻴﺴﺎ ﻣﻦ اﻟﻌﺪم و ﻣﺸﻬﻮرﻳﲔ و ﻋﻠﻴﻪ ﻓﻘﺪ اﻷﻛﻤﻪ و ﻫﻮ اﳌﻤﺴﻮح اﻟﻌﲔ ﻟﻠﺒﺼﺮ و اﳌﻠﻜﺔ ﰲ ﺷﻲ ء.
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8.8. THE OPPOSITION OF PRIVATION AND POSSESSION This kind of opposition is also called ‘taqâbul al-‘adam wa al-qunyah.’ The opposites in this case consist of a positive quality generally possessed by a certain locus by virtue of its nature, and the absence of that quality in the locus. An example of it is eyesight and blindness, the latter being privation from sight in a subject whose general nature is to possess it. If the locus possessing the quality is taken to be individual nature, or the nature of the species or genus, whose general character it is to possess the quality regardless of a particular time, the opposites are called ‘real’ privation and possession. Thus the absence of sight in the scorpion is blindness and a privation due to its being an animal by genus and hence a locus capable of sight, though its species be incapable of it, as alleged. Similarly, beardlessness in a man before the age of beardedness is an instance of privation, though his age group be incapable of possessing beard before the age of puberty. If the locus is taken to be individual nature along with a condition of time of qualification, the opposites are called ‘privation and possession in accordance with common usage,’ according to which the absence of sight in a blind-born person and beardlessness in a child are not reckoned to be instances of privation and possession in any manner.
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اﻟﻔﺼﻞ اﻟﺘﺎﺳﻊ ﻓﻲ ﺗﻘﺎﺑﻞ اﻟﺘﻨﺎﻗﺾ و ﻫﻮ ﺗﻘﺎﺑﻞ اﻹﳚﺎب و اﻟﺴﻠﺐ ﺑﺄن ﻳﺮد اﻟﺴﻠﺐ ﻋﻠﻰ ﻧﻔﺲ ﻣﺎ ورد ﻋﻠﻴﻪ اﻹﳚﺎب ﻓﻬﻮ ﲝﺴﺐ اﻷﺻﻞ ﰲ اﻟﻘﻀﺎﻳﺎ و ﻗﺪ ﳛﻮل ﻣﻀﻤﻮن اﻟﻘﻀﻴﺔ إﱃ ا ﳌﻔﺮد ﻓﻴﻘﺎل اﻟﺘﻨﺎﻗﺾ ﺑﲔ وﺟﻮد اﻟﺸﻲ ﺷﻲ ﻛﻞ ﻛﻤﺎ ﻗﺪ ﻳﻘﺎل ﻧﻘﻴﺾ ء و ﻋﺪﻣﻪ ﻪ ء رﻓﻌ. ﻤﺎ ﻻ ﳚﺘﻤﻌﺎن ﻣﻌﺎ و ﻻ ﻳﺮﺗﻔﻌﺎن ﻣﻌﺎ ﻋﻠﻰ 5 و ﺣﻜﻢ اﻟﻨﻘﻴﻀﲔ أﻋﲏ اﻹﳚﺎب و اﻟﺴﻠﺐ أ ﻛﻞ ﺳﺒﻴﻞ اﻟﻘﻀﻴﺔ اﳌﻨﻔﺼﻠﺔ اﳊﻘﻴﻘﻴﺔ و ﻫﻲ ﻣﻦ اﻟﺒﺪﻳﻬﻴﺎت اﻷوﻟﻴﺔ اﻟﱵ ﻋﻠﻴﻬﺎ ﻳﺘﻮﻗﻒ ﺻﺪق ﻛﺎﻧﺖ ﻗﻀﻴﺔ ﻣﻔﺮوﺿﺔ ﺿﺮورﻳﺔ أو ﻧﻈﺮﻳﺔ إذ ﻻ ﻳﺘﻌﻠﻖ اﻟﻌﻠﻢ ﺑﻘﻀﻴﺔ إﻻ ﺑﻌﺪ اﻟﻌﻠﻢ ﺑﺎﻣﺘﻨﺎع ﻧﻘﻴﻀﻬﺎ ﻛﺬب ﻗﻮﻟﻨﺎ ﻟﻴﺴﺖ اﻷرﺑﻌﺔ زوﺟﺎ و ﻟﺬا ﲰﻴﺖ ﻓﻘﻮﻟﻨﺎ اﻷرﺑﻌﺔ زوج إﳕﺎ ﻳﺘﻢ ﺗﺼﺪﻳﻘﻪ إذا ﻋﻠﻢ ﻗﻀﻴﺔ اﻣﺘﻨﺎع اﺟﺘﻤﺎع اﻟﻨﻘﻴﻀﲔ و ارﺗﻔﺎﻋﻬﻤﺎ أوﱃ اﻷواﺋﻞ. ج ﻋﻦ ﺣﻜﻢ اﻟﻨﻘﻴﻀﲔ ﺷﻲ و ﻣﻦ أﺣﻜﺎم اﻟﺘﻨﺎﻗﺾ أﻧﻪ ﻻ ﳜﺮ ء اﻟﺒﺘﺔ ﺷﻲ ﻓﻜﻞ ء ﻣﻔﺮوض إﻣﺎ ﻛﻞ ﺷﻲ أن ﻳﺼﺪق ﻋﻠﻴﻪ زﻳﺪ أو اﻟﻼ زﻳﺪ و ء ﻣﻔﺮوض إﻣﺎ أن ﻳﺼﺪق ﻋﻠﻴﻪ اﻟﺒﻴﺎض أو اﻟﻼ ﺑﻴﺎض و ﻫﻜﺬا. ﻛﻘﻮﻟﻨﺎ اﻹﻧﺴﺎن ﻣﻦ و أﻣﺎ ﻣﺎ ﺗﻘﺪم ﰲ ﻣﺮﺣﻠﺔ اﳌﺎﻫﻴﺔ أن اﻟﻨﻘﻴﻀﲔ ﻣﺮﺗﻔﻌﺎن ﻋﻦ ﻣﺮﺗﺒﺔ اﻟﺬات ﺣﻴﺚ إﻧﻪ إﻧﺴﺎن ﻟﻴﺲ ﲟﻮﺟﻮد و ﻻ ﻻ ﻣﻮﺟﻮد ﻓﻘﺪ ﻋﺮﻓﺖ أن ذﻟﻚ ﻟﻴﺲ ﲝﺴﺐ اﳊﻘﻴﻘﺔ ﻣﻦ ارﺗﻔﺎع اﻟﻨﻘﻴﻀﲔ ﰲ ﺷﻲ ﻲ ج اﻟﻨﻴﻘﻀﲔ ﻣﻌﺎ ﻋﻦ ﻣﺮﺗﺒﺔ ذات اﻟﺸ ء ﺑﻞ ﻣﺂﻟﻪ إﱃ ﺧﺮو ء ﻓﻠﻴﺲ ﳛﺪ اﻹﻧﺴﺎن ﺑﺄﻧﻪ ﺣﻴﻮان ﻧﺎﻃﻖ ﻣﻮﺟﻮد و ﻻ ﳛﺪ ﺑﺄﻧﻪ ﺣﻴﻮان ﻧﺎﻃﻖ ﻣﻌﺪوم. ﻛﺘﺐ و ﻣﻦ أﺣﻜﺎﻣﻪ أن ﲢﻘﻘﻪ ﰲ اﻟﻘﻀﺎﻳﺎ ﻣﺸﺮوط ﺑﺜﻤﺎن وﺣﺪات ﻣﻌﺮوﻓﺔ ﻣﺬﻛﻮرة ﰲ اﳌﻨﻄﻖ و زاد ﻋﻠﻴﻬﺎ ﺻﺪر اﳌﺘﺄ ﳍﲔ رﻩ وﺣﺪة اﳊﻤﻞ ﺑﺄن ﻳﻜﻮن اﳊﻤﻞ ﻓﻴﻬﻤﺎ ﲨﻴﻌﺎ ﲪﻼ أوﻟﻴﺎ أو ﻓﻴﻬﻤﺎ ﻣﻌﺎ ﲪﻼ ﺷﺎﻳﻌﺎ ﻣﻦ ﻏﲑ اﺧﺘﻼف ﻓﻼ ﺗﻨﺎﻗﺾ ﺑﲔ ﻗﻮﻟﻨﺎ اﳉﺰﺋﻲ ﺟﺰﺋﻲ أي ﻣﻔﻬﻮﻣﺎ و ﻗﻮﻟﻨﺎ ﻟﻴﺲ اﳉﺰﺋﻲ ﲜﺰﺋﻲ أي ﻣﺼﺪاﻗﺎ.
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8.9. CONTRADICTION Contradiction (tanâqud) is an opposition involving affirmation and negation, in the sense that what is negated is exactly what is affirmed. Though basically it occurs in propositions, it may occur in terms when they implicitly bear the import of a proposition. Thus it is said that there is a contradiction between a thing’s existence and its non-existence, or that the contradictory of anything is its ‘negation’ (raf’). A property of the contradictories – i.e. affirmation and negation – is that both of them cannot be true or false, as in a ‘factual disjunctive’ proposition. This is one of the primary self-evident axioms on which rests the truth of every conceivable proposition, whether self-evident or inferred, for there can be no knowledge of a proposition’s truth without the knowledge of the falsity of its contradictory. For instance, the truth of the statement ‘Every four is even’ can only be ascertained only when we know that the statement ‘Every four is not even’ is false. Hence the law of contradiction has been called ‘the most primary of the primary principles’ (ûla al-awâ’il). Another property of contradiction is that absolutely nothing lies outside the purview of the contradictories. Hence everything that can be conceived is either Zayd or non-Zayd, white or non-white, and so on. As to that which was mentioned earlier in the chapter on quiddity,’ that ‘both the contradictories are removed on the plane of essence’ (dzât), as when it is said ‘Man qua man is neither existent nor non-existent,’ it is not in fact a case of removal of both the contradictories in any manner. Rather, what it signifies is that both the contradictories (viz. existence and nonexistence) are irrelevant on the plane of quiddity; for ‘man’ is neither defined as ‘a rational animal that exists’ nor as ‘a rational animal that does not exist.’ Another of its properties is that it applies to propositions on condition of the presence of the well-known eightfold unities mentioned in the books on logic. To these Sadr al-Muta’allihîn – may God’s mercy be upon him – has added the unity of predication: that predication in both the cases (i.e. affirmation and negation) should either be of the primary or the common type, difference of predication being inadmissible. Hence there is no contradiction between the statement, ‘The particular is particular,’ that is, from the viewpoint of intension (mafhûman), and the statement “The particular is not particular,’ that is, from the viewpoint of extension (mishdâqan)
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اﻟﻔﺼﻞ اﻟﻌﺎﺷﺮ ﻓﻲ ﺗﻘﺎﺑﻞ اﻟﻮاﺣﺪ و اﻟﻜﺜﻴﺮ اﺧﺘﻠﻔﻮا ﰲ ﺗﻘﺎﺑﻞ اﻟﻮاﺣﺪ و اﻟﻜﺜﲑ ﻫﻞ ﻫﻮ ﺗﻘﺎﺑﻞ ﺑﺎﻟﺬات أو ﻻ و ﻋﻠﻰ اﻷول ذﻫﺐ ﻤﺎ ﻣﺘﻀﺎدان و ﺑﻌﻀﻬﻢ إﱃ أن ﺗﻘﺎﺑﻠﻬﻤﺎ ﻧﻮع 5 ﻤﺎ ﻣﺘﻀﺎﺋﻔﺎن و ﺑﻌﻀﻬﻢ إﱃ أ 5 ﺑﻌﻀﻬﻢ إﱃ أ ﺧﺎﻣﺲ ﻏﲑ اﻷﻧﻮاع اﻷرﺑﻌﺔ اﳌﺬﻛﻮرة. و اﳊﻖ أن ﻣﺎ ﺑﲔ اﻟﻮاﺣﺪ و اﻟﻜﺜﲑ ﻣﻦ اﻻﺧﺘﻼف ﻟﻴﺲ ﻣﻦ اﻟﺘﻘﺎﺑﻞ اﳌﺼﻄﻠﺢ ﰲ ﺷﻲ ء ﻷن اﺧﺘﻼف اﳌﻮﺟﻮد اﳌﻄﻠﻖ ﺑﺎﻧﻘﺴﺎﻣﻪ إﱃ اﻟﻮاﺣﺪ و اﻟﻜﺜﲑ اﺧﺘﻼف ﺗﺸﻜﻴﻜﻲ ﻳﺮﺟﻊ ﻓﻴﻪ ﻣﺎ ﺑﻪ اﻻﺧﺘﻼف إﱃ ﻣﺎ ﺑﻪ اﻻﺗﻔﺎق ﻧﻈﲑ اﻧﻘﺴﺎﻣﻪ إﱃ اﻟﻮﺟﻮد اﳋﺎرﺟﻲ و اﻟﺬﻫﲏ و اﻧﻘﺴﺎﻣﻪ إﱃ ﻛﻞ ﻣﻦ أﻗﺴﺎم اﻟﺘﻘﺎﺑﻞ اﻷرﺑﻊ ﳝﺘﻨﻊ أن ﻣﺎ ﺑﺎﻟﻔﻌﻞ و ﻣﺎ ﺑﺎﻟﻘﻮة و اﻻﺧﺘﻼف و اﳌﻐﺎﻳﺮة اﻟﱵ ﰲ ﻳﺮﺟﻊ إﱃ ﻣﺎ ﺑﻪ اﻻﲢﺎد ﻓﻼ ﺗﻘﺎﺑﻞ ﺑﲔ اﻟﻮاﺣﺪ و اﻟﻜﺜﲑ ﺑﺸﻲ ﺔ ء ﻣﻦ أﻗﺴﺎم اﻟﺘﻘﺎﺑﻞ اﻷرﺑﻌ. ﺗﺘﻤﺔ اﻟﺘﻘﺎﺑﻞ ﺑﲔ اﻹﳚﺎب و اﻟﺴﻠﺐ ﻟﻴﺲ ﺗﻘﺎﺑﻼ ﺣﻘﻴﻘﻴﺎ ﺧﺎرﺟﻴﺎ ﺑﻞ ﻋﻘﻠﻲ ﺑﻨﻮع ﻣﻦ اﻻﻋﺘﺒﺎر ﻷن اﻟﺘﻘﺎﺑﻞ ﻧﺴﺒﺔ ﺧﺎﺻﺔ ﺑﲔ اﳌﺘﻘﺎﺑﻠﲔ و اﻟﻨﺴﺐ وﺟﻮدات راﺑﻄﺔ ﻗﺎﺋﻤﺔ ﺑﻄﺮﻓﲔ ﻣﻮﺟﻮدﻳﻦ ﳏﻘﻘﲔ واﺣﺪ اﻟﻄﺮﻓﲔ ﰲ اﻟﺘﻨﺎﻗﺾ ﻫﻮ اﻟﺴﻠﺐ اﻟﺬي ﻫﻮ ﻋﺪم و ﺑﻄﻼن ﻟﻜﻦ اﻟ ﻌﻘﻞ ﻳﻌﺘﱪ اﻟﺴﻠﺐ ﻃﺮﻓﺎ ﻟﻺﳚﺎب ﻓﲑى ﻋﺪم ﺟﻮاز اﺟﺘﻤﺎﻋﻬﻤﺎ ﻟﺬاﺗﻴﻬﻤﺎ. و أﻣﺎ ﺗﻘﺎﺑﻞ اﻟﻌﺪم و اﳌﻠﻜﺔ ﻓﻠﻠﻌﺪم ﻓﻴﻪ ﺣﻆ ﻣﻦ اﻟﺘﺤﻘﻖ ﻟﻜﻮﻧﻪ ﻋﺪم ﺻﻔﺔ ﻣﻦ ﺷﺄن ﻛﺎف ﰲ ﲢﻘﻖ اﳌﻮﺿﻮع أن ﻳﺘﺼﻒ -ﺎ ﻓﻴﻨﺘﺰع ﻋﺪﻣﻬﺎ ﻣﻨﻪ و ﻫﺬا اﳌﻘﺪار ﻣﻦ اﻟﻮﺟﻮد اﻻﻧﺘﺰاﻋﻲ اﻟﻨﺴﺒﺔ.
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8.10. THE OPPOSITION OF ONE AND MANY The philosophers have differed concerning the opposition between one and many, as to whether it is innate (bi at-dzât) or not. Of those who consider it innate, some have held them to be correlatives and some as contraries, while some others have held their opposition to be of a fifth kind, different from the four kinds mentioned above. The truth is that the difference between one and many is not an opposition of any kind in the technical sense of the word, because the difference pertaining to unconditioned existence by virtue of its division into ‘one’ and ‘many’ is a difference of gradation (tasykîk) in which the differentiating factor is the same as the common factor, like the division of existence into external and mental, actual and potential, whereas otherness in all the four kinds of opposition is not one that is reducible to the common factor. Hence between one and many there is no opposition from among the four kinds of opposition. Note The opposition between affirmation and negation is not an actual opposition in external reality, but relates to the intellect and is mentally posited. That is because opposition involves a certain relation between the opposites, and relations between existents depend on two actual and existing sides, whereas one of the sides in contradiction is negation, which involves non-being and nonentity. However, the intellect posits the negation as a side opposed to the affirmation and judges their co-presence to be inadmissible. As to the opposition of privation and possession, the non-being therein has some kind of entity, for it is absence of a quality possessed by the subject in the normal course. This measure of abstract existence is sufficient for the occurrence of a relation.
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اﻟﻤﺮﺣﻠﺔ اﻟﺘﺎﺳﻌﺔ ﻓﻲ اﻟﺴﺒﻖ و اﻟﻠﺤﻮق و ث اﻟﻘﺪم و اﻟﺤﺪو و ﻓﻴﻬﺎ ﺛﻼﺛﺔ ﻓﺼﻮل CHAPTER NINE: Priority and Posteriority, Qidam and Huduth 3 Units

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اﻟﻔﺼﻞ اﻷول ﻓﻲ ﻣﻌﻨﻰ اﻟﺴﺒﻖ و اﻟﻠﺤﻮق و أﻗﺴﺎﻣﻬﻤﺎ و اﻟﻤﻌﻴﺔ ﻛﺎن ﻟﺸﻴﺌﲔ ﲟﺎ إن ﻣﻦ ﻋﻮارض اﳌﻮﺟﻮد ﲟﺎ ﻫﻮ ﻣﻮﺟﻮد اﻟﺴﺒﻖ و اﻟﻠﺤﻮق و ذﻟﻚ أﻧﻪ رﲟﺎ ﳘﺎ ﻣﻮﺟﻮدان ﻧﺴﺒﺔ ﻛﻨﺴﺒﺔ ﻣﺸﱰﻛﺔ إﱃ ﻣﺒﺪإ وﺟﻮدي ﻟﻜﻦ ﻷﺣﺪﳘﺎ ﻣﻨﻬﺎ ﻣﺎ ﻟﻴﺲ ﻟﻶﺧﺮ اﻻﺛﻨﲔ و اﻟﺜﻼﺛﺔ إﱃ اﻟﻮاﺣﺪ ﻟﻜﻦ اﻻﺛﻨﲔ أﻗﺮب إﻟﻴﻪ ﻓﻴﺴﻤﻰ ﺳﺎﺑﻘﺎ و ﻣﺘﻘﺪﻣﺎ و ﺗﺴﻤﻰ اﻟﺜﻼﺛﺔ ﻛﺎﻧﺖ اﻟﻨﺴﺒﺔ اﳌﺸﱰﻛﺔ ﻣﻦ ﻏﲑ ﺗﻔﺎوت ﺑﲔ اﳌﻨﺘﺴﺒﲔ ﻓﺘﺴﻤﻰ ﺣﺎﳍﻤﺎ ﻻﺣﻘﺔ و ﻣﺘﺄﺧﺮة و رﲟﺎ ﺑﺎﻟﻨﺴﺒﺔ إﻟﻴﻪ ﻣﻌﻴﺔ و ﳘﺎ ﻣﻌﺎن. و ﻗﺪ ﻋﺪوا ﻟﻠﺴﺒﻖ و اﻟﻠﺤﻮق أﻗﺴﺎﻣﺎ ﻋﺜﺮوا ﻋﻠﻴﻬﺎ ﺑﺎﻻﺳﺘﻘﺮاء. ﻣﻨﻬﺎ اﻟﺴﺒﻖ اﻟﺰﻣﺎﱐ و ﻫﻮ اﻟﺴﺒﻖ اﻟﺬي ﻻ ﳚﺎﻣﻊ ﻓﻴﻪ اﻟﺴﺎﺑﻖ اﻟﻼﺣﻖ ﻛﺘﻘﺪم أﺟﺰاء اﻟﺰﻣﺎن ﻛﺎﻷﻣﺲ ﻋﻠﻰ اﻟﻴﻮم و ﺗﻘﺪم اﳊﻮادث اﻟﻮاﻗﻌﺔ ﰲ اﻟﺰﻣﺎن اﻟﺴﺎﺑﻖ ﻋﻠﻰ اﻟﻮاﻗﻌﺔ ﺑﻌﻀﻬﺎ ﻋﻠﻰ ﺑﻌﺾ ﰲ اﻟﺰﻣﺎن اﻟﻼﺣﻖ و ﻳﻘﺎﺑﻠﻪ اﻟﻠﺤﻮق ا ﱐ ﻟﺰﻣﺎ. و ﻣﻨﻬﺎ اﻟﺴﺒﻖ ﺑﺎﻟﻄﺒﻊ و ﻫﻮ ﺗﻘﺪم اﻟﻌﻠﺔ اﻟﻨﺎﻗﺼﺔ ﻋﻠﻰ اﳌﻌﻠﻮل ﻛﺘﻘﺪم اﻻﺛﻨﲔ ﻋﻠﻰ اﻟﺜﻼﺛﺔ. و ﻣﻨﻬﺎ اﻟﺴﺒﻖ ﺑﺎﻟﻌﻠﻴﺔ و ﻫﻮ ﺗﻘﺪم اﻟﻌﻠﺔ اﻟﺘﺎﻣﺔ ﻋﻠﻰ اﳌﻌﻠﻮل. و ﻣﻨﻬﺎ اﻟﺴﺒﻖ ﺑﺎﳌﺎﻫﻴﺔ و ﻳﺴﻤﻰ أﻳﻀﺎ اﻟﺘﻘﺪم ﺑﺎﻟﺘﺠﻮﻫﺮ و ﻫﻮ ﺗﻘﺪم ﻋﻠﻞ اﻟﻘﻮام ﻋﻠﻰ ﻣﻌﻠﻮﳍﺎ ﻛﺘﻘﺪم أﺟﺰاء اﳌﺎﻫﻴﺔ اﻟﻨﻮﻋ ﻛﺘﻘﺪم ﻴﺔ ﻋﻠﻰ اﻟﻨﻮع و ﻋﺪ ﻣﻨﻪ ﺗﻘﺪم اﳌﺎﻫﻴﺔ ﻋﻠﻰ ﻟﻮازﻣﻬﺎ اﻷرﺑﻌﺔ ﻋﻠﻰ اﻟﺰوﺟﻴﺔ و ﻳﻘﺎﺑﻠﻪ اﻟﻠﺤﻮق و اﻟﺘﺄﺧﺮ ﺑﺎﳌﺎﻫﻴﺔ و اﻟﺘﺠﻮﻫﺮ. و ﺗﺴﻤﻰ ﻫﺬﻩ اﻷﻗﺴﺎم اﻟﺜﻼﺛﺔ أﻋﲏ ﻣﺎ ﺑﺎﻟﻄﺒﻊ و ﻣﺎ ﺑﺎﻟﻌﻠﻴﺔ و ﻣﺎ ﺑﺎﻟﺘﺠﻮﻫﺮ ﺳﺒﻘﺎ و ﳊﻮﻗﺎ ﺑﺎﻟﺬات. و ﻣﻨﻬﺎ اﻟﺴﺒﻖ ﺑﺎﳊﻘﻴﻘﺔ و ﻫﻮ أن ﻳﺘﻠﺒﺲ اﻟﺴﺎﺑﻖ ﲟﻌﲎ ﻣﻦ اﳌﻌﺎﱐ ﺑﺎﻟﺬات و ﻳﺘﻠﺒﺲ ﺑﻪ ب ﺑﻪ ﺑﺎﻟﻌﺮض و ﻳﻘﺎﺑﻠﻪ ﻛﺘﻠﺒﺲ اﳌﺎء ﺑﺎﳉﺮﻳﺎن ﺣﻘﻴﻘﺔ و ﺑﺎﻟﺬات و ﺗﻠﺒﺲ اﳌﻴﺰا اﻟﻼﺣﻖ ﺑﺎﻟﻌﺮض اﻟﻠﺤﻮق ﺑﺬاك اﳌﻌﲎ و ﻫﺬا اﻟﻘﺴﻢ ﳑﺎ زادﻩ ﺻﺪر اﳌﺘﺄﳍﲔ. و ﻣﻨﻬﺎ اﻟﺴﺒﻖ و اﻟﺘﻘﺪم ﺑﺎﻟﺪﻫﺮ و ﻫﻮ ﺗﻘﺪم اﻟﻌﻠﺔ اﳌﻮﺟﺒﺔ ﻋﻠﻰ ﻣﻌﻠﻮﳍﺎ ﻟﻜﻦ ﻻ ﻣﻦ ﺣﻴﺚ إﳚﺎ-ﺎ ﻛﻤﺎ ﰲ اﻟﺘﻘﺪم ﺑﺎﻟﻌﻠﻴﺔ ﺑﻞ ﻣﻦ ﺣﻴﺚ اﻧﻔﻜﺎك وﺟﻮدﻫﺎ و ﻟﻮﺟﻮد اﳌﻌﻠﻮل و إﻓﺎﺿﺘﻬﺎ ﻟﻪ ﻛﺘﻘﺪم ﻧﺸﺄة اﻟﺘﺠﺮد اﻟﻌﻘﻠﻲ اﻧﻔﺼﺎﻟﻪ ﻋﻦ وﺟﻮد اﳌﻌﻠﻮل و ﺗﻘﺮر ﻋﺪم اﳌﻌﻠﻮل ﰲ ﻣﺮﺗﺒﺔ وﺟﻮدﻫﺎ ﻋﻠﻰ ﻧﺸﺄة اﳌﺎدة و ﻳﻘﺎﺑﻠﻪ اﻟﻠﺤﻮق و اﻟﺘﺄﺧﺮ اﻟﺪﻫﺮي. و ﻫﺬا اﻟﻘﺴﻢ ﻗﺪ زادﻩ اﻟﺴﻴﺪ اﻟﺪاﻣﺎد رﻩ ﺑﻨﺎء ﻋﻠﻰ ﻣﺎ ﺻﻮرﻩ ﻣﻦ اﳊﺪوث و اﻟﻘﺪم اﻟﺪﻫﺮﻳﲔ و ﺳﻴﺠﻲ ﻪ ء ﺑﻴﺎﻧ. و ﻣﻨﻬﺎ اﻟﺴﺒﻖ و اﻟﺘﻘﺪم ﺑﺎﻟﺮﺗﺒﺔ أﻋﻢ ﻣﻦ أن ﻳﻜﻮن اﻟﱰﺗﻴﺐ ﲝﺴﺐ اﻟﻄﺒﻊ أو ﲝﺴﺐ اﻟﻮﺿﻊ ﻛﺎﻷﺟﻨﺎس و اﻷﻧﻮاع اﳌﱰﺗﺒﺔ ﻓﺈﻧﻚ إن اﺑﺘﺪأت آﺧﺬا ﻣﻦ ﺟﻨﺲ اﻷﺟﻨﺎس و اﻻﻋﺘﺒﺎر ﻓﺎﻷول
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ﻛﺎن ﺳﺎﺑﻘﺎ ﻣﺘﻘﺪﻣﺎ ﻋﻠﻰ ﻣﺎ دوﻧﻪ ﰒ اﻟﺬي ﻳﻠﻴﻪ و ﻫﻜﺬا ﺣﱴ ﻳﻨﺘﻬﻲ إﱃ اﻟﻨﻮع اﻷﺧﲑ و إن ﻛﺎن اﻷﻣﺮ ﰲ اﻟﺘﻘﺪم و اﻟﺘﺄﺧﺮ ﺑﺎﻟﻌﻜﺲ اﺑﺘﺪأت آﺧﺬا ﻣﻦ اﻟﻨﻮع اﻷﺧﲑ . ﻛﺎن اﻹﻣﺎم ﻫﻮ اﻟﺴﺎﺑﻖ ﻋﻠﻰ ﻛﺎﻹﻣﺎم و اﳌﺄﻣﻮم ﻓﺈﻧﻚ إن اﻋﺘﱪت اﳌﺒﺪأ ﻫﻮ اﶈﺮاب و اﻟﺜﺎﱐ ﻛ ﻣﻦ ﻳﻠﻴﻪ ﻣﻦ اﳌﺄﻣﻮﻣﲔ ﰒ ﻣﻦ ﻳﻠﻴﻪ ﻋﻠﻰ ﻣﻦ ﻳﻠﻴﻪ و إن اﻋﺘﱪت اﳌﺒﺪأ ﻫﻮ اﻟﺒﺎب ﺎن أﻣﺮ اﻟﺴﺒﻖ و اﻟﻠﺤﻮق ﺑﺎﻟﻌﻜﺲ. و ﻳﻘﺎﺑﻞ اﻟﺴﺒﻖ و اﻟﺘﻘﺪم ﺑﺎﻟﺮﺗﺒﺔ اﻟﻠﺤﻮق و اﻟﺘﺄﺧﺮ ﺑﺎﻟﺮﺗﺒﺔ. ﻛﺘﻘﺪم اﻟﻌﺎﱂ ﻋﻠﻰ اﳉﺎﻫﻞ و و ﻣﻨﻬﺎ اﻟﺴﺒﻖ ﺑﺎﻟﺸﺮف و ﻫﻮ اﻟﺴﺒﻖ ﰲ اﻟﺼﻔﺎت اﻟﻜﻤﺎﻟﻴﺔ اﻟﺸﺠﺎع ﻋﻠﻰ اﳉﺒﺎن.
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9. l. THE MEANING OF PRIORITY, POSTERIORITY AND COEXISTENCE Priority (sabq) and posteriority (luhûq) are among the characteristics of existents qua existents. That is because two entities often share, as existents, a relation to a source of existence that is not the same for each of them. An example of it is the relation of ‘two’ and ‘three’ to ‘one;’ ‘two’ being closer to ‘one’ than ‘three’ is called prior and antecedent, and ‘three’ is called posterior and subsequent. At times the common relation is the same for both the things, in which case they are called ‘coexistent’ and their condition is called ‘coexistence’ (ma’iyyah). The metaphysicians have mentioned several kinds of priority and posteriority derived through induction. (i) Temporal priority (al-sabq al-zamânî), in which the prior and the posterior are not contemporaneous. An example of it is the priority of some parts of time to other parts, such as that of yesterday to today and the priority of events of a preceding period to those of a subsequent period. Its opposite is temporal posteriority (al-luhûq al-zamânî). (ii) Priority by nature (al-sabq bi al-thab’) is the priority of the incomplete cause to the effect, like the priority of two to three. (iii) Priority by causality (al-sabq bi al-’illiyyah) is the priority of the complete cause to its effect. (iv) Priority by virtue of quiddity (al-sabq bi al-mâhiyyah, also called altaqaddum bi al-tajawhur) is the priority of the constituting causes of quiddity to their effects, like the priority of the parts of a specific quiddity (i.e. genus and differentia) to the species. The priority of a quiddity to its propria (lawâzim), such as the priority of four to evenness, has also been considered as belonging to this kind. Its opposite is posteriority by virtue of quiddity (al-luhûq bi al-mâhiyyah or al-ta’akhkhur bi al-tajawhur). The above three kinds, viz. priority by nature, priority by causality and priority by virtue of quiddity, are called ‘priority by virtue of essence’ (alsabq bi al-dzât). (v) Priority by virtue of laterality (al-sabq bi al-haqîqah) is when what is ‘prior’ has a quality that is accidentally (i.e. figuratively) ascribed to what is ‘posterior.’ An example of it is water flowing in a channel: water literally possesses the flow, and this flow is ascribed accidentally to the channel in which it flows. Its opposite is posteriority by virtue of literality. This kind has been added by Sadr al-Muta’allihîn. (vi) Meta-temporal priority (al-sabq bi-dahr) is the priority of the necessitating cause over its effect, though not in respect of its necessitating the existence of the effect and bringing it into being, as mentioned under priority by causality, but in the respect that its existence is separate and detached from the existence of the effect. By virtue of the cause existing on a higher existential plane than the effect, the effect is non-existent at the existential plane of the cause, such as the priority of the immaterial world of the Intellect over the world of matter. Its opposite is meta-temporal posteriority (al-ta’akkkhur al-dahrî).
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This kind has been added by Mir Dâmâd, may God’s mercy be upon him, on the basis of his conception of meta-temporal hudûts and qidam, which will be explained later on.’ (vii) Priority by rank (al-sabq bi al-rutbah) occurs in hierarchies based on nature, position and convention. An example of the first kind is the hierarchy of genera and species. If one were to begin at the highest genus, a higher genus will be prior to the one below it, which in its turn will be prior to the one below it until the ultimate species is reached. But if one were to begin at the ultimate species, the order of priority will be reversed. The imam or the prayer leader and those who follow him in a congregational prayer offer an example of the second kind. If one were to begin at the prayer niche, the imam will be seen to be prior to those in the row behind him, and those in the first row will be prior to those in the second, and so on and so forth. But if one were to begin from the last row, the order of priority and posteriority will be reverse. Opposed to this kind of priority is posteriority in terms of rank. (viii) Priority by virtue of superiority (al-sabq bi al-syaraf) depends on worth and merit, such as the priority of a knowledgeable person over an ignorant one and a courageous person over a coward.
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اﻟﻔﺼﻞ اﻟﺜﺎﻧﻲ ﻓﻲ ﻣﻼك اﻟﺴﺒﻖ ﻓﻲ أﻗﺴﺎﻣﻪ و ﻫﻮ اﻷﻣﺮ اﳌﺸﱰك ﻓﻴﻪ ﺑﲔ اﳌﺘﻘﺪم و اﳌﺘﺄﺧﺮ اﻟﺬي ﻓﻴﻪ اﻟﺘﻘﺪم. ﻣﻼك اﻟﺴﺒﻖ ﰲ اﻟﺴﺒﻖ اﻟﺰﻣﺎﱐ ﻫﻮ اﻟﻨﺴﺒﺔ إﱃ اﻟﺰﻣﺎن ﺳﻮاء ﰲ ذﻟﻚ ﻧﻔﺲ اﻟﺰﻣﺎن و اﻷﻣﺮ اﻟﺰﻣﺎﱐ و ﰲ اﻟﺴﺒﻖ ﺑﺎﻟﻄﺒﻊ ﻫﻮ اﻟﻨﺴﺒﺔ إﱃ اﻟﻮﺟﻮد و ﰲ اﻟﺴﺒﻖ ﺑﺎﻟﻌﻠﻴﺔ ﻫﻮ اﻟﻮﺟﻮب و ﰲ اﻟﺴﺒﻖ ﺑﺎﳌﺎﻫﻴﺔ و اﻟﺘﺠﻮﻫﺮ ﻫﻮ ﺗﻘﺮر اﳌﺎﻫﻴﺔ و ﰲ اﻟﺴﺒﻖ ﺑﺎﳊﻘﻴﻘﺔ ﻫﻮ ﻣﻄﻠﻖ اﻟﺘﺤﻘﻖ اﻷﻋﻢ ﻣﻦ ﺎزي و ﰲ اﻟﺴﺒﻖ اﻟﺪﻫﺮي ﻫﻮ اﻟﻜﻮن ﲟﱳ اﻟﻮاﻗﻊ و ﰲ اﻟﺴﺒﻖ ﺑﺎﻟﺮﺗﺒﺔ اﻟﻨﺴﺒﺔ إﱃ R اﳊﻘﻴﻘﻲ و ا
ﻛﺎﳉﻨﺲ اﻟﻌﺎﱄ أو اﻟﻨﻮ ﻛﺎﶈﺮاب أو اﻟﺒﺎب ﰲ اﻟﺮﺗﺒﺔ اﳊﺴﻴﺔ و ﻣﺒﺪإ ﳏﺪود ع اﻷﺧﲑ ﰲ اﻟﺮﺗﺒﺔ اﻟﻌﻘﻠﻴﺔ و ﰲ اﻟﺴﺒﻖ ﺑﺎﻟﺸﺮف ﻫﻮ اﻟﻔﻀﻞ و اﳌﺰﻳﺔ.
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9.2. THE CRITERION OF PRIORITY It is something that is common to the prior and the posterior and by virtue of which priority exists. The criterion in temporal priority is the relation to time, regardless of whether what is prior is time itself or something existing in it. The criterion in priority by nature is the relation to existence. In priority by causality, it is necessity. In priority by quiddity it is the. constitution of the quiddity. In priority by virtue of literality, it is realization in general, including the literal and the metaphorical. In meta-temporal priority, it depends on an entity’s situation in the existential context. In priority by rank, it depends on the point of reference, such as the niche or the mosque entrance in the example pertaining to a sensible hierarchy, and the highest genus or the ultimate species in a conceptual hierarchy. In priority by virtue of superiority, it is merit and advantage.
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اﻟﻔﺼﻞ اﻟﺜﺎﻟﺚ ﻓﻲ اﻟ ﺎ ﻘﺪم و اﻟﺤﺪوث و أﻗﺴﺎﻣﻬﻤ ﻛﺎﻧﺖ اﻟﻌﺎﻣﺔ ﺗﻄﻠﻖ اﻟﻠﻔﻈﺘﲔ اﻟﻘﺪﱘ و اﳊﺎدث ﻋﻠﻰ أﻣﺮﻳﻦ ﻳﺸﱰﻛﺎن ﰲ اﻻﻧﻄﺒﺎق ﻋﻠﻰ ﻛﺎن زﻣﺎن وﺟﻮد أﺣﺪﳘﺎ أﻛﺜﺮ ﻣﻦ زﻣﺎن وﺟﻮد اﻵﺧﺮ ﻓﻜﺎن اﻷﻛﺜﺮ زﻣﺎﻧﺎ ﻫﻮ زﻣﺎن واﺣﺪ إذا اﻟﻘﺪﱘ و اﻷﻗﻞ زﻣﺎﻧﺎ ﻫﻮ اﳊﺎدث و اﳊﺪﻳﺚ و ﳘﺎ وﺻﻔﺎن إﺿﺎﻓﻴﺎن أي إن اﻟﺸﻲ ء اﻟﻮ اﺣﺪ ﻳﻜﻮن ﺣﺎدﺛﺎ ﺑﺎﻟﻨﺴﺒﺔ إﱃ ﺷﻲ ء و ﻗﺪﳝﺎ ﺑﺎﻟﻨﺴﺒﺔ إﱃ آﺧﺮ ﻓﻜﺎن اﶈﺼﻞ ﻣﻦ ﻣﻔﻬﻮم اﳊﺪوث ﻫﻮ ﻣﺴﺒﻮﻗﻴﺔ اﻟﺸﻲ ﻚ ﻛﻮﻧﻪ ﻣﺴﺒﻮﻗﺎ ﺑﺬﻟ ء ﺑﺎﻟﻌﺪم ﰲ زﻣﺎن و ﻣﻦ ﻣﻔﻬﻮم اﻟﻘﺪم ﻋﺪم . ﰒ ﻋﻤﻤﻮا ﻣﻔﻬﻮﻣﻲ اﻟﻠﻔﻈﲔ ﺑﺄﺧﺬ اﻟﻌﺪم ﻣﻄﻠﻘﺎ ﻳﻌﻢ اﻟﻌﺪم اﳌﻘﺎﺑﻞ و ﻫﻮ اﻟﻌﺪم اﻟﺰﻣﺎﱐ اﻟﺬي ﻻ ﳚﺎﻣﻊ اﻟﻮﺟﻮد و ﻲ ﺎﻣﻊ اﻟﺬي ﻫﻮ ﻋﺪم اﻟﺸ R اﻟﻌﺪم ا ﺎﻣﻊ ﻟﻮﺟﻮدﻩ ﺑﻌﺪ R ء ﰲ ﺣﺪ ذاﺗﻪ ا اﺳﺘﻨﺎدﻩ إﱃ اﻟﻌﻠﺔ. ﻓﻜﺎن ﻣﻔﻬﻮم اﳊﺪوث ﻣﺴﺒﻮﻗﻴﺔ اﻟﻮﺟﻮد ﺑﺎﻟﻌﺪم و ﻣﻔﻬﻮم اﻟﻘﺪم ﻋﺪم ﻣﺴﺒﻮﻗﻴﺘﻪ ﺑﺎﻟﻌﺪم و اﳌﻌﻨﻴﺎن ﻣﻦ اﻷﻋﺮاض اﻟﺬاﺗﻴﺔ ﳌﻄﻠﻖ اﻟﻮﺟﻮد ﻓﺈن اﳌﻮﺟﻮد ﲟﺎ ﻫﻮ ﻣﻮﺟﻮد إﻣﺎ ﻣﺴﺒﻮق ﺑﺎﻟﻌﺪم و إﻣﺎ ﻟﻴﺲ ﲟﺴﺒ ﺔ ﻮق ﺑﻪ و ﻋﻨﺪ ذﻟﻚ ﺻﺢ اﻟﺒﺤﺚ ﻋﻨﻬﻤﺎ ﰲ اﻟﻔﻠﺴﻔ. ﻓﻤﻦ اﳊﺪوث اﳊﺪوث اﻟﺰﻣﺎﱐ و ﻫﻮ ﻣﺴﺒﻮﻗﻴﺔ وﺟﻮد اﻟﺸﻲ ﻛﻤﺴﺒﻮﻗﻴﺔ اﻟﻴﻮم ء ﺑﺎﻟﻌﺪم اﻟﺰﻣﺎﱐ ﺑﺎﻟﻌﺪم ﰲ أﻣﺲ و ﻣﺴﺒﻮﻗﻴﺔ ﺣﻮادث اﻟﻴﻮم ﺑﺎﻟﻌﺪم ﰲ أﻣﺲ و ﻳﻘﺎﺑﻠﻪ اﻟﻘﺪم اﻟﺰﻣﺎﱐ و ﻫﻮ ﻋﺪم ﻣﺴﺒﻮﻗﻴﺔ اﻟﺸﻲ ﻻ ﻛﻤﻄﻠﻖ اﻟﺰﻣﺎن اﻟﺬي ء ﺑﺎﻟﻌﺪم اﻟﺰﻣﺎﱐ ﻳﺘﻘﺪﻣﻪ زﻣﺎن و ﻻ زﻣﺎﱐ و إﻻ ﺛﺒﺖ اﻟﺰﻣﺎن ﻣﻦ ﺣﻴﺚ اﻧﺘﻔﻰ ﻫﺬا ﺧﻠﻒ. و ﻣﻦ اﳊﺪوث اﳊﺪوث اﻟﺬاﰐ و ﻫﻮ ﻣﺴﺒﻮﻗﻴﺔ وﺟﻮد اﻟﺸﻲ ﻛﺠﻤﻴﻊ ء ﺑﺎﻟﻌﺪم ﰲ ذاﺗﻪ ﺎT ﺎ و ﻟﻴﺲ ﳍﺎ ﰲ ﻣﺎﻫﻴﺘﻬﺎ و ﺣﺪ ذا T اﳌﻮﺟﻮدات اﳌﻤﻜﻨﺔ اﻟﱵ ﳍﺎ اﻟﻮﺟﻮد ﺑﻌﻠﺔ ﺧﺎرﺟﺔ ﻣﻦ ذا إﻻ اﻟﻌﺪم. ﻓﺈن ﻗﻠﺖ اﳌﺎﻫﻴﺔ ﻟﻴﺲ ﳍﺎ ﺎ إﻻ اﻹﻣﻜﺎن و ﻻزﻣﻪ ﺗﺴﺎوي ﻧﺴﺒﺘﻬﺎ إﱃ اﻟﻮﺟﻮد و T ﰲ ﺣﺪ ذا ﻛﻤﺎ ﻗﻴﻞ اﻟﻌﺪم و ﺧﻠﻮ اﻟﺬات ﻋﻦ اﻟﻮﺟﻮد و اﻟﻌﺪم ﲨﻴﻌﺎ دون اﻟﺘﻠﺒﺲ ﺑﺎﻟﻌﺪم . ﺎ ﺧﺎﻟﻴﺔ ﻋﻦ اﻟﻮﺟﻮد و اﻟﻌﺪم ﻣﻔﺘﻘﺮة ﰲ ﺗﻠﺒﺴﻬﺎ ﺑﺄﺣﺪﳘﺎ T ﻛﺎﻧﺖ ﰲ ذا ﻗﻠﺖ اﳌﺎﻫﻴﺔ و إن ﺎ5ﻛﻮ ﻛﺎف ﰲ إﱃ ﻣﺮﺟﺢ ﻟﻜﻦ ﻋﺪم ﻣﺮﺟﺢ اﻟﻮﺟﻮد و ﻋﻠﺘﻪ ﻣﻌﺪوﻣﺔ و ﺑﻌﺒﺎرة أﺧﺮى ﺧﻠﻮﻫﺎ ﰲ ﺎ ﻋﻦ اﻟﻮﺟﻮد و اﻟﻌﺪم و ﺳﻠﺒﻬﻤﺎ ﻋﻨﻬﺎ إﳕﺎ ﻫﻮ ﲝﺴﺐ اﳊﻤﻞ اﻷوﱃ و ﻫﻮ ﻻ ﻳﻨﺎﰲ T ﺣﺪ ذا اﺗﺼﺎﻓﻬﺎ ﺑﺎﻟﻌﺪم ﺣﻴﻨﺌﺬ ﲝﺴﺐ اﳊﻤﻞ اﻟﺸﺎﺋﻊ. و ﻳﻘﺎﺑﻞ اﳊﺪوث -ﺬا اﳌﻌﲎ اﻟﻘﺪم اﻟﺬاﰐ و ﻫﻮ ﻋﺪم ﻣﺴﺒﻮﻗﻴﺔ اﻟﺸﻲ ء ﺑﺎﻟﻌﺪم ﰲ ﺣﺪ ذاﺗﻪ ﻛﺎﻧﺖ ا و إﳕﺎ ﻳﻜﻮن ﻓﻴﻤﺎ ﻟﺬات ﻋﲔ ﺣﻘﻴﻘﺔ اﻟﻮﺟﻮد اﻟﻄﺎرد ﻟﻠﻌﺪم ﺑﺬاﺗﻪ و ﻫﻮ اﻟﻮﺟﻮد اﻟﻮاﺟﱯ اﻟﺬي ﻣﺎﻫﻴﺘﻪ إﻧﻴﺘﻪ.
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و ﻣﻦ اﳊﺪوث اﳊﺪوث اﻟﺪﻫﺮي اﻟﺬي ذﻛﺮﻩ اﻟﺴﻴﺪ اﶈﻘﻖ اﻟﺪاﻣﺎد رﻩ و ﻫﻮ ﻣﺴﺒﻮﻗﻴﺔ وﺟﻮد ﻣﺮﺗﺒﺔ ﻣﻦ ﻣﺮاﺗﺐ اﻟﻮﺟﻮد ﺑﻌﺪﻣﻪ اﳌﺘﻘﺮر ﰲ ﻣﺮﺗﺒﺔ ﻫﻲ ﻓﻮﻗﻬﺎ ﰲ اﻟﺴﻠﺴﻠﺔ اﻟﻄﻮﻟﻴﺔ و ﻫﻮ ﻋﺪم ﻏﲑ ﳎﺎﻣﻊ ﻟﻜﻨﻪ ﻏ ﻛﻤﺴﺒﻮﻗﻴﺔ ﻋﺎﱂ اﳌﺎدة ﺑﻌﺪﻣﻪ اﳌﺘﻘﺮر ﰲ ﻋﺎﱂ اﳌﺜﺎل و ﻳﻘﺎﺑﻠﻪ اﻟﻘﺪم ﲑ زﻣﺎﱐ اﻟﺪﻫﺮي و ﻫﻮ ﻇﺎﻫﺮ.
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9.3. QIDAM AND HUDÛTH, AND THEIR KINDS In common usage the words qadîm (lit. old) and hadîts (lit. new or recent) were originally applied to two contemporaneous things. When the period of existence of one of them was greater than that of the other, the one which had existed for a longer period was called qadîm and the one which had existed for a shorter period was called hadîts or hadith. Hence they were relative attributes, in the sense that a single thing could be hadîts in relation to one thing and qadîm in relation to another. That which was implied in the concept of hudûts was the prior non-existence of a thing in a certain period of time, and qidam implied that a thing was not preceded by non-existence in a given period of time. Then a more general meaning was given to these two words by giving ‘non-existence’ (‘adam) a more general sense that included non-existence as opposed to existence – that is non-existence in time, which does not cohabit with existence – as well as the non-existence that cohabits with existence. The latter of kind of non-existence is a thing’s essential non-being that accompanies its existence after its being brought into existence by the cause. Thus the meaning of hudûts became ‘existence posterior to nonexistence’ and the meaning of qidam ‘non-precedence of existence by nonexistence.’ These two concepts are essential (dzâtî) characteristics of existence in general, for an existent qua existent is either preceded by nonexistence or it is not. Thereupon, these concepts became fit for philosophical discussion. (i) Thus one kind of hudûts is ‘temporal hudûts’ or hudûts in terms of time [al- hudûts al-zamânî), which means a thing’s existence being posterior to its non-existence, such as today’s being posterior to its non-existence yesterday, or the posteriority of today’-s events to their non-existence yesterday. Opposed to it is qidam in terms of time (al-qidam al-zamânî), which is a thing’s not being posterior to non-existence in time, like the qidam of time itself which is neither preceded by a time nor anything temporal – for other- wise it would imply the subsistence of time when it does not exist, and this involves a contradiction. (ii) Another kind of hudûts is ‘essential hudûts’ (al-hudûts al-dzâtî), which means non-existence’s being prior to the existence of a thing at the plane of its essence, as is the case with all contingent existents, which owe their existence to a cause beyond themselves with nothing in their quiddities and essences except non-existence. One may raise an objection here that quiddity in itself does not possess anything but contingency. That means the equality of its relation to existence and non-existence and its being devoid of both of them. Thus it is devoid of non-existence, as mentioned. The answer is that it is true that quiddity by itself is devoid of existence and non-existence. In order to assume one of these it stands in need of something to tilt the scale one way or the other; the non-existence of such a preponderant and cause is sufficient to make it non-existent. In other words, its being devoid in itself of existence and non-existence and its being divested of these two is in the sense of primary predication (i.e. as a
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concept). That does not contradict its being characterized with non-existence in the sense of common predication (i.e. in external reality). The opposite of hudûts in this sense is ‘essential qidam’ [al-qidam aldzâtî), which means non-precedence of a thing by non-existence at the plane of its essence (dzât). That is only true of an entity whose essence is the very reality of existence, an entity that dispels non-existence by its very essence. That is the Necessary Being, whose essence is Its existence. (iii) A third kind of hudûts is ‘meta-temporal hudûts’ (al-hudûts al-dahrî), mentioned by Mir Dâmâd – may God’s mercy be upon him. It means the posteriority of the existence of an existential plane to its non-existence at a higher plane in the vertical hierarchy of existence. That kind of nonexistence does not cohabit (ghayr mujâmi’) with existence, though it is nontemporal. An instance of it is the posteriority of the material world to its nonexistence at the plane of the imaginal world (‘âlam al-mitsâl). Opposed to it is ‘meta-temporal qidam’
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اﻟﻤﺮﺣﻠﺔ اﻟﻌﺎﺷﺮة ﻓﻲ اﻟﻘﻮة و اﻟﻔﻌﻞ
وﺟﻮد اﻟﺸﻲ ء ﻓﻲ اﻷﻋﻴﺎن ﺑﺤﻴﺚ ﻳﺘﺮﺗﺐ ﻋﻠﻴﻪ آﺛﺎرﻩ اﻟﻤﻄﻠﻮﺑﺔ ﻣﻨﻪ ﻳﺴﻤﻰ ﻓﻌﻼ و ﻳﻘﺎل إن وﺟﻮدﻩ ﺑﺎﻟﻔﻌﻞ و إﻣﻜﺎﻧﻪ اﻟﺬي ﻗﺒﻞ ﺗﺤﻘﻘﻪ ﻳﺴﻤﻰ ﻗﻮة و ﻳﻘﺎل إن وﺟﻮدﻩ ﺑﺎﻟﻘﻮة ﺑﻌﺪ و ﻛﺎﻟﻤﺎء ﻳﻤ ذﻟﻚ ﻜﻦ أن ﻳﺘﺒﺪل ﻫﻮاء ﻓﺈﻧﻪ ﻣﺎ دام ﻣﺎء ﻣﺎء ﺑﺎﻟﻔﻌﻞ و ﻫﻮاء ﺑﺎﻟﻘﻮة ﻓﺈذا ﺗﺒﺪل ﻫﻮاء ﺻﺎر ﻫﻮاء ﺑﺎﻟﻔﻌﻞ و ﺑﻄﻠﺖ اﻟﻘﻮة ﻓﻤﻦ اﻟﻮﺟﻮد ﻣﺎ ﻫﻮ ﺑﺎﻟﻔﻌﻞ و ﻣﻨﻪ ﻣﺎ ﻫﻮ ﺑﺎﻟﻘﻮة و اﻟﻘﺴﻤﺎن ﻫﻤﺎ اﻟﻤﺒﺤﻮث ﻋﻨﻬﻤﺎ ﻓﻲ ﻫﺬﻩ اﻟﻤﺮﺣﻠﺔ و ﻓﻴﻬﺎ ﺳﺘﺔ ﻋﺸﺮ ﻓﺼﻼ CHAPTER TEN: Actuality and Potentiality The existence of a thing in external reality, wherein it possesses the external properties (atsâr) expected of it, is called ‘act,’ and it is to exist in actuality (bi al-fi’l). The potential that precedes its actualization is called ‘potentiality’ (quwwah), and before it has actualized it is said to be in potentiality. For instance, water has the potential to change into vapour. As long as it is water, it is water in actuality and vapour potentially. However, when it has changed into vapour, it becomes vapour in actuality and the potentiality is annulled. Hence there is existence in actuality and existence in potentiality, and these two divisions are discussed in this chapter. 16 Units
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ﻛﻞ ﺣﺎدث زﻣﺎﻧﻲ ﻣﺴﺒﻮق ﺑﻘﻮة اﻟﻮﺟﻮد اﻟﻔﺼﻞ اﻷول ﻛﻞ ﺣﺎدث زﻣﺎﱐ ﻓﺈﻧﻪ ﻣﺴﺒﻮق ﺑﻘﻮة اﻟﻮﺟﻮد ﻷﻧﻪ ﻗﺒﻞ ﲢﻘﻖ وﺟﻮدﻩ ﳚﺐ أن ﻳﻜﻮن ﳑﻜﻦ ﻛﺎن ﳑﺘﻨﻊ اﻟﻮﺟﻮد اﺳﺘﺤﺎل ﻛﻤﺎ ﳚﻮز أن ﻻ ﻳﻮﺟﺪ إذ ﻟﻮ اﻟﻮﺟﻮد ﳚﻮز أن ﻳﺘﺼﻒ ﺑﺎﻟﻮﺟﻮد ﻛﺎن واﺟﺒﺎ ﱂ ﻳﺘﺨﻠﻒ ﻋﻦ اﻟﻮﺟﻮد ﻟﻜﻨﻪ رﲟﺎ ﱂ ﻳﻮﺟﺪ و إﻣﻜﺎﻧﻪ ﻫﺬا ﻏﲑ ﻛﻤﺎ أﻧﻪ ﻟﻮ ﲢﻘﻘﻪ
ﻗﺪرة اﻟﻔﺎﻋﻞ ﻋﻠﻴﻪ ﻷن إﻣﻜﺎن وﺟﻮدﻩ وﺻﻒ ﻟﻪ ﺑﺎﻟﻘﻴﺎس إﱃ و ﺷﻲ ﺟﻮدﻩ ﻻ ﺑﺎﻟﻘﻴﺎس إﱃ ء آﺧﺮ ﻛﺎﻟﻔﺎﻋﻞ. و ﻫﺬا اﻹﻣﻜﺎن أﻣﺮ ﺧﺎرﺟﻲ ﻻ ﻣﻌﲎ ﻋﻘﻠﻲ اﻋﺘﺒﺎري ﻻﺣﻖ ﲟﺎﻫﻴﺔ اﻟﺸﻲ ء ﻷﻧﻪ ﻳﺘﺼﻒ ﺑﺎﻟﺸﺪة و اﻟﻀﻌﻒ و اﻟﻘﺮب و اﻟﺒﻌﺪ ﻓﺎﻟﻨﻄﻔﺔ اﻟﱵ ﻓﻴﻬﺎ إﻣﻜﺎن أن ﻳﺼﲑ إﻧﺴﺎﻧﺎ أﻗﺮب إﱃ اﻹﻧﺴﺎﻧﻴﺔ ﻣﻦ اﻟﻐﺬاء اﻟﺬي ﻳﺘﺒﺪل ﻧﻄﻔﺔ و اﻹﻣﻜﺎن ﻓﻴﻬﺎ أﺷﺪ ﻣﻨﻪ ﻓﻴﻪ. و ج ﻓﻠﻴﺲ ﺟﻮﻫﺮا ﻗﺎﺋﻤﺎ ﺑﺬاﺗﻪ و ﻫﻮ ﻇﺎﻫﺮ ﺑﻞ ﻛﺎن ﻫﺬا اﻹﻣﻜﺎن أﻣﺮا ﻣﻮﺟﻮدا ﰲ اﳋﺎر إذ ﻫﻮ ﻋﺮض ﻗﺎﺋﻢ ﺑﺸﻲ ء آﺧﺮ ﻓﻠﻨﺴﻤﻪ ﻗﻮة و ﻟﻨﺴﻢ ﻣﻮﺿﻮﻋﻪ ﻣﺎدة ﻓﺈذن ﻟﻜﻞ ﺣﺎدث زﻣﺎﱐ ﻣﺎدة ﺳﺎﺑﻘﺔ ﻋﻠﻴﻪ ﲢﻤﻞ ﻗﻮة وﺟﻮدﻩ.
ﺎ ﻗﻮ T ﺎ ﻓﻬﻲ ﰲ ذا 5 و ﳚﺐ أن ﺗﻜﻮن اﳌﺎدة ﻏﲑ آﺑﻴﺔ ﻋﻦ اﻟﻔﻌﻠﻴﺔ اﻟﱵ ﲢﻤﻞ إﻣﻜﺎ ة اﻟﻔﻌﻠﻴﺔ ﻛﺎﻧﺖ ذات ﻓﻌﻠﻴﺔ ﰲ ﻧﻔﺴﻬﺎ ﻷﺑﺖ ﻋﻦ ﻗﺒﻮل ﻓﻌﻠﻴﺔ أﺧﺮى ﺑﻞ ﻫﻲ ﺎ إذ ﻟﻮ 5 اﻟﱵ ﻓﻴﻬﺎ إﻣﻜﺎ ﺎ ﺟﻮﻫﺮا ﺑﺎﻟﻘﻮة ﻗﺎﺋﻤﺔ ﺑﻔﻌﻠﻴﺔ أﺧﺮى إذا 5 ﺟﻮﻫﺮ ﻓﻌﻠﻴﺔ وﺟﻮدﻩ أﻧﻪ ﻗﻮة اﻷﺷﻴﺎء و ﻫﻲ ﻟﻜﻮ ﻛﺎﳌﺎء إذ ﺎ ﺑﻄﻠﺖ اﻟﻔﻌﻠﻴﺔ اﻷوﱃ و ﻗﺎﻣﺖ ﻣﻘﺎﻣﻬﺎ اﻟﻔﻌﻠﻴﺔ اﳊﺪﻳﺜﺔ T ﺣﺪﺛﺖ اﻟﻔﻌﻠﻴﺔ اﻟﱵ ﻓﻴﻬﺎ ﻗﻮ ا ﻛﺎﻧﺖ ﺗﻘﻮم اﳌﺎدة اﳊﺎﻣﻠﺔ ﻟﺼﻮرة اﳍﻮاء و ﻗﺎﻣﺖ اﻟﺼﻮرة ﺻﺎر ﻫﻮاء ﺑﻄﻠﺖ اﻟﺼﻮرة اﳌﺎﺋﻴﺔ اﻟﱵ ﺎ5 ﻛﺎﻧﺖ ﲢﻤﻞ إﻣﻜﺎ اﳍﻮاﺋﻴﺔ ﻣﻘﺎﻣﻬﺎ ﻓﺘﻘﻮﻣﺖ -ﺎ اﳌﺎدة اﻟﱵ . ﻛﺎﻧﺖ ﺣﺎدﺛﺔ و ﻣﺎدة اﻟﻔﻌﻠﻴﺔ اﳉﺪﻳﺪة اﳊﺎدﺛﺔ و اﻟﻔﻌﻠﻴﺔ اﻟﺴﺎﺑﻘﺔ اﻟﺰاﺋﻠﺔ واﺣﺪة و إﻻ ﲝﺪوث اﻟﻔﻌﻠﻴﺔ اﳊﺎدﺛﺔ ﻓﺎﺳﺘﻠﺰﻣﺖ إﻣﻜﺎﻧﺎ آﺧﺮ و ﻣﺎدة أﺧﺮى و ﻫﻜﺬا ﻓﻜﺎﻧﺖ ﳊﺎدث واﺣﺪ ﻣﻮاد و إﻣﻜﺎﻧﺎت ﻏﲑ ﻣﺘﻨﺎﻫﻴﺔ و ﻫﻮ ﳏﺎل و ﻧﻈﲑ اﻹﺷﻜﺎل ﻻزم ﻓﻴﻤﺎ ﻟﻮ ﻓﺮض ﻟﻠﻤﺎدة ﺣﺪوث زﻣﺎﱐ. و ﻗﺪ ﺗﺒﲔ ﲟﺎ ﻣﺮ أﻳﻀﺎ أوﻻ :ﻩ ﻛﻞ ﺣﺎدث زﻣﺎﱐ ﻓﻠﻪ ﻣﺎدة ﲢﻤﻞ ﻗﻮة وﺟﻮد أن . و ﺛﺎﻧﻴﺎ :ﺑﻴﻨ أن ﻣﺎدة اﳊﻮادث اﻟﺰﻣﺎﻧﻴﺔ واﺣﺪة ﻣﺸﱰﻛﺔ ﻬﺎ. و ﺛﺎﻟﺜﺎ :ﻲ أن اﻟﻨﺴﺒﺔ ﺑﲔ اﳌﺎدة و ﻗﻮة اﻟﺸ ء اﻟﱵ ﲢﻤﻠﻬﺎ ﻧﺴﺒﺔ اﳉﺴﻢ اﻟﻄﺒﻴﻌﻲ و اﳉﺴﻢ اﻟﺘﻌﻠﻴﻤﻲ ﻓﻘﻮة اﻟﺸﻲ ﻛﻤﺎ أن اﳉﺴﻢ اﻟﺘﻌﻠﻴﻤﻲ ﺗﻌﲔ ء اﳋﺎص ﺗﻌﲔ ﻗﻮة اﳌﺎدة اﳌﺒﻬﻤﺔ اﻻﻣﺘﺪادات اﻟﺜﻼث اﳌﺒﻬﻤﺔ ﰲ اﳉﺴﻢ اﻟﻄﺒﻴﻌﻲ.
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و راﺑﻌﺎ :ﲑ أن وﺟﻮد اﳊﻮادث اﻟﺰﻣﺎﻧﻴﺔ ﻻ ﻳﻨﻔﻚ ﻋﻦ ﺗﻐ ﻛﺎﻧﺖ ﺟﻮاﻫﺮ أو ﰲ ﰲ ﺻﻮرﻫﺎ إن ﻛﺎﻧﺖ أﻋﺮاﺿﺎ أﺣﻮاﳍﺎ إن . و ﺧﺎﻣﺴﺎ : أن اﻟﻘﻮة ﺗﻘﻮم داﺋﻤﺎ ﺑﻔﻌﻠﻴﺔ و اﳌﺎدة ﺗﻘﻮم داﺋﻤﺎ ﺑﺼﻮرة ﲢﻔﻈﻬﺎ ﻓﺈذا ﺣﺪﺛﺖ ﺻﻮرة ﺑﻌﺪ ﺻﻮرة ﻗﺎﻣﺖ اﻟﺼﻮرة اﳊﺪﻳﺜﺔ ﻣﻘﺎم اﻟﻘﺪﳝﺔ و ﻗﻮﻣﺖ اﳌﺎدة. و ﺳﺎدﺳﺎ :ﺎ ﻳﺘﺒﲔ ﲟﺎ ﺗﻘﺪم أن اﻟﻘﻮة ﺗﺘﻘﺪم ﻋﻠﻰ اﻟﻔﻌﻞ اﳋﺎص ﺗﻘﺪﻣ زﻣﺎﻧﻴﺎ و أن ﻣﻄﻠﻖ اﻟﻔﻌﻞ ﻳﺘﻘﺪم ﻋﻠﻰ اﻟﻘﻮة ﲜﻤﻴﻊ أﳓﺎء اﻟﺘﻘﺪم ﻣﻦ ﻋﻠﻲ و ﻃﺒﻌﻲ و زﻣﺎﱐ و ﻏﲑﻫﺎ.
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10.1 A TEMPORAL HADITH IS PRECEDED BY POTENTIALITY Everything that comes into existence in time [hadits zamânî) is preceded by a potentiality for existence. For before it actualizes, it necessary that its existence be contingent, that is, it should be capable of being qualified with existence or non-existence. For if it were impossible, its actualization would not be possible. Similarly it were necessary, it would not fail to exist. This potential is something other than the agent’s power over it, for its potential for existence is an attribute of it with reference to its own existence, not to something else such as the agent. This potential is something external and not a derivative concept (i’tibâr ‘aqlî) associated with the thing’s quiddity, for it is characterized with strength and weakness, proximity and remoteness. For instance, an embryo possessing the potential to become a human being is closer to humanity than a lump of food, which assesses the potential for changing into an embryo, and the potential possessed by the former is greater than what is possessed by food. It is obvious that this potential, which is something existing in external reality, is not something substantial (jawhar) subsisting bv itself. Rather, it is an accident that subsists through something else. We will call it ‘potentiality’ (quwwah) and its substratum, ‘matter’ (mâddah). Thus everything that comes into existence in time consists of ‘matter’ that precedes it and carries the potentiality of its existence. It is necessary that ‘matter’ should not be unreceptive to the actuality whose potential it bears. Hence it is in itself the potentiality for receiving the actuality whose potential it bears. For if matter were to have an actuality of its own, it would refuse to accept any other actuality. Thus it is a substance (jawhar) whose intrinsic actuality is the potentiality for things. However, in order to be a substance endowed with potentiality, it subsists through another actuality. When the actuality for which it has the potentiality comes into being, the earlier actuality disappears, giving its place to the new actuality. An example of it is water. When it changes into vapour, its aqueous form – which earlier sustained the matter that now bears the form of vapour – disappears and is replaced by the gaseous form through which the matter that earlier bore the potential to become vapour is now sustained. The matter of the new emergent actuality and that of the earlier defunct actuality is one, for otherwise we would have to regard it as coming into being with the emergent actuality. This would necessitate another potential and another matter, and this entails an indefinite regress. Thus a single emergent thing would require an infinite number of potentials and matters, and this is inadmissible. A similar difficulty arises if we consider matter as having come into existence in time (hadits zamânî). From the above discussion it becomes clear that, first, everything that comes into existence in time has a ‘matter’ that bears the potentiality for its existence. Second, the matter of things that come into existence in time is one and common to them. Third, the relation between ‘matter’ and the potentiality it bears for becoming something is one that exists between a physical body and its
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three-dimensional geometrical form ( al-jism al-ta’lîmî). Hence, the potentiality for a particular thing delimits the indefinite potentiality of matter, in the same way as a three-dimensional geometrical form defines the indefinite threefold dimensions of a physical mass. Fourth, the existence of entities that come into existence in time inseparable from the change in their forms if they are substances, and in their states if accidents. Fifth, potentiality always subsists through actuality, and matter subsists continually through a form that sustains it. Thus when a – form takes the place of an earlier one, the subsequent form takes the place of the preceding one in sustaining matter. Sixth, it becomes clear from what has been mentioned that potentiality temporally precedes only a particular actuality; otherwise actuality when taken in an absolute manner precedes potentiality respect of all forms of priority: causal, temporal, by nature, etc.
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اﻟﻔﺼﻞ اﻟﺜﺎﻧﻲ ﻓﻲ ﺗﻘﺴﻴﻢ اﻟﺘﻐﻴﺮ ج اﻟﺸﻲ ﻗﺪ ﻋﺮﻓﺖ أن ﻣﻦ ﻟﻮازم ﺧﺮو ء ﻣﻦ اﻟﻘﻮة إﱃ اﻟﻔﻌﻞ ﺣﺼﻮل اﻟﺘﻐﲑ إﻣﺎ ﰲ ذاﺗﻪ أو ﰲ أﺣﻮال ذاﺗﻪ ﻓﺎﻋﻠﻢ أن ﺣﺼﻮل اﻟﺘﻐﲑ إﻣﺎ دﻓﻌﻲ و إﻣﺎ ﺗﺪرﳚﻲ و اﻟﺜﺎﱐ ﻫﻮ اﳊﺮﻛﺔ و ﻫﻲ ﳓﻮ وﺟﻮد ﺗﺪرﳚﻲ ﻟﻠﺸﻲ ﻫﺬﻩ ء ﻳﻨﺒﻐﻲ أن ﻳﺒﺤﺚ ﻋﻨﻬﺎ ﻣﻦ ﱃ اﳉﻬﺔ ﰲ اﻟﻔﻠﺴﻔﺔ اﻷو.
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10.2. THE KINDS OF CHANGE We have seen that a thing’s motion from potentiality to actuality ails change, either in its essence or its states. Change is either instantaneous or gradual. Gradual change is called motion (harakah), which is a thing’s gradual mode of existence (i.e. extended over time). As it relates to a mode of being, it deserves to be a subject of metaphysical study in this respect.
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اﻟﻔﺼﻞ اﻟﺜﺎﻟﺚ ﻓﻲ ﺗﺤﺪﻳﺪ اﻟﺤﺮﻛﺔ ج اﻟﺸﻲ ﻗﺪ ﺗﺒﲔ ﰲ اﻟﻔﺼﻞ اﻟﺴﺎﺑﻖ أن اﳊﺮﻛﺔ ﺧﺮو ﻘ ء ﻣﻦ اﻟ ﻮة إﱃ اﻟﻔﻌﻞ ﺗﺪرﳚﺎ و إن ﺷﺌﺖ ﻓﻘﻞ ﻫﻲ ﺗﻐﲑ اﻟﺸﻲ ء ﺗﺪرﳚﺎ و اﻟﺘﺪرﻳﺞ ﻣﻌﲎ ﺑﺪﻳﻬﻲ اﻟﺘﺼﻮر ﺑﺈﻋﺎﻧﺔ اﳊﺲ ﻋﻠﻴﻪ و ﻋﺮﻓﻬﺎ اﳌﻌﻠﻢ ﻛﻤﺎل أول ﳌﺎ ﺑﺎﻟﻘﻮة ﻣﻦ ﺣﻴﺚ إﻧﻪ ﺑﺎﻟﻘﻮة و ﺗﻮﺿﻴﺤﻪ أن ﺣﺼﻮل ﻣﺎ ﳝﻜﻦ أن اﻷول ﺑﺄ5ﺎ ﳛﺼﻞ ﻟﻠﺸﻲ ﻲ ﻛﻤﺎل ﻟﻪ و اﻟﺸ ء ء اﻟﺬي ﻳﻘﺼﺪ ﺑﺎﳊﺮﻛﺔ ﺣﺎﻻ ﻣﻦ اﻷﺣﻮال ﻛﺎﳉﺴﻢ ﻣﺜﻼ ﻳﻘﺼﺪ ﻛﻞ ﻣﻦ اﻟﺴﻠﻮك و اﻟﺘﻤﻜﻦ ﰲ اﳌﻜﺎن اﻟﺬي ﻳﺴﻠﻚ إﻟﻴﻪ ﻛﺎن ﻣﻜﺎﻧﺎ ﻟﻴﺘﻤﻜﻦ ﻓﻴﻪ ﻓﻴﺴﻠﻚ إﻟﻴﻪ ﻛﻤﺎل ﺛﺎن ﻓﺈذا ﺷﺮع ﰲ ﻛﻤﺎل أول ﻟﺘﻘﺪﻣﻪ و اﻟﺘﻤﻜﻦ ﻛﻤﺎﻻ ﻟﺬﻟﻚ اﳉﺴﻢ ﻏﲑ أن اﻟﺴﻠﻮك ﻛﻤﺎﻟﻪ ﻛﻤﺎل ﻟﻜﻦ ﻻ ﻣﻄﻠﻘﺎ ﺑﻞ ﻣﻦ ﺣﻴﺚ إﻧﻪ ﺑﻌﺪ ﺑﺎﻟﻘﻮة ﺑﺎﻟﻨﺴﺒﺔ إﱃ اﻟﺴﻠﻮك ﻓﻘﺪ ﲢﻘﻖ ﻟﻪ اﻟﺜ ﻛﻤﺎل أول ﳌﺎ ﻫﻮ ﺑﺎﻟﻘﻮة ﺑﺎﻟﻨﺴﺒﺔ إﱃ ﺎﱐ و ﻫﻮ اﻟﺘﻤﻜﻦ ﰲ اﳌﻜﺎن اﻟﺬي ﻳﺮﻳﺪﻩ ﻓﺎﳊﺮﻛﺔ اﻟﻜﻤﺎﻟﲔ ﻣﻦ ﺣﻴﺚ إﻧﻪ ﺑﺎﻟﻘﻮة ﺑﺎﻟﻨﺴﺒﺔ إﱃ اﻟﻜﻤﺎل اﻟﺜﺎﱐ. و ﻗﺪ ﺗﺒﲔ ﺑﺬﻟﻚ أن اﳊﺮﻛﺔ ﺗﺘﻮﻗﻒ ﰲ ﲢﻘﻘﻬﺎ ﻋﻠﻰ أﻣﻮر ﺳﺘﺔ اﳌﺒﺪأ اﻟﺬي ﻣﻨﻪ اﳊﺮﻛﺔ و اﳌﻨﺘﻬﻰ اﻟﺬي إﻟﻴﻪ اﳊﺮﻛﺔ و اﳌﻮﺿﻮع اﻟﺬي ﻟﻪ اﳊﺮﻛﺔ و ﻫﻮ اﳌﺘﺤﺮك و اﻟﻔﺎﻋﻞ اﻟﺬي ﻳﻮﺟﺪ اﳊﺮﻛﺔ و ﻫﻮ اﶈﺮك و اﳌﺴﺎﻓﺔ اﻟﱵ ﻓﻴﻬﺎ اﳊﺮﻛﺔ و اﻟﺰﻣﺎن اﻟﺬي ﻳﻨﻄﺒﻖ ﻋﻠﻴﻪ اﳊﺮﻛﺔ ﻧﻮﻋﺎ ﻣﻦ اﻻﻧﻄﺒﺎق و ﺳﻴﺠﻲ ﻚ ء ﺗﻮﺿﻴﺢ ذﻟ.
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10.3. THE DEFINITION OF MOTION It was said above that motion is a thing’s transition from potentiality to actuality in a gradual manner. One may also call it ‘gradual change.’ (Gradual transition is a self-evident concept, whose formation in the mind is assisted by sense-experience.) Aristotle defined it as “the first perfection (kamâl awwal) for that which is in a state of potentiality qua something in potentiality.” To explain, the acquisition of what a thing may possibly acquire is a perfection for it. For a thing in its movement towards a certain state – for instance, a body moving towards a certain location to become situated in it – its movement as well as its establishment in the location towards which it moves are perfections for that body, with difference, however, that its movement is the first perfection and its establishment in that location the second perfection. Hence, when it starts its movement, a perfection is realized for it, though not absolutely but in the sense that it is still in a state of potentiality in relation to its second perfection, which is establishment in the sought destination. Thus, motion is a first perfection for that which is in a state of potentiality in relation to the two perfections, in the respect that it is in a state of potentiality in relation to the second perfection. From this it becomes clear that motion depends for its actualization on six things: (i) the origin (mabda’), from which motion starts, (ii) the end (muntahâ) towards which motion is directed, (iii) the moving subject (mawdhû’) or ‘the moved’ (mutaharrik), (iv) the ‘agent’ that causes the motion, or the ‘mover’ (muharrik), (v) the course (masâfah) of motion, and (vi) the time to which motion corresponds in some manner. These will be explained below.
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اﻟﻔﺼﻞ اﻟﺮاﺑﻊ ﻓﻲ اﻧﻘﺴﺎم اﻟﺤﺮﻛﺔ إﻟﻰ ﺗﻮﺳﻄﻴﺔ و ﻗﻄﻌﻴﺔ ﺗﻌﺘﱪ اﳊﺮﻛﺔ ﲟﻌﻨﻴﲔ أﺣﺪﳘﺎ :ﲔ ﻛﻮن اﳉﺴﻢ ﺑ اﳌﺒﺪإ و اﳌﻨﺘﻬﻰ ﲝﻴﺚ ﻛﻞ ﺣﺪ ﻓﺮض ﰲ اﻟﻮﺳﻂ ﻓﻬﻮ ﻟﻴﺲ ﻗﺒﻠﻪ و ﻻ ﺑﻌﺪﻩ ﻓﻴﻪ و ﻫﻮ ﺣﺎﻟﺔ ﺑﺴﻴﻄﺔ ﺛﺎﺑﺘﺔ ﻻ اﻧﻘﺴﺎم ﻓﻴﻬﺎ و ﺗﺴﻤﻰ اﳊﺮﻛﺔ اﻟﺘﻮﺳﻄﻴﺔ. و ﺛﺎﻧﻴﻬﻤﺎ : اﳊﺎﻟﺔ اﳌﺬﻛﻮرة ﻣﻦ ﺣﻴﺚ ﳍﺎ ﻧﺴﺒﺔ إﱃ ﺣﺪود اﳌﺴﺎﻓﺔ ﻣﻦ ﺣﺪ ﺗﺮﻛﻬﺎ و ﻣﻦ ﺣﺪ ﱂ ﻳﺒﻠﻐﻬﺎ أي إﱃ ﻗﻮة ﺗﺒﺪﻟﺖ ﻓﻌﻼ و إﱃ ﻗﻮة ﺑﺎﻗﻴ ﺔ ﻋﻠﻰ ﺣﺎﳍﺎ ﺑﻌﺪ ﻳﺮﻳﺪ اﳌﺘﺤﺮك أن ﻳﺒﺪﳍﺎ ﻓﻌﻼ ج ﻣﻦ اﻟﻘﻮة إﱃ اﻟﻔﻌﻞ ﻛﻤﺎ أﻧﻪ ﺧﺮو و ﻻزﻣﻪ اﻻﻧﻘﺴﺎم إﱃ اﻷﺟﺰاء و اﻻﻧﺼﺮام و اﻟﺘﻘﻀﻲ ﺗﺪرﳚﺎ ج ﻻﻧﻄﺒﺎﻗﻬﻤﺎ ﻋﻠﻴﻪ ﲜﻤﻴﻊ ﺗﺪرﳚﺎ و ﺗﺴﻤﻰ اﳊﺮﻛﺔ اﻟﻘﻄﻌﻴﺔ و اﳌﻌﻨﻴﺎن ﲨﻴﻌﺎ ﻣﻮﺟﻮدان ﰲ اﳋﺎر .ﻤﺎT ﺧﺼﻮﺻﻴﺎ و أﻣﺎ اﻟﺼﻮرة اﻟﱵ ﻳﺄﺧﺬﻫﺎ ا ﳋﻴﺎل ﻣﻦ اﳊﺮﻛﺔ ﺑﺄﺧﺬ اﳊﺪ ﺑﻌﺪ اﳊﺪ ﻣﻦ اﳊﺮﻛﺔ و ﲨﻌﻬﺎ ﻓﻴﻪ ج ﻟﻌﺪم ﺟﻮاز ﺻﻮرة ﻣﺘﺼﻠﺔ ﳎﺘﻤﻌﺔ ﻣﻨﻘﺴﻤﺔ إﱃ اﻷﺟﺰاء ﻓﻬﻲ ذﻫﻨﻴﺔ ﻻ وﺟﻮد ﳍﺎ ﰲ اﳋﺎر ﻛﺎن ﺛﺒﺎﺗﺎ ﻻ ﺗﻐﲑا اﺟﺘﻤﺎع اﻷﺟﺰاء ﰲ اﳊﺮﻛﺔ و إﻻ . و ﻗﺪ ﺗﺒﲔ ﺑﺬﻟﻚ أن اﳊﺮﻛﺔ و ﻧﻌﲏ -ﺎ اﻟﻘﻄﻌﻴﺔ ﳓﻮ وﺟﻮد ﺳﻴﺎل ﻣﻨﻘﺴﻢ إﱃ أ ج ء ﲤﺘﺰ ﺟﺰا ﻛﻞ ﺟﺰء ﻣﻔﺮوض ﻓﻴﻪ ﻓﻌﻼ ﳌﺎ ﻗﺒﻠﻪ ﻣﻦ اﻷﺟﺰاء و ﻗﻮة ﳌﺎ ﺑﻌﺪﻩ ﻓﻴﻪ اﻟﻘﻮة و اﻟﻔﻌﻞ ﲝﻴﺚ ﻳﻜﻮن و ﻳﻨﺘﻬﻲ ﻣﻦ اﳉﺎﻧﺒﲔ إﱃ ﻗﻮة ﻻ ﻓﻌﻞ ﻣﻌﻬﺎ و إﱃ ﻓﻌﻞ ﻻ ﻗﻮة ﻣﻌﻪ.
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10.4. MEDIATING AND TRAVERSING MOTION There are two conceptions of motion. In one of them, the moving thing is conceived as being between the origin and the end, in the sense that if it is supposed to be at a certain limit in the middle, it is neither before it nor after it: it is a simple static state which is indivisible and is called ‘mediating motion’ (al-harakah al-tawassutiyyah). In the second conception, it is the above-mentioned state of being between the origin and the end, along with its relation to the limits of the course of motion, the limit that it has left and the one that it has not reached, or the potentiality transformed into actuality and the potentiality that still remains in its state and which the moving subject seeks to transform into actuality. Implied in this conception of motion is division into parts and gradual transition and passage, as it is a gradual transition from potentiality to actuality. It is called ‘traversing motion’ (al-harakah al-qath’iyyah), and both of these meanings exist in external reality, for they correspond to it with all their characteristics. However, as to the picture of motion derived from imagination, by taking one limit after another from motion and combining them in the form of a continuous aggregate divisible into parts, it is something purely mental having no existence in external reality; co-presence of parts is impossible in motion, for otherwise it would be something static, not dynamic. From this, it becomes clear that motion – i.e., traversing motion – is a fluid mode of existence, divisible into parts, wherein potentiality and actuality intermingle in the sense that every one of a assumed parts is actuality for its preceding part and potentiality for the succeeding part, terminating on one side in potentiality unaccompanied by actuality and on the other in actuality unaccompanied by potentiality.
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اﻟﻔﺼﻞ اﻟﺨﺎﻣﺲ ﻓﻲ ﻣﺒﺪإ اﻟﺤﺮﻛﺔ و ﻣﻨﺘﻬﺎﻫﺎ ﻗﺪ ﻋﺮﻓﺖ : ﺎ ﻓﺎﻋﻠﻢ أن ﻫﺬا اﻻﻧﻘﺴﺎم ﻻ ﻳﻘﻒ ﻋﻠﻰ ﺣﺪ ﻧﻈﲑ T أن ﰲ اﳊﺮﻛﺔ اﻧﻘﺴﺎﻣﺎ ﻟﺬا اﻻﻧﻘﺴﺎم اﻟﺬي ﰲ اﻟﻜﻤﻴﺎت اﳌﺘﺼﻠﺔ اﻟﻘﺎرة ﻣﻦ اﳋﻂ و اﻟﺴﻄﺢ و اﳉﺴﻢ إذ ﻟﻮ وﻗﻒ ﻋﻠﻰ ﻛﺎن ﺟﺰءا ﻻ ﻳﺘﺠﺰأ و ﻗﺪ ﺗﻘﺪم ﺑﻄﻼﻧﻪ ﺣﺪ . و أﻳﻀﺎ :ﺎ ﻫﻮ اﻧﻘﺴ ﻛﺎن ﺑﺎﻟﻔﻌﻞ ﺑﻄﻠﺖ اﳊﺮﻛﺔ ﻻﻧﺘﻬﺎء اﻟﻘﺴﻤﺔ إﱃ م ﺑﺎﻟﻘﻮة ﻻ ﺑﺎﻟﻔﻌﻞ إذ ﻟﻮ أﺟﺰاء دﻓﻌﻴﺔ اﻟﻮﻗﻮع. و ﺑﺬﻟﻚ ﻳﺘﺒﲔ : أﻧﻪ ﻻ ﻣﺒﺪأ ﻟﻠ ﺤ ﺮﻛﺔ و ﻻ ﻣﻨﺘﻬﻰ ﳍﺎ ﲟﻌﲎ اﳉﺰء اﻷول اﻟﺬي ﻻ ﻳﻨﻘﺴﻢ ﻣﻦ ﻛﺬﻟﻚ ﳌﺎ ﻋﺮﻓﺖ آﻧﻔﺎ أن اﳉﺰء -ﺬا اﳌﻌﲎ دﻓﻌﻲ اﻟﻮﻗﻮع ﻏﲑ ﺟﻬﺔ اﳊﺮﻛﺔ و اﳉﺰء اﻵﺧﺮ اﻟﺬي . ﺎ ﺗﺪرﳚﻴﺔ اﻟﺬات 5 ﺗﺪرﳚﻴﺔ ﻓﻼ ﻳﻨﻄﺒﻖ ﻋﻠﻴﻪ ﺣﺪ اﳊﺮﻛﺔ ﻷ و أﻣﺎ ﻣﺎ ﺗﻘﺪم : أن اﳊﺮﻛﺔ ﺗﻨﺘﻬﻲ ﻣﻦ اﳉﺎﻧﺒﲔ إﱃ ﻗﻮة ﻻ ﻓﻌﻞ ﻣﻌﻬﺎ و ﻓﻌﻞ ﻻ ﻗﻮة ﻣﻌﻪ ﻓﻬﻮ ﺎT ج ﻣﻦ ذا ﲢﺪﻳﺪ ﳍﺎ ﺑﺎﳋﺎر.
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10.5. THE ORIGIN AND END OF MOTION We saw that motion is essentially subject to division. However, it should be noted that this division does not stop at any limit like the division in static continuous quantities, as in the case of geometric line, plane and body. For were it to stop at a limit, that would result in an indivisible part, whose inadmissibility was mentioned earlier. Furthermore, it is a division that is potential, not actual, for were it actual there would be no motion due to the division leading up to instantaneous parts. From this it becomes clear that there is no beginning or end of motion, in the sense that it should have a first, or last, indivisible part from the aspect of motion, as mentioned above. That is because a part in this sense is something instantaneous, not gradual, so the definition of motion as something essentially gradual would not apply to it. As to that which was mentioned above, that motion ends in two sides – on the one side in a potentiality unaccompanied by actuality and on the other in an actuality unaccompanied by potentiality – that is a delimitation of it by something external to it.
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اﻟﻔﺼﻞ اﻟﺴﺎدس ﻓﻲ ﻣﻮﺿﻮع اﻟﺤﺮﻛﺔ و ﻫﻮ اﻟﻤﺘﺤﺮك اﻟﺬي ﻳﺘﻠﺒﺲ ﺑﻬﺎ ﻗﺪ ﻋﺮﻓﺖ :ﻲ ج اﻟﺸ أن اﳊﺮﻛﺔ ﺧﺮو ء ﻣﻦ اﻟﻘﻮة إﱃ اﻟﻔﻌﻞ ﺗﺪرﳚﺎ و أن ﻫﺬﻩ اﻟﻘﻮة ﳚﺐ أن ﻛﻤﺎل ﺑﺎﻟﻘﻮة ﻟﻠﻤﺎدة ﻣﺘﺤﺪ ﻣﻌﻬﺎ ﺗﻜﻮن ﳏﻤﻮﻟﺔ ﰲ أﻣﺮ ﺟﻮﻫﺮي ﻗﺎﺋﻤﺔ ﺑﻪ و ﻫﺬا اﻟﺬي ﺑﺎﻟﻘﻮة ﻓﺈ و ﻛﺎن اﻟﻔﻌﻞ ﻣﺘﺤﺪا ﻣﻊ اﳌﺎدة ﻣﻜﺎن اﻟﻘﻮة ﻓﻤﺎدة اﳌﺎء ﻣﺜﻼ ﻫﻮاء ﺑﺎﻟﻘﻮة ذا ﺗﺒﺪﻟﺖ اﻟﻘﻮة ﻓﻌﻼ ﻛﺎﻧﺖ اﳌﺎدة اﻟﱵ ﻛﺬا اﳉﺴﻢ اﳊﺎﻣﺾ ﺣﻠﻮ ﺑﺎﻟﻘﻮة ﻓﺈذا ﺗﺒﺪﻟﺖ اﳌﺎء ﻫﻮاءا و اﳊﻤﻮﺿﺔ ﺣﻼوة ﻛﻞ ﺣﺮﻛﺔ ﻣﻮﺿﻮع ﰲ اﳌﺎء ﻫﻲ اﳌﺘﻠﺒﺴﺔ ﺑﺎﳍﻮاﺋﻴﺔ و اﳉﺴﻢ اﳊﺎﻣﺾ ﻫﻮ اﳌﺘﻠﺒﺲ ﺑﺎﳊﻼوة ﻓﻔﻲ ﺗﻨﻌﺘﻪ اﳊﺮﻛﺔ و ﲡﺮي ﻋﻠﻴﻪ. ﻛﺎن ﻣﺎ ﺑﺎﻟﻘﻮة و ﳚﺐ أن ﻳﻜﻮن ﻣﻮﺿﻮع اﳊﺮﻛﺔ أﻣﺮا ﺛﺎﺑﺘﺎ ﲡﺮي و ﺗﺘﺠﺪد ﻋﻠﻴﻪ اﳊﺮﻛﺔ و إﻻ ج اﻟﺸﻲ ج إﱃ اﻟﻔﻌﻞ ﻓﻠﻢ ﺗﺘﺤﻘﻖ اﳊﺮﻛﺔ اﻟﱵ ﻫﻲ ﺧﺮو ﻏﲑ ﻣﺎ ﳜﺮ ﺎ ء ﻣﻦ اﻟﻘﻮة إﱃ اﻟﻔﻌﻞ ﺗﺪرﳚ. R ﻛﺎﻟﻌﻘﻞ ا ﻛﻞ ﺟﻬﺔ و ﳚﺐ أن ﻻ ﻳﻜﻮن ﻣﻮﺿﻮع اﳊﺮﻛﺔ أﻣﺮا ﺑﺎﻟﻔﻌﻞ ﻣﻦ ﺮد إذ ﻻ ﺣﺮﻛﺔ إﻻ ﻣﻊ ﻗﻮة ﻣﺎ ﻓﻤﺎ ﻻ ﻗﻮة ﻓﻴﻪ ﻓﻼ ﺣﺮﻛﺔ ﻟﻪ و ﻻ أن ﻳﻜﻮن ﺑﺎﻟﻘﻮة ﻣﻦ ﲨﻴﻊ اﳉﻬﺎت إذ ﻻ وﺟﻮد ﳌﺎ ﻛﺎﳌﺎدة اﻷوﱃ اﻟﱵ ﳍﺎ ﻗﻮة اﻷﺷﻴﺎء و ﻛﺬﻟﻚ ﺑﻞ أﻣﺮا ﺑﺎﻟﻘﻮة ﻣﻦ ﺟﻬﺔ و ﺑﺎﻟﻔﻌﻞ ﻣﻦ ﺟﻬﺔ ﻫﻮ ﻛﺎﳉﺴﻢ اﻟﺬي ﻫﻮ ﻣﺎدة ﺛﺎﻧﻴﺔ ﳍﺎ ﻗﻮة اﻟﺼﻮر اﻟﻨﻮﻋ ﺎ ﺑﺎﻟﻘﻮة و 5 ﻓﻌﻠﻴﺔ أ ﻴﺔ و اﻷﻋﺮاض اﳌﺨﺘﻠﻔﺔ و ﻓﻌﻠﻴﺔ اﳉﺴﻤﻴﺔ و ﺑﻌﺾ اﻟﺼﻮر اﻟﻨﻮﻋﻴﺔ.
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10.6. THE SUBJECT OF MOTION We saw above that motion is the gradual transition of a thing from potentiality to actuality. We also noted that it is necessary that this potentiality be borne by and subsist through something substantial. We further noted that that which is in potency is a potential perfection for matter and united with it. So when potentiality changes into actuality, actuality becomes united with matter in the place of potentiality. An example of this is the matter of water, which is potentially vapour. Another is that of a sour body, e.g., an apple, which is potentially sweet. When water changes into vapour and sourness into sweetness, the matter of water assumes the form of vapour and that of the sour body the form of sweetness. Hence there is a subject in every motion that is qualified with motion and in which motion occurs. It is necessary that the subject of motion be something enduring that undergoes motion. Otherwise that which possessed potentiality would be something other than that which assumes actuality, in which case motion, which is a thing’s transition from potentiality to act, would not be realized. It is also necessary that the subject of motion should not something that has actuality in all respects, such as an immaterial Intellect, for there can be no motion without some kind of potentiality. Hence that which has no potentiality has no motion. Also, it should not be in potentiality in all respects, for that which is such has no existence. Hence, it should be something that is potential in some aspect and actual in some aspect, such as prime matter, which possesses the potentiality for all things and whose actuality is its potentiality, or a body that is secondary matter, which possesses the potentiality for various specific forms and accidents along with the actuality of bodiness and some specific form.
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اﻟﻔﺼﻞ اﻟﺴﺎﺑﻊ ﻓﻲ ﻓﺎﻋﻞ اﻟﺤﺮﻛﺔ و ﻫﻮ اﻟﻤﺤﺮك ﻛﺎن اﳌﺘﺤﺮك ﻫﻮ اﻟﺬي ﻳﻮﺟﺪ اﳊﺮﻛﺔ ﰲ ﻧﻔﺴﻪ ﳚﺐ أن ﻳﻜﻮن اﶈﺮك ﻏﲑ اﳌﺘﺤﺮك إذ ﻟﻮ ﻟﺰم أن ﻳﻜﻮن ﺷﻲ ء واﺣﺪ ﻓﺎﻋﻼ و ﻗﺎﺑﻼ ﻣﻦ ﺟﻬﺔ واﺣﺪة و ﻫﻮ ﳏﺎل ﻓﺈن ﺣﻴﺜﻴﺔ اﻟﻔﻌﻞ ﻫﻲ ﺣﻴﺜﻴﺔ اﻟﻮﺟﺪان و ﺣﻴﺜﻴﺔ اﻟﻘﺒﻮل ﻫﻲ ﺣﻴﺜﻴﺔ اﻟﻔﻘﺪان و ﻻ ﻣﻌﲎ ﻟﻜﻮن ﺷﻲ ء واﺣﺪ واﺟﺪا و ﻓﺎﻗﺪا ﻣﻦ ﺟﻬﺔ واﺣﺪة. و أﻳﻀﺎ :ﻣﺎ اﳌﺘﺤﺮك ﻫﻮ ﺑﺎﻟﻘﻮة ﺑﺎﻟﻨﺴﺒﺔ إﱃ اﻟﻔﻌﻞ اﻟﺬي ﳛﺼﻞ ﻟﻪ ﺑﺎﳊﺮﻛﺔ و ﻓﺎﻗﺪ ﻟﻪ و ﻫﻮ ﺑﺎﻟﻘﻮة ﻻ ﻳﻔﻴﺪ ﻓﻌﻼ. ﻛﺎن أﻣﺮا ﺛﺎﺑﺖ و ﳚﺐ أن ﻳﻜﻮن اﻟﻔﺎﻋﻞ اﻟﻘﺮﻳﺐ ﻟﻠ ﺤ ﺮﻛﺔ أﻣﺮا ﻣﺘﻐﲑا ﻣﺘﺠﺪد اﻟﺬات إذ ﻟﻮ ﻛﺎن اﻟﺼﺎدر ﻣﻨﻪ أﻣﺮا ﺛﺎﺑﺘﺎ ﰲ ﻧﻔﺴﻪ ﻓﻠﻢ ﻳﺘﻐﲑ ﺟﺰء ﻣﻦ اﳊﺮﻛﺔ اﻟﺬات ﻣﻦ ﻏﲑ ﺗﻐﲑ و ﺳﻴﻼن إﱃ ﻏﲑﻩ ﻣﻦ اﻷﺟﺰاء ﻟﺜﺒﺎت ﻋﻠﺘﻪ ﻣﻦ ﻏﲑ ﺗﻐﲑ ﰲ ﺣﺎﳍﺎ ﻓﻠﻢ ﺗﻜﻦ اﳊﺮﻛﺔ ﺧﻠﻒ ﺣﺮﻛﺔ ﻫﺬا

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10.7. THE AGENT OF MOTION, THE MOVER It is necessary that the mover should be other than the moved, for if the moved itself were the creator of motion, that would imply a single thing being active (fâil) and passive (qâbil) in a single aspect. This is impossible, because the mode of action (fi’l) is the mode of possession, whereas the mode of receptivity is the mode of privation, and it is meaningless to say that a single thing is in possession and privation in the same aspect. Moreover, the subject is in potentiality in relation to the actuality attained by it through motion, an actuality which it lacks, and that which is in potentiality cannot provide actuality. It is necessary that the proximate agent of motion should be something undergoing change and renewal, for if it were something stable in itself and without change and flux, that which it produces would also be stable in itself. As a result, no part of motion will give way to another part due to the stability of the cause and absence of change in its state, whereupon motion would not be motion, which is a selfcontradiction.
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اﻟﻔﺼﻞ اﻟﺜﺎﻣﻦ ﻓﻲ ارﺗﺒﺎط اﻟﻤﺘﻐﻴﺮ ﺑﺎﻟﺜﺎﺑﺖ رﲟﺎ ﻗﻴﻞ : إن وﺟﻮب اﺳﺘﻨﺎد اﳌﺘﻐﲑ اﳌﺘﺠﺪد إﱃ ﻋﻠﺔ ﻣﺘﻐﲑة ﻣﺘﺠﺪدة ﻣﺜﻠﻪ ﻳﻮﺟﺐ اﺳﺘﻨﺎد ﻋﻠﺘﻪ اﳌﺘﻐﲑة اﳌﺘﺠﺪدة أﻳﻀﺎ إﱃ ﻣﺜﻠﻬﺎ ﰲ اﻟ ﺘﻐﲑ و اﻟﺘﺠﺪد و ﻫﻠﻢ ﺟﺮا و ﻳﺴﺘﻠﺰم ذﻟﻚ أﻣﺎ اﻟﺘﺴﻠﺴﻞ أو اﻟﺪور أو اﻟﺘﻐﲑ ﰲ اﳌﺒﺪإ اﻷول ﺗﻌﺎﱃ ﻋﻦ ذﻟﻚ. و أﺟﻴﺐ : ﺑﺄن اﻟﺘﺠﺪد و اﻟﺘﻐﲑ ﻳﻨﺘﻬﻲ إﱃ ﺟﻮﻫﺮ ﻣﺘﺤﺮك ﲜﻮﻫﺮﻩ ﻓﻴﻜﻮن اﻟﺘﺠﺪد ذاﺗﻴﺎ ﻟﻪ ﻓﻴﺼﺢ اﺳﺘﻨﺎدﻩ إﱃ ﻋﻠﺔ ﺛﺎﺑﺘﺔ ﺗﻮﺟﺪ ذاﺗﻪ ﻷن إﳚﺎد ذاﺗﻪ ﻋﲔ إﳚﺎد ﲡﺪدﻩ

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10.8. THE RELATION OF THE CHANGEABLE TO THE UNCHANGING It has been said that the necessity of dependence of something undergoing renewal and change on a cause subject to renewal and change like itself requires the dependence of the renewing and changing cause in its turn upon something else subject to renewal and change like itself, and so on and so forth. That implies either an indefinite regress or a vicious circle, or changeability in the First Source, whose exalted station lies beyond such an attribution. The answer that has been given to this objection is that renewal and change originate in a substance that is essentially mobile. Renewal being essential to it, it is correct to ascribe it to an unchanging cause that brings it into existence, for its creation is the same as the creation of its changeability.
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اﻟﻔﺼﻞ اﻟﺘﺎﺳﻊ ﻓﻲ اﻟﻤﺴﺎﻓﺔ اﻟﺘﻲ ﻳﻘﻄﻌﻬﺎ اﻟﻤﺘﺤﺮك ﺑﺎﻟﺤﺮﻛﺔ ﻣﺴﺎﻓﺔ اﳊﺮﻛﺔ ﻫﻲ : اﻟﻮﺟﻮد اﳌﺘﺼﻞ اﻟﺴﻴﺎل اﻟﺬي ﳚﺮي ﻋﻠﻰ اﳌﻮﺿﻮع اﳌﺘﺤﺮك و ﻳﻨﺘﺰع ﻣﻨﻪ ﻻ ﳏﺎﻟﺔ ﻣﻘﻮﻟﺔ ﻣﻦ اﳌﻘﻮﻻت ﻟﻜﻦ ﻻ ﻣﻦ ﺣﻴﺚ إﻧﻪ ﻣﺘﺼﻞ واﺣﺪ ﻣﺘﻐﲑ ﻓﺈن ﻻزﻣﻪ وﻗﻮع ﻛﻞ ﻗﺴﻢ ﻣﻨﻪ اﻟﺘﺸﻜﻴﻚ ﰲ اﳌﺎﻫﻴﺔ و ﻫﻮ ﳏﺎل ﺑﻞ ﻣﻦ ﺣﻴﺚ إﻧﻪ ﻣﻨﻘﺴﻢ إﱃ أﻗﺴﺎم آﻧﻴﺔ اﻟﻮﺟﻮد ﻛﻞ آن ﻛﻨﻤﻮ اﳉﺴﻢ ﻣﺜﻼ ﻓﺈﻧﻪ ﺣﺮﻛﺔ ﻣﻨﻪ ﰲ اﻟﻜﻢ ﻳﺮد ﻋﻠﻴﻪ ﰲ ﻧﻮع ﻣﻦ أﻧﻮاع اﳌﻘﻮﻟﺔ ﻣﺒﺎﺋﻦ ﻟﻐﲑﻩ ﻣﻦ آﻧﺎت اﳊﺮﻛﺔ ﻧﻮع ﻣﻦ أﻧﻮاع اﻟﻜﻢ اﳌﺘﺼﻞ ﻣﺒﺎﺋﻦ ﻟﻠﻨﻮع اﻟﺬي ورد ﻋﻠﻴﻪ ﰲ اﻵن اﻟﺴﺎﺑﻖ و اﻟ ﻖ ﻨﻮع اﻟﺬي ﺳﲑد ﻋﻠﻴﻪ ﰲ اﻟﻼﺣ. ﻓﻤﻌﲎ ﺣﺮﻛﺔ اﻟﺸﻲ ء ﰲ اﳌﻘﻮﻟﺔ أن ﻳﺮد ﻋﻠﻰ اﳌﻮﺿﻮع ﰲ ﻛﻞ آن ﻧﻮع ﻣﻦ أﻧﻮاع اﳌﻘﻮﻟﺔ ﻣﺒﺎﺋﻦ ﻟﻠﻨﻮع اﻟﺬي ﻳﺮد ﻋﻠﻴﻪ ﰲ آن ﻏﲑﻩ.
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10.9. THE COURSE OF MOTION The ‘course’ of motion is the continuous flux of existence through which the moving subject passes. Unavoidably, it yields to the abstraction of some of the categories, though not from the aspect that it is a continuous changing unity, for that would entail the occurrence of gradation in quiddity, which is impossible. Rather, that is from the aspect that the course is divisible into instantaneously existing divisions, each of which is a species from among the species of the category and different from other species. An example of it is a growing body whose motion is in quantity. At every instant of its motion, it is affected by a species from among the species of continuous quantity, different from the species that affected it in a preceding instant as well as those that will affect it in a succeeding instant. Hence the meaning of a thing’s motion in a certain category b that the subject is affected at every instant by a species from among the species of the category, which is different from the species that affect it at any other instant.
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اﻟﻔﺼﻞ اﻟﻌﺎﺷﺮ ﻓﻲ اﻟﻤﻘﻮﻻت اﻟﺘﻲ ﺗﻘﻊ ﻓﻴﻬﺎ اﻟﺤﺮﻛﺔ اﳌﺸﻬﻮر ﺑﲔ ﻗﺪﻣﺎء اﻟﻔﻼﺳﻔﺔ أن اﳌﻘﻮﻻت اﻟﱵ ﺗﻘﻊ ﻓﻴﻬﺎ اﳊﺮﻛﺔ أرﺑﻊ ﻣﻘﻮﻻت اﻷﻳﻦ و اﻟﻜﻴﻒ و اﻟﻜﻢ و اﻟﻮﺿﻊ. أﻣﺎ اﻷﻳﻦ : ﻛﻮن اﻷﻳﻦ ﻛﺎﳊﺮﻛﺎت اﳌﻜﺎﻧﻴﺔ اﻟﱵ ﰲ اﻷﺟﺴﺎم ﻟﻜﻦ ﰲ ﻓﻮﻗﻮع اﳊﺮﻛﺔ ﻓﻴﻪ ﻇﺎﻫﺮ ﻛﺎن ﻣﺸﻬﻮرا ﺑﻴﻨﻬﻢ ﺑﻞ اﻷﻳﻦ ﺿﺮب ﻣﻦ اﻟﻮﺿﻊ و ﻋﻠﻴﻪ ﻓ ﻛﻼم و إن ﻣﻘﻮﻟﺔ ﺑﺮأﺳﻬﺎ ﺎﳊﺮﻛﺔ اﻷﻳﻨﻴﺔ ﺿﺮب ﻣﻦ اﳊﺮﻛﺔ اﻟﻮﺿﻌﻴﺔ. و أﻣﺎ اﻟﻜﻴﻒ : ﻛﺎﻟﻜﻴﻔﻴﺎت اﳌﺨﺘﺼﺔ ﻓﻮﻗﻮع اﳊﺮﻛﺔ ﻓﻴﻪ و ﺧﺎﺻﺔ ﰲ اﻟﻜﻴﻔﻴﺎت ﻏﲑ اﻟﻔﻌﻠﻴﺔ ﻛﻤﻪ ﻳﺘﺤﺮك ﰲ ﻛﺎﻻﺳﺘﻮاء و اﻻﻋﻮﺟﺎج و ﳓﻮﳘﺎ ﻇﺎﻫﺮ ﻓﺈن اﳉﺴﻢ اﳌﺘﺤﺮك ﰲ ﺑﺎﻟﻜﻤﻴﺎت اﻟﻜﻴﻔﻴﺎت اﻟﻘﺎﺋﻤﺔ ﺑﻜﻤﻪ. و أﻣﺎ اﻟﻜﻢ : ﻓﺎﳊﺮﻛﺔ ﻓﻴﻪ ﺗﻐﲑ اﳉ ﺴ ﻢ ﰲ ﻛﺎﻟﻨﻤﻮ ﻛﻤﻪ ﺗﻐﲑا ﻣﺘﺼﻼ ﺑﻨﺴﺒﺔ ﻣﻨﺘﻈﻤﺔ ﺗﺪرﳚﺎ اﻟﺬي ﻫﻮ زﻳﺎدة اﳉﺴﻢ ﰲ ﺣﺠﻤﻪ زﻳﺎدة ﻣﺘﺼﻠﺔ ﻣﻨﺘﻈﻤﺔ ﺗﺪرﳚﺎ. و ﻗﺪ أورد ﻋﻠﻴﻪ : ء اﳉﺴﻢ ﻓﺎﻟﻜﻢ أن اﻟﻨﻤﻮ إﳕﺎ ﻳﺘﺤﻘﻖ ﺑﺎﻧﻀﻤﺎم أﺟﺰاء ﻣﻦ ﺧﺎرج إﱃ أﺟﺰا ﻤﻮع اﻷﺟﺰاء اﻷﺻﻠﻴﺔ و اﳌﻨﻀﻤﺔ و اﻟﻜﻢ اﻟﺼﻐﲑ اﻟ R اﻟﻜﺒﲑ اﻟﻼﺣﻖ ﻫﻮ اﻟﻜﻢ اﻟﻌﺎرض ﺴﺎﺑﻖ ﻫﻮ اﻟﻜﻢ اﻟﻌﺎرض ﻟﻨﻔﺲ اﻷﺟﺰاء اﻷﺻﻠﻴﺔ و اﻟﻜﻤﺎن ﻣﺘﺒﺎﻳﻨﺎن ﻏﲑ ﻣﺘﺼﻠﲔ ﻟﺘﺒﺎﻳﻦ ﻣﻮﺿﻮﻋﻴﻬﻤﺎ ﻛﻢ و ﺣﺪوث آﺧﺮ ﻛﻢ ﺑﻞ ﻫﻮ زوال ﻓﻼ ﺣﺮﻛﺔ ﰲ . و أﺟﻴﺐ ﻋﻨﻪ : أن اﻧﻀﻤﺎم اﻟﻀﻤﺎﺋﻢ ﻻ رﻳﺐ ﻓﻴﻪ ﻟﻜﻦ اﻟﻄﺒﻴﻌﺔ ﺗﺒﺪل اﻷﺟﺰاء اﳌﻨﻀﻤﺔ ﺑﻌﺪ ء اﻷﺻﻠﻴﺔ و ﻻ ﺗﺰال ﺗﺒﺪل و ﺗﺰﻳ اﻟﻀﻢ إﱃ ﺻﻮرة اﻷﺟﺰا ﻛﻤﻴﺔ اﻷﺟﺰاء اﻷﺻﻠﻴﺔ ﺗﺪرﳚﺎ ﺪ ء اﻷﺻﻠﻴﺔ زﻳﺎدة ﺑﺎﻧﻀﻤﺎم اﻷﺟﺰاء و ﺗﻐﲑﻫﺎ إﱃ اﻷﺟﺰاء اﻷﺻﻠﻴﺔ ﻓﻴﺰداد اﻟﻜﻢ اﻟﻌﺎرض ﻟﻸﺟﺰا ﻣﺘﺼﻠﺔ ﺗﺪرﳚﻴﺔ و ﻫﻲ اﳊﺮﻛﺔ. و أﻣﺎ اﻟﻮﺿﻊ : ﻓﺎﳊﺮﻛﺔ ﻓﻴﻪ أﻳﻀﺎ ﻇﺎﻫﺮ ﻛ ﺤ ﺮﻛﺔ اﻟﻜﺮة ﻋﻠﻰ ﳏﻮرﻫﺎ ﻓﺈﻧﻪ ﺗﺘﺒﺪل -ﺎ ﻧﺴﺒﺔ ج ﻋﻨ اﻟﻨﻘﺎط اﳌﻔﺮوﺿﺔ ﻋﻠﻴﻬﺎ إﱃ اﳋﺎر ﺎ ﻬﺎ و ﻫﻮ ﺗﻐﲑ ﺗﺪرﳚﻲ ﰲ وﺿﻌﻬ. ﻗﺎﻟﻮا : و ﻻ ﺗﻘﻊ ﺣﺮﻛﺔ ﰲ ﺑﺎﻗﻲ اﳌﻘﻮﻻت و ﻫﻲ اﻟﻔﻌﻞ و اﻻﻧﻔﻌﺎل و ﻣﱴ و اﻹﺿﺎﻓﺔ و اﳉﺪة و اﳉﻮﻫﺮ. أﻣﺎ اﻟﻔﻌﻞ و اﻻﻧﻔﻌﺎل : ﻓﺈﻧﻪ ﻗﺪ أﺧﺬ ﰲ ﻣﻔﻬﻮﻣﻴﻬﻤﺎ اﻟﺘﺪرﻳﺞ ﻓﻼ ﻓﺮد آﱐ اﻟﻮﺟﻮد ﳍﻤﺎ و
وﻗﻮع اﳊﺮﻛﺔ ﻓﻴﻬﻤﺎ ﻳﻘﺘﻀﻲ اﻻﻧﻘﺴﺎم إﱃ أﻗﺴﺎم آﻧﻴﺔ اﻟﻮ ﻟﻚ ﺟﻮد و ﻟﻴﺲ ﳍﻤﺎ ذ. ﻛﺬا اﻟﻜﻼم ﰲ ﻣﱴ ﻓﺈﻧﻪ اﳍﻴﺄة اﳊﺎﺻﻠﺔ ﻣﻦ ﻧﺴﺒﺔ اﻟﺸﻲ و ء إﱃ اﻟﺰﻣﺎن ﻓﻬﻲ ﺗﺪرﳚﻴﺔ ﺗﻨﺎﰲ وﻗﻮع اﳊﺮﻛﺔ ﻓﻴﻬﺎ اﳌﻘﺘﻀﻴﺔ ﻟﻼﻧﻘﺴﺎم إﱃ أﻗﺴﺎم آﻧﻴﺔ اﻟﻮﺟﻮد.
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و أﻣﺎ اﻹﺿﺎﻓﺔ :ﻲ ﻓﺈ5ﺎ اﻧﺘﺰاﻋﻴﺔ ﺗﺎﺑﻌﺔ ﻟﻄﺮﻓﻴﻬﺎ ﻓﻼ ﺗﺴﺘﻘﻞ ﺑﺸ ﻛﺬا اﳉﺪة ﻓﺈن ﻛﺎﳊﺮﻛﺔ و ء اﻟﺘﻐﲑ ﻓﻴﻬ ﻪ ﻛﺎﻧﺘﺎ ﻋﻠﻴ ﻛﺘﻐﲑ اﻟﻨﻌﻞ أو اﻟﻘﺪم ﻋﻤﺎ ﺎ ﺗﺎﺑﻊ ﻟﺘﻐﲑ ﻣﻮﺿﻮﻋﻬﺎ . و أﻣﺎ اﳉﻮﻫﺮ : ﻓﻮﻗﻮع اﳊﺮﻛﺔ ﻓﻴﻪ ﻳﺴﺘﻠﺰم ﲢﻘﻖ اﳊﺮﻛﺔ ﻣﻦ ﻏﲑ ﻣﻮﺿﻮع ﺛﺎﺑﺖ و ﻗﺪ ﺗﻘﺪم أن ﲢﻘﻖ اﳊﺮﻛﺔ ﻣﻮﻗﻮف ﻋﻠﻰ ﻣﻮﺿﻮع ﺛﺎﺑﺖ ﺑﺎق ﻣﺎ داﻣﺖ اﳊﺮﻛﺔ.
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10.10. THE CATEGORIES WHEREIN MOTION OCCURS In accordance with the opinion prevailing amongst the earlier philosophers, belonging to the period before Mullâ Shadrâ, the categories in which motion occurs are four: place, quality, quantity, and position. As to place, it is obvious that motion takes place in it, like the motion of bodies in respect to location. However, there are certain reservations in considering place as a category in its own right, though such a view has been commonly held. Rather, place is a kind of position; accordingly, a motion in place is a kind of motion in position. As to quality, it is obvious that motion occurs in it, especially in nonactive qualities like the qualities associated with quantities, such as straightness and crookedness and the like; for a body moving in terms of quantity also moves in the qualities that depend on its quantity. As to quantity, the motion in it is defined as gradual change in a body’s quantity that is continuous, proportionate and orderly. One example is the case of biological growth, which is a gradual, continuous and orderly increase in a body’s volume. An objection has been raised against this definition. It is pointed out that growth takes place through the annexation of parts from outside to the parts of the growing body. Thus the resulting larger quantity is an accident of the collection of the original and the annexed parts, whereas the previous smaller quantity was an accident of the original parts. These two quantities are separate and discontinuous due to the difference of their subjects. Hence, there is no motion but the disappearance of one quantity and the emergence of another. The answer that has been given to this objection is that there is no doubt that there is an annexation of the annexed parts; however, the ‘nature’ (i.e. the specific form) transforms the annexed part after assimilation into the form of the original parts. It continues to transform and increase the bulk of the original parts gradually by assimilating parts from outside and changing them into the original parts. Thus the quantity accidental to the original parts increases in a gradual and continuous manner, and this is what motion is. As to position, the occurrence of motion in it is obvious, such is the rotary motion of a sphere on its axis, as a result of which me relationship of any point on its surface changes with its surroundings. This is a gradual change in its position. The philosophers were of the opinion that there is no motion in the remaining categories, which consist of action, affection, time, relation, possession and substance. As to action and affection, gradualness is included in their conception. They do not have instantaneously existing individuals and occurrence of motion in them requires division into instantaneously existing divisions, which they do not have. A similar observation applies to the category of ‘time,’ which is defined as a mode resulting from a thing’s relation to time. It is gradual and so precludes the occurrence of motion in it, which requires divisibility into instantaneously existing divisions.
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As to relation, it is an abstraction dependent upon its two sides and, like motion, is not independently associated with a single thing. The same applies to ‘possession,’ any change wherein is dependent upon the change of its two subjects, like the change occurring in the shoe or the foot from their prior state. As to substance, the earlier philosophers believed that the occurrence of change in it entails the actualization of motion in that which is not a fixed subject, and, as mentioned earlier, the actualization of motion depends on a fixed subject that persists as long as motion continues.
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اﻟﻔﺼﻞ اﻟﺤﺎدي ﻋﺸﺮ ﻓﻲ ﺗﻌﻘﻴﺐ ﻣﺎ ﻣﺮ ﻓﻲ اﻟﻔﺼﻞ اﻟﺴﺎﺑﻖ ذﻫﺐ ﺻﺪر اﳌﺘﺄﳍﲔ رﻩ إﱃ وﻗﻮع اﳊﺮﻛﺔ ﰲ ﻣﻘﻮﻟﺔ اﳉﻮﻫﺮ و اﺳﺘﺪل ﻋﻠﻴﻪ ﺑﺄﻣﻮر أوﺿﺤﻬﺎ أن وﻗﻮع اﳊﺮﻛﺔ ﰲ اﳌﻘﻮﻻت اﻷرﺑﻊ اﻟﻌﺮﺿﻴﺔ ﻳﻘﻀﻲ ﺑﻮﻗﻮﻋﻬﺎ ﰲ ﻣﻘﻮﻟﺔ اﳉﻮﻫﺮ ﻷن اﻷﻋﺮاض ﺗﺎﺑﻌﺔ ﻟﻠﺠﻮاﻫﺮ ﻣﺴﺘﻨﺪة إﻟﻴﻬﺎ اﺳﺘﻨﺎد اﻟﻔﻌﻞ إﱃ ﻓﺎﻋﻠﻪ ﻓﺎﻷﻓﻌﺎل اﳉﺴﻤﺎﻧﻴﺔ ﻣﺴﺘﻨﺪة إﱃ اﻟﻄﺒﺎﺋﻊ و اﻟﺼﻮر اﻟﻨﻮﻋﻴﺔ و ﻫﻲ اﻷﺳﺒﺎب اﻟﻘﺮﻳﺒﺔ ﳍﺎ و ﻗﺪ ﺗﻘﺪم أن اﻟﺴﺒﺐ اﻟﻘﺮﻳﺐ ﻟﻠ ﺤ ﺮﻛﺔ أﻣﺮ ﺗﺪرﳚ ﻲ ﻛﻤﺜﻠﻬﺎ ﻓﺎﻟﻄﺒﺎﺋﻊ و اﻟﺼﻮر اﻟﻨﻮﻋﻴﺔ ﰲ اﻷﺟﺴﺎم اﳌﺘ ﺤ ﺮﻛﺔ ﰲ اﻟﻜﻢ و اﻟﻜﻴﻒ و اﻷﻳﻦ و اﻟﻮﺿﻊ ﻛﺄﻋﺮاﺿﻬﺎ و ﻟﻮ ﻻ ذﻟﻚ ﱂ ﻳﺘﺤﻘﻖ ﺳﺒﺐ ﻟﺸﻲ ﻣﺘﻐﲑة ﺳﻴﺎﻟﺔ اﻟﻮﺟﻮد ت ء ﻣﻦ ﻫﺬﻩ اﳊﺮﻛﺎ. ﻛﻴﻒ ﺻﺪرت ﻋﻦ اﳌﺒﺪإ اﻟﺜﺎﺑﺖ و ﻫﻲ و أورد ﻋﻠﻴﻪ أﻧﺎ ﻧﻨﻘﻞ اﻟﻜﻼم إﱃ اﻟﻄﺒﻴﻌﺔ اﳌﺘﺠﺪدة ﻣﺘﺠﺪدة. ﻛﺎﻧﺖ ﰲ ﺟﻮﻫﺮﻫﺎ و أﺟﻴﺐ ﻋﻨﻪ ﺑﺄن اﳊﺮﻛﺔ ﳌﺎ ﻓﺎﻟﺘﻐﲑ و اﻟﺘﺠﺪد ذاﰐ ﳍﺎ و اﻟﺬاﰐ ﻻ ﻳﻌﻠﻞ ﻓﺎﳉﺎﻋﻞ إﳕﺎ ﺟﻌﻞ اﳌﺘﺠﺪد ﻻ أﻧﻪ ﺟﻌﻞ اﳌﺘﺠﺪد ﻣﺘﺠﺪدا. و أورد ﻋﻠﻴﻪ أﻧﺎ ﻧﻮﺟﻪ اﺳﺘﻨﺎد اﻷﻋﺮاض اﳌﺘﺠﺪدة إﱃ اﻟﻄﺒﻴﻌﺔ -ﺬا اﻟﻮﺟﻪ ﺑﻌﻴﻨﻪ ﻣﻦ ﻏﲑ ﺣﺎﺟﺔ إﱃ ﺟﻌﻞ اﻟﻄﺒﻴﻌﺔ ﻣﺘﺠﺪدة ﻓﺎﻟﺘﺠﺪد ذاﰐ ﻟﻠﻌﺮض اﳌﺘﺠﺪد و اﻟﻄﺒﻴﻌﺔ ﺟﻌﻠﺖ اﻟﻌﺮض اﳌﺘ ا ﺠﺪد و ﱂ ﲡﻌﻞ اﳌﺘﺠﺪد ﻣﺘﺠﺪد. و أﺟﻴﺐ ﻋﻨﻪ : ﺑﺄن اﻷﻋﺮاض ﻣﺴﺘﻨﺪة ﰲ وﺟﻮدﻫﺎ إﱃ اﳉﻮﻫﺮ و ﺗﺎﺑﻌﺔ ﻟﻪ ﻓﺎﻟﺬاﺗﻴﺔ ﻻ ﺑﺪ أن ﺗﺘﻢ ﰲ اﳉﻮاﻫﺮ. و أورد ﻋﻠﻴﻪ أﻳﻀﺎ : أن اﻟﻘﻮم ﺻﺤﺤﻮا ارﺗﺒﺎط ﻫﺬﻩ اﻷﻋﺮاض اﳌﺘﺠﺪدة إﱃ اﳌﺒﺪإ اﻟﺜﺎﺑﺖ ﻣﻦ ﻃﺒﻴﻌﺔ و ﻏﲑﻫﺎ ﺑﻨﺤﻮ آﺧﺮ و ﻫﻮ أن اﻟﺘﻐﲑ ﻻﺣﻖ ﳍﺎ ﻛﺘﺠﺪد ﻣﺮاﺗﺐ ﻗﺮب و ﺑﻌﺪ ﻣﻦ ﻣﻦ ﺧﺎرج ﻛﺘﺠﺪد أﺣﻮال أﺧﺮى ﰲ اﳊﺮﻛﺎت اﻟﻘﺴﺮﻳﺔ اﻟﱵ ﻋﻠﻰ اﻟﻐﺎﻳﺔ اﳌﻄﻠﻮﺑﺔ ﰲ اﳊﺮﻛﺎت اﻟﻄﺒﻴﻌﻴﺔ و ﻛﻞ ﺣﺪ ﻣﻦ ﺣﺪود اﳊﺮﻛﺎت ﻛﺘﺠﺪد إرادات ﺟﺰﺋﻴﺔ ﻣﻨﺒﻌﺜﺔ ﻣﻦ اﻟﻨﻔﺲ ﰲ ﺧﻼف اﻟﻄﺒﻴﻌﺔ و اﻟﻨﻔﺴﺎﻧﻴﺔ اﻟﱵ ﻣﺒﺪؤﻫﺎ اﻟﻨﻔﺲ. و أﺟﻴﺐ ﻋﻨﻪ :ﻫﺬﻩ ﺑﺄﻧﺎ ﻧﻨﻘﻞ اﻟﻜﻼم إﱃ اﻷﺣﻮال و اﻹرادات اﳌﺘﺠﺪدة ﻣﻦ أﻳﻦ ﲡﺪدت ﻛﺬا ﰲ اﻟﻘﺴﺮﻳﺔ ﻓﺈن اﻟﻘﺴﺮ ﻳﻨﺘﻬﻲ إﱃ ﻓﺈ5ﺎ ﻻ ﳏﺎﻟﺔ ﺗﻨﺘﻬﻲ ﰲ اﳊﺮﻛﺎت اﻟﻄﺒﻴﻌﻴﺔ إﱃ اﻟﻄﺒﻴﻌﺔ و ﻛﻤﺎ ﺳﻴﺠﻲ ﻛﺬا ﰲ اﻟﻨﻔﺴﺎﻧﻴﺔ ﻓﺈن اﻟﻔﺎﻋﻞ اﳌﺒﺎﺷﺮ ﻟﻠﺘﺤﺮﻳﻚ ﻓﻴﻬﺎ أﻳﻀﺎ اﻟﻄﺒﻴﻌﺔ اﻟﻄﺒﻴﻌﺔ و ء. و ﳝﻜﻦ أن ﻳﺴﺘﺪل ﻋﻠﻰ اﳊﺮﻛﺔ ﰲ اﳉﻮﻫﺮ ﲟﺎ ﺗﻘﺪم أن وﺟﻮد اﻟﻌﺮض ﻣﻦ ﻣﺮاﺗﺐ وﺟﻮد ﻛﻮن وﺟﻮدﻩ ﰲ ﻧﻔﺴﻪ ﻋﲔ وﺟﻮدﻩ ﻟﻠﺠﻮﻫﺮ ﻓﺘﻐﲑﻩ و ﲡﺪدﻩ ﺗﻐﲑ ﻟﻠﺠﻮﻫﺮ و اﳉﻮﻫﺮ ﻣﻦ ﺣﻴﺚ ﲡﺪد ﻟﻪ.
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و ﻳﺘﻔﺮع ﻋﻠﻰ ﻣﺎ ﺗﻘﺪم أوﻻ أن اﻟﺼﻮر اﻟﻄﺒﻴﻌﻴﺔ اﳌﺘﺒﺪﻟﺔ ﺻﻮرة ﺑﻌﺪ ﺻﻮرة ﻋﻠﻰ اﳌﺎدة ﺑﺎﳊﻘﻴﻘﺔ ﺻﻮرة ﺟﻮﻫﺮﻳﺔ واﺣﺪة ﺳﻴﺎﻟﺔ ﲡﺮي ﻋﻠﻰ اﳌﺎدة و ﻳﻨﺘﺰع ﻣ ﻛﻞ ﺣﺪ ﻣﻦ ﺣﺪودﻫﺎ ﻣﻔﻬﻮم ﻣﻐﺎﻳﺮ ﻦ ﳌﺎ ﻳﻨﺘﺰع ﻣﻦ ﻏﲑﻩ. ﻫﺬا ﰲ ﺗﺒﺪل اﻟﺼﻮر اﻟﻄﺒﻴﻌﻴﺔ ﺑﻌﻀﻬﺎ ﻣﻦ ﺑﻌﺾ و ﻫﻨﺎك ﺣﺮﻛﺔ اﺷﺘﺪادﻳﺔ ﺟﻮﻫﺮﻳﺔ أﺧﺮى ﻫﻲ ﺣﺮﻛﺔ اﳌﺎدة اﻷوﱃ إﱃ اﻟﻄﺒﻴﻌﻴﺔ ﰒ اﻟﻨﺒﺎﺗﻴﺔ ﰒ اﳊﻴﻮاﻧﻴﺔ ﰒ اﻹﻧﺴﺎﻧﻴﺔ. و ﺛﺎﻧﻴﺎ :ﲰ أن اﳉﻮﻫﺮ اﳌﺘﺤﺮك ﰲ ﺟﻮﻫﺮﻩ ﻣﺘﺤﺮك ﲜﻤﻴﻊ أﻋﺮاﺿﻪ ﳌﺎ ﻛﻮن ﻌﺖ ﻣﻦ ﺣﺪﻳﺚ وﺟﻮد اﻷﻋﺮاض ﻣﻦ ﻣﺮاﺗﺐ وﺟﻮد اﳉﻮﻫﺮ اﳌﻮﺿﻮع ﳍﺎ. و ﻻزم ذﻟﻚ : ﻛﻮن ﺣﺮﻛﺔ اﳉﻮﻫﺮ ﰲ اﳌﻘﻮﻻت اﻷرﺑﻊ أو اﻟﺜﻼث ﻣﻦ ﻗﺒﻴﻞ اﳊﺮﻛﺔ ﰲ اﳊﺮﻛﺔ و ﻋﻠﻰ ﻫﺬا ﻳﻨﺒﻐﻲ أن ﺗﺴﻤﻰ ﻫﺬﻩ اﳊﺮﻛﺎت اﻷرﺑﻊ أو اﻟﺜﻼث ﺣﺮﻛﺎت ﺛﺎﻧﻴﺔ و ﻣﺎ ﳌﻄﻠﻖ اﻷﻋﺮاض ﻣﻦ اﳊﺮﻛﺔ ﺑﺘﺒﻊ اﳉﻮﻫﺮ ﻻ ﺑﻌ ﱃ ﺮﺿﻪ ﺣﺮﻛﺎت أو. و ﺛﺎﻟﺜﺎ : أن اﻟﻌﺎﱂ اﳉﺴﻤﺎﱐ ﲟﺎدﺗﻪ اﻟﻮاﺣﺪة ﺣﻘﻴﻘﺔ واﺣﺪة ﺳﻴﺎﻟﺔ ﻣﺘ ﺤ ﺮﻛﺔ ﲜﻤﻴﻊ ﺟﻮاﻫﺮﻫﺎ و أﻋﺮاﺿﻬﺎ ﻗﺎﻓﻠﺔ واﺣﺪة إﱃ ﻏﺎﻳﺔ ﺛﺎﺑﺘﺔ ﳍﺎ اﻟﻔﻌﻠﻴﺔ اﶈﻀﺔ.
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10.11. CONTINUATION OF THE ABOVE DISCUSSION Shadr al-Muta’allihîn, may God’s mercy be upon him, came to ho A that motion occurs in the category of substance. Among the various arguments that he advanced in favour of this view, the most persuasive is that the occurrence of motion in the four accidental categories requires that motion occur in the category of substance, because the accidents are dependent upon the substance in the way an action depends upon its agent. Thus physical actions depend on the natures or specific forms, which are the proximate causes of them. As mentioned earlier, the proximate cause of motion is something gradual like it. Thus the natures and specific forms in bodies moving in respect of quantity, quality, place and position are changeable with a fluid existence like the accidents: otherwise there would not actualize any cause of these motions. An objection against this argument states: If we transfer our argument to the renewing nature, the question still remains as to how something changeable can emanate from an unchanging source. The answer to this is that since motion occurs within the substance of the changeable ‘nature,’ change and renewal are essential to it, and that which is essential to something does not stand in need of a cause. The ‘maker’ has made it changeable, not that he first made it and then made it changeable. This answer may be contested with the following remark. The same thing may be asserted concerning the dependence of changeable accidents on the ‘nature’ without making the ‘nature’ changeable; hence changeability is essential to changeable accidents and the nature made the changeable accident; not that it made the accident and then caused it to change. The answer to this is that accidents depend for their existence on the substance and are subject to it. Hence it is necessary that their essentiality should culminate in the substance. Another objection that has been raised is that the relation between the changing accidents and the unchanging source – a nature or something else – can be explained in another manner. According to this explanation, change is produced in the accidents from outside, for instance, by the varying degrees of proximity and distance from destination in physical motions, by the changing states in coercive motions which are opposite to nature, and by the succession of particular acts of will produced in the soul at very stage of psychic motions whose source is the soul. The answer to this is that, transferring our argument to these successive states or acts of will, we may ask: What is it that makes them successive? For they unavoidably culminate, in the case of physical motions, in a nature. The same is true of coercive motions, for coercion culminates in a nature. The same applies to psychic motions, wherein the immediate agent of motion is the nature, as will be explained later on. One may also argue in favour of substantial motion on the basis of what was mentioned earlier,” that the existence of the accident is a plane from among the planes of the existence of substance, in the respect that its existence-in-itself is identical with its existence-for-the-substance. Hence its change and renewal are change and renewal in the substance.
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It follows from the above discussion, first, that the changing natural forms that appear one after another in matter are in reality a single substantial form in flux through which matter passes, and from each of whose limits is abstracted an idea different from what is abstracted from another limit. This was concerning change in natural forms (e.g. water into vapour and vapour into water), which is change within a single form in flux. But there are other evolutionary substantial motions represented by the motion of prime matter towards physical form, followed by vegetative, animal and human forms. Second, in its substantial motion the moving substance moves with all its accidents, for, as mentioned, the existence of accidents is a plane of the existence of the substance, which is their substratum. A consequence of this is that the motion of substance in the four – or the three’ – categories is a kind of motion within motion. On this basis, these fourfold or threefold motions may be called ‘secondary motions,’ and the motions that relate absolutely to the accidents in subordination to the substance – not parallel to it – may be termed ‘primary motions.’ Third, the physical world with its one matter is a single reality in flux. With all its substances and accidents, it is a single caravan moving towards its fixed end of an absolute actuality.
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اﻟﻔﺼﻞ اﻟﺜﺎﻧﻲ ﻋﺸﺮ ﻓﻲ ﻣﻮﺿﻮع اﻟﺤﺮﻛﺔ اﻟﺠﻮﻫﺮﻳﺔ و ﻓﺎﻋﻠﻬﺎ ﻗﺎﻟﻮا :اﳊ إن ﻣﻮﺿﻮع ﻫﺬﻩ ﺮﻛﺔ ﻫﻮ اﳌﺎدة اﳌﺘﺤﺼﻠﺔ ﺑﺼﻮرة ﻣﺎ ﻣﻦ اﻟﺼﻮر اﳌﺘﻌﺎﻗﺒﺔ اﳌﺘﺤﺪة ﺑﺎﻻﺗﺼﺎل و اﻟﺴﻴﻼن ﻓﻮﺣﺪة اﳌﺎدة و ﺷﺨﺼﻴﺘﻬﺎ ﳏﻔﻮﻇﺔ ﺑﺼﻮرة ﻣﺎ ﻣﻦ اﻟﺼﻮر اﳌﺘﺒﺪﻟﺔ و ﺻﻮرة ﺎ ﳏﻔﻮﻇﺔ ﲜﻮﻫﺮ ﻣﻔﺎرق ﻫﻮ اﻟﻔﺎﻋﻞ ﻟﻠﻤﺎدة اﳊﺎﻓﻆ ﳍﺎ و T ﻛﺎﻧﺖ ﻣﺒﻬﻤﺔ ﻟﻜﻦ وﺣﺪ ﻣﺎ و إن ﺎ و ﺷﺨﺼﻴﺘﻬﺎ ﺑﺼﻮرة ﻣﺎ ﻓﺼﻮرة ﻣ T ﻟﻮﺣﺪ ﺎ ﺷﺮﻳﻜﺔ اﻟﻌﻠﺔ ﻟﻠﻤﺎدة و اﳌﺎدة اﳌﺘﺤﺼﻠﺔ -ﺎ ﻫﻲ ﻣﻮﺿﻮع اﳊﺮﻛﺔ. ﻛﻤﺎ أن اﻟﻘﺎﺋﻠﲔ ﺑﺎﻟﻜﻮن و اﻟﻔﺴﺎد اﻟﻨﺎﻓﲔ ﻟﻠ ﺤ ﺮﻛﺔ اﳉﻮﻫﺮﻳﺔ ﻗﺎﻟﻮا أن ﻓﺎﻋﻞ اﳌﺎدة ﻫﻮ و ﻫﺬا ﺎ ﲜﻮﻫﺮ ﻣﻔﺎرق ﻳﻔﻌﻠﻬﺎ و ﻳﻔﻌﻞ اﳌﺎدة ﺑﻮاﺳﻄﺘﻬﺎ ﻓﺼﻮرة ﻣﺎ ﺷﺮﻳﻜﺔ اﻟﻌﻠﺔ T ﺻﻮرة ﻣﺎ ﳏﻔﻮﻇﺔ وﺣﺪ ﺑﺎﻟﻨﺴﺒﺔ إﱃ اﳌﺎدة ﺣﺎﻓﻈﺔ ﺎ .T ﻟﺘﺤﺼﻠﻬﺎ و وﺣﺪ و اﻟﺘﺤﻘﻴﻖ : ﻛﺎﻧﺖ ﻷﺟﻞ أن أن ﺣﺎﺟﺔ اﳊﺮﻛﺔ إﱃ ﻣﻮﺿﻮع ﺛﺎﺑﺖ ﺑﺎق ﻣﺎ داﻣﺖ اﳊﺮﻛﺔ إن ﺗﻨﺤﻔﻆ ﺑﻪ وﺣﺪة اﳊﺮﻛﺔ و ﻻ ﺗﻨﺜﻠﻢ ﺑﻄﺮو اﻻﻧﻘﺴﺎم ﻋﻠﻴﻬﺎ و ﻋﺪم اﺟﺘﻤﺎع أﺟﺰاﺋﻬﺎ ﰲ اﻟﻮﺟﻮد ﻛﺎﻧﺖ ﻷﺟﻞ ﻛﺎف ﰲ ذﻟﻚ و إن ﻛﻮن اﻻﻧﻘﺴﺎم وﳘﻴﺎ ﻏﲑ ﻓﻜﻲ ﻓﺎﺗﺼﺎل اﳊﺮﻛﺔ ﰲ ﻧﻔﺴﻬﺎ و أ ﻛﻤﺎ أن اﻷﻋﺮاض و اﻟﺼﻮر ﺎ ﻣﻌﲎ ﻧﺎﻋﱵ ﳛﺘﺎج إﱃ أﻣﺮ ﻣﻮﺟﻮد ﻟﻨﻔﺴﻪ ﺣﱴ ﻳﻮﺟﺪ ﻟﻪ و ﻳﻨﻌﺘﻪ 5 ﻛﺬﻟﻚ ﺗﻮﺟﺪ ﻟﻪ و ﺗﻨﻌﺘﻪ ﻓﻤﻮﺿﻮع اﳊﺮﻛﺎت اﳉﻮﻫﺮﻳﺔ اﳌﻨﻄﺒﻌﺔ ﰲ اﳌﺎدة ﲢﺘﺎج إﱃ ﻣﻮﺿﻮع اﻟﻌﺮﺿﻴﺔ أﻣﺮ ﺟﻮﻫﺮي ﻏﲑﻫﺎ و ﻣﻮﺿﻮع اﳊﺮﻛﺔ اﳉﻮﻫﺮﻳﺔ ﻧﻔﺲ اﳊﺮﻛﺔ إذ ﻻ ﻧﻌﲏ ﲟﻮﺿﻮع اﳊﺮﻛﺔ إﻻ ذاﺗﺎ ﻛﺎﻧﺖ ﻗﺎﺋﻤﺔ ﻛﺎﻧﺖ ذاﺗﺎ ﺟﻮﻫﺮﻳﺔ ﺳﻴﺎﻟﺔ ﺗﻘﻮم ﺑﻪ اﳊﺮﻛﺔ و ﺗﻮﺟﺪ ﻟﻪ و اﳊﺮﻛﺔ اﳉﻮﻫﺮﻳﺔ ﳌﺎ . ﺎ ﻣﻮﺟﻮدة ﻟﻨﻔﺴﻬﺎ ﻓﻬﻲ ﺣﺮﻛﺔ و ﻣﺘ ﺤ ﺮﻛﺔ ﰲ ﻧﻔﺴﻬﺎ Tﺑﺬا و إﺳﻨﺎد اﳌﻮﺿﻮﻋﻴﺔ إﱃ اﳌﺎدة اﻟﱵ ﲡﺮي ﻋﻠﻴﻬﺎ اﻟﺼﻮر اﳉﻮﻫﺮﻳﺔ ﻋﻠﻰ ﳓﻮ اﻻﺗﺼﺎل و اﻟﺴﻴﻼن ﳌﻜﺎن اﲢﺎدﻫﺎ ﻣﻌﻬﺎ و إﻻ ﻓﻬﻲ ﰲ ﻧﻔﺴﻬﺎ ﻋ ﺔ ﻛﻞ ﻓﻌﻠﻴ ﺎرﻳﺔ ﻋﻦ .
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10.12. THE SUBJECT OF SUBSTANTIAL MOTION AND ITS AGENT It has been held by philosophers of the post-Shadrâ period that the subject in this motion is the matter actualized in one or the other of successive forms united by continuity and flux. Thus the unity of matter and its individuality are preserved through one or the other of the changing forms. The unity of the changing form, though indefinite, is preserved by an immaterial substance, which is the agent of matter. This agent preserves matter and its unity and individuality through some form or another. Thus the form, whatsoever, participates in the cause of matter and the matter actualized through it is the subject of motion. This is similar to the opinion of those who reject substantial motion and believe in continuous coming into being and annihilation (al-kawn wa alfasâd). They state that the agent of matter is some form whatsoever, whose unity is preserved by an immaterial substance that creates form and matter through its mediation. Thus some form whatsoever participates in the cause in relation to matter and preserves its actualization and unity. The correct position is that motion’s need for a fixed subject remains as long as motion continues. Should a fixed subject be needed to preserve the unity of motion, in order that motion may not fall apart through divisibility and for the reason that its parts are not co-present in existence, it is the continuity of motion in itself and its divisibility in imagination, not external fact, which is sufficient for its unity. Should the need for a fixed subject be for the reason that motion is something predicative that stands in need of an entity existent-in-itself, in order to exist for it and to characterize it – as in the case of accidents and substantial forms impressed in matter, which also stand in need of a substratum for which they may exist and which they may characterize – the subject of accidental motions is something other that is substantial, and the subject of substantial motion is motion itself. For we do not mean by ‘subject of motion’ anything except an entity through which motion may subsist and for which “it may exist, and substantial motion, being a flowing and substantial entity, is subsistent through itself and for itself. Thus it is motion and the moving in. itself. Matter, which undergoes substantial forms in a continuous and flux-like manner, is referred to as ‘subject’ due to its union with forms; otherwise, in itself it is devoid of all actuality.
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اﻟﻔﺼﻞ اﻟﺜﺎﻟﺚ ﻋﺸﺮ ﻓﻲ ن اﻟﺰﻣﺎ إﻧﺎ ﳒﺪ اﳊﻮادث اﻟﻮاﻗﻌﺔ ﲢﺖ اﳊﺮﻛﺔ ﻣﻨﻘﺴﻤﺔ إﱃ ﻗﻄﻌﺎت ﻻ ﲡﺎﻣﻊ ﻗﻄﻌﺔ ﻣﻨﻬﺎ اﻟﻘﻄﻌﺔ اﻷﺧﺮى ﰲ ﻓﻌﻠﻴﺔ اﻟﻮﺟﻮد ﳌﺎ أن ﻓﻌﻠﻴﺔ وﺟﻮد اﻟﻘﻄﻌﺔ اﳌﻔﺮوﺿﺔ ﺛﺎﻧﻴﺎ ﻣﺘﻮﻓﻘﺔ ﻋﻠﻰ زوال اﻟﻮﺟﻮد اﻟﻔﻌﻠﻲ ﻟﻠﻘﻄﻌﺔ اﻷوﱃ ﰒ ﳒﺪ اﻟﻘﻄﻌﺔ اﻷوﱃ اﳌﺘﻮﻗﻒ ﻋﻠﻴﻬﺎ ﻣﻨﻘﺴﻤﺔ ﰲ ﻧﻔﺴﻬﺎ إﱃ ﻗﻄﻌﺘ ﲔ ﻛ ﻛﻠﻤﺎ ﺣﺼﻠﻨﺎ ﻗﻄﻌﺔ ﻗﺒﻠﺖ اﻟﻘﺴﻤﺔ إﱃ ﻗﻄﻌﺘ ﲔ ﺬﻟﻚ ﻻ ﲡﺎﻣﻊ إﺣﺪاﳘﺎ اﻷﺧﺮى و ﻫﻜﺬا ﻛﺬﻟﻚ ﻣﻦ دون أن ﺗﻘﻒ اﻟﻘﺴﻤﺔ ﻋﻠﻰ ﺣﺪ. ﻛﻤﻲ ﻋﻠﻰ اﳊﺮﻛﺔ ﺗﺘﻘﺪر ﺑﻪ و ﺗﻘﺒﻞ اﻻﻧﻘﺴﺎم و ﻟﻴﺲ و ﻻ ﻳﺘﺄﺗﻰ ﻫﺬا إﻻ ﺑﻌﺮوض اﻣﺘﺪاد ﻫﺬا اﻻﻣﺘﺪاد ﻧﻔﺲ ﺣﻘﻴﻘﺔ اﳊﺮﻛﺔ ﻷﻧﻪ اﻣﺘﺪاد ﻣﺘﻌﲔ و ﻣﺎ ﰲ اﳊﺮﻛﺔ ﰲ ﻧﻔﺴﻬ ﺎ اﻣﺘﺪاد ﻣﺒﻬﻢ ﻧﻈﲑ اﻻﻣﺘﺪاد اﳌﺒﻬﻢ اﻟﺬي ﰲ اﳉﺴﻢ اﻟﻄﺒﻴﻌﻲ و ﺗﻌﻴﻨﻪ اﻟﺬي ﻫﻮ اﳉﺴﻢ اﻟﺘﻌﻠﻴﻤﻲ. ﻛﻢ ﻣﺘﺼﻞ ﻋﺎرض ﻟﻠ ﺤ ﺮﻛﺔ ﻧﻈﲑ اﳉﺴﻢ اﻟﺘﻌﻠﻴﻤﻲ ﻓﻬﺬا اﻻﻣﺘﺪاد اﻟﺬي ﺑﻪ ﺗﻌﲔ اﻣﺘﺪاد اﳊﺮﻛﺔ اﻟﺬي ﺑﻪ ﺗﻌﲔ اﻣﺘﺪاد اﳉﺴﻢ اﻟﻄﺒﻴﻌﻲ ﻟﻠﺠﺴﻢ اﻟﻄﺒﻴﻌﻲ إﻻ أن ﻫﺬا اﻟﻜﻢ اﻟﻌﺎرض ﻟﻠ ﺤ ﺮﻛﺔ ﻏﲑ ﻗﺎر ﻛﻤﻴﺔ اﳉﺴﻢ اﻟﺘﻌﻠﻴﻤﻲ ﻓﺈ5ﺎ ﻗﺎرة ﳎﺘﻤﻌﺔ و ﻻ ﳚﺎﻣﻊ ﺑﻌﺾ أﺟﺰاﺋﻪ اﳌﻔﺮوﺿﺔ ﺑﻌﻀﺎ ﲞﻼف اﻷﺟﺰاء.

ﻛﻞ ﺟﺰء ﻣﻨﻪ ﻣﻦ ﺣﻴﺚ أﻧﻪ ﻣﺘﻮﻗﻒ ﻋﻠﻴﻪ و ﻫﺬا ﻫﻮ اﻟﺰﻣﺎن اﻟﻌﺎرض ﻟﻠ ﺤ ﺮﻛﺔ و ﻣﻘﺪارﻫﺎ و اﻵﺧﺮ ﻣﺘﻘﺪم ﺑﺎﻟﻨﺴﺒﺔ إﻟﻴﻪ و ﻣﻦ ﺣﻴﺚ إﻧﻪ ﻣﺘﻮﻗﻒ ﻣﺘﺄﺧﺮ ﺑﺎﻟﻨﺴﺒﺔ إﱃ ﻣﺎ ﺗﻮﻗﻒ ﻋﻠﻴﻪ و اﻟﻄﺮف ﻣﻨﻪ اﳊﺎ ن ﺻﻞ ﺑﺎﻟﻘﺴﻤﺔ ﻫﻮ اﻵ. و ﻗﺪ ﺗﺒﲔ ﲟﺎ ﺗﻘﺪم أوﻻ : أن ﻟﻜﻞ ﺣﺮﻛﺔ زﻣﺎﻧﺎ ﺧﺎﺻﺎ -ﺎ ﻫﻮ ﻣﻘﺪار ﺗﻠﻚ اﳊﺮﻛﺔ و ﻗﺪ أﻃﺒﻖ اﻟﻨﺎس ﻋﻠﻰ ﺗﻘﺪﻳﺮ ﻋﺎﻣﺔ اﳊﺮﻛﺎت و ﺗﻌﻴﲔ اﻟﻨﺴﺐ ﺑﻴﻨﻬﺎ ﺑﺎﻟﺰﻣﺎن اﻟﻌﺎم اﻟﺬي ﻫﻮ ﻣﻘﺪار اﳊﺮﻛﺔ ﻛﺎﻓﺔ و ﻗﺪ ﻗﺴﻤﻮﻩ إﱃ اﻟﻘﺮون و اﻟﺴ اﻟﻴﻮﻣﻴﺔ ﻟﻜﻮﻧﻪ ﻣﻌﺮوﻓﺎ ﻋﻨﺪﻫﻢ ﻣﺸﻬﻮدا ﳍﻢ ﻨﲔ و اﻟﺸﻬﻮر و اﻷﺳﺎﺑﻴﻊ و اﻷﻳﺎم و اﻟﺴﺎﻋﺎت و اﻟﺪﻗﺎﺋﻖ و اﻟﺜﻮاﱐ و ﻏﲑﻫﺎ ﻟﺘﻘﺪﻳﺮ اﳊﺮﻛﺎت ﺑﺎﻟﺘﻄﺒﻴﻖ ﻋﻠﻴﻬﺎ. و اﻟﺰﻣﺎن اﻟﺬي ﻟﻪ دﺧﻞ ﰲ اﳊﻮادث اﻟﺰﻣﺎﻧﻴﺔ ﻋﻨﺪ اﳌﺜﺒﺘﲔ ﻟﻠ ﺤ ﺮﻛﺔ اﳉﻮﻫﺮﻳﺔ ﻫﻮ زﻣﺎن اﳊﺮﻛﺔ اﳉﻮﻫﺮﻳﺔ. و ﺛﺎﻧﻴﺎ :أ ء اﻟﺰﻣﺎن ﲟﻌﲎ أن اﻟﺘﻘﺪم و اﻟﺘﺄﺧﺮ ذاﺗﻴﺎن ﺑﲔ أﺟﺰا ﻛﻮن وﺟﻮد اﻟﺰﻣﺎن ﺳﻴﺎﻻ ﻏﲑ ن ﻗﺎر ﻳﻘﺘﻀﻲ أن ﻳﻨﻘﺴﻢ ﻟﻮ اﻧﻘﺴﻢ إﱃ ﺟﺰء ﻳﺘﻮﻗﻒ ﻋﻠﻰ زواﻟﻪ وﺟﻮد ﺟﺰء آﺧﺮ ﺑﺎﻟﻔﻌﻞ و اﳌﺘﻮﻗﻒ ﻋﻠﻴﻪ ﻫﻮ اﳌﺘﻘﺪم و اﳌﺘﻮﻗﻒ ﻫﻮ اﳌﺘﺄﺧﺮ و ﺛﺎﻟﺜﺎ : أن اﻵن و ﻫﻮ ﻃﺮف اﻟﺰﻣﺎن و اﳊﺪ اﻟﻔﺎﺻﻞ ﺑﲔ اﳉﺰءﻳﻦ ﻟﻮ اﻧﻘﺴﻢ ﻫﻮ أﻣﺮ ﻋﺪﻣﻲ ﻟﻜﻮن اﻻﻧﻘﺴﺎم وﳘﻴﺎ ﻏﲑ ﻓﻜﻲ.
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و راﺑﻌﺎ : أن ﺗﺘﺎﱄ اﻵﻧﺎت و ﻫﻮ اﺟﺘﻤﺎع ﺣﺪﻳﻦ ﻋﺪﻣﻴﲔ أو أﻛﺜﺮ ﻣﻦ ﻏﲑ ﲣﻠﻞ ﺟﺰء ﻣﻦ اﻟﺰﻣﺎن ﻓﺎﺻﻞ ﺑﻴﻨﻬﻤﺎ ﳏﺎل و ﻫﻮ ﻇﺎﻫﺮ و ﻣﺜﻠﻪ اﻟﻜﻼم ﰲ ﺗﺘﺎﱄ اﻵﻧﻴﺎت اﳌﻨﻄﺒﻘﺔ ﻋﻠﻰ ﻃﺮف ﻛﺎﻟﻮﺻﻮل و اﻻﻓﱰاق اﻟﺰﻣﺎن . و ﺧﺎﻣﺴﺎ : أن اﻟﺰﻣﺎن ﻻ أول ﻟﻪ و ﻻ آﺧﺮ ﻟﻪ ﲟﻌﲎ اﳉﺰء اﻟﺬي ﻻ ﻳﻨﻘﺴﻢ ﻣﻦ ﻣﺒﺘﺪﺋﻪ أو ﻣﻨﺘﻬﺎﻩ ﻷن ﻗﺒﻮل اﻟﻘﺴﻤﺔ ذاﰐ ﻟﻪ.
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10.13. TIME We find that events occurring as a result of motion, are divisible into segments, of which no segment is co-present with another in respect of actual existence. For the actual existence of any posterior segment under consideration depends on the termination of foe actual existence of the prior segment. Moreover, we find that the prior segment is itself divisible into similar segments none of which is co-present with the other. We can go on bisecting segments in this way, and whenever we reach a segment it would be visible into two parts in the aforementioned manner without the division ever stopping at any limit. This division is not possible without the application of quantitative extension to motion, by which motion becomes measurable and divisible. However, that extension does not represent the reality of motion itself, for it is something determinate whereas motion in itself has only an indeterminate extension, like the indefinite shape of a physical mass, which is defined by a three dimensional geometrical form. This extension, through which the extension of motion is determined, is a continuous quantity corresponding to motion, like a three-dimensional geometrical form through which the dimensions of a physical mass become determinate, with the difference that this quantity corresponding to motion is non-static and its parts are not co-present with one another, as opposed to a three dimensional geometrical form in which the parts are static and copresent. This quantity is time, which corresponds to motion and constitutes its extent. Every part of it is prior in relation to the part that depends upon it, and it is posterior in relation to the part on whose termination it depends. The extremities that result from the division of time into segments are called ‘instants.’ The following conclusions are drawn from this discussion. (i) For every motion there is a time particular to it, which is the extent of that motion. People have adopted ordinary time, which is the extent of diurnal motion, as a convention for the measurement of motions in general and for the determination of the relationships between them. This is because ordinary time is commonly known and observable. They have divided it into centuries, years, months, weeks, days, hours, minutes, seconds, etc., in order to measure motions by their means. For those who uphold substantial motion, the time that is relevant in temporal events is the time of substantial motion (not accidental motions, like the earth’s rotation, for they are derived from substantial motion). (ii) Priority and posteriority are essential to the parts of time, in the sense that the existence of time is flowing, non-static. This requires that it be divisible, if divided, into a part on whose termination depends the actual existence of another part, the former being prior and the latter posterior. (iii) The instant, which is the extremity of a period of time and the dividing limit between two parts of it, if divided, is something unreal (i.e. imaginary), because the division is imaginary. (iv) The succession of instants, which is the co-presence of two or more unreal limits without any intervening segment of time separating them, is
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obviously impossible. The same observation applies to succession of instantaneous events, which correspond extremities of segments of time, e.g. reaching and separating. (v) There is no beginning or end for time, in the sense that there may be an indivisible part at its beginning or end; that is because divisibility is essential to it.
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اﻟﻔﺼﻞ اﻟﺮاﺑﻊ ﻋﺸﺮ ﻓﻲ اﻟﺴﺮﻋﺔ و اﻟﺒﻄﺆ إذا ﻓﺮﺿﻨﺎ ﺣﺮﻛﺘﲔ و اﻋﺘﱪﻧﺎ اﻟﻨﺴﺒﺔ ﺑﻴﻨﻬﻤﺎ ﻓﺈن ﺗﺴﺎوﺗﺎ زﻣﺎﻧﺎ ﻓﺄﻛﺜﺮﳘﺎ ﻗﻄﻌﺎ ﻟﻠﻤﺴﺎﻓﺔ ﻛﺜﲑة ﰲ زﻣﺎن أﺳﺮﻋﻬﻤﺎ و إن ﺗﺴﺎوﺗﺎ ﻣﺴﺎﻓﺔ ﻓﺄﻗﻠﻬﻤﺎ زﻣﺎﻧﺎ أﺳﺮﻋﻬﻤﺎ ﻓﺎﻟﺴﺮﻋﺔ ﻗﻄﻊ ﻣﺴﺎﻓﺔ ﻗﻠﻴﻞ و اﻟﺒﻄﺆ ﺧﻼﻓﻪ. ﻗﺎﻟﻮا :إن ﻛﺎن ﲣﻠﻞ اﻟﺴﻜﻮن ﻓﻴﻬﺎ أﻛﺜﺮ ﻛﻠﻤﺎ اﻟﺒﻄﺆ ﻟﻴﺲ ﺑﺘﺨﻠﻞ اﻟﺴﻜﻮن ﺑﺄن ﺗﻜﻮن اﳊﺮﻛﺔ ج اﻟﻘﻮة و اﻟﻔﻌﻞ ﻓﻴﻬﺎ ﻛﺎﻧﺖ أﺳﺮع و ذﻟﻚ ﻻﺗﺼﺎل اﳊﺮﻛﺔ ﺑﺎﻣﺘﺰا ﻛﺎن أﻗﻞ ﻛﻠﻤﺎ ﻛﺎﻧﺖ أﺑﻄﺄ و ﻓﻼ ﺳﺒﻴﻞ إﱃ ﲣﻠﻞ اﻟﺴﻜﻮن ﻓﻴﻬﺎ. و ﻗﺎﻟﻮا :ﻓﻠ ﻤﺎ وﺟﻮدﻳﺎن 5 إن اﻟﺴﺮﻋﺔ و اﻟﺒﻄﺆ ﻣﺘﻘﺎﺑﻼن ﺗﻘﺎﺑﻞ اﻟﺘﻀﺎد و ذﻟﻚ ﻷ ﻴﺲ ﻛﻠﻤﺎ ﺛﺒﺖ أﺣﺪﳘﺎ ﻛﺎﻧﺎ ﺗﻘﺎﺑﻠﻬﻤﺎ ﺗﻘﺎﺑﻞ اﻟﺘﻨﺎﻗﺾ أو اﻟﻌﺪم و اﳌﻠﻜﺔ و ﻟﻴﺴﺎ ﺑﺎﳌﺘﻀﺎﺋﻔﲔ و إﻻ ﻛﺬﻟﻚ ﻓﻠﻢ ﻳﺒﻖ إﻻ أن ﻳﻜﻮﻧﺎ ﻣﺘﻀﺎدﻳﻦ و ﻫﻮ اﳌﻄﻠﻮب ﺛﺒﺖ اﻵﺧﺮ و ﻟﻴﺲ . و ﻓﻴﻪ : أن ﻣﻦ ﺷﺮط اﳌﺘﻀﺎدﻳﻦ أن ﻳﻜﻮن ﺑﻴﻨﻬﻤﺎ ﻏﺎﻳﺔ اﳋﻼف و ﻟﻴﺴﺖ ﲟﺘﺤﻘﻘﺔ ﺑﲔ اﻟﺴﺮﻋﺔ و اﻟﺒﻄﺆ إذ ﻣﺎ ﻣﻦ ﺳﺮﻳﻊ ﻲ ﻛﺬا ﻣﺎ ﻣﻦ ﺑﻄ إﻻ و ﳝﻜﻦ أن ﻳﻔﺮض ﻣﺎ ﻫﻮ أﺳﺮع ﻣﻨﻪ و ء إﻻ و ﳝﻜﻦ أن ﻳﻔﺮض ﻣﺎ ﻫﻮ أﺑﻄﺄ ﻣﻨﻪ. و اﳊﻖ : أن اﻟﺴﺮﻋﺔ و اﻟﺒﻄﺆ وﺻﻔﺎن إﺿﺎﻓﻴﺎن ﻓﺴﺮﻋﺔ ﺣﺮﻛﺔ ﺑﺎﻟﻨﺴﺒﺔ إﱃ أﺧﺮى ﺑﻄﺆ ﺑﻌﻴﻨﻬﺎ ﻛﺬﻟﻚ اﻷﻣﺮ ﰲ اﻟﺒﻄﺆ و اﻟﺴﺮﻋﺔ ﲟﻌﲎ اﳉﺮﻳﺎن و اﻟﺴﻴﻼن ﺧﺎﺻﺔ ﳌﻄﻠﻖ ﺑﺎﻟﻨﺴﺒﺔ إﱃ ﺛﺎﻟﺜﺔ و اﳊﺮﻛﺔ ن ﰒ ﺗﺸﺘﺪ و ﺗﻀﻌﻒ ﻓﻴﺤﺪث ﺑﺈﺿﺎﻓﺔ ﺑﻌﻀﻬﺎ إﱃ ﺑﻌﺾ اﻟﺴﺮﻋﺔ و اﻟﺒﻄﺆ اﻹﺿﺎﻓﻴﺎ.
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10.14. FASTNESS AND SLOWNESS If we consider two motions occurring in equal time, that which covers a longer course is the one that is faster. If two motions cover an equal course, the one that takes lesser time is the faster. Thus fastness lies in covering a relatively longer distance in lesser time, and slowness is its opposite. The philosophers state that slowness does not consist of intervening rests, so that one may say that a motion is slower because of a greater number of intervening rests, and faster when they are fewer. That is because motion is a continuity in which potentiality and actuality intermingle. Hence there is no room for intervening rest in it. They further state that fastness and slowness are opposites, in the sense of contrariety. That is because both of them are positive and the opposition between them is neither one of contradiction, nor that of possession and privation, nor are they correlatives; otherwise, whenever one of them exists the other would also exist, which is not the case. This does not leave any alternative except to consider them as contraries. However, a difficulty that lies in this view is that a condition for the contraries is that there should be an extreme difference between them – something which is not present between fastness and slowness; for it is always possible to assume something faster in that which is fast, and, similarly, something slower than that which is slow. The truth is that fastness (sur’ah; also means speed) and slowness [buth’) are relative attributes; what is fast in relation to a certain motion may be slow in relation to a third one. The same applies to slowness. Sur’ah (speed) in the sense of transition and flow is peculiar to all motion and is characterized by intensity and weakness. Relative fastness and slowness derive from comparison between different speeds.
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اﻟﻔﺼﻞ اﻟﺨﺎﻣﺲ ﻋﺸﺮ ﻓﻲ اﻟﺴﻜﻮن ﻳﻄﻠﻖ اﻟﺴﻜﻮن ﻋﻠﻰ ﺧﻠﻮ اﳉﺴﻢ ﻣﻦ اﳊﺮﻛﺔ ﻗﺒﻠﻬﺎ أو ﺑﻌﺪﻫﺎ و ﻋﻠﻰ ﺛﺒﺎت اﳉﺴﻢ ﻋﻠﻰ ﺣﺎﻟﻪ اﻟﱵ ﻫﻮ ﻋ ﻠﻴﻬﺎ و اﻟﺬي ﻳﻘﺎﺑﻞ اﳊﺮﻛﺔ ﻫﻮ اﳌﻌﲎ اﻷول و اﻟﺜﺎﱐ ﻻزﻣﻪ و ﻫﻮ ﻣﻌﲎ ﻋﺪﻣﻲ ﲟﻌﲎ اﻧﻌﺪام اﻟﺼﻔﺔ ﻋﻦ ﻣﻮﺿﻮع ﻗﺎﺑﻞ ﻫﻮ اﳉﺴﻢ ﻓﻴﻜﻮن ﻫﻮ ﻋﺪم اﳊﺮﻛﺔ ﻋﻤﺎ ﻣﻦ ﺷﺄﻧﻪ أن ﻳﺘﺤﺮك ﻓﺎﻟﺘﻘﺎﺑﻞ ﺑﻴﻨﻪ و ﺑﲔ اﳊﺮﻛﺔ ﺗﻘﺎﺑﻞ اﻟﻌﺪم و اﳌﻠﻜﺔ و ﻻ ﻳﻜﺎد ﳜﻠﻮ ﻋﻦ اﳊﺮﻛﺔ ﺟﺴﻢ أو ﻛﺎن أﻣﺮ ﺟﺴﻤﺎﱐ إﻻ ﻣﺎ ﺷﻲ ﻛﺎﻟﻮﺻﻮل إﱃ ﺣﺪ اﳌﺴﺎﻓﺔ و اﻧﻔﺼﺎل آﱐ اﻟﻮﺟﻮد ﺷﻲ ء ﻣﻦ ء و ﺣﺪوث اﻷﺷﻜﺎل اﳍﻨﺪﺳﻴﺔ و ﳓﻮ ذﻟﻚ.
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10.15. REST The term ‘rest’ is applied to a body’s state of being devoid of motion, before or after being in motion. It is also applied to a body’s remaining unchanged in its state. That which is opposed to motion is the first meaning. The second one is implied by it. Rest has the negative sense of absence of a quality from the subject, which is a body capable of possessing it. Thus it means absence of motion in something that generally moves. Hence the opposition between it and motion is that of privation and possession. A body, or anything physical, cannot be devoid of motion, except what is instantaneous, such as reaching the limit of a journey, separation of a thing from another, the formation of geometric figures and the like.
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اﻟﻔﺼﻞ اﻟﺴﺎدس ﻋﺸﺮ ﻓﻲ اﻧﻘﺴﺎﻣﺎت اﻟﺤﺮﻛﺔ .ﺎT ﺗﻨﻘﺴﻢ اﳊﺮﻛﺔ ﺑﺎﻧﻘﺴﺎم اﻷﻣﻮر اﻟﺴﺘﺔ اﻟﱵ ﺗﺘﻌﻠﻖ -ﺎ ذا
ﻛﺬا و اﳊﺮﻛﺔ ﻣﻦ ﻛﺬا إﱃ ﻣﻜﺎن ﻛﺎﳊﺮﻛﺔ ﻣﻦ ﻣﻜﺎن ﻓﺎﻧﻘﺴﺎﻣﻬﺎ ﺑﺎﻧﻘﺴﺎم اﳌﺒﺪإ و اﳌﻨﺘﻬﻰ ﻛﺬا إﱃ ﻟﻮن ﻟﻮن ا ﻛﺬ ﻛﺬا إﱃ ﻗﺪر ﻛﺬا و ﺣﺮﻛﺔ اﻟﻨﺒﺎت ﻣﻦ ﻗﺪر . و اﻧﻘﺴﺎﻣﻬﺎ ﺑﺎﻧﻘﺴﺎم اﳌﻮﺿﻮع :ن ﻛ ﺤ ﺮﻛﺔ اﻟﻨﺒﺎت و ﺣﺮﻛﺔ اﳊﻴﻮان و ﺣﺮﻛﺔ اﻹﻧﺴﺎ. و اﻧﻘﺴﺎﻣﻬﺎ ﺑﺎﻧﻘﺴﺎم اﳌﻘﻮﻟﺔ :ﻊ ﻛﺎﳊﺮﻛﺔ ﰲ اﻟﻜﻴﻒ و اﳊﺮﻛﺔ ﰲ اﻟﻜﻢ و اﳊﺮﻛﺔ ﰲ اﻟﻮﺿ. و اﻧﻘﺴﺎﻣﻬﺎ ﺑﺎﻧﻘﺴﺎم اﻟﺰﻣﺎن :ﺔ ﻛﺎﳊﺮﻛﺔ اﻟﻠﻴﻠﻴﺔ و اﳊﺮﻛﺔ اﻟﻨﻬﺎرﻳ و اﳊﺮﻛﺔ اﻟﺼﻴﻔﻴﺔ و اﳊﺮﻛﺔ اﻟﺸﺘﻮﻳﺔ. و اﻧﻘﺴﺎﻣﻬﺎ ﺑﺎﻧﻘﺴﺎم اﻟﻔﺎﻋﻞ : ﻛﺎﳊﺮﻛﺔ اﻟﻄﺒﻴﻌﻴﺔ و اﳊﺮﻛﺔ اﻟﻘﺴﺮﻳﺔ و اﳊﺮﻛﺔ اﻹرادﻳﺔ و ﻳﻠﺤﻖ -ﺎ ﺑﻮﺟﻪ اﳊﺮﻛﺔ ﺑﺎﻟﻌﺮض ﻓﺈن اﻟﻔﺎﻋﻞ إﻣﺎ أن ﻳﻜﻮن ذا ﺷﻌﻮر و إرادة ﺑﺎﻟﻨﺴﺒﺔ إﱃ ﻓﻌﻠﻪ أم ﻻ و ﺮ ﻛﺎﳊ اﻷول ﻫﻮ اﻟﻔﺎﻋﻞ اﻟﻨﻔﺴﺎﱐ و اﳊﺮﻛﺔ ﻧﻔﺴﺎﻧﻴﺔ ﻛﺎت اﻹرادﻳﺔ اﻟﱵ ﻟﻺﻧﺴﺎن و اﳊﻴﻮان و اﻟﺜﺎﱐ إﻣﺎ أن ﺗﻜﻮن اﳊﺮﻛﺔ ﻣﻨﺒﻌﺜﺔ ﻋﻦ ﻧﻔﺴﻪ ﻟﻮ ﺧﻠﻲ و ﻧﻔﺴﻪ و إﻣﺎ أن ﺗﻜﻮن ﻣﻨﺒﻌﺜﺔ ﻋﻨﻪ ﻟﻘﻬﺮ ﻓﺎﻋﻞ آﺧﺮ إﻳﺎﻩ ﻋﻠﻰ اﳊﺮﻛﺔ و اﻷول ﻫﻮ اﻟﻔﺎﻋﻞ اﻟﻄﺒﻴﻌﻲ و اﳊﺮﻛﺔ ﻃﺒﻴﻌﻴﺔ و اﻟﺜﺎﱐ ﻫﻮ اﻟﻔﺎﻋﻞ ﻛﺎﳊﺠﺮ اﳌﺮﻣﻲ إﱃ ﻓﻮق اﻟﻘﺎﺳﺮ و اﳊﺮﻛﺔ ﻗﺴﺮﻳﺔ . ﻗﺎ ا ﻟﻮ : إن اﻟﻔﺎﻋﻞ اﻟﻘﺮﻳﺐ ﻟﻠ ﺤ ﺮﻛﺔ ﰲ ﲨﻴﻊ ﻫﺬﻩ اﳊﺮﻛﺎت ﻫﻮ ﻃﺒﻴﻌﺔ اﳌﺘﺤﺮك ﻋﻦ ﺗﺴﺨﲑ ﻧﻔﺴﺎﱐ أو اﻗﺘﻀﺎء ﻃﺒﻴﻌﻲ أو ﻗﻬﺮ اﻟﻄﺒﻴﻌﺔ اﻟﻘﺎﺳﺮة ﻟﻄﺒﻴﻌﺔ اﳌﻘﺴﻮر ﻋﻠﻰ اﳊﺮﻛﺔ و اﳌﺒﺪإ اﳌﺒﺎﺷﺮ اﳌﺘﻮﺳﻂ ﺑﲔ اﻟﻔﺎﻋﻞ و ﺑﲔ اﳊﺮﻛﺔ ﻫﻮ ﻣﺒﺪأ اﳌﻴﻞ اﻟﺬي ﻳﻮﺟﺪﻩ اﻟﻔﺎﻋﻞ ﰲ ﻃﺒﻴﻌﺔ اﳌﺘﺤﺮك و ﺗﻔﺼﻴﻞ اﻟﻜ ت ﻼم ﻓﻴﻪ ﰲ اﻟﻄﺒﻴﻌﻴﺎ. ﺧﺎﺗﻤﺔ ﻟﻴﻌﻠﻢ : ﻛﺬﻟﻚ ﺗﻄﻠﻖ ﻋﻠﻰ ﺣﻴﺜﻴﺔ اﻟﻔﻌﻞ ﻛﻤﺎ ﺗﻄﻠﻖ ﻋﻠﻰ ﺣﻴﺜﻴﺔ اﻟﻘﺒﻮل أن اﻟﻘﻮة أو ﻣﺎ ﺑﺎﻟﻘﻮة ﻛﺬﻟﻚ ﺗﻄﻠﻖ ﻋﻠﻰ ﻣﺒﺪإ ﻛﺎﻧﺖ ﺷﺪﻳﺪة و ﻛﻤﺎ ﺗﻄﻠﻖ ﻋﻠﻰ ﻣﺒﺪإ اﻟﻘﺒﻮل اﻟﻘﺎﺋﻢ ﺑﻪ ذﻟﻚ إذا اﻟﻔﻌﻞ ﻛﻤﺎ ﺗﻄﻠﻖ اﻟﻘﻮى اﻟﻨﻔﺴﺎﻧﻴﺔ و ﻳﺮاد -ﺎ ﻣﺒﺎدي اﻵﺛﺎر اﻟﻨﻔﺴﺎﻧﻴﺔ ﻣﻦ إﺑﺼﺎ ر و ﲰﻊ و ﲣﻴﻞ ﻛﺬﻟﻚ اﻟﻘﻮى اﻟﻄﺒﻴﻌﻴﺔ ﳌﺒﺎدي اﻵﺛﺎر اﻟﻄﺒﻴﻌﻴﺔ و ﻏﲑ ذﻟﻚ و . و ﻫﺬﻩ اﻟﻘﻮة اﻟﻔﺎﻋﻠﺔ إذا ﻗﺎرﻧﺖ اﻟﻌﻠﻢ و اﳌﺸﻴﺔ ﲰﻴﺖ ﻗﺪرة اﳊﻴﻮان و ﻫﻲ ﻋﻠﺔ ﻓﺎﻋﻠﺔ ﲢﺘﺎج ﻛﺤﻀﻮر اﳌﺎدة اﻟﻘﺎﺑﻠﺔ و ﺻﻼﺣﻴﺔ أدوات ﰲ ﲤﺎم ﻋﻠﻴﺘﻬﺎ و وﺟﻮب اﻟﻔﻌﻞ -ﺎ إﱃ أﻣﻮر ﺧﺎرﺟﺔ اﻟﻔﻌﻞ و ﻏﲑﻫﺎ ﺗﺼﲑ ﻞ ﺑﺎﺟﺘﻤﺎﻋﻬﺎ ﻋﻠﺔ ﺗﺎﻣﺔ ﳚﺐ ﻣﻌﻬﺎ اﻟﻔﻌ.
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و ﻣﻦ ﻫﻨﺎ ﻳﻈﻬﺮ أوﻻ : ﻋﺪم اﺳﺘﻘﺎﻣﺔ ﲢﺪﻳﺪ ﺑﻌﻀﻬﻢ ﻟﻠﻘﺪرة ﺑﺄ5ﺎ ﻣﺎ ﻳﺼﺢ ﻣﻌﻪ اﻟﻔﻌﻞ و ﻛﺎن ﺟﺰءا ﻣﻦ اﻟﱰك ﻓﺈن ﻧﺴﺒﺔ اﻟﻔﻌﻞ و اﻟﱰك إﱃ اﻟﻔﺎﻋﻞ إﳕﺎ ﺗﻜﻮن ﺑﺎﻟﺼﺤﺔ و اﻹﻣﻜﺎن إذا اﻟﻌﻠﺔ اﻟﺘﺎﻣﺔ ﻻ ﳚﺐ اﻟﻔﻌﻞ ﺑﻪ وﺣﺪﻩ ﺑﻞ ﺑﻪ و ﺑﺒﻘﻴﺔ اﻷﺟﺰاء اﻟﱵ ﺗﺘﻢ -ﺎ اﻟﻌﻠﺔ اﻟﺘﺎﻣﺔ و أﻣﺎ ﻛﺎﻟﻮاﺟﺐ ﺗﻌﺎﱃ ﻓﻼ ﻣﻌﲎ ﻟﻜﻮن ﻧﺴﺒﺔ اﻟﻔﻌﻞ و اﻟﻔﺎﻋﻞ اﻟﺘﺎم اﻟﻔﺎﻋﻠﻴﺔ اﻟﺬي ﻫﻮ وﺣﺪة ﻋﻠﺔ ﺗﺎﻣﺔ اﻟﱰك إﻟﻴﻪ ﺑﺎﻹﻣﻜﺎن. ﻛﻮن ﻓﻌﻠﻪ واﺟﺒﺎ أن ﻳﻜﻮن ﻣﻮﺟﺒﺎ ﳎﱪا ﻋﻠﻰ اﻟﻔﻌﻞ ﻏﲑ ﻗﺎدر ﻋﻠﻴﻪ إذ ﻫﺬا و ﻻ ﻳﻮﺟﺐ اﻟﻮﺟﻮب ﻻﺣﻖ ﺑﺎﻟﻔﻌﻞ ﻣﻦ ﻗﺒﻠﻪ و ﻫﻮ أﺛﺮﻩ ﻓﻼ ﻳﻀﻄﺮﻩ إﱃ اﻟﻔﻌﻞ و ﻻ أن ﻫﻨﺎك ﻓﺎﻋﻼ آﺧﺮ ﻳﺆﺛﺮ ﻓﻴﻪ ﲜﻌﻠﻪ ﻣﻀﻄﺮا إﱃ اﻟﻔﻌﻞ. و ﺛﺎﻧﻴﺎ : ﻛﻮﻧﻪ ﻣﺴﺒﻮﻗﺎ ﺑﺎﻟﻌﺪم اﻟﺰﻣﺎﱐ ﺑﻄﻼن ﻣﺎ ﻗﺎل ﺑﻪ ﻗﻮم إن ﺻﺤﺔ اﻟﻔﻌﻞ ﻣﺘﻮﻗﻔﺔ ﻋﻠﻰ ﻓﺎﻟﻔﻌﻞ اﻟﺬي ﻻ ﻳﺴﺒﻘﻪ ﻋﺪم زﻣﺎﱐ ﳑﺘﻨﻊ و ﻫﻮ ﻣﺒﲏ ﻋﻠﻰ اﻟﻘﻮل ﺑﺄن ﻋﻠﺔ اﻻﺣﺘﻴﺎج إﱃ اﻟﻌﻠﺔ ﻫﻲ اﳊﺪوث دون اﻹﻣﻜﺎن و ﻗﺪ ﺗﻘﺪم إﺑﻄﺎﻟﻪ و إﺛﺒﺎت أن ﻋﻠﺔ اﳊﺎﺟﺔ إﱃ اﻟﻌﻠﺔ ﻫﻮ اﻹﻣﻜﺎن دون اﳊﺪوث ﻋﻠﻰ أﻧﻪ ﻣﻨﻘﻮض ﺑﻨﻔﺲ اﻟﺰﻣﺎن. و ﺛﺎﻟﺜﺎ : ﺑﻄﻼن ﻗﻮل ﻣﻦ ﻗﺎل إن اﻟﻘﺪرة إﳕﺎ ﲢﺪث ﻣﻊ اﻟﻔﻌﻞ و ﻻ ﻗﺪرة ﻋﻠﻰ ﻓﻌﻞ ﻗﺒﻠﻪ و ﻛﻮن اﻟﺸﻲ ﻓﻴﻪ أ5ﻢ ﻳﺮون أن اﻟﻘﺪرة ﻫﻲ ﻧ ء ﲝﻴﺚ ﻳﺼﺢ ﻣﻨﻪ اﻟﻔﻌﻞ و اﻟﱰك ﻓﻠﻮ ﺗﺮك اﻟﻔﻌﻞ زﻣﺎ ﺎ ﰒ ﻓﻌﻞ ﺻﺪق ﻋﻠﻴﻪ ﻗﺒﻞ اﻟﻔﻌﻞ أﻧﻪ ﻳﺼﺢ ﻣﻨﻪ اﻟﻔﻌﻞ و اﻟﱰك و ﻫﻲ اﻟﻘﺪرة.
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10.16. DIVISIONS OF MOTION Motion is divided into various kinds on the basis of the six factors that relate to it: On the basis of origin and end; e.g., the motion from one place to another, the motion from one colour to another and a plant’s motion from a certain extent to another. On the basis of the subject; e.g., the motions of a plant, the motions of an animal, the motions of a human being. On the basis of category; e.g., motion in quality, motion in quantity and motion in position. On the basis of time; e.g. nocturnal motion, diurnal motion, summer and winter motion. On the basis of agent; i.e. (i) natural motion, (ii) coercive motion and (iii) voluntary motion. Related with these in a certain aspect is motion by accident. The basis for this threefold division is that the agent either possesses knowledge and will in relation to his act or he does not. In the first case, the agent is conscious (nafsânî) and so is the motion, e.g. the voluntary motions of a human being or an animal. In the second case, the motion either arises from the agent by itself, or due to some other agent, which compels it to move. In the first case, the agent is a natural agent and the motion a natural motion. In the second case, the agent is a coercive one and the motion is a coercive motion, e.g. a stone thrown upwards. The philosophers state that the proximate agent in all these motion is the moving ‘nature,’ which moves either as a result of subjection to a soul, or by natural disposition, or under the compulsion of a coercing ‘nature’ that compels the coerced ‘nature’ to move. The immediate ‘source’ between the agent and the motion the inclination that the agent produces in the moving ‘nature.’ The related details are given in works on traditional physics. Conclusion Some points may be noted here concerning the terms quwwah (potentiality) and mâ bil-quwwah (the object possessing potentiality). In the same way as these terms are applied to the mode of receptivity, they are also applied to the mode of action, when strong. In the same way as these terms are applied to the source of receptivity (mabda’ al-qabûl, i.e. prime matter) through which receptivity subsists, they are also applied to the source of action (mabda’ al-fi’l), as in the case of the faculties of the soul (al-quwâ alnafsâniyyah), by which are meant the ‘sources’ of the soul’s properties, such as sight, hearing, imagination, etc., and the natural forces (such as gravity), which are ‘sources’ of natural phenomena. This active quwwah (al-quwwah al-fâ’iliyyah) when accompanied with knowledge and will is called qudrat al-hayawân (vital power), which is an efficient cause that stands in need of external factors, such as the presence of receptive matter and proper implements of action, etc., for the completion of its causal efficiency and necessitation of action by it. When these are all present, it becomes a complete cause on whose presence the action becomes necessary. The following points become clear in the light of the above discussion.
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(i) The first point is the incorrectness of the definition advanced by some theologians for ‘power’ (qudrah) as something in whose presence the execution of an action or its omission is possible. For the execution of an action or its omission is contingent on the agent when the agent is only part of the complete cause, so that the action is not necessitated by the agent alone but through its agency as well as that of the remaining factors which make up the complete cause together. However, an agent whose efficiency is complete is a complete cause, as in the case of the exalted Necessary Being. Hence it is meaningless to characterize with contingency such an agent and its action or omission of action (i.e. to say that an agent that is a complete cause of its action may or may not carry out the action). The necessary character of its action does not imply that the agent is compelled to carry it out and that it has no power over its own action; for this necessity, which inheres in the action, derives from the agent itself. The action is the agent’s effect and cannot compel it to action, nor is there any other agent that may influence it and compel it to carry out the action. (ii) It makes evident the invalidity of the view advanced by some theologians that the contingency of an action depends on its being preceded by temporal non-existence (al-’adam al-zamânî); hence an action that is not preceded by temporal non-existence is impossible. This view is based on the belief that the reason for a thing’s need for a cause is its coming into existence (hudûts), not its contingency (imkân). We have refuted this belief earlier’ and proved that the reason for the need for a cause is contingency, not hudûts. Moreover, their theory is invalidated by the instance of time itself (which is not hâdits). (iii) It discloses the invalidity of the view advanced by those theologians who have held that ‘power’ emerges along with action and that there is no power for an action prior to it. The inconsistency of this view is made evident by the fact that they themselves define ‘power’ as ‘the capacity to act or not to act.’ Now, if the agent ceases the action for some time to resume it, it would be right to ascribe to it the capacity to act or not to act before the resumption of action. This is what ‘power’ is according to their definition.
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اﻟﻤﺮﺣﻠﺔ اﻟﺤﺎدﻳﺔ ﻋﺸﺮ ﻓﻲ اﻟﻌﻠﻢ و اﻟﻌﺎﻟﻢ و اﻟﻤﻌﻠﻮم ﻗﺪ ﺗﺤﺼﻞ ﻣﻤﺎ ﺗﻘﺪم أن اﻟﻤﻮﺟﻮد ﻳﻨﻘﺴﻢ إﻟﻰ ﻣﺎ ﺑﺎﻟﻘﻮة و ﻣﺎ ﺑﺎﻟﻔﻌﻞ و اﻷول ﻫﻮ اﻟﻤﺎدة و اﻟﻤﺎدﻳﺎت و اﻟﺜﺎﻧﻲ ﻏﻴﺮﻫﻤﺎ و ﻫﻮ اﻟﻤﺠﺮد و ﻣﻤﺎ ﻳﻌﺮض اﻟﻤﺠﺮد ﻋﺮوﺿﺎ أوﻟﻴﺎ أن ﻳﻜﻮن ﻛﻤﺎ ﺳﻴﺠﻲ ﻋﻠﻤﺎ و ﻋﺎﻟﻤﺎ و ﻣﻌﻠﻮﻣﺎ ﻷن اﻟﻌﻠﻢ ء ﺑﻴﺎﻧﻪ ﺣﻀﻮر وﺟﻮد ﻣﺠﺮد ﻟﻮﺟﻮد ﻣﺠﺮد ﻓﻤﻦ اﻟﺤﺮي أن ﻧﺒﺤﺚ ﻋﻦ ذﻟﻚ ﻓﻲ اﻟﻔﻠﺴﻔﺔ اﻷوﻟﻰ . و ﻓﻴﻬﺎ اﺛﻨﺎ ﻋﺸﺮ ﻓﺼﻼ CHAPTER ELEVEN: Knowledge, Knower, and the Known In the last chapter we saw that existence is divided into that which has potentiality and that which has (absolute) actuality, and that the former consists of matter and material things and the latter of immaterial (mujarrad) existents. Of the primary (i.e. essential) accidents of immaterial being is to be knowledge, knower, and known. For knowledge, as will be explained later on, consists of the presence (hudhûr) of an immaterial existent for another immaterial existent. Accordingly, it is proper to discuss it in metaphysics. 12 Units
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اﻟﻔﺼﻞ اﻷول ﻓﻲ ﺗﻌﺮﻳﻒ اﻟﻌﻠﻢ و اﻧﻘﺴﺎﻣﻪ اﻷوﻟﻰ ﻛﺬﻟﻚ ﻣﻔﻬﻮﻣﻪ ﻋﻨﺪﻧﺎ و إﳕﺎ ﻧﺮﻳﺪ ﰲ ﻫﺬا اﻟﻔﺼﻞ ﻣﻌﺮﻓﺔ ﻣﺎ ﻫﻮ ﺣﺼﻮل اﻟﻌﻠﻢ ﻟﻨﺎ ﺿﺮوري و .ﺎT أﻇﻬﺮ ﺧﻮاﺻﻪ ﻟﻨﻤﻴﺰ -ﺎ ﻣﺼﺎدﻳﻘﻪ و ﺧﺼﻮﺻﻴﺎ ﻓﻨﻘﻮل : ﻗﺪ ﺗﻘﺪم ﰲ ﲝﺚ اﻟﻮﺟﻮد اﻟﺬﻫﲏ أن ﻟﻨﺎ ﻋﻠﻤﺎ ﺑﺎﻷﻣﻮر اﳋﺎرﺟﺔ ﻋﻨﺎ ﰲ اﳉﻤﻠﺔ ﲟﻌﲎ 5أ ﺎ اﳋﺎرﺟﻴﺔ اﻟﱵ ﺗﱰﺗﺐ ﻋﻠﻴﻬﺎ اﻵﺛﺎر ﻓﻬﺬا T ﺎ ﻻ ﺑﻮﺟﻮدا T ﺎ ﲢﺼﻞ ﻟﻨﺎ و ﲢﻀﺮ ﻋﻨﺪﻧﺎ ﲟﺎﻫﻴﺎ ﻗﺴﻢ ﻣﻦ اﻟﻌﻠﻢ و ﻳﺴﻤﻰ ﻋﻠﻤﺎ ﺣﺼﻮﻟﻴﺎ. و ﻣﻦ اﻟﻌﻠﻢ : ﻋﻠﻢ اﻟﻮاﺣﺪ ﻣﻨﺎ ﺑﺬاﺗﻪ اﻟﱵ ﻳﺸﲑ إﻟﻴﻬﺎ ﺑﺄﻧﺎ ﻓﺈﻧﻪ ﻻ ﻳﻐﻔﻞ ﻋﻦ ﻧﻔﺴﻪ ﰲ ﺣﺎل ﻣﻦ اﻷﺣﻮال ﺳﻮاء ﰲ ذﻟﻚ اﳋﻼء و اﳌﻼء و اﻟﻨﻮم و اﻟﻴﻘﻈﺔ ى و أﻳﺔ ﺣﺎل أﺧﺮ. و ﻟﻴﺲ ذﻟﻚ ﲝﻀﻮر ﻣﺎﻫﻴﺔ ذاﺗﻨﺎ ﻋﻨﺪﻧﺎ ﺣﻀﻮرا ﻣﻔﻬﻮﻣﻴﺎ و ﻋﻠﻤﺎ ﺣﺼﻮﻟﻴﺎ ﻷن اﳌﻔﻬﻮم ﻛﺜﲑﻳﻦ و إﳕﺎ ﻳﺘﺸﺨﺺ ﺑﺎﻟﻮﺟﻮد اﳋﺎرﺟﻲ ﻛﻴﻔﻤﺎ ﻓﺮض ﻻ ﻳﺄﰉ اﻟﺼﺪق ﻋﻠﻰ اﳊﺎﺿﺮ ﰲ اﻟﺬﻫﻦ و ﻫﺬا اﻟﺬي ﻧﺸﺎﻫﺪﻩ ﻣﻦ أﻧﻔﺴﻨﺎ و ﻧﻌﱪ ﻋﻨﻪ ﺑﺄﻧﺎ أﻣﺮ ﺷﺨﺼﻲ ﻟﺬاﺗﻪ ﻻ ﻳﻘﺒﻞ اﻟﺸﺮﻛﺔ و اﻟﺘﺸﺨﺺ ﺷﺄن اﻟﻮﺟﻮد ﻓﻌﻠﻤﻨﺎ ﺑﺬواﺗﻨﺎ إﳕﺎ ﻫﻮ ﲝﻀﻮرﻫﺎ ﻟﻨﺎ ﺑﻮﺟﻮدﻫﺎ اﳋﺎرﺟﻲ اﻟﺬي ﻫﻮ ﻣﻼك اﻟﺸﺨﺼﻴﺔ و ﺗﺮﺗﺐ اﻵﺛﺎر و ﻫﺬا ﻗﺴﻢ آﺧﺮ ﻣﻦ اﻟﻌﻠﻢ و ﻳﺴﻤﻰ اﻟﻌﻠﻢ اﳊﻀﻮري. و ﻫﺬان ﻗﺴﻤﺎن ﻳﻨﻘﺴﻢ إﻟﻴﻬﻤﺎ اﻟﻌﻠﻢ ﻗﺴﻤﺔ ﺣﺎﺻﺮة ﻓﺈن ﺣﺼﻮل اﳌﻌﻠﻮم ﻟﻠﻌﺎﱂ : إﻣﺎ ﲟﺎﻫﻴﺘﻪ أو ﺑﻮﺟﻮدﻩ و اﻷول ﻫﻮ اﻟﻌﻠﻢ اﳊﺼﻮﱄ و ي اﻟﺜﺎﱐ ﻫﻮ اﻟﻌﻠﻢ اﳊﻀﻮر. ﻛﻮن اﻟﻌﻠﻢ ﺣﺎﺻﻼ ﻟﻨﺎ ﻣﻌﻨﺎﻩ ﺣﺼﻮل اﳌﻌﻠﻮم ﻟﻨﺎ ﻷن اﻟﻌﻠﻢ ﻋﲔ اﳌﻌﻠﻮم ﺑﺎﻟﺬات إذ ﻻ ﰒ إن ﻧﻌﲏ ﺑﺎﻟﻌﻠﻢ إﻻ ﺣﺼﻮل اﳌﻌﻠﻮم ﻟﻨﺎ و ﺣﺼﻮل اﻟﺸﻲ ء و ﺣﻀﻮرﻩ ﻟﻴﺲ إﻻ وﺟﻮدﻩ و وﺟﻮدﻩ ﻧﻔﺴﻪ. ﻛﺎن ﻣﻌﻠ و ﻻ ﻣﻌﲎ ﳊﺼﻮل اﳌﻌﻠﻮم ﻟﻠﻌﺎﱂ إﻻ اﲢﺎد اﻟﻌﺎﱂ ﻣﻌﻪ ﺳﻮاء ﻮﻣﺎ ﺣﻀﻮرﻳﺎ أو ﻛﺎن وﺟﻮدﻩ ﻟﻨﻔﺴﻪ و ﻫﻮ ﻣﻊ ذﻟﻚ ﻛﺎن ﺟﻮﻫﺮا ﻗﺎﺋﻤﺎ ﺑﻨﻔﺴﻪ ﺣﺼﻮﻟﻴﺎ ﻓﺈن اﳌﻌﻠﻮم اﳊﻀﻮري إن ﻛﺎن أﻣﺮا وﺟﻮدﻩ ﳌﻮﺿﻮﻋﻪ و اﳌﻔﺮوض أن وﺟﻮدﻩ ﻟﻠﻌﺎﱂ ﻟﻠﻌﺎﱂ ﻓﻘﺪ اﲢﺪ اﻟﻌﺎﱂ ﻣﻊ ﻧﻔﺴﻪ و إن ج ﻣﻨﻪ ﻓﻘﺪ اﲢﺪ اﻟﻌﺎﱂ ﻣﻊ ﻣﻮﺿﻮﻋﻪ و اﻟﻌﺮض أﻳﻀﺎ ﻣﻦ ﻣﺮاﺗﺐ وﺟﻮد ﻣﻮﺿﻮﻋﻪ ﻏﲑ ﺧﺎر ﻓﻜﺬﻟ ﻛﺎن ﺟﻮﻫﺮا ﻛﺬا اﳌﻌﻠﻮم اﳊﺼﻮﱄ ﻣﻮﺟﻮد ﻟﻠﻌﺎﱂ ﺳﻮاء ﻚ ﻣﻊ ﻣﺎ اﲢﺪ ﻣﻊ ﻣﻮﺿﻮﻋﻪ و ﻛﻮﻧﻪ ﻣﻮﺟﻮدا ﻟﻠﻌﺎﱂ اﲢﺎد اﻟﻌﺎﱂ ﻣﻌﻪ ﻣﻮﺟﻮدا ﻟﻨﻔﺴﻪ أو أﻣﺮا ﻣﻮﺟﻮدا ﻟﻐﲑﻩ و ﻻزم . ﻋﻠﻰ :ﻲ أﻧﻪ ﺳﻴﺠ ﺔ ء أن اﻟﻌﻠﻢ اﳊﺼﻮﱄ ﻋﻠﻢ ﺣﻀﻮري ﰲ اﳊﻘﻴﻘ. ﻛﻴ ﻛﻞ ﺣﺼﻮل ﻓﺤﺼﻮل اﻟﻌﻠﻢ ﻟﻠﻌﺎﱂ ﻣﻦ ﺧﻮاص اﻟﻌﻠﻢ ﻟﻜﻦ ﻻ ﻛﺎن ﺑﻞ ﺣﺼﻮل أﻣﺮ ﻒ ﺑﺎﻟﻔﻌﻞ ﻓﻌﻠﻴﺔ ﳏﻀﺔ ﻻ ﻗﻮة ﻓﻴﻪ ﻟﺸﻲ ء ﻣﻄﻠﻘﺎ ﻓﺈﻧﺎ ﻧﺸﺎﻫﺪ ﺑﺎﻟﻮﺟﺪان أن اﳌﻌﻠﻮم ﻣﻦ ﺣﻴﺚ ﻫﻮ
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ﻣﻌﻠﻮم ﻻ ﻳﻘﻮى ﻋﻠﻰ ﺷﻲ ء آﺧﺮ و ﻻ ﻳﻘﺒﻞ اﻟﺘﻐﲑ ﻋﻤﺎ ﻫﻮ ﻋﻠﻴﻪ ﻓﻬﻮ ﺣﺼﻮل أﻣﺮ ﳎﺮد ﻋﻦ اﳌﺎدة ﺧﺎل ﻣﻦ ﻏﻮاﺷﻲ اﻟﻘﻮة و ﻧﺴﻤﻲ ذﻟﻚ ﺣﻀﻮرا. ﻛﻮﻧﻪ أﻣﺮا ﺗﺎﻣﺎ ﻓﺤﻀﻮر اﳌﻌﻠﻮم ﻳﺴﺘﺪﻋﻲ ﰲ ﻓﻌﻠﻴﺘﻪ ﻣﻦ ﻏﲑ ﺗﻌﻠﻖ ﺑﺎﳌﺎدة و اﻟﻘﻮة ﻳﻮﺟﺐ ﻛﻤﺎﻻﺗﻪ اﻟﱵ ﺑﺎﻟﻘﻮة ﻧﻘﺼﻪ و ﻋﺪم ﲤﺎﻣﻪ ﻣﻦ ﺣﻴﺚ . و ﻣﻘﺘﻀﻰ ﺣﻀﻮر اﳌﻌﻠﻮم أن ﻳﻜﻮن اﻟﻌﺎﱂ اﻟﺬي ﳛﺼﻞ ﻟﻪ اﻟﻌﻠﻢ أﻣﺮا ﻓﻌﻠﻴﺎ ﺗﺎم اﻟﻔﻌﻠﻴﺔ ﻏﲑ ﻛﻮن اﻟﻌﺎﱂ ﳎﺮدا ﻋﻦ اﳌﺎدة ﺧﺎﻟﻴﺎ ﻋﻦ اﻟﻘﻮة ﻧﺎﻗﺺ ﻣﻦ ﺟﻬﺔ اﻟﺘﻌﻠﻖ ﺑﺎﻟﻘﻮة و ﻫﻮ . ﻓﻘﺪ ﺑﺎن :أن ﻛﺎن اﳊﺎﺻﻞ ﻋﲔ ﻣﺎ ﺣﺼﻞ ﻟﻪ اﻟﻌﻠﻢ ﺣﻀﻮر ﻣﻮﺟﻮد ﳎﺮد ﳌﻮﺟﻮد ﳎﺮد ﺳﻮاء ﻛﻤﺎ ﰲ ﻋﻠﻢ اﻟﺸﻲ ﻲ ﻛﻤﺎ ﰲ ﻋﻠﻢ اﻟﺸ ء ﺑﻨﻔﺴﻪ أو ﻏﲑﻩ ﺑﻮﺟﻪ ﻪ ء ﺑﺎﳌﺎﻫﻴﺎت اﳋﺎرﺟﺔ ﻋﻨ. و ﺗﺒﲔ أﻳﻀﺎ أوﻻ : أن اﳌﻌﻠﻮم اﻟﺬي ﻫﻮ ﻣﺘﻌﻠﻖ اﻟﻌﻠﻢ ﳚﺐ أن ﻳﻜﻮن أﻣﺮا ﳎﺮدا ﻋﻦ اﳌﺎدة و ﺳﻴﺠﻲ ء ﻣﻌﲎ ﺗﻌﻠﻖ اﻟﻌﻠﻢ ﺑﺎﻷﻣﻮ ﺔ ر اﳌﺎدﻳ. و ﺛﺎﻧﻴﺎ :ﺎ أن اﻟﻌﺎﱂ اﻟﺬي ﻳﻘﻮم ﺑﻪ اﻟﻌﻠﻢ ﳚﺐ أن ﻳﻜﻮن ﳎﺮدا ﻋﻦ اﳌﺎدة أﻳﻀ.
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11.l. DEFINITION OF KNOWLEDGE AND ITS FIRST DIVISIONS That we acquire a ‘knowledge’ of things is self-evident, and so is the concept of it. In this section our purpose is to identify its salient properties in order to differentiate between its various forms and their characteristics. It was stated in the discussion on mental existence that we possess a certain knowledge of external things, in the sense that we cognize them and they are present for us with their quiddities , though not with their external existence and its accompanying external properties. This is one of the kinds of knowledge, called ‘mediated knowledge’ (‘ilm hushûlî, lit. acquired knowledge). Another kind of knowledge is the knowledge that each of us has of his own self, to which he refers as his ‘I’ One cannot fail to be conscious of his own self in any circumstance, in solitude or in company, in sleep or in wakefulness, or in any other state. This consciousness is not by virtue of the presence of the quiddity of the self for us; it is not present as a concept, or known through mediated knowledge. That is because a mental concept, of whatever kind, is always capable of corresponding to a multiplicity of objects, and [when considered as referring to a particular object] its individuality is only due to the external existent [to which it corresponds]. Now what we cognize in relation to ourselves – i.e., what we refer to as ‘I’ – is something essentially individuated, incapable of corresponding to multiple things. Individuality is a property of existence; hence our knowledge of our selves is by virtue of their presence for us with their very external existence, which is the ground of individuation and external properties. This is another kind of knowledge, called ‘immediate’ knowledge (‘Ilm hudhûrî, lit., ‘knowledge by presence’). These two divisions of knowledge are exhaustive, for the cognition of the known by the knower is either through the former’s quiddity or by its existence. The first is ‘mediated’ and the second is ‘immediate’ knowledge. Furthermore, attainment of knowledge means apprehension (hushûl) of the known by the knower; for knowledge is identical with that which is known by itself, because we do not mean anything by knowledge except the apprehension of the known by us. The apprehension of a thing and its presence is nothing except its existence, and its existence is itself. The apprehension of the known by the knower does not mean anything except its union (ittihâd) with the knower, whether the known is immediate or mediated. Thus if the immediately known is a substance subsisting by itself, its existence is for-itself (wujûd li nafsihi) while at the same time it is for-the-knower, and hence the knower is united with it. If the immediately known is something existent-for-its-subject, as the known’s existence is existence-for-the-knower, the knower is united with its subject. Moreover, an accident is one of the planes of the existence of its subject, no-something extraneous to it. Hence it is likewise in relation to something united with its subject. Similarly, the mediated known is existent-for-the-knower, irrespective of whether it is a substance existing-for-itself or something existent-for-other-than-itself. An implication of its existence for the knower is the knower’s union with it.
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This is because, as will be explained later on,’ mediated knowledge in fact involves immediate knowledge. Accordingly, apprehension (hushûl) by the knower is a property of knowledge, though not every kind of apprehension, but an apprehension of something that is in pure actuality and absolutely devoid of all potentiality. That is because we know intuitively that the known qua known has no potentiality to become another thing; it is not susceptible to change, nor can it become something diet than what it is. Accordingly, it involves the apprehension of something that is immaterial and free from all traces of potentiality. This we call ‘immediacy’ (hudhûr, lit. ‘presence’). The immediacy of the known requires it to be something possessing complete actuality, free from any association with matter and potentiality that may make it deficient and incomplete in relation to its potential perfections. Further, the immediacy of the known requires that the knower rearing its knowledge should also possess complete actuality, not being deficient in any respect arising from association with matter. Hence, the knower is also immaterial and free from potentiality. From the above discussion it becomes clear that knowledge is the ‘presence’ of an immaterial existent for an immaterial existent, nether what is apprehended is the same as that which apprehends – as in the case of a thing’s knowledge of itself- – or is something else, as in the case of thing’s knowledge of quiddities external to it. It also becomes clear, in the first place, that the known, to which knowledge pertains, must necessarily be something immaterial. The meaning of knowledge of material things shall be explained below. Second, the knower, through whom knowledge subsists, must also necessarily be immaterial.
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ﻛﻠﻲ و ﺟﺰﺋﻲ اﻟﻔﺼﻞ اﻟﺜﺎﻧﻲ ﻳﻨﻘﺴﻢ اﻟﻌﻠﻢ اﻟﺤﺼﻮﻟﻲ إﻟﻰ ﻛﺎﻟﻌﻠﻢ ﲟﺎﻫﻴﺔ اﻹﻧﺴﺎن و ﻳﺴﻤﻰ ﻋﻘﻼ و ﻛﺜﲑﻳﻦ و اﻟﻜﻠﻲ ﻣﺎ ﻻ ﳝﺘﻨﻊ ﻓﺮض ﺻﺪﻗﻪ ﻋﻠﻰ ﺗﻌﻘﻼ و اﳉﺰﺋﻲ ﻣﺎ ﳝﺘﻨﻊ ﻓﺮض ﺻﺪﻗﻪ ﻛﺎﻟﻌﻠﻢ -ﺬا اﻹﻧﺴﺎن ﺑﻨﻮع ﻣﻦ اﻻﺗﺼﺎل ﻛﺜﲑﻳﻦ ﻋﻠﻰ ﻛﺎﻟﻌﻠﻢ ﺑﺎﻹﻧﺴﺎن اﻟﻔﺮد ﻣﻦ ﻏﲑ ﺣﻀﻮر ﻣﺎدﺗﻪ و ﲟﺎدﺗﻪ اﳊﺎﺿﺮة و ﻳﺴﻤﻰ ﻋﻠﻤﺎ إﺣﺴﺎﺳﻴﺎ و ﻛﺜﲑﻳﻦ إﳕﺎ ﻫﻮ ﻣﻦ ﺟﻬﺔ اﺗﺼﺎل ﻳﺴﻤﻰ ﻋﻠﻤﺎ ﺧﻴﺎﻟﻴﺎ و ﻋﺪ ﻫﺬﻳﻦ اﻟﻘﺴﻤﲔ ﳑﺘﻨﻊ اﻟﺼﺪق ﻋﻠﻰ أدوات اﻹﺣﺴﺎس ﺑﺎﳌﻌﻠﻮم اﳋﺎرﺟﻲ ﰲ اﻟﻌﻠﻢ اﻹﺣﺴﺎﺳﻲ و ﺗﻮﻗﻒ اﻟﻌﻠﻢ اﳋﻴﺎﱄ ﻋﻠﻰ اﻟﻌﻠﻢ ﻛﺜﲑﻳﻦ ﻛﻴﻔﻤﺎ ﻓﺮﺿﺖ ﻻ ﺗﺄﰉ أن ﺗﺼﺪق ﻋﻠﻰ اﻹﺣﺴﺎﺳﻲ و إﻻ ﻓﺎﻟﺼﻮرة اﻟﺬﻫﻨﻴﺔ . و اﻟﻘﺴﻤﺎن ﲨﻴﻌﺎ ﳎﺮدان ﻋﻦ اﳌﺎدة ﳌﺎ ﺗﻘﺪم : ﺎ و ﻋﺪم T ﻣﻦ ﻓﻌﻠﻴﺔ اﻟﺼﻮرة اﻟﻌﻠﻤﻴﺔ ﰲ ذا ﻗﺒﻮﳍﺎ ﻟﻠﺘﻐﲑ. و أﻳﻀﺎ : ﻛﺜﲑ ﻛﻴﻔﻤﺎ ﻓﺮﺿﺖ ﻻ ﲤﺘﻨﻊ ﻋﻦ اﻟﺼﺪق ﻋﻠﻰ اﻟﺼﻮرة اﻟﻌﻠﻤﻴﺔ ﻛﻞ أﻣﺮ ﻣﺎدي ﻳﻦ و ﻣﺘﺸﺨﺺ ﳑﺘﻨﻊ اﻟﺼﺪق ﻋﻠﻰ أزﻳﺪ ﻣﻦ ﺷﺨﺺ واﺣﺪ. و أﻳﻀﺎ : ء ﻛﺎﻧﺖ اﻟﺼﻮرة اﳊﺴﻴﺔ أو اﳋﻴﺎﻟﻴﺔ ﻣﺎدﻳﺔ ﻣﻨﻄﺒﻌﺔ ﺑﻨﻮع ﻣﻦ اﻻﻧﻄﺒﺎع ﰲ ﺟﺰ ﻟﻮ ﻛﺬﻟﻚ ﻓﺎﻟﻌﻠﻢ ﻻ ﻳﻘﺒﻞ ﺑﺪﱐ ﻟﻜﺎﻧﺖ ﻣﻨﻘﺴﻤﺔ ﺑﺎﻧﻘﺴﺎم ﳏﻠﻬﺎ و ﻟﻜﺎن ﰲ ﻣﻜﺎن و زﻣﺎن و ﻟﻴﺲ اﻟﻘﺴﻤﺔ و ﻻ ﻳﺸﺎر إﻟﻴﻪ إﺷﺎرة وﺿﻌﻴﺔ ﻣﻜﺎﻧﻴﺔ و ﻻ أﻧﻪ ﻣﻘﻴﺪ ﺑﺰﻣﺎن ﻟﺼﺤﺔ ﺗﺼﻮرﻧﺎ اﻟﺼﻮرة ﻛﺎﻧﺖ ﻣﻘﻴﺪة ﻛﺎﻧﺖ ﻋﻠﻴﻪ ﻣﻦ ﻏﲑ ﺗﻐﲑ ﻓﻴﻬﺎ و ﻟﻮ اﶈﺴﻮﺳﺔ ﰲ وﻗﺖ ﺑﻌﺪ أﻣﺪ ﺑﻌﻴﺪ ﻋﻠﻰ ﻣﺎ ﺑﺎﻟﺰﻣﺎن ﻟﺘﻐﲑت ﺑﺘﻘﻀﻴﻪ. و ﻣﺎ ﻳﺘﻮﻫﻢ : ﻣﻦ ﻣﻘﺎرﻧﺔ ﺣﺼﻮل اﻟﻌﻠﻢ ﻟﻠﺰﻣﺎن إﳕﺎ ﻫﻮ ﻣﻘﺎرﻧﺔ ﺷﺮاﺋﻂ ﺣﺼﻮل اﻻﺳﺘﻌﺪاد ﻟﻪ ﻻ ﻧﻔﺲ اﻟﻌﻠﻢ. و أﻣﺎ ﺗﻮﺳﻂ أدوات اﳊﺲ ﰲ ﺣﺼﻮل اﻟﺼﻮرة اﶈﺴﻮﺳﺔ و ﺗﻮﻗﻒ اﻟﺼﻮرة اﳋﻴﺎﻟﻴﺔ ﻋﻠﻰ ذﻟﻚ ﻓﺈﳕﺎ ﻫﻮ ﳊﺼﻮل اﻻﺳﺘﻌﺪاد اﳋﺎص ﻟﻠﻨﻔﺲ ﻟﺘﻘﻮى ﺑﻪ ﻋﻠﻰ ﲤﺜﻴﻞ اﻟﺼﻮرة اﻟﻌﻠﻤﻴﺔ و ﺗﻔﺼﻴﻞ اﻟﻘﻮل ﰲ ﻋﻠﻢ اﻟﻨﻔﺲ و ﳑﺎ ﺗﻘﺪم ﻳﻈﻬﺮ أن ﻗﻮﳍﻢ : إن اﻟﺘﻌﻘﻞ إﳕﺎ ﻫﻮ ﺑﺘﻘﺸﲑ اﳌﻌﻠﻮم ﻋﻦ اﳌﺎدة و اﻷﻋﺮاض اﳌﺸﺨﺼﺔ ﻟﻪ ﺣﱴ ﻻ ﻳﺒﻘﻰ ﺮدR ﻛﺎﻹﻧﺴﺎن ا إﻻ اﳌﺎﻫﻴﺔ اﳌﻌﺮاة ﻋﻦ اﻟﻘﺸﻮر ﻋﻦ اﳌﺎدة اﳉﺴﻤﻴﺔ و اﳌﺸﺨﺼﺎت اﻟﺰﻣﺎﻧﻴﺔ و اﳌﻜﺎﻧﻴﺔ و اﻟﻮﺿﻌﻴﺔ و ﻏﲑﻫﺎ ﲞﻼف اﻹﺣﺴﺎس اﳌﺸﺮوط ﲝﻀﻮر اﳌﺎدة و اﻛﺘﻨﺎف اﻷﻋﺮاض و اﳍﻴﺌﺎت اﻟﺸﺨﺼﻴﺔ و اﳋﻴﺎل اﳌﺸﺮوط ﺑﺒﻘﺎء اﻷﻋﺮاض و اﳍﻴﺌﺎت اﳌﺸﺨﺼﺔ ﻣﻦ دون ﺣﻀﻮر اﳌﺎدة ﻗﻮل ﻋﻠﻰ ﺳﺒﻴﻞ اﻟﺘﻤﺜﻴﻞ ﻟﻠﺘﻘﺮﻳﺐ و إﻻ ﻓﺎﶈﺴﻮس ﺻﻮرة ﳎﺮدة ﻋﻠﻤﻴﺔ و اﺷﱰاط ﺣﻀﻮر اﳌﺎدة و اﻻﻛﺘﻨﺎف ﺑﺎﻷﻋﺮاض اﳌﺸﺨﺼﺔ ﻛﺬا اﺷﱰاط اﻻﻛﺘﻨﺎف ﺑﺎﳌﺸﺨﺼﺎت ﻟﻠﺘﺨﻴﻞ و ﳊﺼﻮل اﻻﺳﺘﻌﺪاد ﰲ اﻟﻨﻔﺲ ﻟﻺﺣﺴﺎس و
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ﻛﺬا اﺷﱰاط اﻟﺘﻘﺸﲑ ﰲ اﻟﺘﻌﻘﻞ ﻟﻠﺪﻻﻟﺔ ﻋﻠﻰ اﺷﱰاط ﲣﻴﻞ أزﻳﺪ ﻣﻦ ﻓﺮد واﺣﺪ ﰲ ﺣﺼﻮ ل اﺳﺘﻌﺪاد اﻟﻨﻔﺲ ﻟﺘﻌﻘﻞ اﳌﺎﻫﻴﺔ اﻟﻜﻠﻴﺔ اﳌﻌﱪ ﻋﻨﻪ ﺑﺎﻧﺘﺰاع اﻟﻜﻠﻲ ﻣﻦ اﻷﻓﺮاد. و ﺗﺒﲔ ﳑﺎ ﺗﻘﺪم أﻳﻀﺎ : أن اﻟﻮﺟﻮد ﻳﻨﻘﺴﻢ ﻣﻦ ﺣﻴﺚ اﻟﺘﺠﺮد ﻋﻦ اﳌﺎدة و ﻋﺪﻣﻪ إﱃ ﺛﻼﺛﺔ ﻛﻠﻴﺔ أﺣﺪﻫﺎ ﻋﺎﱂ اﳌﺎدة و اﻟﻘﻮة و اﻟﺜﺎﱐ ﻋﺎﱂ اﻟﺘﺠﺮد ﻋﻦ اﳌﺎدة دون آﺛﺎرﻫﺎ ﻣﻦ اﻟﺸﻜﻞ ﻋﻮاﱂ
و اﳌﻘﺪار و اﻟﻮ ﺎ اﻟﻜﻤﺎﻟﻴﺔ ﻣﻦ ﻏﲑ T ﺿﻊ و ﻏﲑﻫﺎ ﻓﻔﻴﻪ اﻟﺼﻮر اﳉﺴﻤﺎﻧﻴﺔ و أﻋﺮاﺿﻬﺎ و ﻫﻴﺌﺎ خ ﺑﲔ ﻋﺎﱂ اﻟﻌﻘﻞ و ﻋﺎﱂ اﳌﺎدة و ﻣﺎدة ﲢﻤﻞ اﻟﻘﻮة و اﻻﻧﻔﻌﺎل و ﻳﺴﻤﻰ ﻋﺎﱂ اﳌﺜﺎل و اﻟﱪز اﻟﺜﺎﻟﺚ ﻋﺎﱂ اﻟﺘﺠﺮد ﻋﻦ اﳌﺎدة و آﺛﺎرﻫﺎ و ﻳﺴﻤﻰ ﻋﺎﱂ اﻟﻌﻘﻞ. و ﻗﺪ ﻗﺴﻤﻮا ﻋﺎﱂ اﳌﺜﺎل إﱃ :ﻘ اﳌﺜﺎل اﻷﻋﻈﻢ اﻟ ﺎﺋﻢ ﺑﺬاﺗﻪ و اﳌﺜﺎل اﻷﺻﻐﺮ اﻟﻘﺎﺋﻢ ﺑﺎﻟﻨﻔﺲ ﻛﻴﻒ ﺗﺸﺎء ﲝﺴﺐ اﻟﺪواﻋﻲ اﳌﺨﺘﻠﻔﺔ اﳊﻘﺔ و اﳉﺰاﻓﻴﺔ ﻓﺘﺄﰐ أﺣﻴﺎﻧﺎ اﻟﺬي ﺗﺘﺼﺮف ﻓﻴﻪ اﻟﻨﻔﺲ ﺑﺼﻮر ﺣﻘﺔ ﺻﺎﳊﺔ و أﺣﻴﺎﻧﺎ ﺑﺼﻮر ﺟﺰاﻓﻴﺔ ﺗﻌﺒﺚ -ﺎ. و اﻟﻌﻮاﱂ اﻟﺜﻼﺛﺔ اﳌﺬﻛﻮرة ﻣﱰﺗﺒﺔ ﻃﻮﻻ :ﻣ ﻓﺄﻋﻼﻫﺎ ﻣﺮﺗﺒﺔ و أﻗﻮاﻫﺎ و أﻗﺪﻣﻬﺎ وﺟﻮدا و أﻗﺮ-ﺎ ﻦ ﺎ ﻋﻦ ﺷﻮب اﳌﺎدة و اﻟﻘﻮة و T ﺮدة ﻟﺘﻤﺎم ﻓﻌﻠﻴﺘﻬﺎ و ﺗﻨﺰﻩ ذوا R اﳌﺒﺪإ اﻷول ﺗﻌﺎﱃ ﻋﺎﱂ اﻟﻌﻘﻮل ا ﻛﻞ ﻧﻘﺺ و ﺷﺮ و ﻻ ﻳﻠﻴﻪ ﻋﺎﱂ اﳌﺜﺎل اﳌﺘﻨﺰﻩ ﻋﻦ اﳌﺎدة دون آﺛﺎرﻫﺎ و ﻳﻠﻴﻪ ﻋﺎﱂ اﳌﺎدة ﻣﻮﻃﻦ ﻳﺘﻌﻠﻖ ﲟﺎ ﻓﻴﻪ ﻋﻠﻢ إﻻ ﻣﻦ ﺟﻬﺔ ﻣﺎ ﳛﺎذﻳﻪ ﻣﻦ اﳌﺜﺎل و اﻟﻌﻘﻞ.
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11.2. THE DIVISION OF MEDIATED KNOWLEDGE INTO UNIVERSAL AND PARTICULAR A universal (kullî) is that which is capable of corresponding to a multiplicity of instances, such as the knowledge of the quiddity of man. This kind of knowledge is called ‘aql or ta’aqqul (intellection). A particular (juz’î) is that which is incapable of corresponding to a multiplicity of things, such as the knowledge of a particular person with some kind of association with a present matter, which called ‘sensory’ knowledge (al-’ilm al-ihsâsî), or the knowledge a human individual without there being any present matter. The latter kind is called ‘imaginary’ knowledge (al-’ilm al-khâyalî). These two kinds are considered incapable of corresponding to a multiplicity of referents only from the aspect of connection between the sense organs and the external object of knowledge, in the ca, of sensory knowledge, and for the reason of dependence ‘imaginary’ knowledge on sensory knowledge. Otherwise. the mental impression itself (al-shûrat al-dzihniyyah), of whatever kind not incapable of corresponding to a multiplicity of objects. On the basis of that which has been said above, both kinds are immaterial due to the essential actuality of the cognitive form (al-shûrat al-’ilmiyyah) and its being unsusceptible to change. Also, the cognitive form, of whatever kind, is not incapable of corresponding to a multiplicity of objects; anything that is mater and individuated is incapable of corresponding to more than one individual. Furthermore, had the sensory or the imaginal form been something material, impressed in some manner in a part of the body, would have been divisible due to the divisibility of its location and would have been in space and time. However, such is not the case. Hence knowledge is neither susceptible to division nor capable of attribution to a physical location. Also, it is not subject to time, for a sensory form cognized at a certain time remains valid and unchanged even after the passage of a long period of time and had it been time-bound it would change with the passage time. There has been a misconception arising from the contiguity the acquisition of knowledge to time. This contiguity (muqâranah) merely relates to the conditions for the attainment of the potential (isti’dâd) for receiving knowledge, not to knowledge itself. As for the mediating role of the sense organs in the apprehension of the sensible form and the dependence of the imaginary form on it, that merely pertains to the attainment of a specific capacity in the soul enabling it to evoke the cognitive form. T related details are to be found in works on traditional psychology (‘ilm al-nafs). There is a theory according to which the formation of concepts occurs through a process in which the known object is divested of matter and its characteristic material accidents, until there remains nothing except a quiddity stripped of its material shell (e.g. the concept of man stripped of all physical matter and its accompanying characteristics relating to time, space, position, and so on). This process is different from sense perception, wherein matter and its accompanying accidents and individuating features are present. It is also different from imagination, wherein the accidents associated with matter and its individuating features survive without the
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presence of matter itself. However, from the above discussion it becomes clear that such a theory can be justified only as a metaphorical aid to understanding. Otherwise, the perceived form is also immaterial; the requirement of the presence of matter and its accompanying individuating accidents is in order to prepare the soul for perception. The same applies to the requirement of accompanying particular features in imagination, as well as the requirement of ‘divesting’ in conception, wherein the imagination of more than an individual prepares the soul for conceiving the universal quiddity – a process referred to as ‘the abstraction of the universal from individuals.’ From what has been said it also becomes clear that existence is divisible into three realms in respect of freedom from matter and its absence. One of them is the world of matter and potentiality. The second realm is the one in which matter is absent, though not some of its properties such as shape, quantity, position, etc. It contains physical forms and their accidents and features of perfection without the presence of any matter possessing potentiality and passivity. It is called the ‘imaginal’ or the ‘intermediate’ world (‘âlam al-mitsâl, or al-barzakh), which lies between the world of the Intellect (‘âlam al-’aql) and the world of matter (‘âlam al-mâddah). The third is the immaterial world (‘âlam al-tajarrud), which is absolutely free from matter and its properties. It is called the world of the Intellect (‘âlam al-’aql). The metaphysicians have further divided the imaginal world into the ‘macrocosmic’ (or objective) imaginal world (al-mitsâl al-a’zham), which is a self-subsisting realm by itself, and the ‘microcosmic’ (or subjective) imaginal world (al-mitsâl al-asghar), which subsists through the soul and governs it in any manner it wishes according to its motives, rightful or extravagant, producing s times real and healthy forms and at other times fantastic form, which the soul creates for the sake of diversion. These three worlds constitute a hierarchy. Amongst them the highest of them in rank and, existentially, the strongest and the prior-most, as well as nearest to the First Source, is the world of the immaterial Intellects (‘âlam al-’uqûl al-mujarradah), due to the completeness of their actuality and freedom of their essences from all traces of matter and potentiality. Below it lies the (macrocosmic or objective) imaginal world, which is free from matter though not some of its properties. Further below is the world o matter, the abode of all deficiency and evil. Knowledge does not pertain to that which is in it except through what corresponds it in the imaginal world and the world of the Intellect.
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ﻛﻠﻲ و ﺟﺰﺋﻲ اﻟﻔﺼﻞ اﻟﺜﺎﻟﺚ ﻳﻨﻘﺴﻢ اﻟﻌﻠﻢ اﻧﻘﺴﺎﻣﺎ آﺧﺮ إﻟﻰ و اﳌﺮاد ﺑﺎﻟﻜﻠﻲ ﻣﺎ ﻻ ﻳﺘﻐﲑ ﺑﺘﻐﲑ ﻛﺼﻮرة اﻟﺒﻨﺎء اﻟﱵ ﻳﺘﺼﻮرﻫﺎ اﻟﺒﻨﺎء ﰲ ﻧﻔﺴﻪ اﳌﻌﻠﻮم ﺑﺎﻟﻌﺮض ﺪم5 ﻟﻴﺒﲎ ﻋﻠﻴﻬﺎ ﻓﺎﻟﺼﻮرة ﻋﻨﺪﻩ ﻋﻠﻰ ﺣﺎﳍﺎ ﻗﺒﻞ اﻟﺒﻨﺎء و ﻣﻊ اﻟﺒﻨﺎء و ﺑﻌﺪ اﻟﺒﻨﺎء و إن ﺧﺮب و ا ﻛﻠﻴﺔ ﻣﻦ ﻫﺬا اﻟﻘﺒﻴﻞ داﺋﻤﺎ و ﻳﺴﻤﻰ ﻋﻠﻢ ﻣﺎ ﻗﺒﻞ اﻟﻜﺜﺮة و اﻟﻌﻠﻮم اﳊﺎﺻﻠﺔ ﻣﻦ ﻃﺮﻳﻖ اﻟﻌﻠﻞ ﻛﻌﻠﻢ اﳌﻨﺠﻢ ﺑﺄن اﻟﻘﻤﺮ ﻣﻨﺨﺴﻒ ﻳﻮم ﻛﺬا ﻳﻌﻮد ﻓﻴﻪ اﻟﻮﺿﻊ اﻟﺴﻤﺎوي ﻛﺬا إﱃ ﻣﺪة ﻛﺬا ﺳﺎﻋﺔ ﲝﻴﺚ ﻳﻮﺟﺐ ﺣﻴﻠﻮﻟﺔ اﻷرض ﺑﻴﻨﻪ و ﺑﲔ اﻟﺸﻤﺲ ﻓﻌﻠﻤﻪ ﺛﺎﺑﺖ ﻋﻠﻰ ﺣﺎﻟﻪ ﻗﺒﻞ اﳋﺴﻮف و ﻣﻌﻪ و ﺑﻌﺪﻩ. و اﳌﺮاد ﺑﺎﳉﺰﺋﻲ : ﻣﺎ ﻳﺘﻐﲑ ﺑﺘﻐﲑ اﳌﻌﻠﻮم ﺑﺎﻟﻌﺮض ﻛﻤﺎ إذا ﻋﻠﻤﻨﺎ ﻣﻦ ﻃﺮﻳﻖ اﻹﺑﺼﺎر ﲝ ﺮﻛﺔ زﻳﺪ ﰒ إذا وﻗﻒ ﻋﻦ اﳊﺮﻛﺔ ﺗﻐﲑت اﻟﺼﻮرة اﻟﻌﻠﻤﻴﺔ ﻣﻦ اﳊﺮﻛﺔ إﱃ اﻟﺴﻜﻮن و ﻳﺴﻤﻰ ﻋﻠﻢ ﻣﺎ ﺑﻌﺪ اﻟﻜﺜﺮة. ﻓﺈن ﻗﻠﺖ : ﻛﻮن اﻟﻌﻠﻮم اﳉﺰﺋﻴﺔ اﻟﺘﻐﲑ ﻻ ﻳﻜﻮن إﻻ ﺑﻘﻮة ﺳﺎﺑﻘﺔ و ﺣﺎﻣﻠﻬﺎ اﳌﺎدة و ﻻزﻣﻪ ﻣﺎدﻳﺔ ﻻ ﳎﺮدة. ﻗﻠﻨﺎ : اﻟﻌﻠﻢ ﺑﺎﻟﺘﻐﲑ ﻏﲑ ﺗﻐﲑ اﻟﻌﻠﻢ و اﳌﺘﻐﲑ ﺛﺎﺑﺖ ﰲ ﺗﻐﲑﻩ ﻻ ﻣﺘﻐﲑ و ﺗﻌﻠﻖ اﻟﻌﻠﻢ ﺑﻪ أﻋﲏ ﺣﻀﻮرﻩ ﻋﻨﺪ اﻟﻌ ﺎﱂ ﻣﻦ ﺣﻴﺚ ﺛﺒﺎﺗﻪ ﻻ ﺗﻐﲑﻩ و إﻻ ﱂ ﻳﻜﻦ ﺣﺎﺿﺮا ﻓﻠﻢ ﻳﻜﻦ اﻟﻌﻠﻢ ﺣﻀﻮر ﺷﻲ ﻲ ء ﻟﺸ ﻒ ء ﻫﺬا ﺧﻠ.
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11.3. ANOTHER DIVISION OF KNOWLEDGE INTO UNIVERSAL AND PARTICULAR That which is meant by ‘universal’ knowledge here is the knowledge that does not change with the accidental object of knowledge (al-ma’lûm bi al’arad). An instance of it is the form of a structure conceived by an architect in order to build an actual one similar to it. The conceived form remains as it was before, during, and after the structure’s construction, even though the actual structure should collapse or be razed to the ground. This kind of knowledge is called ‘knowledge prior to multiplicity’ (‘ilrn mâ qabl al katsrah) The knowledge acquired through the means of universal causes is of this kind, such as an astronomer’s knowledge that lunar eclipse would occur on a certain day at a certain time for certain period during which there would occur an astronomical configuration in which the earth will intervene between the sui and the moon. In this case, his knowledge remains unchanged before, during, and after the eclipse. By ‘particular’ knowledge here is meant the knowledge that changes with the change in the accidental object of knowledge. An example of it is our knowledge obtained through eyesight of Zayd’s movements: when Zayd stops moving, the perceived impression changes from motion to rest. This kind of knowledge is called ‘knowledge posterior to multiplicity’ (‘ilm mâ ba’da al-katsrah). Here someone may say that change does not occur without prior potentiality, which is borne by matter, and that requires that the object of particular knowledge be material, not immaterial. The answer is that knowledge of change is not change of knowledge. The changing object undergoes a fixed course of change, which does not change itself. The knowledge of it – that is, its presence before the knower – is from the aspect of its fixity not its change, for otherwise it would not be present and knowledge would not be the presence of an entity for another entity. This involves a contradiction.
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اﻟﻔﺼﻞ اﻟﺮاﺑﻊ ﻓﻲ أﻧﻮاع اﻟﺘﻌﻘﻞ ذﻛﺮوا أن اﻟﺘﻌﻘﻞ ﻋﻠﻰ ﺛﻼﺛﺔ أﻧﻮاع: أﺣﺪﻫﺎ :ﺷﻲ أن ﻳﻜﻮن اﻟﻌﻘﻞ ﺑﺎﻟﻘﻮة أي ﻻ ﻳﻜﻮن ﺷﻴﺌﺎ ﻣﻦ اﳌﻌﻘﻮﻻت ﺑﺎﻟﻔﻌﻞ و ﻻ ﻟﻪ ء ﻣﻦ اﳌﻌﻘﻮﻻت ﺑﺎﻟﻔﻌﻞ ﳋﻠﻮ اﻟﻨﻔﺲ ﻋﻦ ﻋﺎﻣﺔ اﳌﻌﻘﻮﻻت. اﻟﺜﺎﱐ :ﺑﺎ ﻛﺜﲑة أن ﻳﻌﻘﻞ ﻣﻌﻘﻮﻻ أو ﻣﻌﻘﻮﻻت ﻟﻔﻌﻞ ﳑﻴﺰا ﻟﺒﻌﻀﻬﺎ ﻣﻦ ﺑﻌﺾ ﻣﺮﺗﺒﺎ ﳍﺎ و ﻫﻮ اﻟﻌﻘﻞ اﻟﺘﻔﺼﻴﻠﻲ. اﻟﺜﺎﻟﺚ : ﻛﺜﲑة ﻋﻘﻼ ﺑﺎﻟﻔﻌﻞ ﻣﻦ ﻏﲑ أن ﻳﺘﻤﻴﺰ ﺑﻌﻀﻬﺎ ﻣﻦ ﺑﻌﺾ و إﳕﺎ أن ﻳﻌﻘﻞ ﻣﻌﻘﻮﻻت ﻛﻞ اﻟﺘﻔﺎﺻﻴﻞ و ﻣﺜﻠﻮا ﻟﻪ ﲟﺎ إذا ﺳﺄﻟﻚ ﺳﺎﺋﻞ ﻋﻦ ﻋﺪة ﻣﻦ اﳌﺴﺎﺋﻞ ﻫﻮ ﻋﻘﻞ ﺑﺴﻴﻂ إﲨﺎﱄ ﻓﻴﻪ اﻟﱵ ﻟﻚ ﻋﻠﻢ -ﺎ ﻓﺤﻀﺮك اﳉﻮاب ﰲ اﻟﻮﻗﺖ ﻓﺄﻧﺖ ﰲ أول ﳊﻈﺔ ﺗﺄﺧﺬ ﰲ اﳉﻮاب ﺗﻌﻠﻢ -ﺎ ﲨﻴﻌﺎ ﻋﻠﻤﺎ ﻳﻘﻴﻨﻴﺎ ﺑﺎﻟﻔﻌﻞ ﻟﻜﻦ ﻻ ﲤﻴﺰ ﻟﺒﻌﻀﻬﺎ ﻣﻦ ﺑﻌﺾ و ﻻ ﺗﻔﺼﻴﻞ و إﳕﺎ ﳛﺼﻞ اﻟﺘﻤﻴﺰ و ﻛﺎن ﻣﺎ ﻋﻨﺪك ﻣﻨﺒﻊ ﺗﻨﺒﻊ و ﲡﺮي ﻣﻨﻪ اﻟﺘﻔﺎﺻﻴﻞ و ﻳﺴﻤﻰ ﻋﻘﻼ إﲨﺎﻟﻴﺎ اﻟﺘﻔﺼﻴﻞ ﺑﺎﳉﻮاب .
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11.4. KINDS OF INTELLECTION The metaphysicians mention three kinds of intellection (ta’aqqul). One of them is potential intellection (al-’aql bi al-quwwah), wherein the ‘intellect’ neither actually cognizes the intelligibles, nor does it apprehend any ‘intelligibles in act’ due to the soul’s being devoid of all intelligibles. The second is wherein the intellect intellects one or many intelligibles in act differentiating them from one another and conceiving them in an orderly manner. This is called ‘detailed intellection’ (al-’aql al-tafshîlî). In the third kind of intellection, the mind intellects many intelligibles in act without differentiating them from one another. It is a simple, undifferentiated form of intellection wherein all the details are contained. An example that has been given of it is when one is asked concerning several issues of which one has knowledge. The answer immediately comes to one’s mind. At the very first moment one has the answer wherein one actually knows all of them for certain without sorting them out or their details from one another. The sorting out and the details come only in the process of answering, as if one had a store from which the details flow out. This kind of intellection is called ‘non-differentiated intellection’ (al-’aql al-ijmâlî).
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اﻟﻔﺼﻞ اﻟﺨﺎﻣﺲ ﻓﻲ ﻣﺮاﺗﺐ اﻟﻌﻘﻞ ذﻛﺮوا أن ﻣﺮاﺗﺐ اﻟﻌﻘﻞ أرﺑﻊ: إﺣﺪاﻫﺎ : ﻛﻮﻧﻪ ﺑﺎﻟﻘﻮة ﺑﺎﻟﻨﺴﺒﺔ إﱃ ﲨﻴﻊ اﳌﻌﻘﻮﻻت و ﻳﺴﻤﻰ ﻋﻘﻼ ﻫﻴﻮﻻﻧﻴﺎ ﻟﺸﺒﺎﻫﺘﻪ ﰲ ﺎ ﺑﺎﻟﻘﻮة ﺑﺎﻟﻨﺴﺒﺔ إﱃ ﲨﻴﻊ اﻟﺼﻮر 5ﻛﻮ ﺧﻠﻮﻩ ﻋﻦ اﳌﻌﻘﻮﻻت اﳍﻴﻮﱃ ﰲ و ﺛﺎﻧﻴﺘﻬﺎ : ت و اﻟﻌﻘﻞ ﺑﺎﳌﻠﻜﺔ و ﻫﻲ اﳌﺮﺗﺒﺔ اﻟﱵ ﺗﻌﻘﻞ ﻓﻴﻬﺎ اﻷﻣﻮر اﻟﺒﺪﻳﻬﻴﺔ ﻣﻦ اﻟﺘﺼﻮرا اﻟ ت ﺘﺼﺪﻳﻘﺎت ﻓﺈن ﺗﻌﻠﻖ اﻟﻌﻠﻢ ﺑﺎﻟﺒﺪﻳﻬﻴﺎت أﻗﺪم ﻣﻦ ﺗﻌﻠﻘﻪ ﺑﺎﻟﻨﻈﺮﻳﺎ. و ﺛﺎﻟﺜﺘﻬﺎ : ﻛﺎﻧﺖ ﻣﺮﺗﺒﺔ اﻟﻌﻘﻞ ﺑﺎﻟﻔﻌﻞ و ﻫﻮ ﺗﻌﻠﻘﻪ اﻟﻨﻈﺮﻳﺎت ﺑﺘﻮﺳﻴﻂ اﻟﺒﺪﻳﻬﻴﺎت و إن ﺑﻌﻀﻬﺎ ﻋﻠﻰ ﺑﻌﺾ. و راﺑﻌﺘﻬﺎ : ﻋﻘﻠﻪ ﳉﻴﻤﻊ ﻣﺎ اﺳﺘﻔﺎدﻩ ﻣﻦ اﳌﻌﻘﻮﻻت اﻟﺒﺪﻳﻬﻴﺔ و اﻟﻨﻈﺮﻳﺔ اﳌﻄﺎﺑﻘﺔ ﳊﻘﺎﺋﻖ اﻟﻌﺎﱂ اﻟﻌﻠﻮى و اﻟﺴﻔﻠﻰ ﺑ ﺎﺳﺘﺤﻀﺎرﻩ اﳉﻤﻴﻊ و اﻟﺘﻔﺎﺗﻪ إﻟﻴﻬﺎ ﺑﺎﻟﻔﻌﻞ ﻓﻴﻜﻮن ﻋﺎﳌﺎ ﻋﻠﻤﻴﺎ ﻣﻀﺎﻫﻴﺎ ﻟﻠﻌﺎﱂ اﻟﻌﻴﲏ و ﻳﺴﻤﻰ اﻟﻌﻘﻞ اﳌﺴﺘﻔﺎد.
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11.5. PLANES OF THE INTELLECT The metaphysicians mention four planes of the intellect. One of them is that which is in a state of potentiality in relation to all intelligibles. It is called the material intellect (al-’aql al-hayûlânî) on account of its similarity to prime matter (hayûlâ) in being devoid of intelligibles and with respect to its potentiality in relation to all forms. The second is the ‘intellect by proficiency’ (al-’aql bi al-malakah which is the plane wherein it intellects self-evident concepts (tasawwurât) and judgements ( tashdîqât); for the knowledge of self-evident matters (badîhiyyât) precedes the knowledge of ‘speculative’ matters (nazhariyyât). The third is the ‘intellect in act’ which intellects speculative matters through the mediation of self-evident concepts and judgements, though some of them are based on the others. The fourth is the intellect that partakes of all self-evident and speculative intelligibles corresponding to the realities of the higher and lower realms of existence by virtue of having all of them present before it and its actual consciousness of them. Thus it is a ‘knowing world’ similar to the external world, and is called the ‘acquired intellect’ (al-’aql al-mustafâd).
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اﻟﻔﺼﻞ اﻟﺴﺎدس ﻓﻲ ﻣﻔﻴﺾ ﻫﺬﻩ اﻟﺼﻮر اﻟﻌﻠﻤﻴﺔ ج ﻟﻺﻧﺴﺎن ﻣﺜﻼ ﻣﻦ اﻟﻘﻮة إﱃ اﻟﻔﻌﻞ ﻋﻘﻞ أﻣﺎ اﻟﺼﻮر اﻟﻌﻘﻠﻴﺔ اﻟﻜﻠﻴﺔ ﻓﺈن ﻣﻔﻴﻀﻬﺎ اﳌﺨﺮ ﻣﻔﺎرق ﻟﻠﻤﺎدة ﻋﻨﺪﻩ ﲨﻴﻊ اﻟﺼﻮر اﻟﻌﻘﻠﻴﺔ اﻟﻜﻠﻴﺔ و ذﻟﻚ أﻧﻚ ﻗﺪ ﻋﺮﻓﺖ أن ﻫﺬﻩ اﻟﺼﻮر ﲟﺎ أ ﺎ5 ﻛﻞ أﻣﺮ ﺣﺎل ﰲ اﳌﺎدة واﺣﺪ ﻛﺜﲑﻳﻦ و ﻛﻠﻴﺔ ﺗﻘﺒﻞ اﻻﺷﱰاك ﺑﲔ ﺎ5 ﻋﻠﻢ ﳎﺮدة ﻋﻦ اﳌﺎدة ﻋﻠﻰ أ ﺷﺨﺼﻲ ﻻ ﻳﻘﺒﻞ اﻻﺷﱰاك ﻓﺎﻟﺼﻮرة اﻟﻌﻘﻠﻴﺔ ﳎﺮدة ﻋﻦ اﳌﺎدة ﻓﻔﺎﻋﻠﻬﺎ اﳌﻔﻴﺾ ﳍﺎ أﻣﺮ ﳎﺮد ﻋﻦ اﳌﺎدة ﻷن اﻷﻣﺮ اﳌﺎدي ﺿﻌﻴﻒ اﻟﻮﺟﻮد ﻓﻼ ﻳﺼﺪر ﻋﻨﻪ ﻣﺎ ﻫﻮ أﻗﻮى ﻣﻨﻪ وﺟﻮدا ﻋﻠﻰ أن ﻓﻌﻞ اﳌﺎدة ﻣﺸﺮوط ﺑﺎﻟﻮﺿﻊ اﳋﺎص و ﻻ وﺿﻊ ﻟﻠﻤﺠﺮد. ﺎ ﺑﻌﺪ ﺑﺎﻟﻘﻮة 5 ﺮدة اﻟﻌﻠﻤﻴﺔ ﻷ R ﺮد ﻫﻮ اﻟﻨﻔﺲ اﻟﻌﺎﻗﻠﺔ ﳍﺬﻩ اﻟﺼﻮر ا R و ﻟﻴﺲ ﻫﺬا اﳌﻔﻴﺾ ا ج ﻣﺎ ﺑﺎﻟﻘﻮة ﻧﻔﺴﻪ ﻣﻦ ﺑﺎﻟﻨﺴﺒﺔ إﻟﻴﻬﺎ و ﺣﻴﺜﻴﺘﻬﺎ ﺣﻴﺜﻴﺔ اﻟﻘﺒﻮل دون اﻟﻔﻌﻞ و ﻣﻦ اﶈﺎل أن ﳜﺮ اﻟﻘﻮة إﱃ اﻟﻔﻌﻞ. ﻓﻤﻔﻴﺾ اﻟﺼﻮرة اﻟﻌﻘﻠﻴﺔ ﺟﻮﻫﺮ ﻋﻘﻠﻲ ﻣﻔﺎرق ﻟﻠﻤﺎدة ﻓﻴﻪ ﲨﻴﻊ اﻟﺼﻮر اﻟﻌﻘﻠﻴﺔ اﻟﻜﻠﻴﺔ ﻋﻠﻰ ﳓﻮ ﻣﺎ ﺗﻘﺪم ﻣﻦ اﻟﻌﻠﻢ اﻹﲨﺎﱄ اﻟﻌﻘﻠﻲ ﺗﺘﺤﺪ ﻣﻌﻪ اﻟﻨﻔﺲ اﳌﺴﺘﻌﺪة ﻟﻠﺘﻌﻘﻞ ﻋﻠﻰ ﻗﺪر اﺳﺘﻌﺪادﻫﺎ اﳋﺎص ﻓﻴﻔﻴﺾ ﻋﻠﻴﻬﺎ ﻣﺎ ﺗﺴﺘﻌﺪ ﻟﻪ ﻣﻦ اﻟﺼﻮر اﻟﻌﻘﻠﻴﺔ و ﻫﻮ اﳌﻄﻠﻮب. و ﺑﻨﻈﲑ اﻟﺒﻴﺎن اﻟﺴﺎﺑﻖ ﻳﺘﺒﲔ أن ﻣﻔﻴﺾ اﻟﺼﻮر اﻟﻌﻠﻴﻤﺔ اﳉﺰﺋﻴﺔ ﺟﻮﻫﺮ ﻣﺜﺎﱄ ﻣﻔﺎرق ﻓﻴﻪ ﲨﻴﻊ اﻟﺼﻮر اﳌﺜﺎﻟﻴﺔ اﳉﺰﺋﻴﺔ ﻋﻠﻰ ﳓﻮ اﻟﻌﻠﻢ اﻹﲨﺎﱄ ﺗﺘﺤﺪ ﻣﻌﻪ اﻟﻨﻔﺲ ﻋﻠﻰ ﻗﺪر ﻣﺎ ﳍﺎ ﻣﻦ اﻻﺳﺘﻌﺪاد.
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11.6. THE EMANATING SOURCE OF THE INTELLIGIBLE FORMS As to the universal intelligible forms, which bring man, for instance, from potentiality to actuality, its source of emanation (mufîdh) is an immaterial Intellect which possesses all the universal intelligible forms. That is because, as we have seen, these forms constitute knowledge and are immaterial. Moreover, by virtue of their universality they are capable of corresponding to a multiplicity of objects, whereas everything impressed in matter is an individual incapable of such correspondence. Therefore, the intelligible forms are immaterial, created by an agent that is an immaterial source, for a material entity is existentially weak and incapable of producing something existentially stronger. In addition, the action of matter is conditioned by a particular [physical] configuration (wadh’) and an immaterial entity does not have a [physical] position or location. This immaterial source is not the soul itself, which intellects these immaterial cognitive forms, for it is still in potentiality in relation to these forms and its mode is passive, not active; it is impossible that something in potentiality should by itself make the transition from potentiality to actuality. Therefore, the source of the intelligible form is an immaterial intelligent substance that possesses all the universal intelligible ::ms in the manner of non-differentiated knowledge. The soul assessing potential unites with it in order to intellect in accordance with its particular potential, whereupon the source of emanation creates in it the intelligible form for whose reception it possesses the potential. A similar explanation in relation to particular intelligible forms would make clear that their source is an imaginal immaterial substance which possesses all the particular imaginal forms in the manner of nondifferentiated knowledge, and that the soul unites pith them in accordance with its potential.
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اﻟﻔﺼﻞ اﻟﺴﺎﺑﻊ ﻳﻨﻘﺴﻢ اﻟﻌﻠﻢ اﻟﺤﺼﻮﻟﻲ إﻟﻰ ﺗﺼﻮر و ﺗﺼﺪﻳﻖ ﻛﺜﲑ ﻣﻦ ﻏﲑ إﳚﺎب أو ﺳﻠﺐ و ﻳﺴﻤﻰ ﺗﺼﻮرا ﻷﻧﻪ إﻣﺎ ﺻﻮرة ﺣﺎﺻﻠﺔ ﻣﻦ ﻣﻌﻠﻮم واﺣﺪ أو ﻛﺘﺼﻮر اﻹﻧﺴﺎن و اﳉﺴﻢ و اﳉﻮﻫﺮ و إﻣﺎ ﺻﻮرة ﺣﺎﺻﻠﺔ ﻣﻦ ﻣﻌﻠﻮم ﻣﻌﻬﺎ إﳚﺎب ﺷﻲ ﻲ ء ﻟﺸ ء أو ﺳﻠﺐ ﺷﻲ ﻋﻦ ء ﺷﻲ ﻛﻘﻮﻟﻨﺎ اﻹﻧﺴﺎن ﺿﺎﺣﻚ و ﻗﻮﻟﻨﺎ ﻟﻴﺲ اﻹﻧﺴﺎن ﲝﺠﺮ و ﻳﺴﻤﻰ ء ﺗﺼﺪﻳﻘﺎ و ﺑﺎﻋﺘﺒﺎر ﺣﻜﻤﻪ ﻗﻀﻴﺔ. ﰒ إن اﻟﻘﻀﻴﺔ ﲟﺎ ﺗﺸﺘﻤﻞ ﻋﻠﻰ إﺛﺒﺎت ﺷﻲ ﻲ ء ﻟﺸ ﺷﻲ ء أو ﻧﻔﻲ ﺷﻲ ء ﻋﻦ ء ﻣﺮﻛﺒﺔ ﻣﻦ أﺟﺰاء ﻓﻮق اﻟﻮاﺣﺪ. و اﳌﺸﻬﻮر أن اﻟﻘﻀﻴﺔ اﳌﻮﺟﺒﺔ ﻣﺆﻟﻔﺔ ﻣﻦ اﳌﻮﺿﻮع و اﶈﻤﻮل و اﻟﻨﺴﺒﺔ اﳊﻜﻤﻴﺔ و ﻫﻲ ﻧﺴ ﺒﺔ ﺎT اﶈﻤﻮل إﱃ اﳌﻮﺿﻮع و اﳊﻜﻢ ﺑﺎﲢﺎد اﳌﻮﺿﻮع ﻣﻊ اﶈﻤﻮل ﻫﺬا ﰲ اﳍﻠﻴﺎت اﳌﺮﻛﺒﺔ اﻟﱵ ﳏﻤﻮﻻ ﻛﻘﻮﻟﻨﺎ اﻹﻧﺴﺎن ﻣﻮﺟﻮد ﻏﲑ وﺟﻮد اﳌﻮﺿﻮع و أﻣﺎ اﳍﻠﻴﺎت اﻟﺒﺴﻴﻄﺔ اﻟﱵ ﳏﻤﻮﳍﺎ وﺟﻮد اﳌﻮﺿﻮع
ﻓﺄﺟﺰاؤﻫﺎ ﺛﻼﺛﺔ اﳌﻮﺿﻮع و اﶈﻤﻮل و اﳊﻜﻢ إذ ﻻ ﻣﻌﲎ ﻟﺘﺨﻠﻞ اﻟﻨﺴﺒﺔ و ﻫﻲ اﻟﻮﺟﻮ د اﻟﺮاﺑﻂ ﺑﲔ اﻟﺸﻲ ﻪ ء و ﻧﻔﺴ. و : أن اﻟﻘﻀﻴﺔ اﻟﺴﺎﻟﺒﺔ ﻣﺆﻟﻔﺔ ﻣﻦ اﳌﻮﺿﻮع و اﶈﻤﻮل و اﻟﻨﺴﺒﺔ اﳊﻜﻤﻴﺔ اﻹﳚﺎﺑﻴﺔ و ﻻ ﺣﻜﻢ ﻓﻴﻬﺎ ﻻ أن ﻓﻴﻬﺎ ﺣﻜﻤﺎ ﻋﺪﻣﻴﺎ ﻷن اﳊﻜﻢ ﺟﻌﻞ ﺷﻲ ء ﺷﻴﺌﺎ و ﺳﻠﺐ اﳊﻜﻢ ﻋﺪم ﺟﻌﻠﻪ ﻻ ﺟﻌﻞ ﻋﺪﻣﻪ. و اﳊﻖ :اﳊ أن اﳊﺎﺟﺔ إﱃ ﺗﺼﻮر اﻟﻨﺴﺒﺔ اﳊﻜﻤﻴﺔ إﳕﺎ ﻫﻲ ﻣﻦ ﺟﻬﺔ ﻜﻢ ﲟﺎ ﻫﻮ ﻓﻌﻞ اﻟﻨﻔﺲ ﻻ ﲟﺎ ﻫﻮ ﺟﺰء اﻟﻘﻀﻴﺔ أي إن اﻟﻘﻀﻴﺔ إﳕﺎ ﻫﻲ اﳌﻮﺿﻮع و اﶈﻤﻮل و اﳊﻜﻢ و ﻻ ﺣﺎﺟﺔ ﰲ ﲢﻘﻖ اﻟﻘﻀﻴﺔ ﲟﺎ ﻫﻲ ﻗﻀﻴﺔ إﱃ ﺗﺼﻮر اﻟﻨﺴﺒﺔ اﳊﻜﻤﻴﺔ و إﳕﺎ اﳊﺎﺟﺔ إﱃ ﺗﺼﻮرﻫﺎ ﻟﺘﺤﻘﻖ اﳊﻜﻢ ﻣﻦ اﻟﻨﻔﺲ و ﺟﻌﻠﻬﺎ اﳌﻮﺿﻮع ﻫﻮ اﶈﻤﻮل و ﻳﺪل ﻋﻠﻰ ذﻟﻚ ﲢﻘﻖ اﻟﻘﻀﻴﺔ ﰲ اﳍﻠ ﻴﺎت اﻟﺒﺴﻴﻄﺔ ﺑﺪون اﻟﻨﺴﺒﺔ اﳊﻜﻤﻴﺔ اﻟﱵ ﺗﺮﺑﻂ اﶈﻤﻮل ﺑﺎﳌﻮﺿﻮع. ﻓﻘﺪ ﺗﺒﲔ -ﺬا اﻟﺒﻴﺎن : أوﻻ أن اﻟﻘﻀﻴﺔ اﳌﻮﺟﺒﺔ ذات أﺟﺰاء ﺛﻼﺛﺔ اﳌﻮﺿﻮع و اﶈﻤﻮل و اﳊﻜﻢ و اﻟﺴﺎﻟﺒﺔ ذات ﺟﺰءﻳﻦ اﳌﻮﺿﻮع و اﶈﻤﻮل و أن اﻟﻨﺴﺒﺔ اﳊﻜﻤﻴﺔ ﲢﺘﺎج إﻟﻴﻬﺎ اﻟﻨﻔﺲ ﰲ ﻓﻌﻠﻬﺎ اﳊﻜﻢ ﻻ اﻟﻘﻀﻴﺔ ﲟﺎ ﻫﻲ ﻗ ﺎ ﻀﻴﺔ ﰲ اﻧﻌﻘﺎدﻫ. و ﺛﺎﻧﻴﺎ : أن اﳊﻜﻢ ﻓﻌﻞ ﻣﻦ اﻟﻨﻔﺲ ﰲ ﻇﺮف اﻹدراك اﻟﺬﻫﲏ و ﻟﻴﺲ ﻣﻦ اﻻﻧﻔﻌﺎل اﻟﺘﺼﻮري ﰲ ﺷﻲ ء و ﺣﻘﻴﻘﺔ اﳊﻜﻢ ﰲ ﻗﻮﻟﻨﺎ زﻳﺪ ﻗﺎﺋﻢ ﻣﺜﻼ أن اﻟﻨﻔﺲ ﺗﻨﺎل ﻣﻦ ﻃﺮﻳﻖ اﳊﺲ ﻤﺎ ﻋﻨﺪﻫﺎ ﰒ إذا 5 ﻣﻮﺟﻮدا واﺣﺪا ﻫﻮ زﻳﺪ اﻟﻘﺎﺋﻢ ﰒ ﲡﺰﺋﻪ إﱃ ﻣﻔﻬﻮﻣﻲ زﻳﺪ و اﻟﻘﺎﺋﻢ و ﲣﺰ أرادت ﰒ ج أﺧﺬت ﺻﻮرﰐ زﻳﺪ و اﻟﻘﺎﺋﻢ ﻣﻦ ﺧﺰاﻧﺘﻬﺎ و ﳘﺎ اﺛﻨﺘﺎن ﺣﻜﺎﻳﺔ ﻣﺎ وﺟﺪﺗﻪ ﰲ اﳋﺎر
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ﺟﻌﻠﺘﻬﻤﺎ واﺣﺪا ذا وﺟﻮد واﺣﺪ و ﻫﺬا ﻫﻮ اﳊﻜﻢ اﻟﺬي ذﻛﺮﻧﺎ أﻧﻪ ﻓﻌﻞ ﻟﻠﻨﻔﺲ ﲢﻜﻰ ﺑﻪ ﻛﺎن ج ﻋﻠﻰ ﻣﺎ اﳋﺎر. ﻓﺎﳊﻜﻢ : ﻛﺎن ءﻫﺎ و ﻟﻮ ﻓﻌﻞ ﻟﻠﻨﻔﺲ و ﻫﻮ ﻣﻊ ذﻟﻚ ﻣﻦ اﻟﺼﻮر اﻟﺬﻫﻨﻴﺔ اﳊﺎﻛﻴﺔ ﳌﺎ ورا
اﳊﻜﻢ ﺗﺼﻮر ﻛﻞ ﻣﻦ ﻛﻤﺎ ﰲ ﻛﺎﻧﺖ اﻟﻘﻀﻴﺔ ﻏﲑ ﻣﻔﻴﺪة ﻟﺼﺤﺔ اﻟﺴﻜﻮت ج ا ﻣﺄﺧﻮذا ﻣﻦ اﳋﺎر ﻛﺎن ﺗﺼﻮرا أﻧﺸﺄﺗﻪ اﻟﻨﻔﺲ ﻣﻦ ﻋﻨﺪﻫﺎ ﻣﻦ ﻏﲑ اﺳﺘﻌﺎﻧﺔ اﳌﻘﺪم و اﻟﺘﺎﱄ ﰲ اﻟﻘﻀﻴﺔ اﻟﺸﺮﻃﻴﺔ و ﻟﻮ ج ﱂ ﳛﻚ اﳋﺎرج ﻣﻦ اﳋﺎر و ﺛﺎﻟﺜﺎ :ر أن اﻟﺘﺼﺪﻳﻖ ﻳﺘﻮﻗﻒ ﻋﻠﻰ ﺗﺼﻮر اﳌﻮﺿﻮع و اﶈﻤﻮل ﻓﻼ ﺗﺼﺪﻳﻖ إﻻ ﻋﻦ ﺗﺼﻮ.
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11.7. THE DIVISION OF MEDIATED KNOWLEDGE INTO CONCEPTION AND JUDGEMENT The mere knowledge of the form (shûrah) of the known object, whether one or multiple, regardless of affirmation or negation, is ailed conception (tashawwur), such as the concepts of ‘man,’ ‘body’ and ‘substance.’ If the form of the known is accompanied by an affirmation or negation of something concerning something, such s in the sentence, ‘Man is risible’ or ‘Man is not stone,’ it is an assertion’ (tashdîq; lit. affirmation), and in consideration of the judgement that it contains is called ‘qadhiyyah’ (proposition). Further, a proposition comprises more than one part as it contains the affirmation or negation of something concerning something. According to the prevalent view among metaphysicians, an affirmative proposition comprises a subject (mawdhû’), a predicate (mahmûl) and the ‘relation of judgement’ (al-nisbah al-hukmiyyah), which is the predicate’s relation to the subject and the judgement (hukm) of the subject’s oneness with the predicate. This is the case in ‘composite statements’ (al-halliyyat al-murakkabah) wherein the predicate is not the existence of the subject. But in ‘simple statements’ (al-halliyyat al-basîthah), in which the predicate is the existence of the subject – such as in the statement ‘Man is existent’ – there are three parts: the subject, the predicate and the judgemenr there is no sense in a relation – which is a copulative existent – intervening between a thing and itself. Furthermore, a negative proposition is made up of a subject, a predicate and an affirmative relation of judgement (al-nisbah ai-hukmiyyah alîjâbiyyah). There is no judgement in it, and no negative judgement, for a judgement consists of affirming something of something; the withholding of judgement is the absence of it, not the positing of its absence. The truth is that the need for conceiving the relation of judgement is only from the aspect of the judgement being an act of the soul, not because it is part of the proposition. For a proposition consists only of the subject, the predicate, and the judgement, and the formation of a proposition as such does not require the conception of the relation of judgement. The need for conceiving it arises for the formation of judgement by the soul in identifying the subject with the predicate. This is also confirmed by the formation of the proposition in simple statements without the relation of judgement that relates the predicate to the subject. It becomes clear from this discussion that, first, an affirmative proposition (al-qadhiyyah al-mûjibah) consists of three parts: subject, predicate, and judgement. A negative proposition consists of two parts: subject and predicate, and the relation of judgement is needed by the soul in making the judgement, not for the formation of the proposition as such. Second, judgement is an act of the soul in the context of mental cognition, not a passive act of conception. When we say ‘Zayd is standing,’ for instance, the soul cognizes through sensory means a single entity which is ‘the standing Zayd.’ Then it analyzes it into two concepts ‘Zayd’ and ‘standing’ and stores them. Thereafter, when it wants to describe what it finds in external reality, it takes the forms of ‘Zayd’ and ‘standing’ from its memory as two different notions and combines them into a unity with a
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single existence. This is judgement, which we have described as the act of the soul, by means of which it represents external reality as it is. Hence, judgement is an act of the soul and, at the same time, a mental form that represent something beyond itself. Were judgement a conception abstracted from outside, the proposition would not make a complete statement to which nothing needs to be added, as in the case of each part of a hypothetical proposition. Also, were judgement a concept formulated by the soul without recourse to external reality, it would not represent external reality.
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اﻟﻔﺼﻞ اﻟﺜﺎﻣﻦ و ﻳﻨﻘﺴﻢ اﻟﻌﻠﻢ اﻟﺤﺼﻮﻟﻲ إﻟﻰ ﺑﺪﻳﻬﻲ و ﻧﻈﺮي و اﻟﺒﺪﻳﻬﻲ ﻣﻨﻪ :ﻣ ﻛﺘﺼﻮر ﻣﺎ ﻻ ﳛﺘﺎج ﰲ ﺗﺼﻮرﻩ أو اﻟﺘﺼﺪﻳﻖ ﺑﻪ إﱃ اﻛﺘﺴﺎب و ﻧﻈﺮ ﻔﻬﻮم اﻟﺸﻲ ﻛﺎﻟﺘﺼﺪﻳﻖ ﺑﺄن اﻟﻜﻞ أﻋﻈﻢ ﻣﻦ ﺟﺰﺋﻪ و أن اﻷرﺑﻌﺔ زوج و ء و اﻟﻮﺣﺪة و ﳓﻮﳘﺎ و ﻛﺘﺼﻮر ﻣﺎﻫﻴﺔ اﻹﻧﺴﺎن و اﻟﻨﻈﺮي ﻣﺎ ﻳﺘﻮﻗﻒ ﰲ ﺗﺼﻮرﻩ أو اﻟﺘﺼﺪﻳﻖ ﺑﻪ ﻋﻠﻰ اﻛﺘﺴﺎب و ﻧﻈﺮ اﻟﻔﺮس و اﻟﺘﺼﺪﻳﻖ ﺑﺄن اﻟﺰواﻳﺎ اﻟﺜﻼث ﻣﻦ اﳌﺜﻠﺚ ﻣﺴﺎوﻳﺔ ﻟﻘﺎﺋﻤﺘﲔ و أن اﻹﻧﺴﺎن ذو ﻧﻔﺲ ﳎﺮدة. و اﻟﻌﻠﻮم اﻟﻨﻈﺮﻳﺔ ﺗﻨﺘﻬﻲ إﱃ اﻟﻌﻠﻮم اﻟﺒﺪﻳﻬﻴﺔ و ﺗﺘﺒﲔ -ﺎ و إﻻ ذﻫﺐ اﻷﻣﺮ إﱃ ﻏﲑ اﻟﻨﻬﺎﻳﺔ ﰒ ﱂ ﻳﻔﺪ ﻋﻠﻤﺎ ﻋﻠﻰ ﻣﺎ ﺑﲔ ﰲ اﳌﻨﻄﻖ. و اﻟﺒﺪﻳﻬﻴﺎت ﻛﺜﲑة ﻣﺒﻴﻨﺔ ﰲ اﳌﻨﻄﻖ و أوﻻﻫﺎ ﺑﺎﻟﻘﺒﻮل اﻷوﻟﻴﺎت و ﻫﻲ اﻟﻘﻀﺎﻳﺎ اﻟﱵ ﻳﻜﻔﻲ ﻛﻘﻮﻟﻨﺎ اﻟﻜﻞ أﻋﻈﻢ ﻣﻦ ﰲ اﻟﺘﺼﺪﻳﻖ -ﺎ ﺗﺼﻮر اﳌﻮﺿﻮع و اﶈﻤﻮل ﻲ ﺟﺰﺋﻪ و ﻗﻮﻟﻨﺎ اﻟﺸ ء ﻻ ﻳﺴﻠﺐ ﻋﻦ ﻧﻔﺴﻪ. و أوﱃ اﻷوﻟﻴﺎت ﺑﺎﻟﻘﺒﻮل : ﻗﻀﻴﺔ اﺳﺘﺤﺎﻟﺔ اﺟﺘﻤﺎع اﻟﻨﻘﻴﻀﲔ و ارﺗﻔﺎﻋﻬﻤﺎ و ﻫﻲ ﻗﻀﻴﺔ ﻣﻨﻔﺼﻠﺔ ﺣﻘﻴﻘﻴﺔ إﻣﺎ أن ﻳﺼﺪق اﻹﳚﺎب أو ﻳﺼﺪق اﻟﺴﻠﺐ و ﻻ ﺗﺴﺘﻐﲎ ﻋﻨﻬﺎ ﰲ إﻓﺎدة اﻟﻌﻠﻢ ﻗﻀﻴﺔ ﻧﻈﺮﻳﺔ و ﻻ ﺑﺪﻳﻬﻴﺔ ﺣﱴ اﻷوﻟﻴﺎت ﻓﺈن ﻗﻮﻟﻨﺎ اﻟﻜﻞ أﻋﻈﻢ ﻣﻦ ﺟﺰﺋ إذا ﻪ إﳕﺎ ﻳﻔﻴﺪ ﻋﻠﻤﺎ ﻛﺎذﺑﺎ ﻛﺎن ﻧﻘﻴﻀﻪ و ﻫﻮ ﻗﻮﻟﻨﺎ ﻟﻴﺲ اﻟﻜﻞ ﺑﺄﻋﻈﻢ ﻣﻦ ﺟﺰﺋﻪ . ﻓﻬﻲ أول ﻗﻀﻴﺔ ﻣﺼﺪق -ﺎ ﻻ ﻳﺮﺗﺎب ﻓﻴﻬﺎ ذو ﺷﻌﻮر و ﺗﺒﺘﲎ ﻋﻠﻴﻬﺎ اﻟﻌﻠﻮم ﻓﻠﻮ وﻗﻊ ﻓﻴﻬﺎ ﺷﻚ ﺳﺮى ذﻟﻚ ﰲ ﲨﻴﻊ اﻟﻌﻠﻮم و اﻟﺘﺼﺪﻳﻘﺎت. ﺗﺘﻤﺔ اﻟﺴﻮﻓﺴﻄﻲ اﳌﻨﻜﺮ ﻟﻮﺟﻮد اﻟﻌﻠﻢ ﻏﲑ ﻣﺴﻠﻢ ﻟﻘﻀﻴﺔ أوﱃ اﻷواﺋﻞ إذ ﰲ ﺗﺴﻠﻴﻤﻬﺎ اﻋﱰاف ﺑﺄن ﻛﻞ ﻗﻀﻴﺘﲔ ﻣﺘﻨﺎﻗﻀﺘﲔ ﻓﺈن إﺣﺪاﳘﺎ ﺣﻘﺔ ﺻﺎدﻗﺔ. ﻛﻞ ﺷﻲ ﰒ اﻟﺴﻮﻓﺴﻄﻲ اﳌﺪﻋﻲ ﻻﻧﺘﻔﺎء اﻟﻌﻠﻢ و اﻟﺸﺎك ﰲ ء إن اﻋﱰف ﺑﺄﻧﻪ ﻳﻌﻠﻢ أﻧﻪ ﺷﺎك ﻛﺜﲑة ﲤﺎﺛﻞ ﻋﻠﻤﻪ ﺑﺄﻧﻪ ﻓﻘﺪ اﻋﱰف ﺑﻌﻠﻢ ﻣﺎ و ﺳﻠﻢ ﻗﻀﻴﺔ أوﱃ اﻷواﺋﻞ ﻓﺄﻣﻜﻦ أن ﻳﻠﺰم ﺑﻌﻠﻮم ﻛﻌﻠﻤﻪ ﺑﺄﻧﻪ ﻳﺮى و ﻳﺴﻤﻊ و ﻳﻠﻤ ﺷﺎك ﺲ و ﻳﺬوق و ﻳﺸﻢ و أﻧﻪ رﲟﺎ ﺟﺎع ﻓﻘﺼﺪ ﻣﺎ ﻳﺸﺒﻌﻪ أو ﻛﻤﺎ ﺎ ﻣﻦ اﻟﻌﻠﻮم ﻷن اﻟﻌﻠﻢ ﻳﻨﺘﻬﻲ إﱃ اﳊﺲ 5 ﻇﻤﺄ ﻓﻘﺼﺪ ﻣﺎ ﻳﺮوﻳﻪ و إذا أﻟﺰم -ﺎ أﻟﺰم ﲟﺎ دو ﺗﻘﺪم. ﻛﻞ ﺷﻲ و إن ﱂ ﻳﻌﱰف ﺑﺄﻧﻪ ﻳﻌﻠﻢ أﻧﻪ ﺷﺎك ﺑﻞ أﻇﻬﺮ أﻧﻪ ﺷﺎك ﰲ ء و ﺷﺎك ﰲ ﺷﻜﻪ ﻻ ﻳﺪري ﺷﻴﺌﺎ ﺳﻘﻄﺖ ﻣﻌﻪ اﶈﺎﺟﺔ و ﱂ ﻳﻨﺠﻊ ﻓﻴﻪ ﺑﺮﻫﺎن و ﻫﺬا اﻹﻧﺴﺎن إﻣﺎ ﻣﺒﺘﻠﻰ ﲟﺮض أورﺛﻪ اﺧﺘﻼﻻ ﰲ اﻹدراك ﻓﻠﲑاﺟﻊ اﻟﻄﺒﻴﺐ و إﻣﺎ ﻣﻌﺎﻧﺪ ﻟﻠﺤﻖ ﻳﻈﻬﺮ ﻣﺎ ﻳﻈﻬﺮ ﻟﺪﺣﻀﻪ ﻓﻠﻴﻀﺮب و
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ﻟﻴﺆﱂ و ﻟﻴﻤﻨﻊ ﳑﺎ ﻳﻘﺼﺪﻩ و ﻳﺮﻳﺪﻩ و ﻟﻴﺆﻣﺮ ﲟﺎ ﻳﺒﻐﻀﻪ و ﻳﻜﺮﻫﻪ إذ ﻻ ﻳﺮى ﺣﻘﻴﻘﺔ ﻟﺸﻲ ء ﻣﻦ ذﻟﻚ. ﻧﻌﻢ رﲟﺎ راﺟﻊ ﺑﻌﻀﻬﻢ ﻫﺬﻩ اﻟﻌﻠﻮم اﻟﻌﻘﻠﻴﺔ و ﻫﻮ ﻏﲑ ﻣﺴﻠﺢ ﺑﺎﻷﺻﻮل اﳌﻨﻄﻘﻴﺔ و ﻻ ﻣﺘﺪرب ﰲ ﺻﻨﺎﻋﺔ اﻟﱪﻫﺎن ﻓﺸﺎﻫﺪ اﺧﺘﻼف اﻟﺒﺎﺣﺜﲔ ﰲ اﳌﺴﺎﺋﻞ ﺑﲔ اﻹﺛﺒﺎت و اﻟﻨﻔﻲ و ﻛﻞ ﻣﻦ ﻃﺮﰲ اﻟﻨﻘﻴﺾ و ﱂ ﻳﻘﺪر ﻟﻘﻠﺔ ﺑﻀﺎﻋﺘﻪ ﻋﻠﻰ ﲤﻴﻴﺰ اﳊﻖ ﻣﻦ اﳊﺠﺞ اﻟﱵ أﻗﺎﻣﻮﻫﺎ ﻋﻠﻰ اﻟﺒﺎﻃﻞ ﻓﺘﺴﻠﻢ ﻃﺮﰲ اﻟﻨﻘﻴﺾ ﰲ ﻣﺴﺄﻟﺔ ﺑﻌﺪ ﻣﺴﺄﻟﺔ ﻓﺄﺳﺎء اﻟﻈﻦ ﺑﺎﳌﻨﻄﻖ و زﻋﻢ أ ن اﻟﻌﻠﻮم ﻛﻞ ﺑﺎﺣﺚ ﻣﺎ دﻟﺖ ﻋﻠﻴﻪ ﺣﺠﺘﻪ ﻧﺴﺒﻴﺔ ﻏﲑ ﺛﺎﺑﺘﺔ و اﳊﻘﻴﻘﺔ ﺑﺎﻟﻨﺴﺒﺔ إﱃ . و ﻟﻴﻌﺎﰿ أﻣﺜﺎل ﻫﺆﻻء ﺑﺈﻳﻀﺎح اﻟﻘﻮاﻧﲔ اﳌﻨﻄﻘﻴﺔ و إراءة ﻗﻀﺎﻳﺎ ﺑﺪﻳﻬﻴﺔ ﻻ ﺗﻘﺒﻞ اﻟﱰدﻳﺪ ﰲ ﺣﺎل ﻣﻦ اﻷﺣﻮال ﻛﻀﺮورة ﺛﺒﻮت اﻟﺸﻲ ء ﻟﻨﻔﺴﻪ و اﺳﺘﺤﺎﻟﺔ ﺳﻠﺒﻪ ﻋﻦ ﻧﻔﺴﻪ و ﻏﲑ ذﻟﻚ و ﻟﻴﺒﺎﻟﻎ ﰲ ﺗﻔﻬﻴﻢ ﻣﻌﺎﱐ ﺔ أﺟﺰاء اﻟﻘﻀﺎﻳﺎ و ﻟﻴﺆﻣﺮوا أن ﻳﺘﻌﻠﻤﻮا اﻟﻌﻠﻮم اﻟﺮﻳﺎﺿﻴ. و ﻫﺎﻫﻨﺎ ﻃﺎﺋﻔﺘﺎن أﺧﺮﻳﺎن ﻣﻦ اﻟﺸﻜﺎﻛﲔ ﻓﻄﺎﺋﻔﺔ ﻳﺘﺴﻠﻤﻮن اﻹﻧﺴﺎن و إدراﻛﺎﺗﻪ و ﻳﻈﻬﺮون اﻟﺸﻚ ﰲ ﻣﺎ وراء ذﻟﻚ ﻓﻴﻘﻮﻟﻮن ﳓﻦ و إدراﻛﺎﺗﻨﺎ و ﻧﺸﻚ ﻓﻴﻤﺎ وراء ذﻟﻚ و ﻃﺎﺋﻔﺔ أﺧﺮى ﺗﻔﻄﻨﻮا ﲟﺎ ﰲ ﻗﻮﳍﻢ ﳓﻦ و إدراﻛﺎﺗﻨﺎ ﻣﻦ اﻻﻋﱰاف ﲝ ﻛﺜﲑة ﻣﻦ أﻧﺎﺳﻲ و إدراﻛﺎت ﳍﻢ و ﻘﺎﺋﻖ ﺗﻠﻚ ﺣﻘﺎﺋﻖ ﺧﺎرﺟﻴﺔ ﻓﺒﺪﻟﻮا اﻟﻜﻼم ﺑﻘﻮﳍﻢ أﻧﺎ و إدراﻛﺎﰐ و ﻣﺎ وراء ذﻟﻚ ﻣﺸﻜﻮك. و ﻳﺪﻓﻌﻪ : ﻛﻤﺎ ﰲ ﻣﻮارد أﺧﻄﺎء اﻟﺒﺎﺻﺮة و اﻟﻼﻣﺴﺔ و أن اﻹﻧﺴﺎن رﲟﺎ ﳜﻄﻲ ﰲ إدراﻛﺎﺗﻪ ﻏﲑﻫﺎ ﻣﻦ أﻏﻼط اﻟﻔﻜﺮ و ﻟﻮ ﻻ أن ﻫﻨﺎك ﺣﻘﺎﺋﻖ ﺧﺎرﺟﺔ ﻣﻦ اﻹﻧﺴﺎن و إد راﻛﺎﺗﻪ ﺗﻨﻄﺒﻖ ﻋﻠﻴﻬﺎ إدراﻛﺎﺗﻪ أو ﻻ ﺗﻨﻄﺒﻖ ﱂ ﻳﺴﺘﻘﻢ ذﻟﻚ ﺑﺎﻟﻀﺮورة. و رﲟﺎ ﻗﻴﻞ :ﺷﻲ إن ﻗﻮل ﻫﺆﻻء ﻟﻴﺲ ﻣﻦ اﻟﺴﻔﺴﻄﺔ ﰲ ء ﺑﻞ اﳌﺮاد أن ﻣﻦ اﶈﺘﻤﻞ أن ﻻ ﻛﻤﺎ ﻗﻴﻞ إن ﺗﻨﻄﺒﻖ اﻟﺼﻮر اﻟﻈﺎﻫﺮة ﻟﻠﺤﻮاس ﺑﻌﻴﻨﻬﺎ ﻋﻠﻰ اﻷﻣﻮر اﳋﺎرﺟﻴﺔ ﲟﺎ ﳍﺎ ﻣﻦ اﳊﻘﻴﻘﺔ اﻟﺼﻮت ﲟﺎ ﻟﻪ ﻣﻦ اﳍﻮﻳﺔ اﻟﻈﺎﻫﺮة ﻋﻠﻰ اﻟﺴﻤﻊ ﻟﻴﺲ ﻟﻪ وﺟﻮد ﰲ ﺧﺎرﺟﻪ ﺑﻞ اﻟﺴﻤﻊ إذا اﺗﺼﻞ ﻛﺬا ارﺗﻌﺎﺷﺎ ﻛﺬا ﻇﻬﺮ ﰲ اﻟﺴﻤﻊ ﰲ ﺻﻮرة اﻟﺼﻮت و إذا ﺑﻠﻎ ﻋﺪد اﻻرﺗﻌﺎش ﺑﺎﻻرﺗﻌﺎش ﺑﻌﺪد ﻇﻬﺮ ﰲ اﻟﺒﺼﺮ ﰲ ﺻﻮرة اﻟﻀﻮء و اﻟﻠﻮن ﻓﺎﳊﻮاس اﻟﱵ ﻫﻲ ﻣﺒﺎدي اﻹدراك ﻻ ﺗﻜﺸﻒ ﻋﻤﺎ وراءﻫﺎ ﻣﻦ اﳊﻘﺎﺋﻖ و ﺳﺎﺋﺮ اﻹدراﻛﺎت ﻣﻨﺘﻬﻴﺔ إﱃ اﳊ س ﻮا. و ﻓﻴﻪ : ﻛﺎﺷﻔﺔ ﻋﻤﺎ وراءﻫﺎ ﻓﻤﻦ أﻳﻦ ﻋﻠﻢ أن ﻫﻨﺎك ﺣﻘﺎﺋﻖ أن اﻹدراﻛﺎت إذا ﻓﺮﺿﺖ ﻏﲑ ج اﻟﺴﻤﻊ وراء اﻹدراك ﻻ ﻳﻜﺸﻒ ﻋﻨﻬﺎ اﻹدراك ﰒ ﻣﻦ أدرك أن ﺣﻘﻴﻘﺔ اﻟﺼﻮت ﰲ ﺧﺎر ﻛﺬا و ﻫﻞ ﻳﺼﻞ اﻹﻧﺴﺎن ج اﻟﺒﺼﺮ ارﺗﻌﺎش ﺑﻌﺪد ﻛﺬا و ﺣﻘﻴﻘﺔ اﳌﺒﺼﺮ ﰲ ﺧﺎر ارﺗﻌﺎش ﺑﻌﺪد إﱃ اﻟﺼﻮاب اﻟﺬي ﳜﻄﻰ ﻓﻴ ﱐ ﻪ اﳊﻮاس إﻻ ﻣﻦ ﻃﺮﻳﻖ اﻹدراك اﻹﻧﺴﺎ.
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ﻛﻠﻪ ﲡﻮﻳﺰ أن ﻻ ﻳﻨﻄﺒﻖ ﻣﻄﻠﻖ اﻹدراك ﻋﻠﻰ ﻣﺎ وراءﻩ ﻻ ﳛﺘﻤﻞ إﻻ اﻟﺴﻔﺴﻄﺔ و ﺑﻌﺪ ذﻟﻚ ﺣﱴ أن ﻗﻮﻟﻨﺎ ﳚﻮز أن ﻻ ﻳﻨﻄﺒﻖ ﺷﻲ ج ﻻ ﻳﺆﻣﻦ أن ﻻ ﻳﻜﺸﻒ ء ﻣﻦ إدراﻛﺎﺗﻨﺎ ﻋﻠﻰ اﳋﺎر ﲝﺴﺐ ﻣﻔﺎﻫﻴﻢ ﻣﻔﺮداﺗﻪ و اﻟﺘﺼﺪﻳﻖ اﻟﺬي ﻓﻴﻪ ﻋﻦ ﺷﻲ ء.
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11.8. DIVISION OF MEDIATED KNOWLEDGE INTO SELF-EVIDENT AND SPECULATIVE Something is said to be ‘self-evident’ (badîh) that does not stand in need of reflection and speculative reasoning (nazhar) for the formation of its conception or for the making of a judgement concerning it, e.g. the concepts of ‘thing,’ ‘unity’ and so on, or such assertions as ‘The whole is greater than any of its parts’ or Tour is an even number.’ A ‘speculative’ conception or judgement is one which depends on reflective effort, e.g. the conception of the quiddity of man and horse, or such assertions as, ‘The three angles of a triangle equal two right angles,’ or ‘Man has an immaterial soul.’ The speculative sciences derive from self-evident knowledge effort, and their elaboration rests on the basis of what is self-evident. Otherwise the matter would lead to an indefinite regress, and no knowledge would be possible, as explained in logic. Self-evident assertions, as explained in logic, are many, and the foremost of them are the so-called the basic self-evident propositions (awwaliyyât), which are propositions for whose confirmation the mere conception of the subject and the predicate is sufficient, e.g. such statements as ‘The whole is greater than any of its parts’ and ‘A thing cannot be divested from itself.’ The foremost of the primarily self-evident propositions is the principle of contradiction, which is a proper disjunctive proposition: ‘Either the affirmation or negation of a proposition is true.’ No self-evident or speculative proposition, even the primarily self-evident propositions, can do without contradiction in order to bring knowledge. Thus the statement, ‘The whole is greater than any of its parts’ brings knowledge only if its contradictory. ‘It is not the case that the whole is greater than any of its parts.’ is false. Hence this principle is the most primary proposition to be affirmed, and no sane person can doubt it. All sciences are based upon it and were any doubt cast upon it, it would pervade to d sciences and judgements. A Complementary Note The sophist, who denies the possibility of knowledge, does not affirm the validity of the principle of contradiction; for his acceptance of it would amount to an admission that one out of every pair of contradictory propositions is true. However, should the sophist who denies the possibility of knowledge and is skeptical of everything admit to be a skeptic, it means that he admits the possibility of at least some kind of knowledge and thereby affirms the principle of contradiction Then it becomes possible to make him admit the possibility of knowledge of many things similar to his knowledge of being a skeptic, such as his knowledge that he sees, hears, has sensations of touch, taste and smell, that when he feels hungry he looks for something that would satisfy his hunger, or quench his thirst when he feels thirsty. When he accepts these, he can be led to admit that he possesses the knowledge of other things as well, for all knowledge, as said earlier,’ terminates in senseexperience (al-hiss). However, should he refuse to admit that he knows that he is a skeptic and declare that he is skeptical of everything, even of his own skepticism, and
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knows nothing, there can be no debate with him and no argument will work upon him. This kind of person either suffers from a disease affecting his mental faculty, in which case he should see a physician, or he is one hostile to the truth, seeking to refute it. The latter should be chastened, made to feel pain, kept from what he desires and seeks and compelled to experience what he dislikes and detests, for he does not consider any of these to have reality. Yes, often some persons of this kind who turn to the rational sciences without the necessary training in the principles of logic and the techniques of reasoning, on observing the contradictory opinions of thinkers on various problems and the arguments they advance in support of each of their mutually exclusive positions, cannot make a distinction between the true and the false due to me inadequacy of their intellectual means. Such a person concedes to each of the contradictory opinions on one issue after another, and thereafter becomes suspect of all logic, claiming that the sciences are relative, not absolute, and the truth for every thinker is what his arguments lead him to. The remedy for this kind of skeptic is to fully clarify for him the principles of logic and to demonstrate for him the self-evident principles which are beyond doubt in all circumstances, such as the principle of identity and so on. Utmost effort should be made to explain to him the elements of a proposition, and he should be directed to study the mathematical sciences. There are two other groups of skeptics. One of them accepts man’s perceptions but doubts what lies beyond them. “We can know only what we perceive, and that which lies beyond our perceptions is uncertain,” they declare. There is another group, which, having noticed that the statement, “We can know only what we perceive” implies the admission of many other truths – namely, the existence of other persons and their experiences, which are external facts – re-state their position and say, “I can be certain only of my perceptions. Anything that lies beyond them is uncertain.” In refuting such a position it may be said that occasionally there do occur errors of cognition – as in cases of errors of vision and Tactual sense and errors of reasoning – but if there were no external realities beyond one’s self and one’s perceptions, realities which either correspond to these perceptions or do not, there would obviously be no room for error. It may be said that the opinion of this group is not a total negation of knowledge. What they mean is that the forms presented to the senses may not exactly conform to external facts as they are. For instance, it has been pointed out that sound as it appears to hearing does not exist in external reality. Rather, when it reaches a certain frequency it becomes audible to hearing in the form at audible sound. Similarly, when the frequency of electromagnetic waves reaches a certain number it appears to vision in the form of visible light and colours. Hence the senses, which are the source of perception, do not reveal the realities transcending them, and all other contents of cognition terminate in the senses. However, if perception is assumed to be incapable of revealing the reality transcending it, where does this knowledge come from that there does exist such a reality beyond perception, a reality which perception fails to reveal?
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Who has cognized that external sound consists of vibrations of a certain frequency and visible light has such and such a frequency in external reality? Does man discover the real external facts except through the faculties of perception, the same external facts in perceiving which the senses make errors? In view of what has been said above, the suggestion that perception may not conform absolutely to what lies beyond it only amounts to a denial of the possibility of knowledge. Then, even the statement, “Our perceptions may not conform to anything in external reality” will not be secure from failing to reveal anything in respect of the individual concepts and the judgement involved in it.
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اﻟﻔﺼﻞ اﻟﺘﺎﺳﻊ و ﻳﻨﻘﺴﻢ اﻟﻌﻠﻢ اﻟﺤﺼﻮﻟﻲ إﻟﻰ ﺣﻘﻴﻘﻲ و اﻋﺘﺒﺎري و اﳊﻘﻴﻘﻲ : ﻫﻮ اﳌﻔﻬﻮم اﻟﺬي ﻳﻮﺟﺪ ﺗﺎرة ﺑﻮﺟﻮد ﺧﺎرﺟﻲ ﻓﻴﱰﺗﺐ ﻋﻠﻴﻪ آﺛﺎرﻩ و ﺗﺎرة ﺑﻮﺟﻮد ﻛﺎن ﲞﻼف ذﻟﻚ و ﻫﻮ إﻣﺎ ﻣﻦ ذﻫﲏ ﻻ ﻳﱰﺗﺐ ﻋﻠﻴﻪ آﺛﺎرﻩ و ﻫﺬا ﻫﻮ اﳌﺎﻫﻴﺔ و اﻻﻋﺘﺒﺎري ﻣﺎ ﻛﺎﻟﻮﺣﺪة و ج ﻛﺎﻟﻮﺟﻮد و ﺻﻔﺎﺗﻪ اﳊﻘﻴﻘﻴﺔ اﳌﻔﺎﻫﻴﻢ اﻟﱵ ﺣﻴﺜﻴﺔ ﻣﺼﺪاﻗﻬﺎ ﺣﻴﺜﻴﺔ أﻧﻪ ﰲ اﳋﺎر اﻟﻔﻌﻠﻴﺔ و ﻏﲑﳘﺎ ﻓﻼ ﻳﺪﺧﻞ اﻟﺬﻫﻦ و إﻻ ﻻﻧﻘﻠﺐ و إﻣﺎ ﻣﻦ اﳌﻔﺎﻫﻴﻢ اﻟﱵ ﺣﻴﺜﻴﺔ ﻣﺼﺪاﻗﻬﺎ ج و إﻻ ﻻﻧﻘﻠﺐ ﺣﻴﺜﻴﺔ أﻧﻪ ﰲ اﻟﺬﻫﻦ ﻛﻤﻔﻬﻮم اﻟﻜﻠﻲ و اﳉﻨﺲ و اﻟﻨﻮع ﻓﻼ ﻳﻮﺟﺪ ﰲ اﳋﺎر. و ﻫﺬﻩ اﳌﻔﺎﻫﻴﻢ إﳕﺎ ﻳﻌﻤﻠﻬﺎ اﻟﺬﻫﻦ ﺑﻨﻮع ﻣﻦ اﻟﺘﻌﻤﻞ و ﻳﻮﻗﻌﻬﺎ ﻋﻠﻰ ﻣﺼﺎدﻳﻘﻬﺎ ﻟﻜﻦ ﻻ ﻛﻮﻗﻮع اﳌﺎﻫﻴﺔ و ﲪﻠﻬﺎ ﻋﻠﻰ أﻓﺮادﻫﺎ ﲝﻴﺚ ﺗﺆﺧﺬ ﰲ ﺣﺪﻫﺎ. و ﳑﺎ ﺗﻘﺪم ﻳﻈﻬﺮ أوﻻ: ﻛﺎن ﻣﻦ اﳌﻔﺎﻫﻴﻢ ﳏﻤﻮﻻ ﻋﻠﻰ اﻟﻮاﺟﺐ و اﳌﻤﻜﻦ ﻣﻌﺎ أن ﻣﺎ ﻛﺎﻟﻮﺟﻮد و اﳊﻴﺎة ﻓﻬﻮ اﻋﺘﺒﺎري و إﻻ ﻟﻜﺎن اﻟﻮاﺟﺐ ذا ﻣﺎﻫﻴﺔ ﺗﻌﺎﱃ ﻋﻦ ذﻟﻚ. و ﺛﺎﻧﻴﺎ : ﻛﺎﳊﺮﻛﺔ ﻓﻬﻮ اﻋﺘﺒﺎري و إﻻ ﻛﺎن ﻣﻨﻬﺎ ﳏﻤﻮﻻ ﻋﻠﻰ أزﻳﺪ ﻣﻦ ﻣﻘﻮﻟﺔ واﺣﺪة أن ﻣﺎ ﻛﺎن ﳎﻨﺴﺎ ﲜﻨﺴﲔ ﻓﺄزﻳﺪ و ﻫﻮ ﳏﺎل. و ﺛﺎﻟﺜﺎ : أن ت اﳌﻔﺎﻫﻴﻢ اﻻﻋﺘﺒﺎرﻳﺔ ﻻ ﺣﺪ ﳍﺎ و ﻻ ﺗﺆﺧﺬ ﰲ ﺣﺪ ﻣﺎﻫﻴﺔ ﻣﻦ اﳌﺎﻫﻴﺎ. ﻛﺎﳌﺎﻫﻴﺔ ﻣﻘﺎﺑﻞ و ﻟﻼﻋﺘﺒﺎري ﻣﻌﺎن أﺧﺮ ﺧﺎرﺟﺔ ﻋﻦ ﲝﺜﻨﺎ ﻣﻨﻬﺎ اﻻﻋﺘﺒﺎري ﻣﻘﺎﺑﻞ اﻷﺻﻴﻞ ﻛﺎﻹﺿﺎﻓﺔ اﻟﻮﺟﻮد و ﻣﻨﻬﺎ اﻻﻋﺘﺒﺎري ﲟﻌﲎ ﻣﺎ ﻟﻴﺲ ﻟﻪ وﺟﻮد ﻣﻨﺤﺎز ﻣﻘﺎﺑﻞ ﻣﺎ ﻟﻪ وﺟﻮد ﻣﻨﺤﺎز اﳌﻮﺟﻮدة ﺑﻮﺟﻮد ﻃﺮﻓﻴﻬﺎ ﻣﻘﺎﺑﻞ ا ﳉﻮﻫﺮ اﳌﻮﺟﻮد ﺑﻨﻔﺴﻪ و ﻣﻨﻬﺎ ﻣﺎ ﻳﻮﻗﻊ و ﳛﻤﻞ ﻋﻠﻰ ﻛﺈﻃﻼق اﻟﺮأس ﻋﻠﻰ زﻳﺪ اﳌﻮﺿﻮﻋﺎت ﺑﻨﻮع ﻣﻦ اﻟﺘﺸﺒﻴﻪ و اﳌﻨﺎﺳﺒﺔ ﻟﻠﺤﺼﻮل ﻋﻠﻰ ﻏﺎﻳﺔ ﻋﻤﻠﻴﺔ ﻛﻨﺴﺒﺔ اﻟﺮأس إﱃ اﻟﺒﺪن ﺣﻴﺚ ﻳﺪﺑﺮ أﻣﺮﻫﻢ و ﻳﺼﻠﺢ ﺷﺄ5ﻢ و ﻳﺸﲑ إﱃ ﻟﻜﻮن ﻧﺴﺒﺘﻪ إﱃ اﻟﻘﻮم ﻛﻞ ﲟﺎ ﳜﺼﻪ ﻣﻦ واﺟﺐ اﻟﻌﻤﻞ.
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11.9. DIVISION OF MEDIATED KNOWLEDGE INTO HAQÎQÎ AND I’TIBÂRÎ The term ‘real’ (haqîqî) refers to concepts which [that is, whose referents], when existing externally, exist with their external properties, and which exists in the mind without those external properties. Such concepts pertain to quiddity (mâhiyyah). Opposed to them are concepts that are denoted by the termed ‘derivative’ (i’tibârî). It refers either to concepts the mode (haytsiyyah) of whose referent is externality only, such as ‘existence’ and its real characteristics, such as ‘unity,’ ‘actuality’ and so on. That which is denoted by such concepts does not enter the mind, for otherwise it would involve a violation of the law of identity (inqilâb). Or it refers to concepts the mode of whose referent is mental, such as the oncepts of ‘universal,’ ‘genus’ and ‘species,’ which are not to be found externally, for otherwise that will involve a violation of the . of identity. The so-called i’tibârî concepts are formulated by the mind through a kind of contemplative effort and applied to their referents, though not in the way quiddity is applied to and predicated of its individuals and taken within their confines. From what has been said it first becomes clear that the concepts which are predicated of the Necessary Being and contingent existents, such as existence and life, are i’tibârî; for otherwise the Necessary Being would have quiddity. Second, the concepts which are predicated of more than one category, such as motion, are i’tibârî; for otherwise they would belong to two or more genera, and that is inadmissible. Third, the i’tibârî concepts do not have any definitions (i.e. genus and species), nor are they confined to any particular quiddity. It is important to note that there are other meanings of the term i’tibârî which are not relevant to our discussion, (i) One of these is the sense of i’tibârî as opposed to ‘fundamentally real’ ( ashîl), such s quiddity in opposition to existence, (ii) Another sense of it is meant when i’tibârî is used for something which does not have an independent existence of its own, as opposed to something which exists independently, as in the case of a relation, which exists trough the existence of its two sides as opposed to substance, which exists by itself, (iii) Another meaning of i’tibârî is that which is applied to and predicated of subjects in a figurative and metaphorical sense with a practical end in view, such as the application f the word ‘head’ to Zayd as someone whose relation to his people is like the relation of the head to the body because he manages r.eir affairs, solves their problems and assigns to everyone his particular duties and tasks.
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اﻟﻔﺼﻞ اﻟﻌﺎﺷﺮ ﻓﻲ أﺣﻜﺎم ﻣﺘﻔﺮﻗﺔ ﻣﻨﻬﺎ : أن اﳌﻌﻠﻮم ﺑﺎﻟﻌﻠﻢ اﳊﺼﻮﱄ ﻳﻨﻘﺴﻢ إﱃ ﻣﻌﻠﻮم ﺑﺎﻟﺬات و ﻣﻌﻠﻮم ﺑﺎﻟﻌﺮض و اﳌﻌﻠﻮم ﺑﺎﻟﺬات ﻫﻮ اﻟﺼﻮرة اﳊﺎﺻﻠﺔ ﺑﻨ ﻔﺴﻬﺎ ﻋﻨﺪ اﻟﻌﺎﱂ و اﳌﻌﻠﻮم ﺑﺎﻟﻌﺮض ﻫﻮ اﻷﻣﺮ اﳋﺎرﺟﻲ اﻟﺬي . ﺎز ﻻﲢﺎد ﻣﺎ ﻟﻪ ﻣﻊ اﳌﻌﻠﻮم ﺑﺎﻟﺬات R ﳛﻜﻴﻪ اﻟﺼﻮرة اﻟﻌﻠﻤﻴﺔ و ﻳﺴﻤﻰ ﻣﻌﻠﻮﻣﺎ ﺑﺎﻟﻌﺮض و ا و ﻣﻨﻬﺎ : ﻛﻞ ﻋﺎﻗﻞ ﻓﻬﻮ ﳎﺮد ﻓﻠﻴﻌﻠﻢ أن ﻫﺬﻩ ﻛﻤﺎ أن ﻛﻞ ﻣﻌﻘﻮل ﻓﻬﻮ ﳎﺮد أﻧﻪ ﺗﻘﺪم أن اﳌﻔﺎﻫﻴﻢ اﻟﻈﺎﻫﺮة ﻟﻠﻘﻮة اﻟﻌﺎﻗﻠﺔ اﻟﱵ ﺗﻜﺘﺴﺐ ﻛﺎﻧﺖ ﳎﺮدة ﻓﻬﻲ أﻗﻮى ﲝﺼﻮﳍﺎ ﳍﺎ اﻟﻔﻌﻠﻴﺔ ﺣﻴﺚ وﺟﻮدا ﻣﻦ اﻟﻨﻔﺲ اﻟﻌﺎﻗﻠﺔ اﻟﱵ ﺗﺴﺘﻜﻤﻞ -ﺎ و آﺛﺎرﻫﺎ ﻣﱰﺗﺒﺔ ﻋﻠﻴﻬﺎ ﻓﻬﻲ ﰲ اﳊﻘﻴﻘﺔ ﻣﻮﺟﻮدات ﻛﺎﻧﺖ ﺻﻮر ﺟﻮاﻫﺮ و ﺎ اﳋﺎرﺟﻴﺔ ﻟﻠﻨﻔﺲ اﻟﻌﺎﳌﺔ ﻓﺘﺘﺤﺪ اﻟﻨﻔﺲ -ﺎ إن T ﳎﺮدة ﺗﻈﻬﺮ ﺑﻮﺟﻮدا ﻛﺎﻧﺖ أﻋﺮاﺿﺎ ﻟﻜﻨﺎ ﻻﺗﺼﺎ ﺎ اﳌﺘﺼﻔﺔ -ﺎ إن T ﲟﻮﺿﻮﻋﺎ ﻟﻨﺎ ﻣﻦ ﻃﺮﻳﻖ أدوات اﻹدراك ﺑﺎﳌﻮاد ﻧﺘﻮﻫﻢ ﺎ ﻧﻔﺲ اﻟﺼﻮر اﻟﻘﺎﺋﻤﺔ ﺑﺎﳌﻮاد ﻧﺰﻋﻨﺎﻫﺎ ﻣﻦ اﳌﻮاد ﻣﻦ دون آﺛﺎرﻫﺎ اﳌﱰﺗﺒﺔ ﻋﻠﻴﻬﺎ ﰲ ﻧﺸﺄة اﳌﺎدة 5أ ﻓﺼﺎرت وﺟﻮدات ذﻫﻨﻴﺔ ﻟﻸﺷﻴﺎء ﻻ ﻳﱰﺗﺐ ﻋﻠﻴﻬﺎ آﺛﺎرﻫﺎ. ﻓﻘﺪ ﺗﺒﲔ -ﺬا اﻟﺒﻴﺎن :ﺔ أن اﻟﻌﻠﻮم اﳊﺼﻮﻟﻴﺔ ﰲ اﳊﻘﻴﻘﺔ ﻋﻠﻮم ﺣﻀﻮرﻳ. و ﺑﺎن أﻳ ﺎ ﻀ : ﺮدة ﻋﻦ اﳌﺎدة ﻻ ﻋﻠﻢ ﺣﺼﻮﻟﻴﺎ ﻋﻨﺪﻫﺎ ﻻﻧﻘﻄﺎﻋﻬﺎ ﻋﻦ اﳌﺎدة ذاﺗﺎ R أن اﻟﻌﻘﻮل ا و ﻓﻌﻼ.
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11.10. SOME MISCELLANEOUS ISSUES That which is known through mediated knowledge is divisible ito that which is known by itself (ma’lûm bi al-dzât) and that which is known by accident (ma’lûm bi al-’arad). The known-by-itself is the form apprehended by the knower. The known-by-accident is the external object represented by the cognitive form, it is called the ‘accidentally known’ (ma’lûm bi al-arad) or the ‘figuratively known’ (ma’lûm bi al-majâz) due to its association with the known-by-itself. Another issue is that, as said earlier, every intelligible is immaterial in the same way as every intelligence is immaterial. Hence the concepts presented to the intellectual faculty, by apprehending which it acquires actuality, being immaterial, are existentialliy stronger than the intelligent soul, which develops through then means and is affected by them. Hence they are, in fact, immaterial existents that manifest themselves to the knowing soul through their external existence, and the soul unites with them when they are the forms of substances and with their substrata if they are accidents. However, due to our contact with matter through the means of the sensory organs, we imagine that the substratum of these forms is matter and that we abstract them from matter and the material properties possessed by them in their material state, whereupon they become mental existents representing external things without bearing their external properties. From this discussion it becomes clear that mediated knowledge, in fact, involves immediate knowledge. It also becomes clear that immaterial Intellects do not possess any mediated knowledge due to their total separation from matter – a separation which is essential as well as actual.
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ﻛﻞ ﻣﺠﺮد ﻓﻬﻮ ﻋﺎﻗﻞ اﻟﻔﺼﻞ اﻟﺤﺎدي ﻋﺸﺮ ﺮد ﺗﺎم ذاﺗﺎ ﻻ ﺗﻌﻠﻖ ﻟﻪ ﺑﺎﻟﻘﻮة ﻓﺬاﺗﻪ اﻟﺘﺎﻣﺔ ﺣﺎﺿﺮة ﻟﺬاﺗﻪ ﻣﻮﺟﻮدة ﳍﺎ و ﻻ ﻧﻌﲏ R ﻷن ا ﺑﺎﻟﻌﻠﻢ إﻻ ﺣﻀﻮر ﺷﻲ ﻲ ء ﻟﺸ ء ﺑﺎﳌﻌﲎ اﻟﺬي ﺗﻘﺪم ﻫﺬا ﰲ ﻋﻠﻤﻪ ﺑﻨﻔﺴﻪ و أﻣﺎ ﻋﻠﻤﻪ ﺑﻐﲑﻩ ﻓﺈن ﻟﻪ ﻟﺘﻤﺎم ذاﺗﻪ ﺮد ﺑﺎﻹﻣﻜﺎن ﻓﻬﻮ R ﻛﻞ ذات ﺗﺎم ﳝﻜﻦ أن ﻳﻌﻘﻞ و ﻣﺎ ﻟﻠﻤﻮﺟﻮد ا إﻣﻜﺎن أن ﻳﻌﻘﻞ ﻛﻞ ﳎﺮد ﻓﻬﻮ ﻣﻌﻘﻮل ﺑﺎﻟﻔﻌﻞ و ﻛﻤﺎ أن ﻟﻪ ﺑﺎﻟﻔﻌﻞ ﻓﻬﻮ ﻋﺎﻗﻞ ﺑﺎﻟﻔﻌﻞ ﻟﻜﻞ ﳎﺮد ﺗﺎم اﻟﻮﺟﻮد ﻋﻘﻞ ﺑﺎﻟﻔﻌﻞ. ﻓﺈن ﻗﻠﺖ : ﻛﻮن اﻟﻨﻔﺲ اﻹﻧﺴﺎﻧﻴﺔ ﻋﺎﻗﻠﺔ ﻟﻜﻞ ﻣﻌﻘﻮل ﻟﺘﺠﺮدﻫﺎ و ﻫﻮ ﻣﻘﺘﻀﻰ ﻣﺎ ذﻛﺮ ﺧﻼف اﻟﻀﺮورة. ﻗﻠﺖ :ﻫﻮ ﺎ ﺑﺎﻟﻔﻌﻞ T ﻛﺬﻟﻚ ﻟﻜﻦ اﻟﻨﻔﺲ ﳎﺮدة ذاﺗﺎ ﻻ ﻓﻌﻼ ﻓﻬﻲ ﻟﺘﺠﺮدﻫﺎ ذاﺗﺎ ﺗﻌﻘﻞ ذا ﻟﻜﻦ ﺗﻌﻠﻘﻬﺎ ﻓﻌﻼ ﻳﻮﺟﺐ ﺧﺮوﺟﻬﺎ ﻣﻦ اﻟﻘﻮة إﱃ اﻟﻔﻌﻞ ﺗﺪرﳚﺎ ﲝﺴﺐ اﻻﺳﺘﻌﺪادات اﳌﺨﺘﻠﻔﺔ ﻓﺈذا ﲡﺮدت ﲡﺮدا ﺗﺎﻣﺎ و ﱂ ﻳﺸﻐﻠﻬﺎ ﺗﺪﺑﲑ اﻟﺒﺪن ﺣﺼﻠﺖ ﳍﺎ ﲨﻴﻊ اﻟﻌﻠﻮم ﺣﺼﻮﻻ ﺑﺎﻟﻌﻘﻞ اﻹﲨﺎﱄ و ﺗﺼﲑ ﻋﻘﻼ ﻣﺴﺘﻔﺎ ﻞ دا ﺑﺎﻟﻔﻌ. و ﻏﲑ ﺧﻔﻲ : ﺮدة اﳉﻮﻫﺮﻳﺔ اﻟﱵ وﺟﻮدﻫﺎ ﻟﻨﻔﺴﻬﺎ و R أن ﻫﺬا اﻟﱪﻫﺎن إﳕﺎ ﳚﺮي ﰲ اﻟﺬوات ا .ﺎT أﻣﺎ أﻋﺮاﺿﻬﺎ اﻟﱵ وﺟﻮدﻫﺎ ﻟﻐﲑﻫﺎ ﻓﻼ ﺑﻞ اﻟﻌﺎﻗﻞ ﳍﺎ ﻣﻮﺿﻮﻋﺎ

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11.11. EVERY IMMATERIAL BEING IS INTELLIGENT That is because anything that is essentially and completely immaterial (mujarrad tâm dzâtan) has no association with potentiality. Therefore, its immaterial essence (dzât) is present and existent for itself. That is so because by knowledge we do not mean anything except a thing’s presence for a thing in the aforementioned sense. This pertains to its knowledge of itself. As to its knowledge of entities other than itself, it is possible for it, by virtue of its essential immateriality, to intellect every immaterial being that can be intellected; and for an immaterial existent that which is possible is actual. Hence it intellects in actuality every immaterial existent, in the same way as every immaterial being is intelligible in actuality as well as intelligent in actuality. If it is said that this implies that the human soul, being immaterial, intellects every intelligible, which is obviously not admissible. The answer is that the soul is immaterial essentially, not in actuality; by virtue of its essential immateriality it intellects its own essence in act, but its actual association [with matter] necessitates its gradual transition from potentiality to act in accordance with different degrees of preparedness. And when it attains to complete immateriality and is no more preoccupied with the regulation of the body’s functions, it apprehends all knowables in the manner of non-differentiated knowledge, becoming an acquired intellect in act (‘aql mustafâd bi al-fi’l). It is evident that this argument applies to immaterial essences which are substances and are existent-for-themselves, not to accidents, whose existence is for-other-than-themselves; that which intellects them is their substratum.
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اﻟﻔﺼﻞ اﻟﺜﺎﻧﻲ ﻋﺸﺮ ﻓﻲ اﻟﻌﻠﻢ اﻟﺤﻀﻮري و أﻧﻪ ﻻ ﻳﺨﺘﺺ ﺑﻌﻠﻢ اﻟﺸﻲ ﻪ ء ﺑﻨﻔﺴ ﻗﺪ ﺗﻘﺪم :ﻧ ﺮدة ﻟﺘﻤﺎﻣﻬﺎ و ﻓﻌﻠﻴﺘﻬﺎ ﺣﺎﺿﺮة ﰲ R أن اﳉﻮاﻫﺮ ا ﻔﺴﻬﺎ ﻟﻨﻔﺴﻬﺎ ﻓﻬﻲ ﻋﺎﳌﺔ ﺑﻨﻔﺴﻬﺎ ﻋﻠﻤﺎ ﺣﻀﻮرﻳﺎ ﻓﻬﻞ ﳜﺘﺺ اﻟﻌﻠﻢ اﳊﻀﻮري ﺑﻌﻠﻢ اﻟﺸﻲ ء ﺑﻨﻔﺴﻪ أو ﻳﻌﻤﻪ و ﻋﻠﻢ اﻟﻌﻠﺔ ﻛﺎﻧﺎ ﳎﺮدﻳﻦ و ﺑﺎﻟﻌﻜﺲ اﳌﺸﺎءون ﻋﻠﻰ اﻷول و اﻹﺷﺮاﻗﻴﻮن ﻋﻠﻰ اﻟﺜﺎﱐ و ﻫﻮ اﳊﻖ ﲟﻌﻠﻮﳍﺎ إذا . و ذﻟﻚ :ﻘ ﻛﻤﺎ ﺗﻘﺪم راﺑﻂ ﻟﻮﺟﻮد اﻟﻌﻠﺔ ﻗﺎﺋﻢ ﺑﻪ ﻏﲑ ﻣﺴﺘ ﻷن وﺟﻮد اﳌﻌﻠﻮل إذا ﻞ ﻋﻨﻪ ﻓﻬﻮ ﻛﺎﻧﺎ ﳎﺮدﻳﻦ ﺣﺎﺿﺮ ﺑﺘﻤﺎم وﺟﻮدﻩ ﻋﻨﺪ ﻋﻠﺘﻪ ﻻ ﺣﺎﺋﻞ ﺑﻴﻨﻬﻤﺎ ﻓﻬﻮ ﺑﻨﻔﺲ وﺟﻮدﻩ ﻣﻌﻠﻮم ﳍﺎ ﻋﻠﻤﺎ ﺣﻀﻮرﻳﺎ. ﻛﺬﻟﻚ و : ﻛﺎﻧﺎ ﳎﺮدﻳﻦ ﻣﻦ اﻟﻌﻠﺔ ﺣﺎﺿﺮة ﺑﻮﺟﻮدﻫﺎ ﳌﻌﻠﻮﳍﺎ اﻟﻘﺎﺋﻢ -ﺎ اﳌﺴﺘﻘﻞ ﺑﺎﺳﺘﻘﻼﳍﺎ إذا ﻏﲑ ﺣﺎﺋﻞ ﳛﻮل ﺑﻴﻨﻬﻤﺎ ﻓﻬﻲ ﻣﻌﻠﻮﻣﺔ ﳌﻌﻠﻮﳍﺎ ﻋﻠﻤﺎ ﺣﻀﻮرﻳﺎ و ﻫﻮ اﳌﻄﻠﻮب.

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11.12. IMMEDIATE KNOWLEDGE IS NOT LIMITED TO SELF-KNOWLEDGE It was said earlier that immaterial substances are in themselves presentfor-themselves by virtue of their immateriality and actuality. However, is immediate knowledge confined to an entity’s knowledge of itself? Or does it include a cause’s knowledge of its effect and vice versa, when both of them are immaterial? The Peripatetics subscribe to the former position and the Emanationists subscribe to the latter view, which is the correct one. That is so because the existence of the effect is dependent, as mentioned earlier, on the existence of the cause, which sustains it. It is not independent of the cause. Hence when the cause and effect are immaterial, the effect is present with all its being for the cause, without there being any barrier between them. It is known with immediacy to the cause through its existence itself. Similarly, when the cause and effect are immaterial, the cause present with its existence for its effect, which is sustained by being independent through the independence of the cause, and there is no barrier separating them. Hence it is known to its effect with an immediate knowledge.
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اﻟﻤﺮﺣﻠﺔ اﻟﺜﺎﻧﻴﺔ ﻋﺸﺮ ﻓﻴﻤﺎ ﻳﺘﻌﻠﻖ ﺑﺎﻟﻮاﺟﺐ ﺗﻌﺎﻟﻰ ﻣﻦ إﺛﺒﺎت ذاﺗﻪ و ﺻﻔﺎﺗﻪ و أﻓﻌﺎﻟﻪ و ﻓﻴﻬﺎ أرﺑﻌﺔ ﻋﺸﺮ ﻼ ﻓﺼ CHAPTER TWELVE: The Necessary Being, the Proofs of Its Existence, Its Attributes and Acts 12 Units
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اﻟﻔﺼﻞ اﻷول ﻓﻲ إﺛﺒﺎت ذاﺗﻪ ﺗﻌﺎﻟﻰ ﺎ و ﺻﺮﻓﺔ ﻻ ﳜﺎﻟﻄﻬﺎ ﻏﲑﻫﺎ ﻟﺒﻄﻼن اﻟﻐﲑ ﻓﻼ 5 ﺣﻘﻴﻘﺔ اﻟﻮﺟﻮد اﻟﱵ ﻫﻲ أﺻﻴﻠﺔ ﻻ أﺻﻴﻞ دو ﻛﻤﺎ ﺗﻘﺪم ﰲ اﳌﺮﺣﻠﺔ اﻷوﱃ ﺛﺎﱐ ﳍﺎ ﻲ واﺟﺒﺔ اﻟﻮﺟﻮد ﻟﻀﺮورة ﺛﺒﻮت اﻟﺸ ء ﻟﻨﻔﺴﻪ و اﻣﺘﻨﺎع ﺻﺪق ﻛﻮن وﺟﻮ-ﺎ ﺑﺎﻟﻐﲑ ﺧﻠﻒ إذ ﻻ ﻧﻘﻴﻀﻪ و ﻫﻮ اﻟﻌﺪم ﻋﻠﻴﻪ و وﺟﻮ-ﺎ إﻣﺎ ﺑﺎﻟﺬات أو ﺑﺎﻟﻐﲑ ﻟﻜﻦ ﻏﲑ ﻫﻨﺎك و ﻻ ﺛﺎﱐ ﳍﺎ ﻓﻬﻲ واﺟﺒﺔ اﻟﻮﺟﻮد ﺑﺎﻟﺬات. ﺣﺠﺔ أﺧﺮى اﳌﺎﻫﻴﺎت اﳌﻤﻜﻨﺔ اﳌﻌﻠﻮﻟﺔ ﻣﻮﺟﻮدة ﻓﻬﻲ واﺟﺒﺔ اﻟﻮﺟﻮد ﻷن اﻟﺸﻲ ء ﻣﺎ ﱂ ﳚﺐ ﱂ ﻳﻮﺟﺪ و ﻛﺎن ﺑﺎﻟﺬات ﱂ ﳛﺘﺞ إﱃ ﻋﻠﺔ و اﻟﻌﻠﺔ اﻟﱵ -ﺎ ﳚﺐ وﺟﻮدﻫﺎ ﻣﻮﺟﻮدة وﺟﻮ-ﺎ ﺑﺎﻟﻐﲑ إذ ﻟﻮ واﺟﺒﺔ و وﺟﻮ-ﺎ إﻣﺎ ﺑﺎﻟﺬات أو ﺑﺎﻟﻐﲑ و ﻳﻨﺘﻬﻲ إﱃ اﻟﻮاﺟﺐ ﺑﺎﻟﺬات ﻻﺳﺘﺤﺎﻟﺔ اﻟﺪور و اﻟﺘﺴﻠﺴﻞ.
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12.1. THE PROOFS OF ITS EXISTENCE The reality of existence is necessarily existent, for it is fundamental (there being nothing fundamental except it) and absolute (shirf) (for it is not mingled with anything other than itself, as it has no other or second, as mentioned in Chapter One). This is so because it is necessary for a thing to be what it is and impossible for it to be its own contradictory, which is nonexistence in this case. Further, this necessity (wujûb) derives either from itself (bi al-dzât) or from something else (bi al-ghayr). However, it is selfcontradictory to regard this necessity as deriving from something else, for, in this case, there is no ‘other,’ nor a second. Hence it is necessarily existent-by-itself (wâjib al-wujûd bi al-dzât). Another Proof The quiddities, which are caused (ma’lûl) and contingent (mumkin) existents, also exist by necessity, for a thing does not come into being unless it is necessitated. However, their necessity is by virtue of something else; because were they necessary-by-themselves, they would not stand in need of a cause. Now the cause that necessitates their existence is also existent by necessity. This necessity is either by-itself or by-something-else, and this line of reasoning leads to that which is necessarily existent by-itself, because of the inadmissibility of a vicious circle or an indefinite regress.
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اﻟﻔﺼﻞ اﻟﺜﺎﻧﻲ ﻓﻲ إﺛﺒﺎت وﺣﺪاﻧﻴﺘﻪ ﺗﻌﺎﻟﻰ ﻛﻮن واﺟﺐ اﻟﻮﺟﻮد ﺗﻌﺎﱃ ﺣﻘﻴﻘﺔ اﻟﻮﺟﻮد اﻟﺼﺮف اﻟﱵ ﻻ ﺛﺎﱐ ﳍﺎ ﻳﺜﺒﺖ وﺣﺪاﻧﻴﺘﻪ ﺗﻌﺎﱃ ﻛﻞ ﻣﺎ ﻓﺮض ﺛﺎﻧﻴﺎ ﳍﺎ ﻋﺎد أوﻻ ﻟﻌﺪم ﺑﺎﻟﻮﺣﺪة اﳊﻘﺔ اﻟﱵ ﻳﺴﺘﺤﻴﻞ ﻣﻌﻬﺎ ﻓﺮض اﻟﺘﻜﺜﺮ ﻓﻴﻬﺎ إذ اﳌﻴﺰ ﲞﻼف اﻟ ﺬا ﻮﺣﺪة اﻟﻌﺪدﻳﺔ اﻟﱵ إذا ﻓﺮض ﻣﻌﻬﺎ ﺛﺎن ﻋﺎد ﻣﻊ اﻷول اﺛﻨﲔ و ﻫﻜ. ﺣﺠﺔ أﺧﺮى ﻛﺎن ﻫﻨﺎك واﺟﺒﺎن ﻓﺼﺎﻋﺪا اﻣﺘﺎز أﺣﺪﳘﺎ ﻣﻦ اﻵﺧﺮ ﺑﻌﺪ اﺷﱰاﻛﻬﻤﺎ ﰲ وﺟﻮب اﻟﻮﺟﻮد ﻟﻮ ﻤﺎ ﳑﺎ ﺑﻪ اﻻﺷﱰاك و ﻣﺎ ﺑﻪ T و ﻣﺎ ﺑﻪ اﻻﻣﺘﻴﺎز ﻏﲑ ﻣﺎ ﺑﻪ اﻻﺷﱰاك ﺑﺎﻟﻀﺮورة و ﻻزﻣﻪ ﺗﺮﻛﺐ ذا
اﻻﻣﺘﻴﺎز و ﻻزم اﻟﱰ ﻛﺐ اﳊﺎﺟﺔ إﱃ اﻷﺟﺰاء و ﻫﻲ ﺗﻨﺎﰲ اﻟﻮﺟﻮب اﻟﺬاﰐ اﻟﺬي ﻫﻮ ﻣﻨﺎط اﻟﻐﲎ اﻟﺼﺮف. ﺗﺘﻤﺔ ﻛﻤﻮﻧﺔ ﻋﻠﻰ ﻫﺬﻩ اﳊﺠﺔ أﻧﻪ ﱂ ﻻ ﳚﻮز أن ﻳﻜﻮن ﻫﻨﺎك ﻫﻮﻳﺘﺎن ﺑﺴﻴﻄﺘﺎن ﳎﻬﻮﻟﺘﺎ أورد اﺑﻦ ﻛﻞ ﻣﻨﻬﻤﺎ واﺟﺐ اﻟﻮﺟﻮد ﺑﺬاﺗﻪ و ﻳﻜﻮن ﻣﻔﻬﻮم واﺟﺐ اﻟﻜﻨﻪ ﳐﺘﻠﻔﺘﺎن ﺑﺘﻤﺎم اﳌﺎﻫﻴﺔ ﻳﻜﻮن اﻟﻮﺟﻮد ﻣﻨﺘﺰﻋﺎ ﻣﻨﻬﻤ ﺎ ﺎ ﻣﻘﻮﻻ ﻋﻠﻴﻬﻤﺎ ﻗﻮﻻ ﻋﺮﺿﻴ. و أﺟﻴﺐ ﻋﻨﻪ : ﺑﺄن ﻓﻴﻪ اﻧﺘﺰاع ﻣﻔﻬﻮم واﺣﺪ ﻣﻦ ﻣﺼﺎدﻳﻖ ﳐﺘﻠﻔﺔ ﲟﺎ ﻫﻲ ﳐﺘﻠﻔﺔ و ﻫﻮ ﻏﲑ ﺟﺎﺋﺰ. ﻋﻠﻰ : أن ﻓﻴﻪ إﺛﺒﺎت اﳌﺎﻫﻴﺔ ﻟﻠﻮاﺟﺐ و ﻗﺪ ﺗﻘﺪم إﺛﺒﺎت أن ﻣﺎﻫﻴﺘﻪ ﺗﻌﺎﱃ وﺟﻮدﻩ و ﻓﻴﻪ أﻳﻀﺎ اﻗﺘﻀﺎء اﳌﺎﻫﻴﺔ ﻟﻠﻮﺟﻮد و ﻗﺪ ﺗﻘﺪم أﺻﺎﻟﺘﻪ و اﻋﺘﺒﺎرﻳﺘﻬﺎ و ﻻ ﻣﻌﲎ ﻻ ﻞ ﻗﺘﻀﺎء اﻻﻋﺘﺒﺎري ﻟﻸﺻﻴ. و ﻳﺘﻔﺮع ﻋﻠﻰ وﺣﺪاﻧﻴﺘﻪ ﺗﻌﺎﱃ -ﺬا اﳌﻌﲎ : أن وﺟﻮدﻩ ﺗﻌﺎﱃ ﻏﲑ ﳏﺪود ﲝﺪ ﻋﺪﻣﻲ ﻳﻮﺟﺐ اﻧﺴﻼﺑﻪ ﻋﻤﺎ وراءﻩ. و ﻳﺘﻔﺮع أﻳﻀﺎ : أن ذاﺗﻪ ﺗﻌﺎﱃ ﺑﺴﻴﻄﺔ ﻣﻨﻔﻲ ﻋﻨﻬﺎ اﻟﱰﻛﻴﺐ ﺑﺄي وﺟﻪ ﻓﺮض إذ اﻟﱰﻛﻴﺐ ﺑﺄي وﺟﻪ ﻓﺮض ﻻ ﻳﺘﺤﻘﻖ إﻻ ﺑﺄﺟﺰاء ﻳﺘﺄﻟﻒ ﻣﻨﻬﺎ اﻟﻜﻞ و ﻳﺘﻮﻗﻒ ﲢ ﻘﻘﻪ ﻋﻠﻰ ﲢﻘﻘﻬﺎ و ﻫﻮ اﳊﺎﺟﺔ إﻟﻴﻬﺎ و اﳊﺎﺟﺔ ﺗﻨﺎﰲ اﻟﻮﺟﻮب اﻟﺬاﰐ.

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12.2. THE PROOF OF ITS UNITY As the Necessarily Existent Being [wâjib al-wujûd, henceforth referred to as “the Necessary Being”] is the reality of absolute existence (al-wujûd alshirf), which has no other, this establishes Its unity, which is ‘true unity’ [alwahdat al-haqqah) wherein it is impossible to assume any multiplicity. For if the reality of absolute existence were assumed to have a second, this second will turn out to be the first one due to the absence of any distinction, contrary to the case of numerical unity wherein a second, when assumed, makes it a duality, and so on and so forth. Another Proof If there were two or more Necessary Beings, each of them would be distinct from the other while sharing the quality of being necessarily existent. Now the factor that makes them distinct from one another has, of necessity, to be other than what they hold in common, and this entails that their essences be composed of what they hold in common and what makes them distinct from one another. This composition entails the need for parts – something that contradicts their being necessary-by-themselves (al-wujûb al-dzâtî, henceforth translated as ‘essential necessity’], a condition that is the criterion of absolute self-sufficiency (al-ghinâ al-shirf). A Supplementary Note Ibn Kammûnah has formulated an objection that contests this proof. Why should it be inadmissible to suppose two simple entities (huwiyyatân) of unknown nature that differ from one another with all their quiddities, while each of them is a self-existing necessary being, so that the concept of existential necessity be abstracted from each of them in an accidental manner? The answer to this is that it is inadmissible because it involves the abstraction of a single concept from different entities qua different entities. Moreover, this line of reasoning ascribes quiddity to the Necessary Being, and it was established earlier that Its quiddity is Its existence. Furthermore, it involves the derivation of existence from quiddity, whereas, as mentioned earlier, existence is fundamental (ashîl) and quiddity derived (i’tibârî), and the derivation of something fundamental from that which is derived makes no sense. It follows from the unity of the Necessary Being – i.e., in this particular sense of unity – that Its existence is not limited by any limit of privation (hadd ‘adamî) so as to exclude anything beyond It. It also follows from it that Its essence is simple, without composition of any kind; for composition, whatever its form, does not occur without parts that make up the whole, whose actualization depends on the actualization of the parts that it needs, and need contradicts essential necessity.
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اﻟﻔﺼﻞ اﻟﺜﺎﻟﺚ ﻓﻲ أن اﻟﻮاﺟﺐ ﺗﻌﺎﻟﻰ ﻫﻮ اﻟﻤﺒﺪ ي ﻛﻤﺎل وﺟﻮد أ اﻟﻤﻔﻴﺾ ﻟﻜﻞ وﺟﻮد و ﻛــﻞ ﳑﻜــﻦ ﻛــﻞ ﻣﻮﺟــﻮد ﻏــﲑﻩ ﺗﻌــﺎﱃ ﳑﻜــﻦ ﺑﺎﻟــﺬات ﻻﳓﺼــﺎر اﻟﻮﺟــﻮب ﺑﺎﻟــﺬات ﻓﻴــﻪ ﺗﻌــﺎﱃ و ﻪ ﻣﺎﻫﻴــﺔ ﻫــﻲ اﻟــﱵ ﺗﺴــﺘﻮي ﻧﺴــﺒﺘﻬﺎ إﱃ اﻟﻮﺟــﻮد و اﻟﻌــﺪم و ﻫــﻲ اﻟــﱵ ﲢﺘــﺎج ﰲ وﺟﻮدﻫــﺎ إﱃ ﻓـﺈن ﻟــ ﻛﺎﻧـﺖ ﻛﺎﻧـﺖ واﺟﺒـﺔ ﺑﺎﻟـﺬات ﻓﻬـﻮ و إن ﻋﻠﺔ -ﺎ ﳚﺐ وﺟﻮدﻫـﺎ ﻓﺘﻮﺟـﺪ و اﻟﻌﻠـﺔ إن واﺟﺒـﺔ ﺑـﺎﻟﻐﲑ اﻧﺘﻬﻰ ذﻟﻚ إﱃ اﻟﻮاﺟﺐ ﺑﺎﻟﺬات ﻓﺎﻟﻮاﺟﺐ ﺑﺎﻟﺬات ﻫﻮ اﻟﺬي ﻳﻔﻴﺾ ﻋﻨﻪ وﺟـﻮد ﻛـﻞ ذي وﺟـﻮد . ﻣﻦ اﳌﺎﻫﻴﺎت و ﻣﻦ ﻃﺮﻳﻖ آﺧﺮ ﺪود ذواTــﺎ ﻓﻬــﻲ ﻣــﺎ ﺳــﻮاﻩ ﺗﻌــﺎﱃ ﻣــﻦ اﻟﻮﺟــﻮدات اﻹﻣﻜﺎﻧﻴــﺔ ﻓﻘــﺮاء ﰲ أﻧﻔﺴــﻬﺎ ﻣﺘﻌﻠﻘــﺎت ﰲ ﺣــ
وﺟﻮدات راﺑﻄﺔ ﻻ اﺳﺘﻘﻼل ﳍﺎ ﺣـﺪوﺛﺎ و ﻻ ﺑﻘـﺎء و إﳕـﺎ ﺗﺘﻘـﻮم ﺑﻐﲑ ﻫـﺎ و ﻳﻨﺘﻬـﻲ ذﻟـﻚ إﱃ وﺟـﻮد ﻣﺴﺘﻘﻞ ﰲ ﻧﻔﺴﻪ ﻏـﲏ ﰲ ذاﺗـﻪ ﻻ ﺗﻌﻠـﻖ ﻟـﻪ ﺑﺸـﻲ ء ﺗﻌﻠـﻖ اﻟﻔﻘـﺮ و اﳊﺎﺟـﺔ و ﻫـﻮ اﻟﻮاﺟـﺐ اﻟﻮﺟـﻮد . ﺗﻌﺎﱃ و ﺗﻘﺪس ﻛﻤـﺎ أﻧـﻪ ﻣﻔـﻴﺾ ﳍـﺎ ﻣﻔـﻴﺾ ﻓﺘﺒﲔ أن اﻟﻮاﺟـﺐ اﻟﻮﺟـﻮد ﺗﻌـﺎﱃ ﻫـﻮ اﳌﻔـﻴﺾ ﻟﻮﺟـﻮد ﻣـﺎ ﺳـﻮاﻩ و ﻵﺛﺎرﻫﺎ اﻟﻘﺎﺋﻤﺔ -ﺎ و اﻟﻨﺴﺐ و اﻟﺮواﺑﻂ اﻟﱵ ﺑﻴﻨﻬﺎ ﻓﺈن اﻟﻌﻠﺔ ﻲ اﳌﻮﺟﺒﺔ ﻟﻠﺸ ء اﳌﻘﻮﻣﺔ ﻟﻮﺟﻮدﻩ ﻋﻠـﺔ . ﻣﻮﺟﺒﺔ ﻵﺛﺎرﻩ و اﻟﻨﺴﺐ اﻟﻘﺎﺋﻤﺔ ﺑﻪ و ﻣﻘﻮﻣﺔ ﳍﺎ ﻓﻬــﻮ ﺗﻌــﺎﱃ وﺣــﺪﻩ اﳌﺒــﺪأ اﳌﻮﺟــﺪ ﳌــﺎ ﺳــﻮاﻩ اﳌﺎﻟــﻚ ﳍــﺎ اﳌــﺪﺑﺮ ﻷﻣﺮﻫــﺎ ﻓﻬــﻮ رب اﻟﻌــﺎﳌﲔ ﻻ رب . ﺳﻮاﻩ ﺗﺘﻤﺔ ﻗﺎﻟﺖ اﻟﺜﻨﻮﻳﺔ :ﺎ إن ﰲ اﻟﻮﺟﻮد ﺧﲑا و ﺷﺮا و ﳘﺎ ﻣﺘﻀﺎدان ﻻ ﻳﺴﺘﻨﺪان إﱃ ﻣﺒﺪإ واﺣﺪ ﻓﻬﻨ ك ﻣﺒﺪﺋﺎن ﻣﺒﺪأ اﳋﲑات و ﻣﺒﺪأ اﻟﺸﺮور. و ﻋﻦ أﻓﻼﻃﻮن ﰲ دﻓﻌﻪ : أن اﻟﺸﺮ ﻋﺪم و اﻟﻌﺪم ﻻ ﳛﺘﺎج إﱃ ﻋﻠﺔ ﻓﻴﺎﺿﺔ ﺑﻞ ﻋﻠﺘﻪ ﻋﺪم ﻛﺎﻟﻘﺘﻞ اﻟﺬي ﻫﻮ ﺷﺮ ﻣﺜﻼ ﻓﺈن اﻟﺸﺮ ﻟﻴﺲ ﻫﻮ ﻗﺪرة اﻟﻮﺟﻮد و ﻗﺪ ﺑﲔ اﻟﺼﻐﺮى ﺑﺄﻣﺜﻠﺔ ﺟﺰﺋﻴﺔ ﻛﻤﺎل ﻟﻪ و ﻻ ﺣﺪة اﻟﺴﻴﻒ ﻣﺜﻼ و ﺻﻼﺣﻴﺘﻪ ﻟﻠﻘﻄﻊ ﻓ اﻟﻘﺎﺗﻞ ﻋﻠﻴﻪ ﻓﺈﻧﻪ ﻛﻤﺎل ﻓﻴﻪ و ﻻ ﺈﻧﻪ ﻛﻤﺎل اﻟﺒﺪن ﻓﻼ ﻳﺒﻘﻰ ﻟﻠﺸﺮ إﻻ ﺑﻄﻼن ﺣﻴﺎة اﳌﻘﺘﻮل اﻧﻔﻌﺎل رﻗﺒﺔ اﳌﻘﺘﻮل ﻣﻦ اﻟﻀﺮﺑﺔ ﻓﺈﻧﻪ ﻣﻦ ﺑﺬﻟﻚ و ﻫﻮ أﻣﺮ ﻋﺪﻣﻲ و ﻋﻠﻰ ﻫﺬا اﻟﻘﻴﺎس ﰲ ﺳﺎﺋﺮ اﳌﻮارد. و ﻋﻦ أرﺳﻄﻮ : ﻛﺜﲑ و ﺷﺮﻩ ﻗﻠﻴﻞ و ﻣﺎ أن اﻷﻗﺴﺎم ﲬﺴﺔ ﻣﺎ ﻫﻮ ﺧﲑ ﳏﺾ و ﻣﺎ ﺧﲑﻩ ﺧﲑﻩ و ﺷﺮﻩ ﻣﺘﺴﺎوﻳﺎن و ﻣﺎ ﺷ ﻛﺜﲑ و ﺧﲑﻩ ﻗﻠﻴﻞ و ﻣﺎ ﻫﻮ ﺷﺮ ﳏﺾ و أول اﻷﻗﺴﺎم ﻣﻮﺟﻮد ﺮﻩ ﻛﺴﺎﺋﺮ اﳌﻮﺟﻮدات اﳌﺎدﻳﺔ اﻟﱵ ﻛﺬا اﻟﻘﺴﻢ اﻟﺜﺎﱐ ﺮدة اﻟﱵ ﻟﻴﺲ ﻓﻴﻬﺎ إﻻ اﳋﲑ و R ﻛﺎﻟﻌﻘﻮل ا
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ﻛﺜﲑا و أﻣﺎ اﻷﻗﺴﺎم اﻟﺜﻼﺛﺔ ﻛﺜﲑ ﺑﺎﻟﻨﻈﺮ إﱃ اﻟﻨﻈﺎم اﻟﻌﺎم ﻓﺈن ﰲ ﺗﺮك إﳚﺎدﻩ ﺷﺮا ﻓﻴﻬﺎ ﺧﲑ اﻟﺒﺎﻗﻴﺔ ﻓﻬﻲ ﻏﲑ ﻣﻮﺟﻮدة إﻣ ﺎ ﻣﺎ ﺧﲑﻩ و ﺷﺮﻩ ﻣﺘﺴﺎوﻳﺎن ﻓﺈن ﰲ إﳚﺎدﻩ ﺗﺮﺟﻴﺤﺎ ﺑﻼ ﻣﺮﺟﺢ و أﻣﺎ ﻛﺜﲑ و ﺧﲑﻩ ﻗﻠﻴﻞ ﻓﺈن ﰲ إﳚﺎدﻩ ﺗﺮﺟﻴﺢ اﳌﺮﺟﻮح ﻋﻠﻰ اﻟﺮاﺟﺢ و أﻣﺎ ﻣﺎ ﻫﻮ ﺷﺮ ﳏﺾ ﻣﺎ ﺷﺮﻩ ﻓﺄﻣﺮﻩ واﺿﺢ و ﺑﺎﳉﻤﻠﺔ ﱂ ﻳﺴﺘﻨﺪ ﺑﺎﻟﺬات إﱃ اﻟﻌﻠﺔ إﻻ اﳋﲑ اﶈﺾ و اﳋﲑ اﻟﻜﺜﲑ و أﻣﺎ اﻟﺸﺮ اﻟﻘﻠﻴﻞ ﻓﻘﺪ اﺳﺘﻨﺪ إﻟﻴﻬﺎ ﺑ ﻪ ﻌﺮض اﳋﲑ اﻟﻜﺜﲑ اﻟﺬي ﻳﻠﺰﻣ.
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12.3. THE NECESSARY BEING IS THE SOURCE OF EVERY BEING AND EVERY EXISTENTIAL PERFECTION Every existent other than It is essentially contingent (mumkin bi al-dzât). That is because essential necessity is exclusive to It. Every contingent being has a quiddity which is indifferent to existence and non-existence. Therefore, it needs a cause to exist. The cause necessitates its existence, whereupon it comes into being. If this cause be an existent necessary-byitself, the argument ends there; but if it is necessary-by-something-else, the chain must ultimately terminate in that which is necessary-by-itself. Hence the Essentially Necessary Being (al-wâjib bi al-dzât) is that from which emanates the existence of every existent from among the quiddities. Another Proof As opposed to God, the Exalted, all contingent beings (al-wujûdât alimkâniyyah) are needy in themselves, dependent in their very essence. Hence they are relational existents (wujûdât râbithah), which have no independence, neither for coming into being nor for continuing to exist. They subsist through something other than themselves. This chain of dependence leads up to a being that is independent in itself, self-sufficient, free from need or dependence on anything. That being is the exalted and holy Necessary Being. This shows that the Exalted Necessary Being is the source of emanation (mufîdh) of everything else. In the same way that It is the source of their being, it is also the source of the properties (âtsâr) that subsist through them as well as the relations and connections between them. That is so because the cause, which necessitates a thing and sustains its existence, is also the necessitating cause of its properties and their sustainer, as well as of the relations sustained by it. Hence the Exalted Necessary Being is the sole originating source of everything else, its owner (mâlik) and governor (mudabbir). Thus He is the Sustainer of the worlds and there is no sustainer besides Him. A Supplementary Note The dualists hold being to consist of good and evil, as two opposites that do not derive from a single source. They believe in two sources: a source of all that is good and a source of all that is evil. Plato, in refuting them, has offered the following argument: All evil is non-being. That which is non-existent does not need a cause; rather, its ‘cause’ is absence of existence. He has illustrated the minor premise with examples, such as that of homicide, which is regarded as something evil. The evil in this case is not the killer’s capacity to carry out the act of killing, for it is a perfection (kamâl) in him. Nor is it the sharpness of the sword, for instance, and its ability to cut, which is a perfection in it. Nor is it the passivity of the victim’s neck in relation to the blow, which is a perfection in the body. Hence, there remains no evil except the ceasing of the victim’s life as a result of the act. This is something involving non-being. The same reasoning applies to other instances of evil.
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According to Aristotle, five possibilities are conceivable in this regard: (i) that which is purely good; (ii) that whose good is greater than its evil; (iii) that whose good and evil are equal; (iv) that whose evil is greater than its good; and (v) that which is sheer evil. The first kind exists, such as the immaterial Intellect, which is wholly good. So also does the second kind, such as all the material existents, whose good is preponderant in view of the order of the universe. Had they not come into existence, a greater evil would have resulted. As to the three remaining possibilities, they do not exist. The creation of that whose good is equal to its evil would involve preponderance without a preponderant. As to that whose evil is greater than its good, its creation involves the preponderance of the non-preponderant over what is preponderant. As to that which is sheer evil, its matter is quite obvious. In summary, nothing except that which is purely good or predominantly good essentially derives from the Cause. As to that whose evil is lesser, it derives from the Cause together with the predominant good that accompanies it.
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اﻟﻔﺼﻞ اﻟﺮاﺑﻊ ﻓﻲ ﺻﻔﺎت اﻟﻮاﺟﺐ اﻟﻮﺟﻮد ﺗﻌﺎﻟﻰ و ﻣﻌﻨﻰ اﺗﺼﺎﻓﻪ ﺑﻬﺎ ﺗﻨﻘﺴﻢ اﻟﺼﻔﺎت اﻟﻮاﺟﺒﻴﺔ ﺑﺎﻟﻘﺴﻤﺔ اﻷوﻟﻴﺔ إﱃ ﻣﺎ ﺗﻜﻔﻲ ﰲ ﺛﺒﻮﺗﻪ اﻟﺬات اﳌﺘﻌﺎﻟﻴﺔ ﻣﻦ ﻏﲑ ﺣﺎﺟﺔ إﱃ ﻛﺤﻴﺎﺗﻪ ﺗﻌﺎﱃ و ﻋﻠﻤﻪ ﺑﻨﻔﺴﻪ و ﺗﺴﻤﻰ اﻟﺼﻔﺔ اﻟﺬاﺗﻴﺔ و ﻣﺎ ﻻ ﻳﺘﻢ ج ﻓﺮض أﻣﺮ ﺧﺎر ﻛﺎﳋﻠﻖ و اﻟﺮزق و اﻹﺣﻴﺎء و ﺗﺴﻤﻰ اﻟﺼﻔﺔ ج ﻣﻦ اﻟﺬات اﻻﺗﺼﺎف ﺑﻪ إﻻ ﻣﻊ ﻓﺮض أﻣﺮ ﺧﺎر اﻟﻔﻌﻠﻴﺔ. ﺎ ﻣﻨﺘﺰﻋﺔ ﻣﻦ ﻣﻘﺎم اﻟﻔﻌﻞ ﺧﺎرﺟﺔ ﻋﻦ اﻟﺬات و Tﻛﺜﺮ ﻛﺜﲑة و ﻫﻲ ﻋﻠﻰ و اﻟﺼﻔﺎت اﻟﻔﻌﻠﻴﺔ اﻟﻜﻼم ﰲ ﻫﺬﻩ اﻟﻔﺼﻮل ل ﰲ اﻟﺼﻔﺎت اﻟﺬاﺗﻴﺔ ﻓﻨﻘﻮ: ﻛﻤﺎل وﺟﻮدي و ﻗﺪ ﺛﺒﺖ ﰲ اﳌﺒﺎﺣﺚ ﻗﺪ ﻋﺮﻓﺖ أﻧﻪ ﺗﻌﺎﱃ ﻫﻮ اﳌﺒﺪأ اﳌﻔﻴﺾ ﻟﻜﻞ وﺟﻮد و اﻟﺴﺎﺑﻘﺔ أن اﻟﻌﻠﺔ اﳌﻔﻴﻀﺔ ﻟﺸﻲ ﻲ ء واﺟﺪة ﳊﻘﻴﻘﺔ ذﻟﻚ اﻟﺸ ء ﺑﻨﺤﻮ أﻋﻠﻰ و أﺷﺮف ﻓﻤﻌﻄﻲ اﻟﺸﻲ ﺎ ﻛﺎﻟﻌﻠﻢ و اﻟﻘﺪرة و اﳊﻴ ء ﻏﲑ ﻓﺎﻗﺪ ﻟﻪ ﻓﻠﻪ ﺳﺒﺤﺎﻧﻪ اﺗﺼﺎف ﻣﺎ ﺑﺼﻔﺎت اﻟﻜﻤﺎل ة ﻓﻠﻨﻨﻈﺮ ﰲ أﻗﺴﺎم اﻟﺼﻔﺎت و ﳓﻮ اﺗﺼﺎﻓﻪ -ﺎ ﻓﻨﻘﻮل : ﻛﺎﻟﻌﺎﱂ و اﻟﻘﺎدر و ﺳﻠﺒﻴﺔ ﺗﻔﻴﺪ ﻣﻌﲎ ﺳﻠﺒﻴﺎ ﻟﻜﻨﻚ ﻋﺮﻓﺖ آﻧﻔﺎ أﻧﻪ ﺗﻨﻘﺴﻢ اﻟﺼﻔﺔ إﱃ ﺛﺒﻮﺗﻴﺔ ﻛﻤﺎل ﻓﺼﻔﺎﺗﻪ اﻟﺴﻠﺒﻴﺔ ﻣﺎ دل ﻛﻞ ﻛﻤﺎل ﻣﻦ اﻟﻜﻤﺎﻻت ﻣﻨﻪ ﺗﻌﺎﱃ ﻟﻜﻮﻧﻪ ﻣﺒﺪأ ﻻ ﳚﻮز ﺳﻠﺐ ﻛﻤﻦ ﻟﻴﺲ ﲜﺎﻫﻞ و ﻣﻦ ﻟﻴ ﻋﻠﻰ ﺳﻠﺐ اﻟﻨﻘﺺ و اﳊﺎﺟﺔ ﻛﺎن ﺲ ﺑﻌﺎﺟﺰ و ﻣﺎ ﻟﻴﺲ ﲜﻮﻫﺮ و ﳌﺎ ﻛﺎﻧﺖ اﻟﺼﻔﺔ اﻟﺴﻠﺒﻴﺔ اﳌﻔﻴﺪة ﻟﺴﻠﺐ اﻟﻨﻘﺺ راﺟﻌﺔ اﻟﻨﻘﺺ و اﳊﺎﺟﺔ ﰲ ﻣﻌﲎ ﺳﻠﺐ اﻟﻜﻤﺎل إﱃ ﺳﻠﺐ ﺳﻠﺐ اﻟﻜﻤﺎل و ﻫﻮ إﳚﺎب اﻟﻜﻤﺎل ﻓﻤﻌﲎ ﻟﻴﺲ ﲜﺎﻫﻞ ﺳﻠﺐ ﺳﻠﺐ اﻟﻌﻠﻢ و ﻣﻌﻨﺎﻩ إﳚﺎب اﻟﻌﻠﻢ. ﻛﺎﻟﻘ ﻛﺎﻟﻌﺎﱂ و إﺿﺎﻓﻴﺔ ﰒ اﻟﺼﻔﺎت اﻟﺜﺒﻮﺗﻴﺔ ﺗﻨﻘﺴﻢ إﱃ ﺣﻘﻴﻘﻴﺔ ﺎدرﻳﺔ و اﻟﻌﺎﳌﻴﺔ و ﺗﻨﻘﺴﻢ ﻛﺎﻟﻌﺎﱂ ﺑﺎﻟﻐﲑ ﻛﺎﳊﻲ و ﺣﻘﻴﻘﻴﺔ ذات إﺿﺎﻓﺔ اﳊﻘﻴﻘﻴﺔ إﱃ ﺣﻘﻴﻘﻴﺔ ﳏﻀﺔ . ﺎ ﻣﻌﺎن اﻋﺘﺒﺎرﻳﺔ و ﺟﻠﺖ 5 و ﻻ رﻳﺐ ﰲ زﻳﺎدة اﻟﺼﻔﺎت اﻹﺿﺎﻓﻴﺔ ﻋﻠﻰ اﻟﺬات اﳌﺘﻌﺎﻟﻴﺔ ﻷ اﻟﺬات أن ﺗﻜﻮن ﻣﺼﺪاﻗﺎ ﳍﺎ و اﻟﺼﻔﺎت اﻟﺴﻠﺒﻴﺔ ﺗﺮﺟﻊ إﱃ اﻟﺜﺒﻮﺗﻴﺔ اﳊﻘﻴﻘﻴﺔ ﻓﺤﻜﻤﻬﺎ ﺣﻜﻤﻬﺎ. و ل أﻣﺎ اﻟﺼﻔﺎت اﳊﻘﻴﻘﻴﺔ أﻋﻢ ﻣﻦ اﳊﻘﻴﻘﻴﺔ اﶈﻀﺔ و اﳊﻘﻴﻘﻴﺔ ذات اﻹﺿﺎﻓﺔ ﻓﻔﻴﻬﺎ أﻗﻮا: أﺣﺪﻫﺎ :ى ﻛﻞ ﻣﻨﻬﺎ ﻋﲔ اﻷﺧﺮ ﺎ ﻋﲔ اﻟﺬات اﳌﺘﻌﺎﻟﻴﺔ و 5أ و ﺛﺎﻧﻴﻬﺎ :ﺎ ﺎ زاﺋﺪة ﻋﻠﻰ اﻟﺬات ﻻزﻣﺔ ﳍﺎ ﻓﻬﻲ ﻗﺪﳝﺔ ﺑﻘﺪﻣﻬ 5أ و ﺛﺎﻟﺜﻬﺎ :ﺔ ﺎ زاﺋﺪة ﻋﻠﻰ اﻟﺬات ﺣﺎدﺛ 5أ و راﺑﻌﻬﺎ :ت أن ﻣﻌﲎ اﺗﺼﺎف اﻟﺬا ﻛﻮن اﻟﻔﻌﻞ اﻟﺼﺎدر ﻣﻨﻬﺎ ﻓﻌﻞ ﻣﻦ ﺗﻠﺒﺲ -ﺎ ﻓﻤﻌﲎ -ﺎ ﺎ ﺗﻔﻌﻞ ﻓﻌﻞ اﻟﻌﺎﱂ ﰲ إﺗﻘﺎﻧﻪ و إﺣﻜﺎﻣﻪ و دﻗﺔ ﺟﻬﺎﺗﻪ و ﻫﻜﺬا ﻓﺎﻟﺬات ﻧﺎﺋﺒﺔ 5 ﺎ ﻋﺎﳌﺔ أ 5ﻛﻮ ﻣﻨﺎب اﻟﺼﻔﺎت.
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ﻛﻤﺎل و اﳊﻖ ﻫﻮ اﻷول اﳌﻨﺴﻮب إﱃ اﳊﻜﻤﺎء ﳌﺎ ﻋﺮﻓﺖ أن ذاﺗﻪ اﳌﺘﻌﺎﻟﻴﺔ ﻣﺒﺪأ ﻟﻜﻞ وﺟﻮدي و ﻣﺒﺪأ اﻟﻜﻤﺎل ﻏﲑ ﻓﺎﻗﺪ ﻟﻪ ﻓ ﺔ ﻛﻤﺎل ﻳﻔﻴﺾ ﻋﻨﻪ و ﻫﻮ اﻟﻌﻴﻨﻴ ﻛﻞ ﻔﻲ ذاﺗﻪ ﺣﻘﻴﻘﺔ . ﻛﻤﺎﻟﻪ ﻋﲔ اﻟﺬات اﻟﻮاﺟﺪة ﻟﻠﺠﻤﻴﻊ ﻓﻬﻲ أﻳﻀﺎ واﺟﺪة ﻛﻞ ﻣﻦ ﺻﻔﺎت ﻛﺎﻧﺖ ﰒ ﺣﻴﺚ ﻛﻤﺎﻟﻪ ﳐﺘﻠﻔﺔ ﲝﺴﺐ اﳌﻔﻬﻮم واﺣﺪة ﲝﺴﺐ اﳌﺼﺪاق اﻟﺬي ﻫﻮ ﻟﻠﺠﻤﻴﻊ و ﻋﻴﻨﻬﺎ ﻓﺼﻔﺎت اﻟﺬات اﳌﺘﻌﺎﻟﻴﺔ. و ﻗﻮل ﺑﻌﻀﻬﻢ :د إن ﻋﻠﺔ اﻹﳚﺎد ﻣﺸﻴﺌﺘﻪ و إرادﺗﻪ ﺗﻌﺎﱃ ﻛﻼم ﻻ ﳏﺼﻞ ﻟﻪ ﻓﺈن ون ذاﺗﻪ ﻛﺎﻧﺖ ﻧﺴﺒﺔ اﻹﳚﺎد إﱃ اﻹرادة ﻛﺎﻧﺖ ﺻﻔﺔ ذاﺗﻴﺔ ﻫﻲ ﻋﲔ اﻟﺬات اﻹرادة ﻋﻨﺪ ﻫﺬا اﻟﻘﺎﺋﻞ إن ﻛﺎﻧﺖ ﻣﻦ ﺻﻔﺎت اﻟﻔﻌﻞ اﳌﻨﺘﺰﻋﺔ ﻣﻦ ﻣﻘﺎم اﻟﻔﻌﻞ ﻋﲔ ﻧﺴﺒﺘﻪ إﱃ اﻟﺬات ﻓﻠﻢ ﻳﺄت ﺑﻄﺎﺋﻞ و إن ﻓﻠﻠﻔﻌﻞ ﺗﻘﺪم ﻋﻠﻴﻬﺎ و اﺳﺘﻨﺎدﻩ ﰲ وﺟﻮدﻩ إﻟﻴﻬﺎ ﺗﻘﺪم اﳌﻌﻠﻮل ﻋﻠﻰ اﻟﻌ ﻠﺔ و ﻫﻮ ﳏﺎل ﻋﻠﻰ أن ﻛﻮن ﻧﺴﺒﺔ اﻹﳚﺎد و اﳋﻠﻖ إﻟﻴﻪ ﺗﻌﺎﱃ ﳎﺎزا ﻻزم ﻫﺬا اﻟﻘﻮل . و أﻣﺎ اﻟﻘﻮل اﻟﺜﺎﱐ و ﻫﻮ ﻣﻨﺴﻮب إﱃ اﻷﺷﺎﻋﺮة ﻓﻔﻴﻪ أن ﻫﺬﻩ اﻟﺼﻔﺎت و ﻫﻲ ﻋﻠﻰ ﻣﺎ ﻋﺪوﻫﺎ اﳊﻴﺎة و اﻟﻘﺪرة و اﻟﻌﻠﻢ و اﻟﺴﻤﻊ و اﻟﺒﺼﺮ و اﻹرادة و اﻟﻜﻼم إﻣﺎ أن ﺗﻜﻮن ﻣﻌﻠﻮﻟﺔ أو ﻏﲑ ﻣﻌﻠﻮﻟﺔ ﻟﺸﻲ ء. ﻓﺈن ﱂ ﺗﻜﻦ ﻣﻌﻠﻮﻟﺔ ﻟﺸﻲ ﻛﺎﻧﺖ ﻫﻨﺎك ﺎT ﻛﺎﻧﺖ ﻣﻮﺟﻮدة ﰲ ﻧﻔﺴﻬﺎ واﺟﺒﺔ ﰲ ذا ء و واﺟﺒﺎت ﲦﺎن و ﻫﻲ اﻟﺬات و اﻟﺼﻔﺎت اﻟﺴﺒﻊ و أدﻟﺔ وﺣﺪاﻧﻴﺔ اﻟﻮاﺟﺐ ﺗﺒﻄﻠﻪ. ﻛﺎﻧﺖ ﻣﻌﻠﻮﻟﺔ ﻓﺈﻣﺎ أن ﺗﻜﻮن ﻣﻌﻠﻮﻟﺔ ﻟﻐﲑ اﻟﺬات اﳌﺘﺼﻔﺔ -ﺎ أو ﻣﻌﻠﻮﻟﺔ ﳍﺎ و إن .
ﻛﺎﻧﺖ واﺟﺒﺔ ﺑﺎﻟﻐﲑ و ﻳﻨﺘﻬﻲ وﺟﻮ و ﻋﻠﻰ اﻷول -ﺎ ﺑﺎﻟﻐﲑ إﱃ واﺟﺐ ﺑﺎﻟﺬات ﻏﲑ اﻟﻮاﺟﺐ ﻛﺎﻟﺸﻖ اﻟﺴﺎﺑﻖ ﻋﻠﻰ أن ﻓﻴﻪ ﺣﺎﺟﺔ ﺑﺎﻟﺬات اﳌﻮﺻﻮف -ﺎ و أدﻟﺔ وﺣﺪاﻧﻴﺔ اﻟﻮاﺟﺐ ﺗﺒﻄﻠﻪ ﻛﻤﺎﻟﻪ إﱃ ﻏﲑﻩ و ﻫﻮ ﳏﺎل اﻟﻮاﺟﺐ اﻟﻮﺟﻮد ﻟﺬاﺗﻪ ﰲ اﺗﺼﺎﻓﻪ ﺑﺼﻔﺎت . ﻛﻮن اﻟﺬات اﳌﻔﻴﻀﺔ ﳍﺎ ﻣﺘﻘﺪﻣﺔ ﻋﻠﻴﻬﺎ ﺑﺎﻟﻌﻠﻴﺔ و ﻫﻲ ﻓﺎﻗﺪة ﳌﺎ ﺗﻌﻄﻴ و ﻋﻠﻰ اﻟﺜﺎﱐ ﻳﻠﺰم ﻪ ﻣﻦ اﻟﻜﻤﺎل و ﻫﻮ ﳏﺎل. ﻋﻠﻰ : أن ﻓﻴﻪ ﻓﻘﺪان اﻟﻮاﺟﺐ ﰲ ذاﺗﻪ ﺻﻔﺎت اﻟﻜﻤﺎل و ﻗﺪ ﺗﻘﺪم أﻧﻪ ﺻﺮف اﻟﻮﺟﻮد اﻟﺬي ﻛﻤﺎل وﺟﻮدي ﻫﺬا ﺧﻠﻒ ﻻ ﻳﺸﺬ ﻋﻨﻪ وﺟﻮد و ﻻ . ﻛﻮن اﻟﺼﻔﺎت زاﺋﺪة و أﻣﺎ اﻟﻘﻮل اﻟﺜﺎﻟﺚ و ﻫﻮ ﻣﻨﺴﻮب إﱃ اﻟﻜﺮاﻣﻴﺔ ﻓﻼزم ﻣﺎ ﻓﻴﻪ ﻣﻦ ﻛﻮن اﻟﺬات اﳌﺘﻌﺎﻟﻴﺔ ذات ﻣﺎدة ﻗﺎﺑﻠﺔ ﺣﺎدﺛﺔ ﻟﻠﺼﻔﺎت اﻟﱵ ﲢﺪث ﻓﻴﻬﺎ و ﻻزﻣﺔ ﺗﺮﻛﺐ اﻟﺬات ﻛﻮن اﻟﺬات ﺧﺎﻟﻴﺔ ﰲ ﻧﻔﺴﻬﺎ ﻋﻦ اﻟﻜﻤﺎل و ﻫﻮ ﳏﺎل و ﻫﻮ ﳏﺎل و .
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و أﻣﺎ اﻟﻘﻮل اﻟﺮاﺑﻊ و ﻫﻮ ﻣﻨﺴﻮب إﱃ اﳌﻌﺘﺰﻟﺔ ﻓﻼزم ﻣﺎ ﻓﻴﻪ ﻣﻦ ﻧﻴﺎﺑﺔ اﻟﺬات ﻋﻦ اﻟﺼﻔﺎت ﻛﻤﺎل وﺟﻮدي ﻫﺬا ﻛﻤﺎ ﻋﺮﻓﺖ وﺟﻮد ﺻﺮف ﻻ ﻳﺸﺬ ﻋﻨﻪ وﺟﻮد و ﻻ ﺧﻠﻮﻫﺎ ﻋﻨﻬﺎ و ﻫﻮ ﺧﻠﻒ.
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12.4. THE ATTRIBUTES OF THE NECESSARY BEING AND THE MEANING OF THEIR ATTRIBUTION The Attributes of the Necessary Being are divided, first, into (i) the Attributes of Essence and (ii) the Attributes of Act. The Attributes of Essence are those that relate solely to the Essence, without the need to take into account anything extraneous to It such as Its life and Its knowledge of Itself. The Attributes of Act are those which cannot be ascribed to It without taking into account what is extraneous to It, such as creation, giving life and providing. The Attributes of Act are many, which are abstracted in their multiplicity from Divine activity and are extraneous to the Divine Essence. Our discussion in these sections relates to the Attributes of Essence. As we have seen above, the Exalted Necessary Being is the source of all existence and all existential perfections. It was established in the foregoing discussions that the creative cause of a thing possesses the reality of that thing to a higher and superior degree, for the giver cannot be devoid of what he gives. Hence He, the Glorious One, possesses, in some way or other, certain attributes of perfection such as knowledge, power and life. As for the kinds of Attributes of Essence and His manner of possessing them, it may be observed that the Attributes are divided into (ia) the positive attributes (such as knowledge and power) and (ib) the negative attributes, the latter implying a negation. However, as we saw in the foregoing discussion, one may not negate any of the perfections in relation to God, the Exalted, for He is the source of all perfections. Hence His negative attributes signify the negation of deficiency (naqsh) and need (hâjah) in relation to Him, such as the negation of ignorance, incapacity and substantiality. Since deficiency and need imply the negation of perfection, a negative attribute signifies negation of the negation of perfection, which is affirmation of perfection. Hence the negation of ignorance means negation of the negation of knowledge, which implies affirmation of knowledge. Further, the positive Attributes are divided into (ia 1) those that are ‘intrinsic’ (haqîqiyyah; lit., real), such as ‘the knowing,’ and (ia 2) those that are ‘relative’ (idhâfiyyah), such as ‘possessing power over’ and ‘possessing knowledge of.’ The intrinsic Attributes are in turn divided into (ia 1a) the ‘absolutely intrinsic’ ones (haqîqiyyah mahdhah) such as life and (ia lb) the ‘relatively intrinsic’ ones (haqîqiyyah dzât idhâfah) such as His knowledge of things other than Himself. There is no doubt that the relative Attributes are additional to the Divine Essence, for they are i’tibâri concepts and are not applicable to the Exalted Essence. The negative Attributes derive from the positive intrinsic Attributes, and that which applies to the latter is also true of them. There are various views concerning the intrinsic Attributes, including the absolutely intrinsic and the relatively intrinsic attributes. One of these views is that they are identical with the Essence and each of them is identical with the other [in respect of its referent]. A second view is that they are additional to the Essence and accompany It, being eternal like the Essence. A third view holds that they are additional to the Essence, but not eternal.
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A fourth view is that the meaning of the possession of the Attributes by the Essence is that Its acts are such as are performed by one who has these attributes. Thus, the statement ‘He is knowing’ means that His acts, in respect of their perfection, purposefulness, and precision are like the acts of someone who acts with knowledge. The same applies to the other attributes. Hence the Essence is represented in the Attributes. The first view, which is ascribed to the philosophers, is the right one. As we have seen, the Exalted Essence is the source of every existential perfection, and the source of perfection cannot be devoid of it. Hence His Essence possesses the reality of every perfection emanating from Him, and this is what is meant by the identity of the Attributes and the Essence. Further, as each of His Attributes of perfection is identical with the Essence, which possesses alb of them, It includes all the Attributes and is identical with them. Hence the Attributes differ from one another in regard to their meaning, but are one in respect to their referent, which is the Exalted Essence. The view held by some that the cause of creation is His volition (masyiyyah) and will (irâdah), not His Essence, is of no consequence. For if the will be an attribute of the Essence and identical with It, the ascription of creation to will amounts to its ascription to the Essence, and this view has nothing enlightening to offer. If it be an attribute of Act (shifat al-fi’l), abstracted on the plane of Act, the Act would precede the will, and its dependence on the Act for coming into existence implies the precedence of the effect to the cause, which is impossible. Moreover, such a view implies that the ascription of creation and bringing into existence to God be metaphorical. As to the second view, which is ascribed to the Ash’arites, the question arises whether or not these Attributes – which according to them are: life, power, knowledge, hearing, sight, will and speech – are caused by something. If they are not caused by anything and are self-existent and necessary in themselves, there would be eight necessary beings: the Essence and the seven Attributes. Such a view stands refuted by the proofs of the Unity of the Necessary Being. If these are caused, they are either caused by the Essence or by something else. If caused by something else, they would be necessary-bysomething-else, and this necessity ultimately leads up to a being that is necessary-in-itself, other than the Necessary Being of whom they are attributes. This conclusion, like the former one, is also refuted by the proof of the Unity of the Necessary Being. Moreover, it implies that the Necessary Being stands in need of something else to possess its attributes of perfection, which is impossible. The second case [i.e. if the Attributes are supposed to have been caused by the Essence] implies that their cause precedes them in terms of causality while it is itself devoid of the perfections emanating from it, which is impossible. Moreover, this view implies that the Essence of the Necessary Being is devoid of the attributes of perfection, whereas, as mentioned earlier, It is
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absolute existence, which is not devoid of existence or any existential perfection, and this involves a contradiction. As to the third view, which is ascribed to the Karrâmiyyah, that the Attributes are additional and non-eternal, it implies that the Exalted Essence possesses a matter that receives these Attributes that come to exist in It. This implies that the Essence is composite – which is impossible – and in itself devoid of perfection, which is also impossible. As to the fourth view – that the Essence is represented by the Attributes – which is ascribed to the Mu’tazilah, it also implies that the Essence is devoid of them, whereas, as we have seen, It is absolute existence, which cannot be devoid of existence or any existential perfection. Hence this view involves a contradiction.
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اﻟﻔﺼﻞ اﻟﺨﺎﻣﺲ ﻓﻲ ﻋﻠﻤﻪ ﺗﻌﺎﻟﻰ ﻗﺪ ﺗﻘﺪم :ﻪ أن ﻟﻜﻞ ﳎﺮد ﻋﻦ اﳌﺎدة ﻋﻠﻤﺎ ﺑﺬاﺗﻪ ﳊﻀﻮر ذاﺗﻪ ﻋﻨﺪ ذاﺗﻪ و ﻫﻮ ﻋﻠﻤﻪ ﺑﺬاﺗ. و ﺗﻘﺪ ﺎ م أﻳﻀ : أن ذاﺗﻪ اﳌﺘﻌﺎﻟﻴﺔ ﺻﺮف اﻟﻮﺟﻮد اﻟﺬي ﻻ ﳛﺪﻩ ﺣﺪ و ﻻ ﻳﺸﺬ ﻋﻨﻪ وﺟﻮد و ﻛﻤﺎل وﺟﻮدي ﺑﻨﻈﺎﻣﻬﺎ اﻟﻮﺟﻮدي ﻓﻬﻮ ﻛﻤﺎل وﺟﻮدي ﻓﻤﺎ ﰲ ﺗﻔﺎﺻﻴﻞ اﳋﻠﻘﺔ ﻣﻦ وﺟﻮد أو ﻻ ﻣﻮﺟﻮد ﻋﻨﺪﻩ ﺑﻨﺤﻮ أﻋﻠﻰ و أﺷﺮف ﻏﲑ ﻣﺘﻤﻴﺰ ﺑﻌﻀﻬﺎ ﻣﻦ ﺑﻌﺾ ﻓﻬﻮ ﻣﻌﻠﻮم ﻋﻨﺪﻩ ﻋﻠﻤﺎ إﲨﺎﻟﻴﺎ ﰲ ﻋﲔ اﻟﻜﺸﻒ اﻟﺘﻔﺼﻴﻠﻲ. ﰒ إ ن اﳌﻮﺟﻮدات ﲟﺎ ﻫﻲ ﻣﻌﺎﻟﻴﻞ ﻟﻪ ﻗﺎﺋﻤﺔ اﻟﺬوات ﺑﻪ ﻗﻴﺎم اﻟﺮاﺑﻂ ﺑﺎﳌﺴﺘﻘﻞ ﺣﺎﺿﺮة ﺮدة ﻣﻨﻬﺎ ﺑﺄﻧﻔﺴﻬﺎ و اﳌﺎدﻳﺔ R ﺎ ا T ﺎ ﻋﻨﺪﻩ ﻓﻬﻲ ﻣﻌﻠﻮﻣﺔ ﻟﻪ ﻋﻠﻤﺎ ﺣﻀﻮرﻳﺎ ﰲ ﻣﺮﺗﺒﺔ وﺟﻮدا T ﺑﻮﺟﻮدا . ﺮدة R ﻣﻨﻬﺎ ﺑﺼﻮرﻫﺎ ا ﻓﻘﺪ ﲢﻘﻖ :ﺎ أن ﻟﻠﻮاﺟﺐ ﺗﻌﺎﱃ ﻋﻠﻤﺎ ﺣﻀﻮرﻳﺎ ﺑﺬاﺗﻪ و ﻋﻠﻤﺎ ﺣﻀﻮرﻳﺎ ﺗﻔﺼﻴﻠﻴﺎ ﺑﺎﻷﺷﻴ ء ﰲ ﻣﺮﺗﺒﺔ ذاﺗﻪ ﻗﺒﻞ إﳚﺎدﻫﺎ و ﻫﻮ ﻋﲔ ذاﺗﻪ و ﻋﻠﻤﺎ ﺣﻀﻮرﻳﺎ ﺗﻔﺼﻴﻠﻴﺎ -ﺎ ﰲ ﻣﺮﺗﺒﺘﻬﺎ و ﻫﻮ ﺧﺎرج ﻣﻦ ذاﺗﻪ و ﻣﻦ اﳌﻌﻠﻮم أن ﻋﻠﻤﻪ ﲟﻌﻠﻮﻻﺗﻪ ﻳﺴﺘﻮﺟﺐ اﻟﻌﻠﻢ ﲟﺎ ﻋﻨﺪﻫﺎ ﻣﻦ اﻟﻌﻠﻢ. ﺗﺘﻤﺔ ﻛﺎﻧﺎ ﻣﻦ ﻣﻄﻠﻖ ت ﻛﺎﻧﺖ ﺣﻘﻴﻘﺔ اﻟﺴﻤﻊ و اﻟﺒﺼﺮ ﻫﻲ اﻟﻌﻠﻢ ﺑﺎﳌﺴﻤﻮﻋﺎت و اﳌﺒﺼﺮا و ﳌﺎ اﻟﻌﻠﻢ و ﺛﺒﺘﺎ ﻓﻴ ﲑ ﻛﻤﺎ أﻧﻪ ﻋﻠﻴﻢ ﺧﺒ ﻪ ﺗﻌﺎﱃ ﻓﻬﻮ ﺗﻌﺎﱃ ﲰﻴﻊ ﺑﺼﲑ . ﺗﻨﺒﻴﻪ و إﺷﺎرة ﻟﻠﻨﺎس ﰲ ﻋﻠﻤﻪ ﺗﻌﺎﱃ أﻗﻮال ﳐﺘﻠﻔﺔ و ﻣﺴﺎﻟﻚ ﻣﺘﺸﺘﺘﺔ أﺧﺮ ﻧﺸﲑ إﱃ ﻣﺎ ﻫﻮ اﳌﻌﺮوف ﻣﻨﻬﺎ: أﺣﺪﻫﺎ :ﺎ أن ﻟﺬاﺗﻪ ﺗﻌﺎﱃ ﻋﻠﻤﺎ ﺑﺬاﺗﻪ دون ﻣﻌﻠﻮﻻﺗﻪ ﻷن اﻟﺬات أزﻟﻴﺔ و ﻻ ﻣﻌﻠﻮل إﻻ ﺣﺎدﺛ. و ﻓﻴﻪ : أن اﻟﻌﻠﻢ ﺑﺎﳌﻌﻠﻮل ﰲ ﻛﻤﺎ اﻷزل ﻻ ﻳﺴﺘﻠﺰم وﺟﻮدﻩ ﰲ اﻷزل ﺑﻮﺟﻮدﻩ اﳋﺎص ﺑﻪ ﻋﺮﻓﺖ. اﻟﺜﺎﱐ : ﻣﺎ ﻧﺴﺐ إﱃ اﳌﻌﺘﺰﻟﺔ أن ﻟﻠﻤﺎﻫﻴﺎت ﺛﺒﻮﺗﺎ ﻋﻴﻨﻴﺎ ﰲ اﻟﻌﺪم و ﻫﻲ اﻟﱵ ﺗﻌﻠﻖ -ﺎ ﻋﻠﻤﻪ ﺗﻌﺎﱃ ﻗﺒﻞ اﻹﳚﺎد. و ﻓﻴﻪ :ت أﻧﻪ ﺗﻘﺪم ﺑﻄﻼن اﻟﻘﻮل ﺑﺜﺒﻮت اﳌﻌﺪوﻣﺎ. اﻟﺜﺎﻟﺚ : ﻣﺎ ﻧﺴﺐ إﱃ اﻟﺼﻮﻓﻴﺔ أن ﻟﻠﻤﺎﻫﻴﺎت اﳌﻤﻜﻨﺔ ﺛﺒﻮ ﺗﺎ ﻋﻠﻤﻴﺎ ﺑﺘﺒﻊ اﻷﲰﺎء و اﻟﺼﻔﺎت ﻫﻮ اﳌﺘﻌﻠﻖ ﻟﻌﻠﻤﻪ ﺗﻌﺎﱃ ﻗﺒﻞ اﻹﳚﺎد. و ﻓﻴﻪ : أن اﻟﻘﻮل ﺑﺄﺻﺎﻟﺔ اﻟﻮﺟﻮد و اﻋﺘﺒﺎرﻳﺔ اﳌﺎﻫﻴﺎت ﻳﻨﻔﻲ أي ﺛﺒﻮت ﻣﻔﺮوض ﻟﻠﻤﺎﻫﻴﺔ ﻗﺒﻞ وﺟﻮدﻫﺎ اﻟﻌﻴﲏ اﳋﺎص -ﺎ.
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اﻟﺮاﺑﻊ : ﻣﺎ ﻧﺴﺐ إﱃ أﻓﻼﻃﻦ أن ﻋﻠﻤﻪ ﺗﻌﺎﱃ اﻟﺘﻔﺼﻴﻠﻲ ﺑﺎﻷﺷﻴﺎء ﻫﻮ اﳌﻔﺎرﻗﺎت اﻟﻨﻮرﻳﺔ و اﳌ ع ﻛﻤﺎﻻت اﻷﻧﻮا ﺜﻞ اﻹﳍﻴﺔ اﻟﱵ ﺗﺘﺠﻤﻊ ﻓﻴﻬﺎ . و ﻓﻴﻪ : ﺎ إﳕﺎ ﻳﻜﻔﻲ ﻟﺘﺼﻮﻳﺮ اﻟﻌﻠﻢ اﻟﺘﻔﺼﻴﻠﻲ ﺑﺎﻷﺷﻴﺎء ﰲ ﻣﺮﺗﺒﺘﻬﺎ T أن ذﻟﻚ ﻋﻠﻰ ﺗﻘﺪﻳﺮ ﺛﺒﻮ ﻻ ﰲ ﻣﺮﺗﺒﺔ اﻟﺬات ﻓﺘﺒﻘﻰ اﻟﺬات ﺧﺎﻟﻴﺔ ﻣﻦ اﻟﻜﻤﺎل اﻟﻌﻠﻤﻲ و ﻫﻮ وﺟﻮد ﺻﺮف ﻻ ﻳﺸﺬ ﻋﻨﻪ ﻛﻤﺎل وﺟﻮدي ﻫﺬا ﺧﻠﻒ. اﳋﺎﻣﺲ : ﻣﺎ ﻧﺴﺐ إﱃ ﺷﻴﺦ اﻹﺷﺮاق و ﺗﺒﻌﻪ ﲨﻊ ﻣﻦ اﶈﻘﻘﲔ أن اﻷﺷﻴﺎء ﺑﺄﺳﺮﻫﺎ ﻣﻦ ﺮدات و اﳌﺎدﻳﺎت ﺣﺎﺿﺮة ﺑﻮﺟﻮدﻫﺎ ﻋﻨﺪﻩ ﺗﻌﺎﱃ ﻏﲑ ﻏﺎﺋﺒﺔ ﻋﻨﻪ و ﻫﻮ ﻋﻠﻤﻪ اﻟﺘﻔﺼﻴﻠﻲ Rا ﺑﺎﻷﺷﻴﺎء. و ﻓﻴﻪ : ﻛﻤﺎ ﺗﻘﺪم ﰲ ﻣﺒﺎﺣﺚ اﻟﻌﻠﻢ و اﳌﻌﻠﻮم ﻋﻠﻰ أﻧﻪ إﳕﺎ أن اﳌﺎدﻳﺔ ﻻ ﲡﺎﻣﻊ اﳊﻀﻮر ﻳﻜﻔﻲ ﻟﺘﺼﻮﻳﺮ اﻟﻌﻠﻢ اﻟﺘﻔﺼﻴﻠﻲ ﰲ ﻣﺮﺗﺒﺔ اﻷﺷﻴﺎء ﻓﺘﺒﻘﻰ اﻟﺬات ﺧﺎﻟﻴﺔ ﰲ ﻧﻔﺴﻬﺎ ﻋﻦ اﻟﻜﻤﺎل ﻛﻤﺎ ﰲ اﻟﻘﻮل اﻟﺮاﺑﻊ اﻟﻌﻠﻤﻲ . اﻟﺴﺎدس : ﻣﺎ ﻧﺴﺐ إﱃ ﺛﺎﻟﻴﺲ اﳌﻄﻠﻲ و ﻫﻮ أﻧﻪ ﺗﻌﺎﱃ ﻳﻌﻠﻢ اﻟﻌﻘﻞ اﻷول و ﻫﻮ اﳌﻌﻠﻮل اﻷول ﲝﻀﻮر ذاﺗﻪ ﻋﻨﺪﻩ و ﻳﻌﻠﻢ ﺳﺎﺋﺮ اﻷﺷﻴﺎء ﺑﺎرﺗﺴﺎم ﺻﻮرﻫﺎ ﰲ اﻟﻌﻘﻞ اﻷول. و ﻓﻴﻪ :ﻪ أﻧﻪ ﻳﺮد ﻋﻠﻴﻪ ﻣﺎ ورد ﻋﻠﻰ ﺳﺎﺑﻘ. اﻟﺴ ﺎﺑﻊ: ﻗﻮل ﺑﻌﻀﻬﻢ إن ذاﺗﻪ ﺗﻌﺎﱃ ﻋﻠﻢ ﺗﻔﺼﻴﻠﻲ ﺑﺎﳌﻌﻠﻮل اﻷول و إﲨﺎﱄ ﲟﺎ دوﻧﻪ و ذات اﳌﻌﻠﻮل اﻷول ﻋﻠﻢ ﺗﻔﺼﻴﻠﻲ ﺑﺎﳌﻌﻠﻮل اﻟﺜﺎﱐ و إﲨﺎل ﲟﺎ دوﻧﻪ و ﻫﻜﺬا. و ﻓﻴﻪ ﻣﺎ ﰲ ﺳﺎﺑﻘﻪ. اﻟﺜﺎﻣﻦ :ل ﻣﺎ ﻧﺴﺐ إﱃ ﻓﺮﻓﻮرﻳﻮس أن ﻋﻠﻤﻪ ﺗﻌﺎﱃ ﺑﺎﲢﺎدﻩ ﻣﻊ اﳌﻌﻘﻮ. و ﻓﻴﻪ :ﳓﻮ أﻧﻪ إﳕﺎ ﻳﻜﻔﻲ ﻟﺒﻴﺎن ﻛﻮﻧﻪ ﲢﻘﻖ اﻟﻌﻠﻢ و أﻧﻪ ﺑﺎﻻﲢﺎد دون اﻟﻌﺮوض و ﳓﻮﻩ و أﻣﺎ ﻋﻠﻤﺎ ﺗﻔﺼﻴﻠﻴﺎ ﺑﺎﻷﺷﻴﺎء ﻗﺒﻞ اﻹﳚﺎد ﻣﺜﻼ ﻓﻼ ﻓﻔﻴﻪ ﻣﺎ ﰲ ﺳﺎﺑﻘﻪ. اﻟﺘﺎﺳﻊ : ﻣﺎ ﻧﺴﺐ إﱃ أﻛﺜﺮ اﳌﺘﺄﺧﺮﻳﻦ أن ﻋﻠﻤﻪ ﺑﺬاﺗﻪ ﻋﻠﻢ إﲨﺎﱄ ﺑﺎﻷﺷﻴﺎء ﻓﻬﻮ ﺗﻌﺎﱃ ﻳﻌﻠﻢ ﻛﻠﻬﺎ إﲨﺎﻻ ﺑﻌﻠﻤﻪ ﺑﺬاﺗﻪ و أﻣﺎ ﻋﻠﻤﻪ ﺑﺎﻷﺷﻴﺎء ﺗﻔﺼﻴ اﻷﺷﻴﺎء ﻼ ﻓﺒﻌﺪ وﺟﻮدﻫﺎ ﻷن اﻟﻌﻠﻢ ﺗﺎﺑﻊ ﻟﻠﻤﻌﻠﻮم و ﻻ ﻣﻌﻠﻮم ﻗﺒﻞ وﺟﻮد اﳌﻌﻠﻮم. و ﻓﻴﻪ : ﻛﻤﺎ ﻛﻮن ﻋﻠﻤﻪ ﺗﻌﺎﱃ ﻋﻠﻰ ﳓﻮ اﻻرﺗﺴﺎم و اﳊﺼﻮل ﳑﻨﻮع ﻣﺎ ﰲ ﺳﺎﺑﻘﻪ ﻋﻠﻰ أن ﺳﻴﺄﰐ. اﻟﻌﺎﺷﺮ : ﺎ ﻋﻠﻰ T ﻣﺎ ﻧﺴﺐ إﱃ اﳌﺸﺎءﻳﻦ أن ﻋﻠﻤﻪ ﺗﻌﺎﱃ ﺑﺎﻷﺷﻴﺎء ﻗﺒﻞ إﳚﺎدﻫﺎ ﲝﻀﻮر ﻣﺎﻫﻴﺎ
اﻟﻨﻈﺎم اﳌﻮﺟﻮد ﰲ اﻟﻮﺟﻮ د ﻟﺬاﺗﻪ ﺗﻌﺎﱃ ﻻ ﻋﻠﻰ ﳓﻮ اﻟﺪﺧﻮل ﻓﻴﻬﺎ و اﻻﲢﺎد -ﺎ ﺑﻞ ﻋﻠﻰ ﳓﻮ ﻗﻴﺎﻣﻬﺎ -ﺎ ﺑﺎﻟﺜﺒﻮت اﻟﺬﻫﲏ ﻋﻠﻰ وﺟﻪ اﻟﻜﻠﻴﺔ ﲟﻌﲎ ﻋﺪم ﺗﻐﲑ اﻟﻌﻠﻢ ﺑﺘﻐﲑ اﳌﻌﻠﻮم ﻓﻬﻮ ﻋﻠﻢ ﻋﻨﺎﺋﻲ
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ﺣﺼﻮﻟﻪ اﻟﻌﻠﻤﻲ ﻣﺴﺘﺘﺒﻊ ﳊﺼﻮﻟﻪ اﻟﻌﻴﲏ و ﻗﺪ ﺟﺮى ﻋﻠﻰ ﻫﺬا اﻟﻘﻮل أﻛﺜﺮ اﳌﺘﻜﻠﻤﲔ و إن ﺧﻄﺌﻮﻩ و ﻃﻌﻨﻮا ﻓﻴﻪ ﻣﻦ ﺣﻴﺚ إﺛ ﻛﻮﻧﻪ ﻋﻠﻤﺎ ﺣﺼﻮﻟﻴﺎ ﻗﺒﻞ ﺒﺎت اﻟﻜﻠﻴﺔ ﰲ اﻟﻌﻠﻢ ﻓﺈ5ﻢ ﺟﺮوا ﻋﻠﻰ اﻹﳚﺎد و أﻧﻪ ﻋﻠﻰ ﺣﺎﻟﻪ ﻗﺒﻞ وﺟﻮد اﻷﺷﻴﺎء و ﺑﻌﺪﻩ. و ﻓﻴﻪ : ﻣﺎ ﰲ ﺳﺎﺑﻘﻪ ﻋﻠﻰ أن ﻓﻴﻪ إﺛﺒﺎت اﻟﻌﻠﻢ اﳊﺼﻮﱄ ﳌﻮﺟﻮد ﳎﺮد ذاﺗﺎ و ﻓﻌﻼ و ﻗﺪ ﺗﻘﺪم ﺮد ذاﺗﺎ و ﻓﻌﻼ ﻻ ﻳﺘﺤﻘﻖ ﻓﻴﻪ R ﰲ ﻣﺒﺎﺣﺚ اﻟﻌﻠﻢ و اﳌﻌﻠﻮم أن اﳌﻮﺟﻮد ا ﻋﻠﻢ ﺣﺼﻮﱄ ﻋﻠﻰ أن ﻓﻴﻪ إﺛﺒﺎت وﺟﻮد ذﻫﲏ ﻣﻦ ﻏﲑ وﺟﻮد ﻋﻴﲏ ﻳﻘﺎس إﻟﻴﻪ و ﻻزﻣﻪ أن ﻳﻌﻮد وﺟﻮدا ﻋﻴﻨﻴﺎ آﺧﺮ ﻟﻠﻤﻮﺟﻮد اﳋﺎرﺟﻲ ﻗﺒﻞ وﺟﻮدﻩ اﻟﻌﻴﲏ اﳋﺎص ﺑﻪ و ﻣﻨﻔﺼﻼ ﻋﻨﻪ ﺗﻌﺎﱃ و ﻳﺮﺟﻊ ﻻ ﳏﺎﻟﺔ إﱃ اﻟﻘﻮل اﻟﺮاﺑﻊ.
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12.5. GOD’S KNOWLEDGE It was mentioned earlier that every immaterial being has knowledge of itself, which is the presence of its essence for itself, or self-knowledge. It was also mentioned that the Exalted Essence is absolute existence not bounded by any limit, nor is it devoid of existence or any existential perfection. Hence all the details of creation, of existence and existential perfections, with their existential order, exist in It in their highest and noblest form without being separate from one another. Hence he knows them with an undifferentiated knowledge, which at the same time discloses details (‘ilman ijmâliyyan fî ‘ayn al-kasyf al-tafshîlî). Further, all existents, being Its effects, depend upon It with the dependence of something relative (râbith) on that which is independent, and they are present for It with their existence. Hence It knows them with an immediate knowledge on the plane of their existences, the immaterial among them with their very being and the material ones through their immaterial forms. This establishes that the Exalted Necessary Being has an immediate knowledge (‘ilrn hudhârî) of Itself and a detailed immediate knowledge of the things before their creation on the plane of Its Essence, and that this knowledge is identical with Its Essence. It also has a detailed immediate knowledge of them on their own plane, extraneous to Its Essence. It is evident that Its knowledge of things implies also the knowledge of their knowledge [of themselves and other things]. A Supplementary Note As hearing and seeing consist of the knowledge of that which is audible and visible, they are included in knowledge in general. Thus the attributes related to seeing and hearing have subsistence in God, the Exalted, who is the hearer and the seer in the same way as He is the knower. Some Related Views There are various views concerning Divine knowledge; we shall review some of the well known among them in the following: (i) One of these views is that the Divine Being has knowledge of Its own Essence, not of Its effects, because Its Essence is pre-eternal (azalî) and the existence of every effect is preceded by its non-existence (hadîts). This viewpoint, however, is not correct, because knowledge of the effect in pre-eternity does not imply that the effect existed in pre-eternity with it particular existence, as we saw above. (ii) A second view, which is attributed to the Mu’tazilah, is that quiddities do have a kind of objective subsistence (tsubût ‘aynî) daring their non-existence (‘adam), and it is to this that God’s knowledge pertains before their coming into being. However, as discussed earlier, the notion of subsistence of non-existents is an invalid idea. (iii) The third view, which has been ascribed to the Sufis, is that the contingent quiddities (al-mâhiyyât al-mumkinah) have an epistemic subsistence (tsubût ‘ilmî) subsumed in the Names and the Attributes, and it is to this that God’s knowledge pertains before creation.
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However, the view that existence is fundamental and quiddities are derivative precludes the assumption of any kind of subsistence for quiddity prior to its particular external existence. (iv) The fourth view is ascribed to Plato, who held that God’s detailed knowledge of things consists of immaterial Ideas and divine archetypes that possess all the perfections of the species. This view is also inadequate, because even if such archetypes are assumed to exist, that only helps in conceiving God’s detailed knowledge of things on their own plane, not on the plane of the Essence, leaving It devoid of knowledge, whereas God is absolute existence, which is not without any existential perfection. Hence it leads to contradiction. (v) The fifth view is attributed to Suhrawardî, who is followed by a number of authorities in holding it. According to it, all things, material and immaterial, are present with their very existence for God, the Exalted, not being hidden from Him. This constitutes His detailed knowledge of things. The problem with this view is that presence is inconsistent with materiality, as mentioned in the discussion on knowledge and the known. Moreover, it helps solely in conceiving God’s detailed knowledge of things on their own plane, and, like the fourth theory, it leaves the Essence devoid of the perfection of knowledge. (vi) The sixth view, which is ascribed to Thales of Miletus, holds that God knows the First Intellect, which is the first effect, by virtue of the presence of its essence for Him. Other things are known to Him through the reflection of their forms in the First Intellect. The objections mentioned in relation with the previous theory apply to this view also. (vii) The seventh view holds that God’s essence has a detailed knowledge of the first effect and a non-detailed knowledge (‘ilm ijmâlî) of things below it. The essence of the first effect has a detailed knowledge of the second effect and a non-detailed knowledge of things below it, and so on. The above-mentioned objections apply here also. (viii) The eighth view, which has been attributed to Porphyry, is that God’s knowledge is through His union (ittihâd) with the known. The problem with this theory is that it only explains the manner in which God’s knowledge is realized, namely, that it involves union, not accidence (‘urûdh) or something of the kind. But it does not explain God’s detailed knowledge of things prior to their creation. Hence it suffers from the inadequacy of the previous theories. (ix) The ninth theory, which is ascribed to most of the later philosophers, is that God’s knowledge of His own Essence is as well a non-detailed knowledge of things. Hence He knows all things in a non-detailed manner through His knowledge of His own Essence. His detailed knowledge of things is posterior to their existence, for knowledge is incident to the known and there is nothing to be known prior to the existence of the known. This theory also suffers from the inadequacy of the previous theories. Moreover, as will be explained later on, it is inadmissible to regard God’s knowledge as acquired, and obtained through perceived forms.
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(x) The tenth theory, which is ascribed to the Peripatetics, states that God’s knowledge of things prior to their creation is by presence in His Essence of their quiddities, as per the existing order of being, not in the manner of a union (ittihâd) or penetration (dukhûl), but as universals sustained by the Essence through a mental subsistence. It is universal in the sense that it does not change with the changes of the known thing. Hence it is a foreknowledge (‘ilm ‘inâ’î) wherein cognitive apprehension is accompanied by its objective realization. This view is subscribed to by most of the theologians (mutakallimûn), though they have [erroneously] faulted it in respect of its assertion of universality in Divine knowledge [due to their misunderstanding of the term ‘universal’]. Thus they hold God’s knowledge to be an acquired one prior to creation, remaining unchanged before and after the existence of things. This theory suffers from the inadequacies of the previous ones, in addition to the fact that it ascribes acquired knowledge to an existent that is immaterial in essence and actuality. However, as mentioned in the discussions on knowledge and the known, an existent that is immaterial in its essence and in actuality cannot have acquired knowledge. Moreover, this view posits mental existence without there being any external existent to which it should correspond, which entails another objective existence of the external existent prior to its particular objective existence separate, from God. Hence it boils down to the fourth view mentioned above.
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اﻟﻔﺼﻞ ﻰ اﻟﺴﺎدس ﻓﻲ ﻗﺪرﺗﻪ ﺗﻌﺎﻟ ﻗﺪ ﺗﻘﺪم :ﻲ ﻛﻮن اﻟﺸ أن اﻟﻘﺪرة ء ﻣﺼﺪرا ﻟﻠﻔﻌﻞ ﻋﻦ ﻋﻠﻢ و ﻣﻦ اﳌﻌﻠﻮم أن اﻟﺬي ﻳﻨﺘﻬﻲ إﻟﻴﻪ اﳌﻮﺟﻮدات اﳌﻤﻜﻨﺔ ﻫﻮ ذاﺗﻪ اﳌﺘﻌﺎﻟﻴﺔ إذ ﻻ ﻳﺒﻘﻰ وراء اﻟﻮﺟﻮد اﳌﻤﻜﻦ إﻻ اﻟﻮﺟﻮد اﻟﻮاﺟﱯ ﻣﻦ ﻏﲑ ﻗﻴﺪ و ﺷﺮط ﻓﻬﻮ اﳌﺼﺪر ﻟﻠﺠﻤﻴﻊ و ﻋﻠﻤﻪ ﻋﲔ ذاﺗﻪ اﻟﱵ ﻫﻲ اﳌﺒﺪأ ﻟﺼ ﺪور اﳌﻌﺎﻟﻴﻞ اﳌﻤﻜﻨﺔ ﻓﻠﻪ اﻟﻘﺪرة و ﻫﻲ ﻋﲔ ذاﺗﻪ. ﻓﺈن ﻗﻠﺖ : ﺎ ﻣﻨﻮﻃﺔ ﺑﺎﺧﺘﻴﺎرﻩ إن ﺷﺎء 5 أﻓﻌﺎل اﻹﻧﺴﺎن اﻻﺧﺘﻴﺎرﻳﺔ ﳐﻠﻮﻗﺔ ﻟﻨﻔﺲ اﻹﻧﺴﺎن ﻷ ﻛﺎن اﻹﻧﺴﺎن ﳎﱪا ﻋﻠﻰ ﻛﺎﻧﺖ ﳐﻠﻮﻗﺔ ﷲ ﺳﺒﺤﺎﻧﻪ ﻣﻘﺪورة ﻟﻪ ﻓﻌﻞ و إن ﱂ ﻳﺸﺄ ﱂ ﻳﻔﻌﻞ و ﻟﻮ
اﻟﻔﻌﻞ ﻻ ﳐﺘﺎرا ﻓﻴﻪ ﻓﺄﻓﻌﺎل اﻹﻧﺴﺎن اﻻﺧﺘﻴﺎر ﻛﻞ ﻳﺔ ﺧﺎرﺟﺔ ﻋﻦ ﺗﻌﻠﻖ اﻟﻘﺪرة ﻓﺎﻟﻘﺪرة ﻻ ﺗﻌﻢ ﺷﻲ ء. ﻗﻠﺖ : ﻛﻮن اﻟﻔﻌﻞ اﺧﺘﻴﺎرﻳﺎ ﺗﺴﺎوى ﻧﺴﺒﺘﻪ إﱃ اﻟﻮﺟﻮد و اﻟﻌﺪم ﺣﱴ ﺣﲔ ﻟﻴﺲ ﻣﻌﲎ اﻟﺼﺪور ﻓﻤﻦ اﶈﺎل ﺻﺪور اﳌﻤﻜﻦ ﻣﻦ ﻏﲑ ﺗﺮﺟﺢ و ﺗﻌﲔ ﻷﺣﺪ ﺟﺎﻧﱯ وﺟﻮدﻩ و ﻋﺪﻣﻪ ﺑﻞ اﻟﻔﻌﻞ اﻻﺧﺘﻴﺎري ﻟﻜﻮﻧﻪ ﳑﻜﻨﺎ ﰲ ذاﺗﻪ ﳛﺘﺎج ﰲ وﺟﻮدﻩ إﱃ ﻋﻠﺔ ﺗ ﺎﻣﺔ ﻻ ﻳﺘﺨﻠﻒ ﻋﻨﻬﺎ ﻧﺴﺒﺘﻪ ء ﻋﻠﺘﻪ اﻟﺘﺎﻣﺔ ﻓﺒﺎﻹﻣﻜﺎن إﻟﻴﻬﺎ ﻧﺴﺒﺔ اﻟﻮﺟﻮب و أﻣﺎ ﻧﺴﺒﺘﻪ إﱃ اﻹﻧﺴﺎن اﻟﺬي ﻫﻮ ﺟﺰء ﻣﻦ أﺟﺰا ﻛﺴﺎﺋﺮ اﻷﺟﺰاء اﻟﱵ ﳍﺎ ﻣﻦ اﳌﺎدة اﻟﻘﺎﺑﻠﺔ و ﺳﺎﺋﺮ اﻟﺸﺮاﺋﻂ اﻟﺰﻣﺎﻧﻴﺔ و اﳌﻜﺎﻧﻴﺔ و ﻏﲑﻫﺎ. ﻛﺴﺎﺋﺮ اﳌﻌﻠﻮﻻت و ﻣﻦ ﻓﺎﻟﻔﻌﻞ اﻻﺧﺘﻴﺎري ﻻ ﻳﻘﻊ إﻻ واﺟﺒﺎ ﺑﺎﻟﻐﲑ اﳌﻌﻠﻮم أن اﻟﻮﺟﻮب ﺑﺎﻟﻐﲑ ﻻ ﻳﺘﺤﻘﻖ إﻻ ﺑﺎﻻﻧﺘﻬﺎء إﱃ واﺟﺐ ﺑﺎﻟﺬات و ﻻ واﺟﺐ ﺑﺎﻟﺬات إﻻ ﻫﻮ ﺗﻌﺎﱃ ﻓﻘﺪرﺗﻪ ﺗﻌﺎﱃ ﻋﺎﻣﺔ ﺣﱴ ﻟﻸﻓﻌﺎل اﻻﺧﺘﻴﺎرﻳﺔ. و ﻣﻦ ﻃﺮﻳﻖ آﺧﺮ : ﻛﻐﲑﻫﺎ ﻣﻦ اﳌﻤﻜﻨﺎت ﻣﻌﻠﻮﻟﺔ و ﻗﺪ ﺗﻘﺪم ﰲ ﻣﺮﺣﻠﺔ اﻟﻌﻠﺔ و اﻷﻓﻌﺎل اﳌﻌﻠﻮل أن وﺟﻮد اﳌﻌﻠﻮل راﺑﻂ ﺑﺎﻟﻨﺴﺒﺔ إﱃ ﻋﻠﺘ ﻪ و ﻻ ﻳﺘﺤﻘﻖ وﺟﻮد راﺑﻂ إﻻ ﺑﺎﻟﻘﻴﺎم ﲟﺴﺘﻘﻞ ﻛﻞ ﻣﻌﻠﻮل ﻣﺘﻌﻠﻖ ﻳﻘﻮﻣﻪ و ﻻ ﻣﺴﺘﻘﻞ ﺑﺎﻟﺬات إﻻ اﻟﻮاﺟﺐ ﺑﺎﻟﺬات ﻓﻬﻮ ﻣﺒﺪأ أول ﻟﺼﺪور ﻛﻞ ﺷﻲ اﻟﻮﺟﻮد ﺑﻌﻠﺔ و ﻫﻮ ﻋﻠﻰ ﺮ ء ﻗﺪﻳ. ﻓﺈن ﻗﻠﺖ : ﺎ ﺟﱪﻳﺔ ﻓﺈن ﻻزﻣﻪ اﻟﻘﻮل 5 اﻻﻟﺘﺰام ﺑﻌﻤﻮم اﻟﻘﺪرة ﻟﻸﻓﻌﺎل اﻻﺧﺘﻴﺎرﻳﺔ اﻟﺘﺰام ﺑﻜﻮ ﺑﺘﻌﻠﻖ اﻹرادة اﻹ ﳍﻴﺔ ﺑﺎﻟﻔﻌﻞ اﻻﺧﺘﻴﺎري و ﻫﻲ ﻻ ﺗﺘﺨﻠﻒ ﻋﻦ اﳌﺮاد ﻓﻴﻜﻮن ﺿﺮوري اﻟﻮﻗﻮع و ﻳﻜﻮن اﻹﻧﺴﺎن ﳎﱪا ﻋﻠﻴﻪ ﻻ ﳐﺘﺎرا ﻓﻴﻪ و ﺑﻮﺟﻪ آﺧﺮ ﻣﺎ وﻗﻊ ﻣﻦ اﻟﻔﻌﻞ ﻣﺘﻌﻠﻖ ﻟﻌﻠﻤﻪ ﺗﻌﺎﱃ ﻓﻮﻗﻮﻋﻪ ﺿﺮوري و إﻻ ﻋﺎد ﻋﻠﻤﻪ ﺟﻬﻼ ﺗﻌﺎﱃ ﻋﻦ ذﻟﻚ ﻓﺎﻟﻔﻌﻞ ﺟﱪي ﻻ اﺧﺘﻴﺎري. ﻗﻠﺖ :ﺖ ﻛﻼ ﻓﺎﻹرادة اﻹﳍﻴﺔ إﳕﺎ ﺗﻌﻠﻘ ﺑﺎﻟﻔﻌﻞ ﻋﻠﻰ ﻣﺎ ﻫﻮ ﻋﻠﻴﻪ ﰲ ﻧﻔﺴﻪ و اﻟﺬي ﻋﻠﻴﻪ اﻟﻔﻌﻞ ﻫﻮ أﻧﻪ ﻣﻨﺴﻮب إﱃ اﻹﻧﺴﺎن اﻟﺬي ﻫﻮ ﺟﺰء ﻋﻠﺘﻪ اﻟﺘﺎﻣﺔ ﺑﺎﻹﻣﻜﺎن و ﻻ ﻳﺘﻐﲑ ﺑﺘﻌﻠﻖ
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اﻹرادة ﻋﻤﺎ ﻫﻮ ﻋﻠﻴﻪ ﻓﻘﺪ ﺗﻌﻠﻘﺖ اﻹرادة ﺑﺎﻟﻔﻌﻞ ﻣﻦ ﻃﺮﻳﻖ اﺧﺘﻴﺎر اﻹﻧﺴﺎن و ﻣﺮادﻩ ﺗﻌﺎﱃ أن ﻳﻔﻌﻞ اﻹﻧﺴﺎن اﻟﻔﻌﻞ اﻟﻔﻼﱐ ﺑﺎﺧﺘﻴﺎرﻩ و ﻣﻦ اﶈﺎل ﻪ أن ﻳﺘﺨﻠﻒ ﻣﺮادﻩ ﺗﻌﺎﱃ ﻋﻦ إرادﺗ. ﻛﺎﳉﻮاب ﻋﻦ ﺗﻌﻠﻖ اﻹرادة ﺑﻪ ﻓﺎﻟﻌﻠﻢ و اﳉﻮاب ﻋﻦ اﻻﺣﺘﺠﺎج ﺑﺘﻌﻠﻖ اﻟﻌﻠﻢ اﻷزﱄ ﺑﺎﻟﻔﻌﻞ إﳕﺎ ﺗﻌﻠﻖ ﺑﺎﻟﻔﻌﻞ ﻋﻠﻰ ﻣﺎ ﻫﻮ ﻋﻠﻴﻪ و ﻫﻮ أﻧﻪ ﻓﻌﻞ اﺧﺘﻴﺎري ﻳﺘﻤﻜﻦ اﻹﻧﺴﺎن ﻣﻨﻪ و ﻣﻦ ﺗﺮﻛﻪ و ﻛﺎن ﻋﻠﻤ ج اﻟﻌﻠﻢ اﳌﻌﻠﻮم ﻋﻦ ﺣﻘﻴﻘﺘﻪ ﻓﻠﻮ ﱂ ﻳﻘﻊ اﺧﺘﻴﺎرﻳﺎ ﻻ ﳜﺮ ﻼ ﻪ ﺗﻌﺎﱃ ﺟﻬ. ﻓﺈن ﻗﻠﺖ : اﻟﺴﻠﻮك إﱃ ﺑﻴﺎن ﻋﻤﻮم اﻟﻘﺪرة ﻣﻦ ﻃﺮﻳﻖ ﺗﻮﻗﻒ وﺟﻮد اﳌﻌﻠﻮل اﳌﻤﻜﻦ ﻋﻠﻰ ﻛﻮن ﻓﻌﻠﻪ ﺗﻌﺎﱃ وﺟﻮﺑﻪ ﺑﺎﻟﻐﲑ و اﻧﺘﻬﺎء ذﻟﻚ إﱃ اﻟﻮاﺟﺐ ﺑﺎﻟﺬات ﻳﻨﺘﺞ ﺧﻼف اﳌﻄﻠﻮب ﻓﺈن ﻛﻮﻧﻪ ﺗﻌﺎﱃ ﻣﻮﺟﺒﺎ ﺑﻔﺘﺢ اﳉﻴﻢ أي واﺟﺒﺎ ﻋﻠﻴﻪ اﻟﻔﻌﻞ ﳑﺘﻨﻌﺎ ﻋﻠﻴﻪ اﻟﱰك و ﻻ ﻣﻌﲎ واﺟﺒﺎ ﻳﺴﺘﻠﺰم ﻟﻌﻤﻮم اﻟﻘﺪرة ﺣﻴﻨﺌﺬ. ﻗﻠﺖ : ﻛﺬﻟﻚ ﻛﻤﺎ ﺗﻌﻠﻢ ﻣﻨﺘﺰع ﻣﻦ اﻟﻮﺟﻮد ﻓﻜﻤﺎ أن وﺟﻮد اﳌﻌﻠﻮل ﻣﻦ ﻧﺎﺣﻴﺔ اﻟﻌﻠﺔ اﻟﻮﺟﻮب وﺟﻮﺑﻪ ﺑﺎﻟﻐﲑ ﻣﻦ ﻧﺎﺣﻴﺘﻬﺎ و ﻣﻦ اﶈﺎل أن ﻳﻌﻮد اﻷﺛﺮ اﳌﱰﺗﺐ ﻋﻠﻰ وﺟﻮد اﻟﺸﻲ ء ﻣﺆﺛﺮا ﰲ وﺟﻮد ﻣﺆﺛﺮة ﻓﺎﻹﳚﺎب اﳉﺎﺋﻲ ﻣﻦ ﻧﺎﺣﻴﺘﻪ ﺗﻌﺎﱃ إﱃ ﻓﻌﻠﻪ ﻳﺴﺘﺤﻴﻞ أن ﻳﺮﺟﻊ ﻓﻴﻮﺟﺐ ﻋﻠﻴﻪ ﺗﻌﺎﱃ ﻓﻌﻠﻪ و ﻳﺴﻠﺐ ﻋﻨﻪ ﺑﺬﻟﻚ ﻋﻤﻮم اﻟﻘﺪرة و ﻫﻲ ﻋﲔ ذاﺗﻪ. و ﻳﺘﺒﲔ ﲟﺎ ﺗﻘﺪم : أﻧﻪ ﺗﻌﺎﱃ ﳐﺘﺎر ﺑﺎﻟﺬات إذ ﻻ إﺟﺒﺎر إﻻ ﻣﻦ أﻣﺮ وراء اﻟﻔﺎﻋﻞ ﳛﻤﻠﻪ ﻋﻠﻰ ﺧﻼف ﻣﺎ ﻳﻘﺘﻀﻴﻪ أو ﻋﻠﻰ ﻣﺎ ﻻ ﻳﻘﺘﻀﻴﻪ و ﻟﻴﺲ وراءﻩ ﺗﻌﺎﱃ إﻻ ﻓﻌﻠﻪ و اﻟﻔﻌﻞ ﻣﻼﺋﻢ ﻟﻔﺎﻋﻠﻪ ﻓﻤﺎ ﻓﻌﻠﻪ ﻣﻦ ﻓﻌﻞ ﻫﻮ اﻟﺬي ﺗﻘﺘﻀ ﻪ ﻴﻪ ذاﺗﻪ و ﳜﺘﺎرﻩ ﺑﻨﻔﺴ.
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12.6. THE ATTRIBUTE OF POWER As mentioned earlier, the attribute of power means that an entity be a knowing source of its acts. It is known that contingent existents derive from the Divine Essence, for there is nothing beyond contingent existents except the unconditioned Necessary Being. Hence God is the source of everything and His knowledge is identical with His Essence, which is the source of contingent effects. He has power and it is identical with His Essence. Now if someone were to say that a human being’s voluntary actions are a creation of the human soul, for they are incident to his will – he performs them if he likes and refrains from performing them if he so wills. Had they been created by God and determined by Him, man would be compelled (mujbir) in his acts, not a free actor who acts out of his free choice (mukhtâr). Hence man’s voluntary acts (al-af’âl al-ikhtiyâriyyah) lie outside the ambit of Divine power, which does not encompass everything. The answer to this is that the meaning of the voluntary character of an act is not that it remains neutral in its relation to existence and non-existence until its coming into being; for it is impossible for a contingent to come into being without there being a preponderant on the side of existence or that of non-existence. Rather, by virtue of its essential contingency, a voluntary action requires a complete cause for coming into existence. Hence when the cause exists it cannot fail to exist, for its relation to the cause is one of necessity. However, its relation to man – who is a part from among the parts of a complete cause – is one of contingency, similar to that of its other parts such as a receptive matter, other temporal and spatial conditions and so on. Hence the voluntary act does occur without becoming necessary-bysomething-else, like all other effects, and it is evident that something that is necessary-by-something-else does not actuate without ultimately terminating in that which is necessary-by-itself. There is nothing necessaryby-itself except God, the Exalted. Hence His power is all-encompassing and includes even the acts of free will. Considering the same problem from another angle, voluntary acts, like other contingents, are caused, and, as mentioned in the chapter on cause and effect,’ the existence of an effect is relative (râbith) in relation to its cause, and is not realized except through dependence on something independent that may sustain it. There is nothing that is independent-in-itself except that which is necessary-in-itself. Hence God is the primary source of all effects dependent for their existence on a cause, and He has power over all things. Now if someone were to say: that if the acts of free will were subject to Divine power it would imply that they are compelled (jabarî); for it means that voluntary actions depend on the Divine will, which is never frustrated. Hence their occurrence is necessary, and, as a result, man is compelled in his voluntary acts and not free. Also, considering the issue from yet another angle, since God has prior knowledge of every act that takes place, its occurrence is necessary; for otherwise it would not be knowledge but ignorance, which is far from God’s station. Hence the voluntary acts are compelled, not free. Our answer is that the case is indeed not such, because the Divine will relates to man’s actions as they are in themselves, and as such they remain
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attributed to the person who is part of the complete cause. Their being subject to the Divine will does not change what they are. Hence the subjection of the actions to the Divine will is through man’s free choice. It was God’s will that man should perform such and such acts out of his own free will, and it is impossible for His will to be frustrated. A similar answer may be given to the objection based on the subjection of voluntary acts to God’s pre-eternal knowledge. For acts of free will are subject to God’s knowledge as they are, that is, as voluntary actions which one can perform or refrain from performing, and the knowledge of something does not alter its reality. Hence, if the act were to occur without the exercise of free will, that would imply ignorance on God’s behalf. Someone might say that this explanation of Divine power – i.e. on the basis of the dependence of the existence of a contingent effect on its becoming necessary-by-something-else and the termination of this necessity in that which is necessary-in-itself – leads to a conclusion contrary to what was intended. That is because the necessity of God’s acts implies that He is compelled by necessity. In other words, His acts are forced upon Him by necessity and it is impossible for Him not to carry them out. In view of this, Divine omnipotence becomes meaningless. The answer to this is that necessity, as we know, is abstracted from existence. In the same way as the effect’s existence is derived from the cause, so also its necessity-by-something-else derives from the cause, and it is impossible that a property characterizing a thing’s existence should in turn affect the existence of the cause that creates the property in it. Hence it is impossible that the necessity that God’s acts derive from Him should in turn make the act necessary upon Him and deprive Him of His omnipotence, which is identical with His Essence. From what has been said, it becomes clear that God, the Exalted, is a free actor by essence; for there can be no compulsion except from something extraneous to an agent that may force it to act contrary to its will, and there is nothing extraneous to God except His Act, which is in harmony with the agent. Hence, His Acts are what His Essence requires and chooses.
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اﻟﻔﺼﻞ اﻟﺴﺎﺑﻊ ﻓﻲ ﺣﻴﺎﺗﻪ ﺗﻌﺎﻟﻰ اﳊﻲ ﻋﻨﺪﻧﺎ ﻫﻮ اﻟﺪراك اﻟﻔﻌﺎل ﻓﺎﳊﻴﺎة ﻣﺒﺪأ اﻹدراك و اﻟﻔﻌﻞ أي ﻣﺒﺪأ اﻟﻌﻠﻢ و اﻟﻘﺪرة أو أﻣﺮ ﻳﻼزﻣﻪ اﻟﻌﻠﻢ و اﻟﻘﺪرة و ﻛﺎﻧﺖ اﳊﻴﺎة ﲢﻤﻞ ﻋﻠﻴﻨﺎ و اﻟﻌﻠﻢ و اﻟﻘﺪرة ﻓﻴﻨﺎ زاﺋﺪﺗﺎن ﻋﻠﻰ إذ ﻛﺎﻟﺬات اﻟﻮاﺟﺒﺔ اﻟﻮﺟﻮد ﻛﺎﻧﺘﺎ ﻓﻴﻪ ﻣﻮﺟﻮدﺗﲔ ﻟﻠﺬات ﻋﻠﻰ ﳓﻮ اﻟﻌﻴﻨﻴﺔ اﻟﺬات ﻓﺤﻤﻠﻬﺎ ﻋﻠﻰ ﻣﺎ ﺑﺎﻟﺬات أوﱃ و أﺣﻖ ﻓﻬﻮ ﺗﻌﺎﱃ ﺣﻴﺎة و ﺣﻲ ﺑﺎﻟﺬات. ﻋﻠﻰ :ﻲ ﻛﻞ ﺣﻲ و ﻣﻌﻄﻲ اﻟﺸ أﻧﻪ ﺗﻌﺎﱃ ﻣﻔﻴﺾ ﳊﻴﺎة ﻟﻪ ء ﻏﲑ ﻓﺎﻗﺪ .
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12.7. THE ATTRIBUTE OF LIFE For us something ‘living’ means a conscious agent (al-darrâk al-fa’’âl). That is, life is the source of consciousness and activity, or the source of knowledge and power, or anything associated with knowledge and power. If the predicate ‘living’ is applicable to us as human beings, while knowledge and power are additional to our essences, it is predicable, with greater reason, of the Essence of the Necessary Being in whom they exist with their very reality. Hence God, the Exalted, is Life and is the Living One by virtue of His Essence. Moreover, God, the Exalted, is the source of the life of every living being, and the giver of a thing cannot be devoid of it.
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ﻛﻼﻣﻪ اﻟﻔﺼﻞ اﻟﺜﺎﻣﻦ ﻓﻲ إرادﺗﻪ ﺗﻌﺎﻟﻰ و ﻗﺎﻟﻮا :ﺢ إرادﺗﻪ ﺗﻌﺎﱃ ﻋﻠﻤﻪ ﺑﺎﻟﻨﻈﺎم اﻷﺻﻠ و ﺑﻌﺒﺎرة أﺧﺮى ﻋﻠﻤﻪ ﺑﻜﻮن اﻟﻔﻌﻞ ﺧﲑا ﻓﻬﻲ ﻛﻤﺎ أن اﻟﺴﻤﻊ ﲟﻌﲎ اﻟﻌﻠﻢ ﺑﺎﳌﺴﻤﻮﻋﺎت و اﻟﺒﺼﺮ ﲟﻌﲎ اﻟﻌﻠﻢ وﺟﻪ ﻣﻦ وﺟﻮﻩ ﻋﻠﻤﻪ ﺗﻌﺎﱃ ﺑﺎﳌﺒﺼﺮات وﺟﻬﺎن ﻣﻦ وﺟﻮﻩ ﻋﻠﻤﻪ ﻓﻬﻮ ﻋﲔ ذاﺗﻪ ﺗﻌﺎﱃ. و ﻗﺎﻟﻮا : ﻛﺎﺷﻒ ﻋﻨﻪ ﻓﻬﻨﺎك ﻣﻮﺟﻮد اﻟﻜﻼم ﻓﻴﻤﺎ ﻧﺘﻌﺎرﻓﻪ ﻟﻔﻆ دال ﻋﻠﻰ ﻣﺎ ﰲ اﻟﻀﻤﲑ اﻋﺘﺒﺎري و ﻫﻮ اﻟﻠﻔﻆ اﳌﻮﺿﻮع ﻳﺪل دﻻﻟﺔ وﺿﻌﻴﺔ اﻋﺘﺒﺎرﻳﺔ ﻋﻠﻰ ﻣﻮﺟﻮد آﺧﺮ و ﻫﻮ اﻟﺬي ﰲ ﻛﺎﻷﺛﺮ ﻛﺬﻟﻚ ﻛﺎن ﻫﻨﺎك ﻣﻮﺟﻮد ﺣﻘﻴﻘﻲ دال ﺑﺎﻟﺪﻻﻟﺔ اﻟﻄﺒﻌﻴﺔ ﻋﻠﻰ ﻣﻮﺟﻮد آﺧﺮ اﻟﺬﻫﻦ و ﻟﻮ ﻛﺎن أوﱃ و اﻟﺪال ﻋﻠﻰ ﻣﺆﺛﺮﻩ و ﺻﻔﺔ اﻟﻜﻤﺎل ﰲ اﳌﻌﻠﻮل اﻟﻜﺎﺷﻔﺔ ﻋﻦ اﻟﻜﻤﺎل اﻷﰎ ﰲ ﻋﻠﺘﻪ ﻛﻼﻣﺎ ﻟﻘﻮة دﻻﻟ أﺣﻖ ﺑﺄن ﻳﺴﻤﻰ ﻛﻤﺎل ﻛﺎن ﻫﻨﺎك ﻣﻮﺟﻮد أﺣﺪي اﻟﺬات ذو ﺻﻔﺎت ﺘﻪ و ﻟﻮ ﻛﻤﺎﻟﻪ و ﻣﺎ ﻳﱰﺗﺐ ﻋﻠﻴﻪ ﻣﻦ اﻵﺛﺎر ﻋﻦ وﺟﻮدﻩ اﻷﺣﺪي و ﻫﻮ ﰲ ذاﺗﻪ ﲝﻴﺚ ﻳﻜﺸﻒ ﺑﺘﻔﺎﺻﻴﻞ ﻛﺎن أوﱃ و أﺣﻖ ﺑﺎﺳﻢ اﻟﻜﻼم و ﻫﻮ ﻣﺘﻜﻠﻢ ﻟﻮﺟﻮد ذاﺗﻪ ﻟﺬاﺗﻪ اﻟﻮاﺟﺐ ﺗﻌﺎﱃ . أﻗﻮل : ﻓﻴﻪ إرﺟﺎع ﲢﻠﻴﻠﻲ ﳌﻌﻨﻴﻲ اﻹرادة و اﻟﻜﻼم إﱃ وﺟﻪ ﻣﻦ وﺟﻮ ﻩ اﻟﻌﻠﻢ و اﻟﻘﺪرة ﻓﻼ ﺿﺮورة ﺗﺪﻋﻮ إﱃ إﻓﺮادﳘﺎ ﻋﻦ اﻟﻌﻠﻢ و اﻟﻘﺪرة و ﻣﺎ ﻧﺴﺐ إﻟﻴﻪ ﺗﻌﺎﱃ ﰲ اﻟﻜﺘﺎب و اﻟﺴﻨﺔ ﻣﻦ اﻹرادة و اﻟﻜﻼم أرﻳﺪ ﺑﻪ ﺻﻔﺔ اﻟﻔﻌﻞ ﺑﺎﳌﻌﲎ اﻟﺬي ﺳﻴﺄﰐ إن ﺷﺎء اﷲ

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12.8. THE ATTRIBUTES OF WILL AND SPEECH The metaphysicians state that God’s will (irâdah) is His knowledge of the best [possible] order of the universe. In other words, it is His knowledge that a certain act is good. Hence in the same way as His being the ‘hearer’ and the ‘seer’ (i.e. having knowledge of that which is audible and visible) are two aspects of His knowledge, His will is also an aspect of His knowledge, which is identical with His Essence. It is also said that speech, as we know it, consists of words, which signify meanings in one’s mind. Hence a word is a ‘conventional existent’ (mawjûd i’tibârî), which by virtue of conventional signification (dalâlah wad’iyyah) signifies another existent in the mind. Should there be a real existent that signifies another existent with a ‘natural’ signification (dalâlah thab’iyyah) – such as an effect, which signifies its own cause – and should its attribute of perfection manifest the consummate perfection of its cause, then it can be called a ‘word’ (kalâm) with greater reason due to the strength of its signification. If it were a being unitary in its essence (ahadî al-dzât)P whose essential attributes of perfection, which by virtue of the details of its perfection and effects (âtsâr) manifest that unitary being, which is the Necessary Being, it is worthier of being called a ‘speaker.’ Hence He is the ‘Speaker’ (mutakallim) by virtue of the existence of His Essence for Himself. I say: In this view, the concepts of Divine will and speech are reduced to an aspect of knowledge and power. Accordingly, it is not necessary to consider them in separation from knowledge and power. As to the will and speech that are attributed to God, the Exalted, in the Qur’ân and the Sunnah, they refer to the attributes of Act, in the sense to be explained shortly, God willing.
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اﻟﻔﺼﻞ اﻟﺘﺎﺳﻊ ﻓﻲ ﻓﻌﻠﻪ ﺗﻌﺎﻟﻰ و اﻧﻘﺴﺎﻣﺎﺗﻪ ﻟﻔﻌﻠﻪ ﺗﻌﺎﱃ ﲟﻌﲎ اﳌﻔﻌﻮل و ﻫﻮ اﻟﻮﺟﻮد اﻟﻔﺎﺋﺾ ﻣﻨﻪ اﻧﻘﺴﺎﻣﺎت ﲝﺴﺐ ﻣﺎ ﲢﺼﻞ ﻣﻦ ﻛﺎﻧﻘﺴﺎﻣﻪ إﱃ ﳎﺮد و ﻣﺎدي و اﻧﻘﺴﺎﻣﻪ إﱃ ﺛﺎﺑﺖ و ﺳﻴﺎل و إﱃ ﻏﲑ ذﻟﻚ و اﻷﲝﺎث اﻟﺴﺎﺑﻘﺔ اﳌﺮاد ﰲ ﻫﺬا اﻟﻔﺼﻞ اﻹﺷﺎرة إﱃ ﻣﺎ ﺗﻘﺪم ﺳﺎﺑﻘﺎ أن اﻟﻌﻮاﱂ اﻟﻜﻠﻴﺔ ﺛﻼﺛﺔ ﻋﺎﱂ اﻟﻌﻘﻞ و ﻋﺎﱂ اﳌﺜﺎل و ﻋﺎ ة ﱂ اﳌﺎد. ﻓﻌﺎﱂ اﻟﻌﻘﻞ ﳎﺮد ﻋﻦ اﳌﺎدة و آﺛﺎرﻫﺎ. و ﻋﺎﱂ اﳌﺜﺎل ﳎﺮد ﻋﻦ اﳌﺎدة دون آﺛﺎرﻫﺎ ﻣﻦ اﻷﺑﻌﺎد و اﻷﺷﻜﺎل و اﻷوﺿﺎع و ﻏﲑﻫﺎ ﻓﻔﻴﻪ أﺷﺒﺎح ﺟﺴﻤﺎﻧﻴﺔ ﻣﺘﻤﺜﻠﺔ ﰲ ﺻﻔﺔ اﻷﺟﺴﺎم اﻟﱵ ﰲ ﻋﺎﱂ اﳌﺎدة ﻋﻠﻰ ﻧﻈﺎم ﻳﺸﺒﻪ ﻧﻈﺎﻣﻬﺎ ﰲ ﻋﺎﱂ اﳌﺎدة ﻏﲑ أن ﺗﻌﻘﺐ ﺑﻌﻀﻬﺎ ﻟﺒﻌﺾ ﺑﺎﻟﱰﺗﺐ ا ﻟﻮﺟﻮدي ﺑﻴﻨﻬﺎ ﻻ ﺑﺘﻐﲑ ﺻﻮرة إﱃ ﺻﻮرة أو ﺣﺎل ج ﻣﻦ اﻟﻘﻮة إﱃ اﻟﻔﻌﻞ ﻣﻦ ﻃﺮﻳﻖ اﳊﺮﻛﺔ ﻋﻠﻰ ﻣﺎ ﻫﻮ اﻟﺸﺄن ﰲ ﻋﺎﱂ اﳌﺎدة ﻓﺤﺎل إﱃ ﺣﺎل ﺑﺎﳋﺮو اﻟﺼﻮر اﳌﺜﺎﻟﻴﺔ ﰲ ﺗﺮﺗﺐ ﺑﻌﻀﻬﺎ ﻋﻠﻰ ﺑﻌﺾ ﺣﺎل اﻟﺼﻮر اﳋﻴﺎﻟﻴﺔ ﻣﻦ اﳊﺮﻛﺔ و اﻟﺘﻐﲑ و اﻟﻌﻠﻢ ﳎﺮد ﻻ ﻗﻮة ﻓﻴﻪ و ﻻ ﺗﻐﲑ ﻓﻬﻮ ﻋﻠﻢ ﺑﺎﻟﺘﻐﲑ ﻻ ﻢ ﺗﻐﲑ ﰲ اﻟﻌﻠ و ﻋﺎﱂ اﳌﺎدة ﲜﻮاﻫﺮﻫﺎ و أﻋﺮاﺿﻬﺎ ﻣﻘﺎرن ﻟﻠﻤﺎدة. و اﻟﻌﻮاﱂ اﻟﺜﻼﺛﺔ ﻣﱰﺗﺒﺔ وﺟﻮدا ﻓﻌﺎﱂ اﻟﻌﻘﻞ ﻗﺒﻞ ﻋﺎﱂ اﳌﺜﺎل و ﻋﺎﱂ اﳌﺜﺎل ﻗﺒﻞ ﻋﺎﱂ اﳌﺎدة وﺟﻮدا و ذﻟﻚ ﻷن اﻟﻔﻌﻠﻴﺔ اﶈﻀﺔ اﻟﱵ ﻻ ﺗﺸﻮ-ﺎ ﻗﻮة أﻗﻮى و أﺷﺪ وﺟﻮدا ﳑﺎ ﻫﻮ ﺑﺎﻟﻘﻮة ﳏﻀﺎ أو ﺗﺸﻮﺑﻪ ﻗﻮة ﻓﺎﳌﻔﺎرق ﻗﺒﻞ اﳌﻘﺎرن ﻟﻠﻤﺎدة ﰒ اﻟﻌﻘﻞ اﳌﻔﺎرق أﻗﻞ ﺣﺪودا و ﻗﻴﻮدا و أوﺳﻊ و ﻛﺎﻧﺖ ﻣﺮﺗﺒﺘﻪ ﰲ اﻟﺴﻠﺴﻠﺔ ﻛﺎن اﻟﻮﺟﻮد أﻗﻮى و أوﺳﻊ ﻛﻠﻤﺎ ﺮد و R أﺑﺴﻂ وﺟﻮدا ﻣﻦ اﳌﺜﺎل ا اﳌﱰﺗﺒﺔ ﻣﻦ ﺣﻘﻴﻘﺔ اﻟﻮﺟﻮد اﳌﺸﻜﻜﺔ أﻗﺪم و ﻣﻦ اﳌﺒﺪإ اﻷول اﻟﺬي ﻫﻮ وﺟﻮد ﺻﺮف ﻟﻴﺲ ﻟﻪ ﻛﻤﺎل ﻳﻔﻘﺪﻩ ﺣﺪ ﳛﺪﻩ و ﻻ أﻗﺮب ﻓﻌﺎﱂ اﻟﻌﻘﻞ أﻗﺪم وﺟﻮدا ﻣﻦ اﳉﻤﻴﻊ و ﻳﻠﻴﻪ ﻋﺎﱂ اﳌﺜﺎل و ﻳﻠﻴﻪ ﻋﺎﱂ اﳌﺎدة. و ﻳﺘﺒﲔ ﲟﺎ ذﻛﺮ : أن اﻟﱰﺗﻴﺐ اﳌﺬﻛﻮر ﺗﺮﺗﻴﺐ ﰲ اﻟﻌﻠﻴﺔ أي إن ﻋﺎﱂ اﻟﻌﻘﻞ ﻋﻠﺔ ﻣﻔﻴﻀﺔ ﻟﻌﺎﱂ اﳌﺜﺎل و ﻋﺎﱂ اﳌﺜﺎل ﻋﻠﺔ ﻣﻔﻴﻀﺔ ﻟﻌﺎﱂ اﳌﺎدة. و ﻳﺘﺒﲔ أﻳﻀﺎ ﲟﻌﻮﻧﺔ ﻣﺎ ﺗﻘﺪم ﻣﻦ أن اﻟﻌﻠﺔ ﻣﺸﺘﻤﻠﺔ ﻋ ﻛﻤﺎل اﳌﻌﻠﻮل ﺑﻨﺤﻮ أﻋﻠﻰ و ﻠﻰ أﺷﺮف أن اﻟﻌﻮاﱂ اﻟﺜﻼﺛﺔ ﻣﺘﻄﺎﺑﻘﺔ ﻣﺘﻮاﻓﻘﺔ ﻓﻔﻲ ﻋﺎﱂ اﳌﺜﺎل ﻧﻈﺎم ﻣﺜﺎﱄ ﻳﻀﺎﻫﻲ اﻟﻨﻈﺎم اﳌﺎدي و ﻫﻮ أﺷﺮف ﻣﻨﻪ و ﰲ ﻋﺎﱂ اﻟﻌﻘﻞ ﻣﺎ ﻳﻄﺎﺑﻘﻪ ﻟﻜﻨﻪ ﻣﻮﺟﻮد ﺑﻨﺤﻮ أﺑﺴﻂ و أﲨﻞ و ﻳﻄﺎﺑﻘﻪ اﻟﻨﻈﺎم اﻟﺮﺑﻮﰊ اﳌﻮﺟﻮد ﰲ ﻋﻠﻢ اﻟﻮاﺟﺐ ﺗﻌﺎﱃ.
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12.9. THE DIVINE ACT AND ITS DIVISIONS God’s Act (i.e. creation), in the sense of existence emanating from Him, has various divisions in accordance with the conclusions of the previous discussions, such as its division into material and immaterial, changeable and unchangeable, and so on. Our purpose here is to make a passing reference to that which has already been mentioned,’ that there are three realms: the realm of the Intellect (‘âlam al-’aql), the imaginal realm (‘âlam al-mitsâl), and the material realm (‘âlam al-mâddah). The realm of the Intellect is immaterial and without matter and its properties (âtsâr). The imaginal world is also devoid of matter without, however, being devoid of its properties, such as spatial dimension, shape, configuration and so on. It contains bodily images (asbbdh) which are analogous in their characteristics to bodies in the material realm and with an order that is similar to their order in the material world. But they do not succeed one another in respect of existence, nor do they change from one form to another or from one state to another by passing from potentiality to actuality by motion, as is the case in the material world. Thus the imaginal forms in their succeeding one another are similar to the subjective imaginary forms in respect of change and motion. As knowledge is immaterial and there is no potentiality or change in it, it is knowledge of change, not change of knowledge. The material world, together with its substances and accidents, is associated with matter. These threefold realms stand in an existential hierarchy. Thus the realm of the Intellect existentially precedes the imaginal world, and the imaginal world existentially precedes the material world. That is because absolute actuality, without any trace of potentiality, is existentially stronger and more powerful than that which has either pure potentiality or traces of potentiality in it. Hence that which is immaterial has existential precedence over that which is associated with matter. Further, the immaterial Intellect is least bound by limits and conditions and is existentially more expansive and simpler than the immaterial imaginal form (al-mitsâl al-mujarrad). Whenever an existent is stronger and more expansive, its precedence is greater in the graded hierarchy of existence and it is nearer to the First Source, which is absolute existence, without any limits and not lacking any perfection. Hence the world of the Intellect existentially precedes all being, and below it is the imaginal world, below which is the material world. From what has been said it becomes clear that the above-mentioned hierarchy is one based on causality. That is, the world of the Intellect is the emanating cause (mufîdh) of the imaginal world and the imaginal world is the emanating cause of the material world. It also becomes clear from that which was stated earlier – that the cause possesses the perfection of its effect to a higher and superior degree – that the threefold worlds correspond to one another. Thus the imaginal world has an imaginal order corresponding to the material order while being superior
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to it, and the world of Intellect has an order corresponding to it while being simpler and more undifferentiated (ajmal), and to it corresponds the divine order (al-nizhâm al-rabawî) that exists in the knowledge of the Exalted Necessary Being.
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ﻛﺜﺮة ﻛﺎﻧﺖ ﻓﻴﻪ ﻛﻴﻔﻴﺔ ﺣﺼﻮل اﻟﻜﺜﺮة ﻓﻴﻪ ﻟﻮ اﻟﻔﺼﻞ اﻟﻌﺎﺷﺮ ﻓﻲ اﻟﻌﻘﻞ اﻟﻤﻔﺎرق و و ﻟﻴﻌﻠﻢ : أن اﳌﺎﻫﻴﺔ ﻻ ﺗﺘﻜﺜﺮ ﺗﻜﺜﺮا إﻓﺮادﻳﺎ إﻻ ﲟﻘﺎرﻧﺔ اﳌﺎدة و اﻟﱪﻫﺎن ﻋﻠﻴﻪ إن اﻟﻜﺜﺮة ﺎ أو T اﻟﻌﺪدﻳﺔ إﻣﺎ أن ﺗﻜﻮن ﲤﺎم ذات اﳌﺎﻫﻴﺔ أو ﺑﻌﺾ ذا ﺎ إﻣﺎ ﻻزﻣﺔ أو ﻣﻔﺎرﻗﺔ T ﺧﺎرﺟﺔ ﻣﻦ ذا ﻛﺜﲑ ﻛﻞ ﻛﺜﲑا و ﻛﺎن ﻛﻠﻤﺎ وﺟﺪ ﳍﺎ ﻓﺮد و اﻷﻗﺴﺎم اﻟﺜﻼﺛﺔ اﻷول ﻳﺴﺘﺤﻴﻞ أن ﻳﻮﺟﺪ ﳍﺎ ﻓﺮد إذ ﻛﺜﲑا ﻟﻜﻮﻧﻪ ﻣﺼﺪاﻗﺎ ﻟﻠﻤﺎﻫﻴﺔ و ﻫﺬا اﻟﻜﺜﲑ ﻣﺆﻟﻒ ﻣﻦ آﺣﺎد و اﻟﻮاﺣﺪ ﻣﻨﻬﺎ ﳚﺐ أن ﻳﻜﻮن أﻳﻀﺎ ﻣﺆﻟﻒ ﻣﻦ آﺣﺎد ﻓﻴﺘﺴﻠﺴﻞ و ﻻ ﻳﻨﺘﻬﻲ إﱃ واﺣﺪ ﻓﻼ ﻳﺘﺤﻘﻖ ﻛﺜﲑ ﳍﺎ واﺣﺪ ﻓﻼ ﻳﺘﺤﻘﻖ ﻛﺜﲑة ﻫﺬا ﺧﻠﻒ ﻓﻼ ﺗﻜﻮن اﻟﻜﺜﺮة إﻻ ﺧﺎرﺟﺔ ﻣﻔﺎرﻗﺔ ﳛﺘﺎج ﳊﻮﻗﻬﺎ إﱃ ﻣﺎدة ﻗﺎﺑﻠﺔ ﻓﻜﻞ ﻣﺎﻫﻴﺔ ﺮدة وﺟﻮدا R ﻛﻞ ﻣﺎﻫﻴﺔ ﻏﲑ ﻣﺎدﻳﺔ و ﻫﻲ ا اﻷﻓﺮاد ﻓﻬﻲ ﻣﺎدﻳﺔ و ﻳﻨﻌﻜﺲ ﻋﻜﺲ اﻟﻨﻘﻴﺾ إﱃ أن ﻻ ﺗﺘﻜﺜﺮ ﺗﻜﺜﺮا إﻓﺮادﻳﺎ و ﻫﻮ اﳌﻄﻠﻮب. ﻧﻌﻢ ﲤﻜﻦ اﻟﻜﺜﺮة اﻷﻓﺮادﻳﺔ ﰲ اﻟﻌﻘﻞ اﳌﻔﺎرق ﻓﻴﻤﺎ ﻟﻮ اﺳﺘﻜﻤﻠﺖ أﻓﺮاد ﻣﻦ ﻧﻮع ﻣﺎدي ﻛﺎﻹﻧﺴﺎن ﺑﺎﳊﺮﻛﺔ اﳉﻮﻫﺮﻳﺔ ﻣﻦ ﻣﺮﺣﻠﺔ اﳌﺎدﻳﺔ و اﻹﻣﻜﺎن إﱃ ﻣﺮﺣﻠﺔ اﻟﺘﺠﺮد و اﻟﻔﻌﻠﻴﺔ ﺎ ﻣﺎدﻳﺔ 5ﻛﻮ ﻛﺎن ﳍﺎ ﻋﻨﺪ ﻓﺘﺴﺘﺼﺤﺐ اﻟﺘﻤﻴﺰ اﻟﻔﺮدي اﻟﺬي . ﻛﺜﺮة ﻓﻬﻲ ﻛﺎﻧﺖ ﻓﻴﻪ ﰒ إﻧﻪ ﳌﺎ اﺳﺘﺤﺎﻟﺖ اﻟﻜﺜﺮة اﻷﻓﺮادﻳﺔ ﰲ اﻟﻌﻘﻞ اﳌﻔﺎرق ﻓﻠﻮ اﻟﻜﺜﺮة ﻛﻞ ﻧﻮع ﻣﻨﻬﺎ ﻣﻨﺤﺼﺮ ﰲ ﻓﺮد و ﻳﺘﺼﻮر ذﻟﻚ ﻋﻠﻰ أﺣﺪ اﻟﻨﻮﻋﻴﺔ ﺑﺄن ﺗﻮﺟﺪ ﻣﻨﻪ أﻧﻮاع ﻣﺘﺒﺎﻳﻨﺔ ﻛﻞ وﺟﻬﲔ إﻣﺎ ﻃﻮﻻ و إﻣﺎ ﻋﺮﺿﺎ و اﻟﻜﺜﺮة ﻃﻮﻻ أن ﻳﻮﺟﺪ ﻫﻨﺎك ﻋﻘﻞ ﰒ ﻋﻘﻞ إﱃ ﻋﺪد ﻣﻌﲔ ﻛﺜﲑة ﻣﺘﺒﺎﻳﻨﺔ ﺳﺎﺑﻖ ﻣﻨﻬﺎ ﻋﻠﺔ ﻓﺎﻋﻠﺔ ﻟﻼﺣﻘﻪ ﻣﺒﺎﻳﻦ ﻟﻪ ﻧﻮﻋﺎ و اﻟﻜﺜﺮة ﻋﺮﺿﺎ أن ﻳﻮﺟﺪ ﻫﻨﺎك أﻧﻮاع ﻟﻴﺲ ﺑﻌﻀﻬﺎ ﻋﻠﺔ ﻟﺒﻌﺾ و ﻻ ﻣﻌﻠﻮﻻ و ﻫﻲ ﲨﻴﻌﺎ ﻣﻌﻠﻮﻻت ﻋﻘﻞ واﺣﺪ ﻓﻮﻗﻬﺎ.
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12.10. THE IMMATERIAL INTELLECTS AND THE POSSIBLE MANNER OF THEIR MULTIPLICITY It should be known that without association with matter quiddity is not subject to multiplicity in terms of individuation. The proof of it is that numerical multiplicity is either (i) by virtue of complete quiddity or (ii) part of it, or (iii) by virtue of a non-separable accident or (iv) by a separable accident. It is impossible for a quiddity to have any individuals in the first three cases, for in each of these cases an individual would itself be multiple when found, and every multitude is composed of individuals. Thus each of the individuals would necessarily have to be a multiplicity in order to be an instance of its quiddity, whereas this multiplicity in turn would be comprised of individuals. This leads to an indefinite regress and does not yield an individual member. Therefore, its individual cannot actualize, and hence multiplicity, too, remains non-actualized. This involves a contradiction. Therefore, multiplicity does not occur except by virtue of a separable accident, which requires a receptive matter for its association with quiddity. Hence every quiddity possessing a multiplicity of individuals is material; conversely, every immaterial quiddity, which is existentially immaterial, does not have multiple individuals. Yes, there can be a multiplicity of individuals in the immaterial Intellects where an individual from a material species, such as man, develops by substantial motion from the plane of materiality and potentiality to the plane of immateriality and actuality, whereat its distinctive individual characteristics associated with its material origin accompany it. Further, since it is impossible that there should be a multiplicity of individuals in the immaterial Intellect, any multiplicity therein would be a multiplicity of species, in the sense that each separate species of it will be confined to a unique individual. This is conceivable in two ways, vertical and horizontal. As to vertical multiplicity, it means that there are a definite number of Intellects, each of which is the efficient cause of the succeeding Intellect of a different species. In horizontal multiplicity, there would be different multiple species none of whom is the cause or the effect of another and all of whom are effects of the Intellect above them.
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اﻟﻔﺼﻞ اﻟﺤﺎدي ﻋﺸﺮ ﻓﻲ اﻟﻌﻘﻮل اﻟﻄﻮﻟﻴﺔ و أول ﻣﺎ ﻳﺼﺪر ﻣﻨﻬﺎ ﻛﺎن اﻟﻮاﺟﺐ ﺗﻌﺎﱃ واﺣﺪا ﺑﺴﻴﻄﺎ ﻣﻦ ﲨﻴﻊ اﳉﻬﺎت اﻣﺘﻨﻊ أن ﻳﺼﺪر ﻣﻨﻪ اﻟﻜﺜﲑ ﳌﺎ ء ﺳﻮا ﻛﺎﻷﻧﻮاع اﳌﺎدﻳﺔ ﻷن اﻟﻮاﺣﺪ ﻻ ﻳﺼﺪر ﻋﻨﻪ إﻻ ﻛﺎﻟﻌﻘﻮل اﻟﻌﺮﺿﻴﺔ أو ﻣﺎدﻳﺎ ﻛﺎن اﻟﺼﺎدر ﳎﺮدا اﻟﻮاﺣﺪ ﻓﺄول ﺻﺎدر ﻣﻨﻪ ﺗﻌﺎﱃ ﻋﻘﻞ واﺣﺪ ﳛﺎﻛﻲ ﺑﻮﺟﻮدﻩ اﻟﻮاﺣﺪ اﻟﻈﻠﻲ وﺟﻮد اﻟﻮاﺟﺐ ﺗﻌﺎﱃ ﰲ وﺣﺪﺗﻪ. ﻛﺎن ﻣﻌﲎ أوﻟﻴﺘﻪ ﻫﻮ ﺗﻘﺪﻣﻪ ﰲ اﻟﻮﺟﻮد ﻋﻠﻰ ﻏﲑﻩ ﻣﻦ اﻟﻮﺟﻮدات اﳌﻤﻜﻨﺔ و ﻫﻮ و ﳌﺎ اﻟﻌﻠﻴﺔ ﻛﺎن ﻋﻠﺔ ﻣﺘﻮﺳﻄﺔ ﺑﻴﻨﻪ ﺗﻌﺎﱃ و ﺑﲔ ﺳﺎﺋﺮ اﻟﺼﻮادر ﻣﻨﻪ ﻓﻬﻮ اﻟﻮاﺳﻄﺔ ﰲ ﺻﺪور ﻣﺎ دوﻧﻪ ﻣﺎ ﻟﻴﺲ ﰲ ذﻟﻚ ﲢﺪﻳﺪ اﻟﻘﺪرة اﳌﻄﻠﻘﺔ اﻟﻮاﺟﺒﻴﺔ اﻟﱵ ﻫﻲ ﻋﲔ اﻟﺬات اﳌﺘﻌﺎﻟﻴﺔ ﻋﻠﻰ ﻣﺎ ﺗﻘﺪم ﻛﺜﲑ ﻣﻦ اﻟﻮاﺣﺪ ﻣﻦ ﺣﻴﺚ ﻫﻮ واﺣﺪ اﻟﱪﻫﺎن ﻋﻠﻴﻬﺎ و ذﻟﻚ ﻷن ﺻﺪور اﻟﻜﺜﲑ ﻣﻦ ﺣﻴﺚ ﻫﻮ ﳑﺘﻨﻊ ﻋﻠﻰ ﻣﺎ ﺗﻘﺪم و اﻟﻘﺪرة ﻻ ﺗﺘﻌﻠﻖ إﻻ ﺑﺎﳌﻤﻜﻦ و أﻣﺎ اﶈﺎﻻت اﻟﺬاﺗﻴﺔ اﻟﺒﺎﻃﻠﺔ اﻟﺬوا ت ﻛﺴﻠﺐ اﻟﺸﻲ ء ﻋﻦ ﻧﻔﺴﻪ و اﳉﻤﻊ ﺑﲔ اﻟﻨﻘﻴﻀﲔ و رﻓﻌﻬﻤﺎ ﻣﺜﻼ ﻓﻼ ذات ﳍﺎ ﺣﱴ ﺗﺘﻌﻠﻖ -ﺎ . ﺎ ﻣﻦ اﻟﻮﺟﻮد ﻟﻴﺲ ﲢﺪﻳﺪا ﻟﻠﻘﺪرة و ﺗﻘﻴﻴﺪا ﻹﻃﻼﻗﻬﺎ 5 اﻟﻘﺪرة ﻓﺤﺮﻣﺎ ﻛﺎن واﺣﺪا ﰲ وﺟ ﰒ إن اﻟﻌﻘﻞ اﻷول و إن ﻮدﻩ ﺑﺴﻴﻄﺎ ﰲ ﺻﺪورﻩ ﻟﻜﻨﻪ ﳌﻜﺎن إﻣﻜﺎﻧﻪ ﺗﻠﺰﻣﻪ ﻣﺎﻫﻴﺔ اﻋﺘﺒﺎرﻳﺔ ﻏﲑ أﺻﻴﻠﺔ ﻷن ﻣﻮﺿﻮع اﻹﻣﻜﺎن ﻫﻲ اﳌﺎﻫﻴﺔ و ﻣﻦ وﺟﻪ آﺧﺮ ﻫﻮ ﻳﻌﻘﻞ ذاﺗﻪ و ﻳﻌﻘﻞ اﻟﻮاﺟﺐ ﺗﻌﺎﱃ ﻓﻴﺘﻌﺪد ﻓﻴﻪ اﳉﻬﺔ و ﳝﻜﻦ أن ﻳﻜﻮن ﻟﺬﻟﻚ ﻣﺼﺪرا ﻷﻛﺜﺮ ﻣﻦ ﻣﻌﻠﻮل واﺣﺪ. ﻟﻜﻦ اﳉﻬﺎت اﳌﻮﺟﻮدة ﰲ ﻋﺎﱂ اﳌﺜﺎل اﻟﺬي دون ﻋﺎﱂ اﻟﻌﻘﻞ ﺑﺎﻟﻐﺔ ﻣﺒﻠﻐﺎ ﻻ ﺗﻔﻲ ﺑﺼﺪورﻫﺎ اﳉﻬﺎت اﻟﻘﻠﻴﻠﺔ اﻟﱵ ﰲ اﻟﻌﻘﻞ اﻷول ﻓﻼ ﺑﺪ ﻣﻦ ﺻﺪور ﻋﻘﻞ ﺛﺎن ﰒ ﺛﺎﻟﺚ و ﻫﻜﺬا ﺣﱴ ﺗﺒﻠﻎ ﺟﻬﺎت اﻟﻜﺜﺮة ﻋﺪدا ﻳﻔﻲ ﺑﺼﺪور اﻟﻌﺎﱂ اﻟﺬي ﻳﺘﻠﻮﻩ ﻣﻦ اﳌﺜﺎل. ﻓﺘﺒﲔ :ﺎ ﻛﺜﲑة و إن ﱂ ﻳﻜﻦ ﻟﻨﺎ ﻃﺮﻳﻖ إﱃ إﺣﺼﺎء ﻋﺪدﻫ أن ﻫﻨﺎك ﻋﻘﻮﻻ ﻃﻮﻟﻴﺔ .
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12.11. THE VERTICAL INTELLECTS AND THE FIRST OF THEM Since the Necessary Being is one and simple in all respects, it is impossible for something multiple to emanate from It, irrespective of whether it is immaterial, such as the horizontal Intellects, or material, like the material species. That is because nothing except what is one can emanate from that which is one. Hence the first to emanate from God is the Intellect that with its ‘quasi-unitary existence’ (wujûd al-wâhid al-zhillî) reflects the existence of the Necessary Being in Its unity. As its being the first means its existential precedence over other contingent existents, it is the intermediate cause between God and other endues to emanate from Him. In this there is no limiting of the absolute power of the Necessary Being, which is identical with its exalted Essence in accordance with the proof mentioned earlier. That is because, as mentioned before, it is impossible that something multiple qua multiple should emanate from something one qua one, and power relates only to that which is possible. That which is essentially impossible, being intrinsically void, has no reality to be the subject of Divine power – such as a thing’s not being what it is, and the simultaneous truth or falsehood of two contradictories, for instance. Hence their impossibility of existence does not imply a limitation on God’s power or its absoluteness. Further, the First Intellect, though one in its being and simple in its emanation, has a quiddity – which is derivative and non-fundamental – by virtue of its contingency, for quiddity is the locus of contingency. Considering the matter from yet another angle, since the First Intellect intellects its own essence as well as the Necessary Being, it has multiple aspects, and for this reason it can be the source of more than a single effect. However, the aspects (jihât) existent in the imaginal world, which is below the world of the Intellect, are so numerous that the few aspects of the First Intellect are not sufficient to emanate it. Hence it has to bring into being the Second Intellect, then the Third Intellect and so on and so forth until the number of aspects of multiplicity reaches the number necessary for the creation of the imaginal realm below it. From this, it becomes clear that there are multiple vertical Intellects (al’uqûl al-thûliyyah), although there is no way of determining their number.
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اﻟﻔﺼﻞ اﻟﺜﺎﻧﻲ ﻋﺸﺮ ﻓﻲ اﻟﻌﻘﻮل اﻟﻌﺮﺿﻴﺔ ﻗﻴﻮن ﰲ اﻟﻮﺟﻮد ﻋﻘﻮﻻ ﻋﺮﺿﻴﺔ ﻻ ﻋﻠﻴﺔ و ﻻ ﻣﻌﻠﻮﻟﻴﺔ ﺑﻴﻨﻬﺎ ﻫﻲ ﲝﺬاء اﻷﻧﻮاع أﺛﺒﺖ اﻹﺷﺮا اﳌﺎدﻳﺔ اﻟﱵ ﰲ ﻫﺬا اﻟﻌﺎﱂ اﳌ ﻛﻞ ﻣﻨﻬﺎ ﻣﺎ ﳛﺎذﻳﻪ ﻣﻦ اﻟﻨﻮع و ﺗﺴﻤﻰ أرﺑﺎب اﻷﻧﻮاع و ﺎدي ﻳﺪﺑﺮ ﻛﺎن ﻳﺼﺮ ﻋﻠﻰ اﻟﻘﻮل -ﺎ و أﻧﻜﺮﻫﺎ اﳌﺸﺎءون و ﻧﺴﺒﻮا اﻟﺘﺪاﺑﲑ اﳌﻨﺴﻮﺑﺔ اﳌﺜﻞ اﻷﻓﻼﻃﻮﻧﻴﺔ ﻷﻧﻪ إﻟﻴﻬﺎ إﱃ آﺧﺮ اﻟﻌﻘﻮل اﻟﻄﻮﻟﻴﺔ اﻟﺬي ﻳﺴﻤﻮﻧﻪ اﻟﻌﻘﻞ اﻟﻔﻌﺎل. و ﻗﺪ اﺧﺘﻠﻔﺖ أﻗﻮال اﳌﺜﺒﺘﲔ ﰲ ﺣﻘﻴﻘﺘﻬﺎ و أﺻﺢ اﻷﻗﻮال ﻓﻴﻬﺎ ﻋﻠﻰ ﻣﺎ ﻗﻴﻞ ﻫﻮ أن ﻟﻜﻞ ﻧﻮع ﻣﻦ ﻫﺬﻩ اﻷﻧﻮاع اﳌﺎدﻳﺔ ﻓﺮدا ﳎﺮدا ﰲ أول اﻟﻮﺟﻮد واﺟﺪا ﺑﺎﻟﻔﻌﻞ ﲨﻴﻊ اﻟﻜﻤﺎﻻت اﳌﻤﻜﻨﺔ ﻟﺬاك اﻟﻨﻮع ﻳﻌﺘﲏ ﺑﺄﻓﺮادﻩ اﳌﺎدﻳﺔ ﻓﻴﺪﺑﺮﻫﺎ ﺑﻮاﺳﻄﺔ ﺻﻮرﺗﻪ اﻟﻨﻮﻋﻴﺔ ﻓﻴﺨﺮﺟﻬﺎ ﻣﻦ اﻟﻘﻮة إﱃ اﻟﻔﻌﻞ ﺑﺘﺤﺮﻳﻜﻬﺎ ﺣﺮﻛﺔ ﺟﻮﻫﺮﻳﺔ ﲟﺎ ﻳﺘﺒﻌﻬﺎ ﻣﻦ اﳊﺮﻛﺎت اﻟﻌﺮﺿﻴﺔ. و ﻩ : ﺎ ﺑﻮﺟﻮ T ﻗﺪ اﺣﺘﺠﻮا ﻹﺛﺒﺎ ﻣﻨﻬﺎ : ت أن اﻟﻘﻮى اﻟﻨﺒﺎﺗﻴﺔ ﻣﻦ اﻟﻐﺎذﻳﺔ و اﻟﻨﺎﻣﻴﺔ و اﳌﻮﻟﺪة أﻋﺮاض ﺣﺎﻟﺔ ﰲ ﺟﺴﻢ اﻟﻨﺒﺎ ﻣﺘﻐﲑة ﺑﺘﻐﲑﻩ ﻣﺘﺤﻠﻠﺔ ﺑﺘﺤﻠﻠﻪ ﻟﻴﺲ ﳍﺎ ﺷﻌﻮر و إدراك ﻓﻴﺴﺘﺤﻴﻞ أن ﺗﻜﻮن ﻫﻲ اﳌﺒﺎدئ اﳌﻮﺟﺪة ﳍﺬﻩ اﻟﱰاﻛﻴﺐ و اﻷﻓﺎﻋﻴﻞ اﳌﺨﺘﻠﻔﺔ و اﻷﺷﻜﺎل و اﻟﺘﺨﺎﻃﻴﻂ اﳊﺴﻨﺔ اﳉﻤ ﻴﻠﺔ ﻋﻠﻰ ﻣﺎ ﻓﻴﻬﺎ ﻣﻦ ﻧﻈﺎم دﻗﻴﻖ ﻣﺘﻘﻦ ﺗﺘﺤﲑ ﻓﻴﻪ اﻟﻌﻘﻮل و اﻷﻟﺒﺎب ﻓﻠﻴﺲ إﻻ أن ﻫﻨﺎك ﺟﻮﻫﺮا ﳎﺮدا ﻋﻘﻠﻴﺎ ﻳﺪﺑﺮ أﻣﺮﻫﺎ و ﻳﻬﺪﻳﻬﺎ إﱃ ﻏﺎﻳﺘﻬﺎ ﻓﺘﺴﺘﻜﻤﻞ ﺑﺬﻟﻚ. و ﻓﻴﻪ : ﻛﻞ ﻧﻮع أن ﻣﻦ اﳉﺎﺋﺰ أن ﻳﻨﺴﺐ ﻣﺎ ﻧﺴﺒﻮﻩ إﱃ رب اﻟﻨﻮع إﱃ ﻏﲑﻩ ﻓﺈن أﻓﻌﺎل ﻣﺴﺘﻨﺪة إﱃ ﺻﻮرﺗﻪ اﻟﻨﻮﻋﻴﺔ و ﻓﻮﻗﻬﺎ اﻟﻌﻘﻞ اﻷﺧﲑ اﻟﺬي ﻳﺜﺒﺘﻪ اﳌﺸﺎءون و ﻳﺴﻤﻮﻧﻪ اﻟﻌﻘﻞ اﻟﻔﻌﺎل. و ﻣﻨﻬﺎ : ﻛﻞ ﻣﻨﻬﺎ داﺋﻤﺎ ﻣﻦ ﻏﲑ أن اﻷﻧﻮاع اﻟﻮاﻗﻌﺔ ﰲ ﻋﺎﳌﻨﺎ ﻫﺬا ﻋﻠﻰ اﻟﻨﻈﺎم اﳉﺎري ﰲ ﺗﺒﺪل و ﺗﻐﲑ ﻟﻴﺴﺖ واﻗﻌﺔ ﺑﺎﻻﺗﻔﺎق ﻓﻠﻬﺎ و ﻟﻨﻈﺎﻣﻬﺎ اﻟﺪاﺋﻤﻲ اﳌﺴﺘﻤﺮ ﻋﻠﻞ ﺣﻘﻴﻘﻴﺔ و ﻟﻴﺴﺖ إﻻ ﺟﻮاﻫﺮ ﳎﺮدة ﺗﻮﺟﺪ ﻫﺬﻩ اﻷﻧﻮاع و ﺗﻌﺘﲏ ﺑ ﺘﺪﺑﲑ أﻣﺮﻫﺎ دون ﻣﺎ ﻳﺘﺨﺮﺻﻮن ﺑﻪ ﻣﻦ ﻧﺴﺒﺔ ﻛﻠﻲ ﻳﺪﺑﺮ أﻣﺮﻩ و اﻷﻓﺎﻋﻴﻞ و اﻵﺛﺎر إﱃ اﻷﻣﺰﺟﺔ و ﳓﻮﻫﺎ ﻣﻦ ﻏﲑ دﻟﻴﻞ ﺑﻞ ﻟﻜﻞ ﻧﻮع ﻣﺜﺎل ﻛﻠﻴﺘﻪ ﺟﻮاز ﺻﺪﻗﻪ ﻋﻠﻰ ﻛﺜﲑﻳﻦ ﺑﻞ إﻧﻪ ﻟﺘﺠﺮدﻩ ﺗﺴﺘﻮي ﻧﺴﺒﺘﻪ إﱃ ﲨﻴﻊ اﻷﻓﺮاد ﻟﻴﺲ ﻣﻌﲎ . و ﻓﻴﻪ :إﱃ ﻛﻞ ﻧﻮع ﻣﺴﺘﻨﺪة أن اﻷﻓﻌﺎل و اﻵﺛﺎر اﳌﱰﺗﺒﺔ ﻋﻠﻰ ﺻﻮرﺗﻪ اﻟﻨﻮﻋﻴﺔ و ﻟﻮ ﻻ ذﻟﻚ ﱂ ﺗﺘﺤﻘﻖ ﻧﻮﻋﻴﺔ ﻟﻨﻮع ﻓﺎﻷﻋﺮاض اﳌﺨﺘﺼﺔ ﺑﻜﻞ ﻧﻮع ﻫﻲ اﳊﺠﺔ ﻋﻠﻰ أن ﻫﻨﺎك ﺻﻮرة ﺟﻮﻫﺮﻳﺔ ﻛﻤﺎ أن اﻷﻋﺮاض اﳌﺸﱰﻛﺔ دﻟﻴﻞ ﻋﻠﻰ أن ﻫﻨﺎك ﻣﻮﺿﻮﻋﺎ ﻣﺸﱰﻛﺎ ﻫﻲ اﳌﺒﺪأ اﻟﻘﺮﻳﺐ ﳍﺎ . ﻛﻤﺎ ﺗ ﻓﻔﺎﻋﻞ اﻟﻨﻈﺎم اﳉﺎري ﰲ اﻟﻨﻮع ﻫﻮ ﺻﻮرﺗﻪ اﻟﻨﻮﻋﻴﺔ و ﻓﺎﻋﻞ اﻟﺼﻮرة اﻟﻨﻮﻋﻴﺔ ﻘﺪم ﺟﻮﻫﺮ ﳎﺮد ﻳﻔﻴﻀﻬﺎ ﻋﻠﻰ اﳌﺎدة اﳌﺴﺘﻌﺪة ﻓﺘﺨﺘﻠﻒ اﻟﺼﻮر ﺑﺎﺧﺘﻼف اﻻﺳﺘﻌﺪادات و إﻣﺎ أن ﻫﺬا
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ﺮد ﻋﻘﻞ ﻋﺮﺿﻲ ﳜﺺ اﻟﻨﻮع و ﻳﻮﺟﺪﻩ و ﻳﺪﺑﺮ أﻣﺮﻩ أو أﻧﻪ ﺟﻮﻫﺮ ﻋﻘﻠﻲ ﻣﻦ R اﳉﻮﻫﺮ ا اﻟﻌﻘﻮل اﻟﻄﻮﻟﻴﺔ إﻟﻴﻪ ﻳﻨﺘﻬﻲ أﻣﺮ ﻋﺎﻣﺔ اﻷﻧﻮاع ﻓﻠﻴﺴﺖ ﺗﻜﻔﻲ ﰲ إﺛﺒﺎﺗﻪ ﻫﺬﻩ اﳊﺠﺔ. و ﻣﻨﻬﺎ : اﻻﺣﺘﺠﺎج ﻋﻠﻰ ﺎ ﺑﻘﺎﻋﺪة إﻣﻜﺎن اﻷﺷﺮف ﻓﺈن اﳌﻤﻜﻦ اﻷﺧﺲ إذا وﺟﺪ T إﺛﺒﺎ وﺟﺐ أن ﻳﻮﺟﺪ اﳌﻤﻜﻦ اﻷﺷﺮف ﻗﺒﻠﻪ و ﻫﻲ ﻗﺎﻋﺪة ﻣﱪﻫﻦ ﻋﻠﻴﻬﺎ و ﻻ رﻳﺐ ﰲ أن اﻹﻧﺴﺎن ﺮد اﻟﺬي ﻫﻮ ﺑﺎﻟﻔﻌﻞ ﰲ ﲨﻴﻊ اﻟﻜﻤﺎﻻت اﻹﻧﺴﺎﻧﻴﺔ ﻣﺜﻼ أﺷﺮف وﺟﻮدا ﻣﻦ اﻹﻧﺴﺎن اﳌﺎدي Rا ﻛﻤﺎﻻﺗﻪ ﻓﻮﺟﻮد اﻹﻧﺴﺎ اﻟﺬي ﻫﻮ ﺑﺎﻟﻘﻮة ﰲ ﻣﻌﻈﻢ ن اﳌﺎدي اﻟﺬي ﰲ ﻫﺬا اﻟﻌﺎﱂ دﻟﻴﻞ ﻋﻠﻰ وﺟﻮد ﻣﺜﺎﻟﻪ اﻟﻌﻘﻠﻲ اﻟﺬي ﻫﻮ رب ﻧﻮﻋﻪ. و ﻓﻴﻪ : أن ﺟﺮﻳﺎن ﻗﺎﻋﺪة إﻣﻜﺎن اﻷﺷﺮف ﻣﺸﺮوط ﺑﻜﻮن اﻷﺷﺮف و اﻷﺧﺲ ﻣﺸﱰﻛﲔ ﰲ ج ﻋﻠﻰ إﻣﻜﺎن اﻷﺷﺮف ﲝﺴﺐ ﻣﺎﻫﻴﺘﻪ و ﳎﺮد اﳌﺎﻫﻴﺔ اﻟﻨﻮﻋﻴﺔ ﺣﱴ ﻳﺪل وﺟﻮد اﻷﺧﺲ ﰲ اﳋﺎر ﺻﺪق ﻣﻔﻬﻮم ﻋﻠﻰ ﺷﻲ ﻛﻮ ء ﻻ ﻳﺴﺘﻠﺰم ﻛﻤﺎ أن ﺻﺪق ﻣﻔﻬﻮم اﻟﻌﻠﻢ ن اﳌﺼﺪاق ﻓﺮدا ﻧﻮﻋﻴﺎ ﻟﻪ ﻛﻴﻔﺎ ﻧﻔﺴﺎﻧﻴﺎ ﻓﻤﻦ اﳉﺎﺋﺰ أن ﻳﻜﻮن ﻣﺼﺪاق ﻣﻔﻬﻮم ﻛﻮﻧﻪ ﻋﻠﻰ اﻟﻌﻠﻢ اﳊﻀﻮري ﻻ ﻳﺴﺘﻠﺰم ﻛﻠﻴﺎ ﻣﻦ اﻟﻌﻘﻮل اﻟﻄﻮﻟﻴﺔ ﻋﻨﺪﻩ ﲨﻴﻊ اﻟﻜﻤﺎﻻت اﻷوﻟﻴﺔ اﻹﻧﺴﺎن اﻟﻜﻠﻲ اﻟﺬي ﻧﻌﻘﻠﻪ ﻣﺜﻼ ﻋﻘﻼ
و اﻟﺜﺎﻧﻮﻳﺔ اﻟﱵ ﻟﻸﻧﻮاع اﳌﺎدﻳﺔ ﻓﻴﺼﺪق ﻋﻠﻴﻪ ﻣﻔﻬﻮ ﻛﻤﺎﻟﻪ اﻟﻮﺟﻮدي ﻻ م اﻹﻧﺴﺎن ﻣﺜﻼ ﻟﻮﺟﺪاﻧﻪ ﻟﻜﻮﻧﻪ ﻓﺮدا ﻣﻦ أﻓﺮاد اﻹﻧﺴﺎن. ﺮد اﻟﺬي ﻧﻌﻘﻠﻪ ﻻ ﻳﺴﺘﻠﺰم R و ﺑﺎﳉﻤﻠﺔ ﺻﺪق ﻣﻔﻬﻮم اﻹﻧﺴﺎن ﻣﺜﻼ ﻋﻠﻰ اﻹﻧﺴﺎن اﻟﻜﻠﻲ ا ﻛﻮن ﻣﻌﻘﻮﻟﻨﺎ ﻓﺮدا ﻟﻠﻤﺎﻫﻴﺔ اﻟﻨﻮﻋﻴﺔ اﻹﻧﺴﺎﻧﻴﺔ ﺣﱴ ﻳﻜﻮن ﻣﺜﺎﻻ ﻋﻘﻠﻴﺎ ﻟﻠﻨﻮع اﻹﻧﺴﺎﱐ.
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12.12. THE HORIZONTAL INTELLECTS The Emanationists posit the existence of the horizontal Intellects (al‘uqûl al-‘aradiyyah), between whom there is no relation of causality and which correspond to the material species in the material world, each of them governing its respective species. They are called the ‘lords of the species’ (arbâb al-anwâ’), or Platonic Ideas, so called because Plato was persistent in his advocacy of them. The Peripatetics reject them and attribute their governing function to the last of the vertical Intellects, which they call ‘the Active Intellect’ (al-’aql al-fa’’âl). However, those who posit the reality of the horizontal Intellects differ in their views concerning them. According to the soundest of them, as reported, at the outset of its existence each material species has an immaterial individual possessing all the possible perfections of that species in actuality. It attends to the material individuals of its species and governs them through the means of its specific form. Thus it develops them from potentiality to actuality by impelling them in their substantial motion by virtue of its subordinate accidental motions. They have advanced various arguments in favour of their view. According to one of them the vegetative faculties (al-quwâ al-nabâtiyyah), such as those of nourishment, growth, and reproduction, are accidents in the bodies of the plants. These faculties undergo change with changes occurring in their bodies, and disintegrate with their disintegration. The plants have no consciousness or cognition, and it is impossible that they themselves should be the generative source of these varied compositions and activities, and the source of the beautiful shapes and graceful contours that accord with a precise and perfect order that confounds the human mind. Hence, there must be an immaterial intelligent substance that governs them and guides them towards their goal of perfection. However, the problem with this view is that it is also possible to ascribe to something else the acts that they attribute to the ‘lord of the species,’ for the functions of every species depend on its specific form and, it may be said, that above it is the last vertical Intellect posited by the Peripatetics, which they call the ‘Active Intellect.’ Another argument they have advanced is that the species found in this world of ours, with their constant and unchanging order, are not creatures of accident. Hence this permanent and unceasing order has real causes which are nothing but the immaterial substances that bring the species into being and attend to them and govern them, not as imagined by some people who, on the basis of an unfounded conjecture, ascribe them to the actions and properties of the temperaments (amzijah) and the like. Rather, every species has a universal archetype (mitsâl kullî) that governs it. What is meant by ‘universality’ here is not correspondence to a multiplicity of referents. Rather, by virtue of its immateriality, the archetype has an equal relation to all the individuals of its species. The difficulty with this view is that the actions and properties associated with every species derive from its specific form, and had it not been for this, the specificity of the species would not have actualized. Hence the accidents particular to every species are evidence that there exists a substantial form
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which is their immediate source, in the same way as common accidents are evidence that there is a common substratum. Hence the agent of the prevailing order in a species is the specific form, and the agent of the specific form, as mentioned earlier, is an immaterial substance that brings it into being in a matter possessing potential (isti’dâd). Hence the forms differ with the differing levels of potential. However, this argument is not sufficient to establish whether this immaterial substance that brings the species into being and governs it is a horizontal Intellect associated with a certain species, or a vertical Intellect presiding over all the species. Another argument that has been advanced by the proponents of this view rests on the basis of the ‘principle of the nobler contingent’ (qâ’idah imkân al-asyraf). There is an established philosophical principle according to which whenever there exists a baser contingent (al-mumkin al-akhass), it is necessary for a nobler contingent (al-mumkin al-asyraf) to exist prior to it. There is no doubt that the immaterial man, for instance, who possesses all the perfections of humanity in act, is existentially nobler than the material human being, which is in potentiality in relation to most of its perfections. Hence, the existence of the material human being found in this world is the evidence of its archetype (mitsâl) in the realm of the Intellect, which is the lord of its species. However, the condition for the application of the principle of nobler contingent is that the baser and the nobler share a common specific quiddity, so that the base existence of the baser may imply the possibility of the nobler in external reality in accordance with its quiddity. The mere applicability of a conception to something does not necessarily make its referent an individual of its species, in the same manner as the application of the conception of knowledge to immediate knowledge does not imply its being a psychic quality. Therefore it is possible that a universal Intellect (‘aql kullî) from among the vertical Intellects may be the referent, for instance, of the conception of universal man intellected by us. That universal Intellect may possesses all the primary and secondary perfections of the material human species, so that the conception of ‘man’ may be applicable to it due to its possessing the existential perfection of man, though not because it is a member of the human species. In short, the applicability of the concept of man, for instance, to the immaterial universal man intellected by us does not imply that the object of our intellection is an individual possessing the quiddity of man so that it be regarded as an archetype of the human species in the realm of the Intellect.
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اﻟﻔﺼﻞ اﻟﺜﺎﻟﺚ ﻋﺸﺮ ﻓ ﺎل ﻲ اﻟﻤﺜ ﺮد و اﳉﻮﻫﺮ اﳌﺎدي و اﳋﻴﺎل اﳌﻨﻔﺼﻞ ﻻﺳﺘﻘﻼﻟﻪ R خ ﻟﺘﻮﺳﻄﻪ ﺑﲔ اﻟﻌﻘﻞ ا و ﻳﺴﻤﻰ اﻟﱪز ﻋﻦ اﳋﻴﺎل اﳊﻴﻮاﱐ اﳌﺘﺼﻞ ﺑﻪ. ﻛﻤﺎ ﺗﻘﺪم ﻣﺮﺗﺒﺔ ﻣﻦ اﻟﻮﺟﻮد ﻣﻔﺎرق ﻟﻠﻤﺎدة دون آﺛﺎرﻫﺎ و ﻓﻴﻪ ﺻﻮر ﺟﻮﻫﺮﻳﺔ ﺟﺰﺋﻴﺔ و ﻫﻮ ﺻﺎدرة ﻣﻦ آﺧﺮ اﻟﻌﻘﻮل اﻟﻄﻮﻟﻴﺔ و ﻫﻮ اﻟﻌﻘﻞ اﻟﻔﻌﺎل ﻋﻨﺪ اﳌﺸﺎءﻳﻦ أو ﻣﻦ اﻟﻌﻘﻮل اﻟﻌﺮﺿﻴﺔ ﻋﻠﻰ ﻗﻮل اﻹﺷﺮاﻗﻴﲔ و ﻫﻲ ﻣﺘﻜﺜﺮة ﺣﺴﺐ ﺗﻜﺜﺮ اﳉﻬﺎت ﰲ اﻟﻌﻘﻞ اﳌﻔﻴﺾ ﳍﺎ ﻣﺘﻤﺜﻠﺔ ﻟﻐﲑﻫﺎ ﻛﻞ واﺣﺪ ﻣﻨﻬﺎ وﺣﺪﺗﻪ اﻟﺸﺨﺼﻴﺔ -ﻴﺌﺎت ﳐﺘﻠﻔﺔ ﻣﻦ ﻏﲑ أن ﻳﻨﺜﻠﻢ ﺑﺎﺧﺘﻼف اﳍﻴﺌﺎت ﰲ .
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12.13. THE IMAGINAL WORLD It is also called the ‘intermediate realm’ (barzakh, lit. barrier) due to its being situated between the immaterial realm of the Intellect and the realm of material substances. It is also referred to as al-khiyâl al-munfashil (lit. ‘separate imagination,’ that is an imaginal realm separate from and independent of an imagining subject) due to its being independent of animal imagination (al-khiyâl al-hayawânî), which is a subjective faculty. As mentioned, it is a plane of immaterial existence possessing material properties. In it are particular substantial forms created by the last of the vertical Intellects – the ‘Active Intellect’ of the Peripatetics – or one of the horizontal Intellects of the Emanationists. They are a multitude in accordance with the multiplicity of aspects of the Intellect that emanates them. These forms appear to others as different shapes without this difference of shapes compromising the individual unity of any of them.
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اﻟﻔﺼﻞ اﻟﺮاﺑﻊ ﻋﺸﺮ ﻓﻲ اﻟﻌﺎﻟﻢ اﻟﻤﺎدي و ﻫﻮ اﻟﻌﺎﱂ اﳌﺸﻬﻮد أﻧﺰل ﻣﺮاﺗﺐ اﻟﻮﺟﻮد و أﺧﺴﻬﺎ و ﻳﺘﻤﻴﺰ ﻣﻦ ﻏﲑﻩ ﺑﺘﻌﻠﻖ اﻟﺼﻮر
اﳌﻮﺟﻮ ﻛﻤﺎﻻﺗﻪ ﰲ دة ﻓﻴﻪ ﺑﺎﳌﺎدة و ارﺗﺒﺎﻃﻬﺎ ﺑﺎﻟﻘﻮة و اﻻﺳﺘﻌﺪاد ﻓﻤﺎ ﻣﻦ ﻣﻮﺟﻮد ﻓﻴﻪ إﻻ و ﻋﺎﻣﺔ ج إﱃ اﻟﻔﻌﻠﻴﺔ ﺑﻨﻮع ﻣﻦ اﻟﺘﺪرﻳﺞ و اﳊﺮﻛﺔ و رﲟﺎ ﻋﺎﻣﺔ ﻣﻦ ذﻟﻚ ﻋﺎﺋﻖ أول وﺟﻮد ﺑﺎﻟﻘﻮة ﰒ ﳜﺮ ﻓﺎﻟﻌﺎﱂ ﻋﺎﱂ اﻟﺘﺰاﺣﻢ و اﻟﺘﻤﺎﻧﻊ. و ﻗﺪ ﺗﺒﲔ ﺑﺎﻷﲝﺎث اﻟﻄﺒﻴﻌﻴﺔ و اﻟﺮﻳﺎﺿﻴﺔ إﱃ اﻟﻴﻮم ﺷﻲ ﻛ ء ﺜﲑ ﻣﻦ أﺟﺰاء ﻫﺬا اﻟﻌﺎﱂ و اﻷوﺿﺎع و اﻟﻨﺴﺐ اﻟﱵ ﺑﻴﻨﻬﺎ و اﻟﻨﻈﺎم اﳊﺎﻛﻢ ﻓﻴﻬﺎ و ﻟﻌﻞ ﻣﺎ ﻫﻮ ﳎﻬﻮل ﻣﻨﻬﺎ أﻛﺜﺮ ﳑﺎ ﻫﻮ ﻣﻌﻠﻮم. و ﻫﺬا اﻟﻌﺎﱂ ﲟﺎ ﺑﲔ أﺟﺰاﺋﻪ ﻣﻦ اﻻرﺗﺒﺎط اﻟﻮﺟﻮدي واﺣﺪ ﺳﻴﺎل ﰲ ذاﺗﻪ ﻣﺘﺤﺮك ﲜﻮﻫﺮﻩ و ﻳﺘﺒﻌﻪ أﻋﺮاﺿﻪ و ﻋﻠﻰ ﻫﺬﻩ اﳊﺮﻛﺔ اﻟﻌﺎﻣﺔ ﺣﺮﻛﺎت ﺟﻮﻫﺮﻳﺔ ﺧﺎﺻﺔ ﻧﺒﺎﺗ ﻴﺔ و ﺣﻴﻮاﻧﻴﺔ و إﻧﺴﺎﻧﻴﺔ و ﻛﻤﺎ ﺗﻘﺪم ﰲ ﻣﺮﺣﻠﺔ اﻟﻘﻮة و اﻟﻐﺎﻳﺔ اﻟﱵ ﺗﻘﻒ ﻋﻨﺪﻫﺎ ﻫﺬﻩ اﳊﺮﻛﺔ ﻫﻲ اﻟﺘﺠﺮد اﻟﺘﺎم ﻟﻠﻤﺘﺤﺮك اﻟﻔﻌﻞ. ﻛﺎﻧﺖ ذاﺗﻪ ﻋﲔ اﻟﺘﺠﺪد و اﻟﺘﻐﲑ و ﻛﺎن ﻫﺬا اﻟﻌﺎﱂ ﻣﺘ ﺤ ﺮﻛﺎ ﲜﻮﻫﺮﻩ ﺳﻴﺎﻻ ﰲ ذاﺗﻪ و ﳌﺎ ﺑﺬﻟﻚ ﺻﺢ اﺳﺘﻨﺎدﻩ إﱃ اﻟﻌﻠﺔ اﻟﺜﺎﺑﺘﺔ ﻓﺎﳉﺎﻋﻞ اﻟﺜﺎﺑﺖ ﺟﻌﻞ اﳌﺘﺠﺪد ﻲ ﻻ أﻧﻪ ﺟﻌﻞ اﻟﺸ ء ﻣﺘﺠﺪدا ﺣﱴ ﻳﻠﺰم ﳏﺬور اﺳﺘﻨﺎد اﳌﺘﻐﲑ إﱃ اﻟﺜﺎﺑﺖ و ارﺗﺒﺎط اﳊﺎدث ﺑﺎﻟﻘﺪﱘ. غ ﻣﻦ ﺗﺄﻟﻴﻔﻪ ﻓﻲ اﻟﻴﻮم اﻟﺴﺎﺑﻊ ﺗﻢ اﻟﻜﺘﺎب و اﻟﺤﻤﺪ ﷲ و وﻗﻊ اﻟﻔﺮا ﻣﻦ ﺷﻬﺮ رﺟﺐ ﻣﻦ ﺷﻬﻮر ﺳﻨﺔ أﻟﻒ و ﺛﻼث ﻣﺎﺋﺔ و ﺗﺴﻌﻴﻦ ﻗﻤﺮﻳﺔ ﻫﺠﺮﻳﺔ ﻓﻲ اﻟﻌﺘﺒﺔ اﻟﻤﻘﺪﺳﺔ اﻟﺮﺿﻮﻳﺔ ﻋﻠﻰ ﺻﺎﺣﺒﻬﺎ أﻓﻀﻞ ﺔ اﻟﺴﻼم و اﻟﺘﺤﻴ

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12.14. THE MATERIAL WORLD It is the world that we perceive, at the lowest and the basest plane of existence. The association with matter of the forms that exist in it and its association with potentiality (quwwah) and potential (isti’dâd) distinguish it from the other realms. The perfections of every existent in it are in potentiality at the beginning, after which it advances by gradual motion towards actuality, from which obstacles often hamper it. Hence it is a world of interference and conflict. Physical investigations and mathematical studies that have been carried out up to the present have revealed many things about the parts of this world and their configurations, relations and prevailing order. Perhaps that which remains unknown far exceeds what is known. This world with the existential relation between its parts is essentially a unity in flux, moving with its substance and accompanying accidents. Superimposed on this general motion are the particular substantial motions of plants, animals and human beings. The final end, where this motion will cease, is complete immateriality, as mentioned in the chapter on actuality and potentiality. Since this world is in motion with its substance and essentially in flux, its essence is identical with renewal and change. Hence it is valid to consider it as deriving from a fixed cause. The fixed unchanging agent has created its renewing being, not that it first brought it into existence and then caused its being to undergo renewal. Such a picture avoids the problems that may arise from the notion of the dependence of the changeable on the unchangeable and the relation of something temporal (hâdits) to the eternal (qadîm).

Here the book concludes, and all praise belongs to Allah. Its compilation was completed on the seventh day of Rajab in the year 1390 H / [September 8, 1970] in the sacred shrine of al-Imam al-Ridhâ, may the best of salutations and blessings be upon him.
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Ahmed Hilmi

Ahmed Hilmi

Ahmed is a contributor for Medina minds. He has also written the book Shield of the Believer

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